Epifanio vs. People

The stage of execution depends on whether the assailant passed the subjective phase, not on the gravity of the wounds alone; where the prosecution fails to prove that the wound would have caused death without timely medical intervention and the offender was stopped before completing all acts of execution, the crime is attempted, not frustrated, murder.

Petitioner Leonidas Epifanio y Lazaro was known to Crisaldo Alberto as “Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy.” The case is governed by Article 6 and Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which define attempted and frustrated felonies and murder, respectively. The resolution turns on the statutory distinction between attempted and frustrated murder and on the evidentiary requirements for proving intent to kill and the fatal character of the wounds.

At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto and his cousin Allan Perez were walking to their respective homes in Kilometer 7, Del Monte, Samal, Davao after spending time at the house of Crisaldo’s father. The pavement going to Crisaldo’s house followed a narrow pathway along the local shrubs called banganga, and Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo at a distance of about three meters.

Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing thrust of a bladed weapon on his back, which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround and saw his attacker, petitioner Leonidas Epifanio y Lazaro, also known as “Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy.” Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit the latter’s left arm. When Allan heard Crisaldo’s outcry, he rushed to Crisaldo’s side and said, “Iyo Kingkoy (Uncle Kingkoy), why did you stab Saldo?” Petitioner then ran away.

Allan brought Crisaldo to his father’s house, where Crisaldo’s wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was then brought to the Peñaplata Hospital where he was given first aid and then transferred to the Davao Medical Center where he stayed for three weeks to recuperate from his wounds. The attending physician, Santiago Aquino, issued a Medical Certificate dated September 4, 1990, with findings of a stab wound at the right scapular area, medial border, at level 5-7th ICS and at the left arm medial aspect M3rd, and fracture of the 7th and 8th ribs, posterior, right; the probable healing time was 15-30 days barring complication.

Petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-15 under an Information dated January 4, 1991. During his arraignment on June 25, 1991, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.

Petitioner’s defense consisted mainly of denial. He claimed that at 7:00 o’clock in the morning of August 15, 1990, he went to Anonang, within the Municipality of Kaputian, and harvested coconuts by climbing the coconut trees; that he went back home at 4:30 in the afternoon and slept at 8:00 o’clock in the evening; that while he was sleeping, his wife awakened him because Salvador Epifanio was asking for help, as somebody was hacked, and he went to the place of incident with Salvador; that he found out that Crisaldo was already wrapped in cloth and he asked Crisaldo who was responsible for stabbing him, but Crisaldo did not answer; that they loaded Crisaldo in the jeep to take him to the nearby hospital; that he and Salvador took a ride with Crisaldo up to Del Monte where the two of them alighted and reported the incident to the barangay captain; that the following morning, he went to Anonang to harvest coconuts; and that at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon when he arrived home, policemen Barraga and Labrador were in his house and told him that he was the suspect in the stabbing incident, after which he was detained but was not investigated anymore and was ordered to go home.

The RTC and CA found the facts as narrated above, including Crisaldo’s account of the sudden stabbing from behind and the continued assault, and petitioner’s defense of denial. The medical certificate stated a healing time of 15-30 days barring complication, and no attending physician testified on the nature of the wounds.

• Nature of Wounds / Degree of Injury: Petitioner did not seek the reversal of his conviction but only that it be for the lesser offense of attempted murder. He contended that there is no evidence that the injuries sustained by Crisaldo were life-threatening or would have caused his death had it not been for timely medical intervention, since the medical certificate only stated that the healing time of the wounds was “15-30 days barring complication,” with no notation or testimony of the attending physician that any of the injuries was life-threatening.

• Procedural Bar / Due Process: Respondent countered that the failure to present the doctor to testify on the nature of the wounds suffered by Crisaldo was not raised as an issue in the RTC, and that petitioner is now barred from raising it in the present petition for review without offending the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
• Admissibility of Medical Certificate: Respondent argued that petitioner did not object to the admissibility of the medical certificate when it was offered in evidence.
• Stage of Execution: Respondent maintained that the crime is frustrated murder since petitioner performed “all the acts of execution.”
• Length of Hospital Stay: Respondent argued that the three-week length of stay in the hospital of Crisaldo is not determinative of whether or not the wounds are fatal.

• Stage of Execution / Degree of Proof: Whether the guilt of petitioner for the crime of frustrated murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt, or only for attempted murder.
• Procedural Bar: Whether petitioner may raise on appeal the non-presentation of the doctor to testify on the nature of the wounds despite not raising it in the RTC.
• Damages: Whether the award of ₱6,000.00 as damages is supported by evidence, or whether temperate damages may instead be granted.

• Stage of Execution / Degree of Proof: No as to frustrated murder; guilt was proven only for attempted murder. The subjective phase was not completed because Allan’s intervention forced petitioner to stop, and the prosecution failed to prove the wound was fatal without timely medical attendance.
• Procedural Bar: No. An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, and the reviewing tribunal may correct errors though unassigned or reverse on grounds other than those raised.
• Damages: Actual damages of ₱6,000.00 are not supported; receipts amounted only to ₱853.50. Temperate damages of ₱6,000.00 are proper because Crisaldo incurred expenses during his three-week hospital stay though the exact amount cannot be proved with certainty.

• Stage of Execution / Degree of Proof: The determination of whether a felony is attempted or frustrated does not depend on the gravity of the wounds alone but on whether the assailant passed the subjective phase of the offense. In United States vs. Eduave, the Court distinguished attempted from frustrated felony: in an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase and does not perform all acts of execution, being stopped by a cause apart from voluntary desistance; in a frustrated crime, the offender has performed all acts of execution and passed the subjective phase, but consummation is prevented by a cause independent of his will. In homicide, all acts of execution are performed if the wound inflicted is mortal and could cause death barring medical intervention or attendance. Intent to kill may be proved by motive, nature or number of weapons, nature and number of wounds, manner of commission, and words uttered. Here, intent to kill was evident: petitioner stabbed Crisaldo from behind, continued the assault when Crisaldo turned, and hit his left arm as he tried to defend himself; the attack was sudden, unexpected, and treacherous. However, petitioner did not perform all acts of execution because Allan came to Crisaldo’s aid and petitioner fled; he did not voluntarily desist but was forced to stop when Allan intervened and recognized him. Thus, the subjective phase was not completed. Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds. The medical certificate stated only a healing time of 15-30 days barring complication, and no evidence showed Crisaldo would have died without timely medical attendance. Under People vs. Matyaong, the danger to life of a wound depends on factors including extent, form, region affected, vessels, nerves or organs involved, infection, age and constitution, and opportunities for treatment. Where nothing shows the wound would be fatal if not medically attended, the character of the wound is doubtful, and the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused; the crime is attempted, not frustrated, murder. Accordingly, the penalty for attempted murder under Article 51 is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum must be within arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium, and the maximum within prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. With no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty is 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum and 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
• Procedural Bar: The non-presentation of the doctor, though not raised in the RTC, did not bar petitioner from raising it on appeal. An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, and the reviewing tribunal may correct errors though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision on grounds other than those raised as errors. The Court cited Pangonorom vs. People, People vs. Saludes, and People vs. Lucero.
• Damages: The receipts showing expenses during Crisaldo’s hospitalization amounted only to ₱853.50. As a general rule, a party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify the award; only substantiated and proven expenses will be recognized. Nonetheless, in lieu of actual damages, the Court granted temperate damages of ₱6,000.00 because it cannot be denied that Crisaldo incurred expenses during his three-week stay in the provincial hospital, although the exact amount cannot be proved with certainty. The Court cited People vs. Agudez, People vs. Baño, and People vs. Ronas.

• Attempted vs. Frustrated Felony and the Subjective Phase — In an attempted felony, the offender never passes the subjective phase; he does not perform all the acts of execution and is stopped by a cause apart from voluntary desistance. In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution and passed the subjective phase; the crime is not consummated only because of a cause independent of his will. The subjective phase is the portion of the acts constituting the crime between the act that begins its commission and the last act that, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. The Court applied this test: petitioner stabbed the victim but fled when Allan intervened, so he did not complete the subjective phase; the crime was attempted, not frustrated.
• Mortal Wound Requirement in Homicide — In homicide cases, the offender is deemed to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause death barring medical intervention or attendance. If the evidence does not show that the wound would have been fatal without timely medical attendance, the character of the wound is doubtful, and the doubt is resolved in favor of the accused; the crime is attempted, not frustrated, murder. The Court applied this because the medical certificate only stated a 15-30 day healing time and no doctor testified that the wound was life-threatening.
• Intent to Kill — Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of motive, the nature or number of weapons used, the nature and number of wounds inflicted, the manner the crime was committed, and words uttered by the offender at the time of the injuries. The Court found intent to kill established by the sudden stabbing from behind, the continued assault when the victim turned, the wound on the left arm as the victim defended himself, and the treacherous manner of the attack.
• Appellate Review in Criminal Cases — An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review. The reviewing tribunal may correct errors though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision on grounds other than those raised as errors. The Court applied this to allow petitioner to raise the non-presentation of the doctor despite not raising it in the RTC.
• Actual and Temperate Damages — Actual damages require competent proof or the best evidence obtainable; only substantiated and proven expenses are recognized. Temperate damages may be awarded in lieu of actual damages when it is certain that the claimant incurred expenses but the exact amount cannot be proved with certainty. The Court awarded ₱6,000.00 as temperate damages because the receipts proved only ₱853.50 but the victim’s three-week hospital stay showed expenses were incurred.

• "It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines whether a felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the subjective phase in the commission of the offense." — This states the controlling test for distinguishing attempted from frustrated felony and anchors the Court’s modification of the conviction.
• "In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance." — This defines when all acts of execution are present in homicide, the pivotal issue in the case.
• "No evidence in this case was introduced to prove that Crisaldo would have died from his wound without timely medical attendance. It is well-settled that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated, murder." — This is the ratio decidendi for reducing the conviction from frustrated to attempted murder.
• "Only substantiated and proven expenses will be recognized in court. Nonetheless, in lieu of actual damages, the Court grants temperate damages of ₱6,000.00, as it cannot be denied that Crisaldo incurred expenses during his three-week stay in the provincial hospital, although the exact amount cannot be proved with certainty." — This explains the treatment of the damages award and the basis for granting temperate damages.

• United States vs. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209 (1917) — Leading case distinguishing attempted from frustrated felony; source of the subjective phase doctrine relied upon by the Court.
• People vs. Matyaong, 411 Phil. 939 (2001) — Cited on the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury and the factors affecting the danger to life of a wound.
• People vs. Costales, 424 Phil. 321 (2002) and People vs. De la Cruz, 353 Phil. 363 (1998) — Cited for the rule that where nothing shows the wound would be fatal if not medically attended, the doubt is resolved in favor of the accused and the crime is attempted, not frustrated.
• People vs. Caballero, 448 Phil. 514 (2003) — Cited for the evidentiary factors proving intent to kill.
• Pangonorom vs. People, G.R. No. 143380, April 11, 2005, 455 SCRA 211; People vs. Saludes, 451 Phil. 719 (2003); People vs. Lucero, G.R. Nos. 102407-08, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 93 — Cited for the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and allows correction of unassigned errors.
• People vs. Agudez, G.R. No. 138386-87, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 692 and People vs. Baño, 464 Phil. 872 (2004) — Cited for the requirement of competent proof for actual damages.
• People vs. Ronas, 403 Phil. 613 (2001) — Cited for the award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines attempted and frustrated felonies; the Court applied the stages of execution to hold petitioner guilty only of attempted murder.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder; petitioner was originally charged and convicted of frustrated murder under this article in relation to Article 6, but the conviction was modified to attempted murder.
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for attempted felonies; the Court applied it to impose prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period for attempted murder.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment: 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum and 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The petition was filed as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under this Rule.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Minita V. Chico-Nazario, and Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura concurred.