Erice v. Sison

A judge commits gross ignorance of the law when he issues a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of an Ombudsman Order of Suspension that has already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because the RTC has no jurisdiction to interfere with the Ombudsman's disciplinary decisions — which are appealable to the CA — and because a petition for declaratory relief cannot be used to question an existing judgment or order of a court or quasi-judicial body.

Edgar R. Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Dionisio C. Sison of the RTC, Branch 125, Caloocan City, for gross misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and gross ignorance of the law under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC. The complaint stemmed from Judge Sison's handling of a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by then Mayor Enrico R. Echiverri and other city officials, who sought to enjoin the implementation of an Ombudsman Order of Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, making the Ombudsman co-equal with the RTC in that respect.

Complainant Edgar R. Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against then Mayor Enrico R. Echiverri, City Treasurer Evelina Garma, Budget Officer Jesusa Garcia, and City Accountant Edna Centeno for alleged violation of the Government Service Insurance System Act. Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman issued an Order of Preventive Suspension on July 18, 2011 against Echiverri et al., to last until the administrative adjudication was completed but not to exceed six months. Aggrieved, Echiverri et al. elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. While they initially obtained a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction from the CA Special 14th Division, the CA ultimately affirmed the Order of Suspension in its Decision dated January 2, 2012, and lifted and set aside the TRO.

A week later, on January 9, 2012, Echiverri et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Caloocan City, docketed as Special Civil Action No. C-1060 (2012), naming Erice and the DILG as respondents. They prayed that the RTC make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the implementation of their suspension. On the same date, RTC Executive Judge Eleanor R. Kwong issued a 72-hour ex-parte Order enjoining the DILG and Erice from implementing the Order of Suspension. The case was then raffled to Judge Lorenza R. Bordios.

During the summary hearing on January 10, 2012, Erice and the DILG questioned the RTC's jurisdiction, pointing out that the object of the petition was the CA Decision and the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension. They also raised forum shopping, noting that Echiverri et al. had a pending Motion for Reconsideration with the CA and a Motion to Hold in Abeyance with the Ombudsman. Judge Bordios inhibited herself on January 11, 2012, and the case was re-raffled to Judge Sison. That same day, Erice and the DILG reiterated their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve. Judge Sison noted that the 72-hour TRO would expire the next day and directed the parties to finish presenting evidence before noon of January 12, 2012. Counsel for the DILG informed Judge Sison that the Office of the Solicitor General had not been notified that the summary hearing would proceed that afternoon, but Judge Sison proceeded anyway and allowed Echiverri et al. to present their evidence until 5:00 p.m.

The next morning, the OSG invoked its right to cross-examine the witnesses presented by Echiverri et al., but Judge Sison denied the request, allegedly without consulting the records from Branch 126 that would have shown the OSG had made reservations to that effect on January 10, 2012. At 9:15 a.m., Judge Sison issued an Order extending the TRO to 20 days, inclusive of the earlier 72-hour TRO. On January 17, 2012, the day scheduled for hearing the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Sison instead stated he would hear evidence on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, compelling Erice to file an Urgent Motion to Inhibit. Without ruling on that motion, Judge Sison issued the Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

• Due Process Violation: Complainant Erice charged Judge Sison with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law for issuing the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension despite the CA having already affirmed that same order.
• Jurisdictional Error: Erice and the DILG argued before Judge Sison that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the Petition for Declaratory Relief, because the object of the petition was the CA Decision and the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension — matters beyond the RTC's authority.
• Forum Shopping: Erice and the DILG pointed out that Echiverri et al. had a pending Motion for Reconsideration with the CA and a Motion to Hold in Abeyance with the Ombudsman, rendering the RTC petition an instance of forum shopping.

• No Bias or Partiality: Judge Sison denied any allegation of violation of due process, maintaining that the extension of the 72-hour TRO to a 20-day TRO was to accord Echiverri et al. due process by allowing them to file their written comment and argue against the Motion to Dissolve.
• No Deplorable Haste: Judge Sison argued there was no "deplorable haste" in issuing the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction because of the limited time provided by the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 58, Section 5, and that Erice's counsel, knowing this time constraint, should have made himself always ready to go to trial and present his evidence.
• Denial of Cross-Examination Disputed: While admitting that the DILG's counsel appeared before him and that he denied the OSG's claim of the right to cross-examine, Judge Sison claimed that Erice failed to produce evidence that he made such rulings and therefore "should not be believed."

• Gross Ignorance of the Law (Jurisdiction over Ombudsman Orders): Whether Judge Sison committed gross ignorance of the law by issuing a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of an Ombudsman Order of Suspension that had already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
• Effect of Carpio Morales on Administrative Liability: Whether the subsequent declaration in Carpio Morales vs. Court of Appeals that Section 14 of RA 6770 was ineffective and unconstitutional exonerates Judge Sison from administrative liability.
• Propriety of Declaratory Relief: Whether a petition for declaratory relief may be used to question an existing judgment or order of a court or quasi-judicial body.
• Proper Penalty: Whether a fine may be imposed in lieu of suspension given that Judge Sison had already retired, and whether the amount of the fine was proper considering this was his second offense.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law (Jurisdiction over Ombudsman Orders): Yes. Judge Sison committed gross ignorance of the law because the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases, which are appealable to the CA under Rule 43, more so because the CA had already affirmed the very same Order of Suspension.
• Effect of Carpio Morales on Administrative Liability:** No. The subsequent declaration of the policy in Section 14(1) of RA 6770 as ineffective and of Section 14(2) as invalid does not exonerate Judge Sison, because he independently failed to consider and act in accordance with the basic principle of judicial stability or non-interference.
• Propriety of Declaratory Relief: No. Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject of a petition for declaratory relief, as they are not included within the purview of "other written instrument" in Rule 63 of the Rules of Court; the same applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, anchored on the principle of res judicata.
• Proper Penalty: Yes. A fine of P40,000.00 was imposed in lieu of suspension, to be deducted from Judge Sison's retained terminal leave benefits, the penalty being justified because this was not his first offense and because suspension was no longer feasible due to his retirement.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law (Jurisdiction over Ombudsman Orders): Gross ignorance of the law requires a judge to perform his duty to be acquainted with basic legal commands; liability attaches when there is a patent disregard for well-known rules producing an inference of bad faith, dishonesty, or corruption. Judge Sison failed this standard. Pursuant to the principle of judicial stability or non-interference, where decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the RTCs and their actions are beyond the control of the RTC. The Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule 43. Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions, especially because at the time Judge Sison issued the TRO on January 10, 2012 and the writ of preliminary injunction on January 17, 2012, the CA had already affirmed that very same Order of Suspension in its Decision dated January 2, 2012.

• Effect of Carpio Morales on Administrative Liability: In Carpio Morales vs. Court of Appeals, the Court declared Section 14(2) of RA 6770 unconstitutional and declared the policy in Section 14(1) ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular. However, this supervening declaration did not serve to exonerate Judge Sison because he independently failed to consider and act in accordance with the basic principle of judicial stability or non-interference. The principle holds that where decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these bodies are co-equal with the RTCs, and their actions are beyond RTC control. This principle operated independently of Section 14 of RA 6770 and was sufficient to establish gross ignorance of the law.

• Propriety of Declaratory Relief: Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject of a petition for declaratory relief because they are not included within the purview of "other written instrument" in Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, and this is anchored on the principle of res judicata. A judgment rendered by a court or quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority. The losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory relief. Here, Echiverri et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief specifically prayed that the RTC make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the implementation of the preventive suspension, effectively putting into question the CA-affirmed Ombudsman Order of Suspension — a matter clearly beyond the RTC's jurisdiction.

• Proper Penalty: Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 11, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, with penalties ranging from a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00 to dismissal. Because Judge Sison had already retired on December 9, 2014, suspension was no longer feasible, and a fine could be imposed in lieu thereof. Considering this was not his first offense — he had previously been found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2050 and fined P10,000.00 — the Court found the fine of P40,000.00 justified. Pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated August 5, 2015, the fine was to be charged against the amounts retained from his terminal leave benefits.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — A judge is required to be acquainted with basic legal commands and rules. Liability for gross ignorance of the law attaches when there is a patent disregard for well-known rules so as to produce an inference of bad faith, dishonesty, and corruption. The Court applied this standard to Judge Sison, who disregarded the principle of judicial stability, the jurisdictional limits of the RTC over Ombudsman orders, and the rule that declaratory relief cannot be used to question existing judgments.

• Principle of Judicial Stability or Non-Interference — Where decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the RTCs and their actions are logically beyond the control of the RTC. The RTC cannot interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases, which are appealable to the CA under Rule 43. The Court relied on this principle to hold that Judge Sison acted without jurisdiction.

• Inapplicability of Declaratory Relief to Existing Judgments — Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject of a petition for declaratory relief, as they are not included within the purview of "other written instrument" in Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The same applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, anchored on the principle of res judicata. A judgment is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority, and the losing party cannot escape its effects under the guise of declaratory relief.

• Penalty for Retired Judges — When a judge facing administrative liability has already retired, the penalty of suspension is no longer feasible. In lieu of suspension, a fine may still be imposed. The Court applied this rule by imposing a P40,000.00 fine deductible from Judge Sison's retained terminal leave benefits.

• "The subsequent declaration of the policy in Section 14(1) of RA 6770 as ineffective and of Section 14(2) as invalid, does not serve to exonerate Judge Sison from administrative liability because he failed to consider and act in accordance with the basic principle of judicial stability or non-interference." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that the principle of judicial stability independently grounds administrative liability for gross ignorance of the law, regardless of the constitutional status of Section 14 of RA 6770.

• "Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief. They are not included within the purview of the words 'other written instrument' in Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governing petitions for declaratory relief." — This passage defines the canonical rule that declaratory relief does not lie against existing judgments or orders, a doctrine frequently invoked to dismiss declaratory relief petitions seeking to relitigate adjudicated matters.

• "The losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory relief." — This formulation captures the res judicata underpinning of the rule against using declaratory relief to challenge existing judgments, and is commonly cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the limits of Rule 63.

• Carpio Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 772 Phil. 672 (2015) — The Court's supervening decision declaring Section 14(2) of RA 6770 unconstitutional and Section 14(1) ineffective. The Court distinguished this case by holding that the principle of judicial stability independently established Judge Sison's liability, notwithstanding the constitutional invalidation of the statutory restriction.

• Ogka Benito vs. Balindong, 599 Phil. 196 (2009) — A similar case where a judge issued a 72-hour TRO and extended it for 20 days against the enforcement of a DILG order implementing a suspension. The Court found gross ignorance of the law for violating Section 14 of RA 6770 and fined the judge P30,000.00. The OCA relied on this as analogous precedent.

• DILG vs. Gatuz, 771 Phil. 153 (2015) — Cited for the principle of judicial stability: where decisions of administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these bodies are co-equal with the RTCs and their actions are beyond RTC control. Also cited for the rule that court orders and quasi-judicial decisions cannot be subjects of declaratory relief, anchored on res judicata.

• Leviste vs. Alameda, 640 Phil. 620 (2010) — Cited for the proposition that the pace in resolving incidents of a case is not per se an indication of bias, which the OCA acknowledged before proceeding to find liability on other grounds.

• Fabian vs. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998) — Cited by the OCA for the proposition that the CA has appellate jurisdiction over administrative cases resolved by the Ombudsman.

• Section 14, RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Section 14(1) prohibited any court from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an Ombudsman investigation unless there was prima facie evidence that the matter was outside Ombudsman jurisdiction. Section 14(2) provided that no court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against Ombudsman decisions except the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. The Court noted that Carpio Morales declared Section 14(2) unconstitutional and Section 14(1) ineffective, but held that Judge Sison's liability arose independently from the principle of judicial stability.

• Rule 140, Section 8 and Section 11, Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC) — Section 8 defines gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge. Section 11 prescribes the sanctions for serious charges: dismissal, suspension for more than three but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. The Court imposed a P40,000.00 fine, the maximum for a serious charge short of dismissal or suspension.

• Rule 43, Rules of Court — Governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals. The Court relied on this rule to establish that the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA, making the Ombudsman co-equal with the RTC and placing its actions beyond RTC control.

• Rule 58, Section 5, Rules of Court — Governs the issuance of temporary restraining orders. Judge Sison invoked this provision to justify the speed of his proceedings, but the Court found his reliance misplaced given the jurisdictional defect.

• Rule 63, Section 1, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for declaratory relief, allowing any person interested under a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation, or ordinance to bring an action for declaration of rights or duties. The Court held that court orders and quasi-judicial decisions are not "other written instruments" within the meaning of this rule.

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred. Reyes, Jr., J., was on leave.