Engaño vs. Court of Appeals

An appointment made in violation of minimum qualification standards prescribed by law is void and subject to judicial review, notwithstanding the President's discretionary appointing power. Furthermore, a quo warranto suit questioning such an appointment becomes moot upon the appointee's retirement and the subsequent appointment of another, and the unqualified appointee is not entitled to salary differentials or damages for the period served as a de facto officer.

Private respondent Arturo W. Alit served as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) following the resignation of the previous Director. After a selection process conducted by the DILG Selection Board for Senior Executive Positions, Alit was the only candidate who fully met the Civil Service Commission (CSC) qualification standards, specifically the one-year experience requirement as Chief Superintendent. DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. recommended Alit for the permanent position. Nevertheless, the President appointed petitioner Josue G. Engaño, a Jail Senior Superintendent who lacked the requisite experience.

• The Appointment Process: Pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 4 of the Office of the President, the BJMP Chief Directorate for Personnel submitted a seniority lineal list to the DILG Selection Board for Senior Executive Positions (SB-SEP). Of the eleven candidates interviewed, the Board ranked private respondent Alit first, he being the only one who fully met the CSC Qualification Standards, specifically the one-year experience requirement as Chief Superintendent. DILG Secretary Lina recommended Alit for the position. Despite this recommendation, the President appointed petitioner Engaño on September 6, 2001.
• The Quo Warranto Suit: Engaño assumed the post of BJMP Chief on September 27, 2001. The following day, Alit instituted quo warranto proceedings in the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that Engaño's appointment was irregular and illegal due to his lack of minimum qualifications. On October 2, 2001, the Executive Secretary informed Secretary Lina that Engaño's appointment was being held in abeyance pending resolution of the legal issues regarding his qualifications.
• The Cease and Desist Order: On October 8, 2001, the RTC directed the Office of the President to take a definite stand on whether it was permanently appointing Engaño or retaining Alit as OIC. The trial court additionally issued a cease and desist order restraining both Alit and Engaño from performing the duties of the Director, and designated Secretary Lina to perform the duties of the Director for twenty days. Secretary Lina complied with the order.
• Lower Court Rulings: On October 29, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Alit, declaring Engaño's appointment null and void for lacking the minimum qualifications required by law, and ruling that Alit's prior OIC designation remained. The CA affirmed this decision on November 22, 2002, and denied Engaño's motion for reconsideration on January 21, 2003.
• Supervening Events: While the petition was pending before the Supreme Court, Engaño reached the compulsory retirement age on May 13, 2003. Subsequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Alit as BJMP Director, who then took his oath and assumed the position.

• Presidential Prerogative: Petitioner argued that the President's discretionary power to appoint persons of trust and confidence to presidential appointive positions cannot be declared null and void by the courts.
• Locus Standi of Nominee: Petitioner maintained that a mere nominee to a presidential appointive position cannot validly maintain a quo warranto action against the person appointed thereto by the President.
• Vested Right of Nominee: Petitioner asserted that a mere nominee cannot acquire a vested right to an appointment to the contested post upon a court finding that the appointed person lacks the minimum qualifications.
• Mootness: Petitioner contended that his compulsory retirement did not render the petition moot and academic.
• Salary and Benefits: Petitioner claimed entitlement to salary differential, emoluments, RATA, allowances, rank, and benefits attached to the position of Chief, BJMP, alleging unlawful and arbitrary deprivation by public respondent DILG Secretary Lina.
• Damages: Petitioner sought moral, nominal, exemplary, and corrective damages under Articles 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, and 2229 of the Civil Code, alleging deliberate, willful, arbitrary, baseless, unfounded, and wrongful acts by private respondent Alit and public respondent Lina.

• Lack of Qualifications: Private respondent Alit countered that petitioner's appointment was highly irregular and illegal due to his failure to meet the minimum qualifications required by the CSC.
• Good Faith: Public respondent Lina implicitly argued good faith, his assumption of the post in a temporary capacity having been pursuant to the trial court's order, and his recommendation of Alit having been based on the latter's fulfillment of CSC standards.

• Judicial Review of Appointments: Whether courts can nullify an appointment made by the President due to the appointee's lack of minimum qualifications prescribed by law.
• Mootness: Whether the quo warranto petition was rendered moot and academic by the compulsory retirement of the petitioner and the subsequent appointment of the private respondent.
• Money Claims: Whether the petitioner is entitled to salary differentials, emoluments, RATA, and other benefits attached to the position.
• Damages: Whether the petitioner is entitled to moral, nominal, exemplary, and corrective damages against the respondents.

• Judicial Review of Appointments: The lower courts correctly asserted jurisdiction over void appointments. While appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the limitation that the appointee should possess none of the disqualifications and all the qualifications required by law. Where the law prescribes certain qualifications for a given office, courts may determine whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications; absent such qualifications, the right or title to the office may be declared void.
• Mootness: The petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic due to supervening events. A quo warranto suit determines who is entitled to the position. Because petitioner Engaño retired and private respondent Alit was subsequently appointed by the President, all questions on the validity of the previous appointment have become moot, there being no more justiciable controversy to resolve.
• Money Claims: The claim for salary differential and benefits was denied. A public office is not property within the context of the due process guarantee, and there is no vested interest in a public office or its salary, except when salary has already been earned or accrued. Petitioner served only six days as a de facto officer before his appointment was nullified. While a de facto officer is entitled to some compensation, respondents Secretary Lina and Alit cannot be held personally liable, and the BJMP cannot be compelled to pay as it was not a party to the proceedings.
• Damages: The claim for damages was denied. The records are bereft of any showing that respondents acted in a willful, arbitrary, baseless, or wrongful manner. Both respondents acted in good faith, believing petitioner was unqualified—a fact subsequently affirmed by the trial court and the CA. Secretary Lina assumed the post pursuant to a court order, and Alit was well within his rights in challenging petitioner's eligibility.

• Mootness Principle — Courts refrain from expressing opinions in cases where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or value. Applied to dismiss the petition following the petitioner's retirement and the private respondent's subsequent appointment.
• Public Office is Not Property — There is no such thing as a vested interest in a public office, let alone an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices providing special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in a public office or its salary. Salary only becomes private property entitled to due process protection when it has already been earned or accrued. Applied to deny the petitioner's claim for salary differentials and benefits.
• Judicial Review of Executive Appointments — While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the limitation that the appointee should possess none of the disqualifications but all the qualifications required by law. Where the law prescribes certain qualifications for a given office or position, courts may determine whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent which, his right or title thereto may be declared void. Applied to affirm the lower courts' jurisdiction to nullify the petitioner's appointment.

• "A public office is not a property within the context of the due process guarantee of the Constitution. There is no such thing as a vested interest in a public office, let alone an absolute right to hold it."
• "While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the limitation that the appointee should possess none of the disqualifications but all the qualifications required by law."

• Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 258 SCRA 754 (1996) — Followed. Cited for the principle that courts refrain from deciding moot and academic issues.
• National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Service Commission, 221 SCRA 145 (1993) — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that there is no vested interest in a public office or its salary.
• Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 (1986) — Followed. Cited for the rule that the appointing power is subject to the limitation that the appointee must possess the qualifications required by law.
• Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973) — Followed. Cited for the authority of courts to determine if an appointee has the requisite qualifications prescribed by law.
• Mendoza v. Allas, 302 SCRA 623 (1999) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that a de facto officer is entitled to some compensation, but respondents cannot be held personally liable, and the BJMP cannot be compelled to pay as it was not a party.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs the petition for review filed before the Supreme Court.
• Section 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court — Defines quo warranto as an action against the usurpation of a public office or position, framing the nature of the original suit.
• Articles 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, and 2229, Civil Code — Cited by the petitioner as basis for damages; rejected by the Court due to lack of bad faith on the part of the respondents.

Reynato S. Puno, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Renato C. Corona, Adolfo S. Azcuna