Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

A dismissal of an administrative complaint following a fact-finding or preliminary investigation is not a judgment on the merits and cannot serve as res judicata or sustain a charge of forum-shopping; and substantial evidence of a public officer’s demand for money in exchange for official action supports a finding of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Petitioner was the Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija, while respondents were Fire Officer I personnel in the same province. The administrative charges arose under Book V of Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Section 46(b)(4) and (27), while related complaints invoked Republic Act No. 6975 and Republic Act No. 6713. The case also implicated the Civil Service Commission’s disciplinary jurisdiction over civil servants and the Bureau of Fire Protection’s internal fact-finding process.

Petitioner Carlito C. Encinas was then the Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija, while respondents Alfredo P. Agustin and Joel S. Caubang were Fire Officer I personnel in the same province. According to respondents, on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner informed them that unless they gave him five thousand pesos (₱5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas—Agustin to the Cuyapo Fire Station and Caubang to the Talugtug Fire Station. Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain “Myrna,” they came up short and managed to give only two thousand pesos (₱2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning Agustin and Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.

Based on these circumstances, respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection a letter-complaint on 27 March 2000 for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act No. 6975, or the DILG Act of 1990. The record is not clear as to why this complaint was later docketed by the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts, respondents filed with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, and with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City their Joint Affidavit/Complaint, accusing petitioner of violation of Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; the complaint erroneously cited the provision as Section 4(c), which should be denoted as Section 4(A)(c). On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation into the alleged extortion activities, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and was required to file an answer within five days from notice. The record does not indicate whether petitioner was formally charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6713.

In answer to the BFP complaint, petitioner claimed that a Confidential Investigation Report dated 31 July 2000, no copy of which was attached to the record, recommended that the charges against him be dropped for insufficiency of evidence and instead recommended that respondents be charged with conducting unauthorized fire safety inspection and engaging in the sale of fire extinguishers, both in violation of the rules. The Internal Audit Services of the BFP later issued a Resolution dated 5 July 2005 recommending that the administrative complaint against petitioner be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, ruling that the reassignment of respondents was within the authority of the head of office and could be ordered when the exigencies of the service required. In his answer to the formal charge, petitioner claimed that the CSCRO complaint was an offshoot of the reassignment of respondents after it was discovered that they had conducted a fire safety inspection of establishments within Nueva Ecija without any mission order and had sold fire extinguishers to the owners. He cited the alleged Confidential Report, added that the then-incumbent governor had requested the continuance of his stint as Provincial Fire Marshall, and in his Position Paper claimed that respondents’ transfer had been made in compliance with the directive of Supt. Simeon C. Tutaan and pursuant to law.

The CSCRO found that respondents, through their respective testimonies, established that petitioner demanded ₱5,000 in exchange for their non-reassignment to far-flung fire stations. The absence of any document showing that petitioner received ₱2,000 did not preclude a finding of administrative liability, because the consistency of respondents’ oral testimonies already constituted substantial evidence. The CSCRO held that the alleged illegal acts of respondents prior to their reassignment did not rebut their claims of extortion, and that Supt. Tutaan’s admission that he gave instructions for their reassignment did not disprove the accusation but merely established that there was indeed an order to reassign them. On reconsideration, the CSCRO ruled that the statements of petitioner’s witnesses were incompetent and immaterial and rejected petitioner’s res judicata argument because the dismissal of the BFP complaint was not a judgment on the merits rendered by a competent tribunal. The CSC affirmed, finding no forum-shopping and substantial evidence of petitioner’s liability; it reasoned that extortion hardly yields documentary evidence, that respondents’ testimonies and the disparity in rank supported the charge, and that the withdrawal of the complaint would not absolve petitioner. The CA likewise found that substantial evidence supported the CSC’s findings, that petitioner’s witnesses were incompetent and immaterial, and that the withdrawal of a complaint did not result in outright dismissal or discharge from administrative liability. Respondent Caubang denounced the supposed Affidavit of Desistance, claiming that he did not sign it and that his purported signature therein was a forgery.

• Forum Shopping: Petitioner argued that respondents were guilty of forum-shopping for filing two allegedly identical complaints, one before the CSCRO and one before the BFP/DILG, because the charges of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service were equivalent to the BFP complaint for illegal transfer of personnel under R.A. No. 6975, and the issues investigated were substantially the same.
• Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping: Petitioner maintained that a certificate of non-forum shopping attached to a complaint is a mandatory requirement under Section 8, Rule I of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, and that respondents failed to attach one to either complaint.
• Jurisdiction and Res Judicata: Petitioner argued that the CSCRO should not have entertained the complaint because it knew of the pending BFP/DILG investigation; that the CSCRO had only appellate jurisdiction or authority to decide cases brought before it by the head of agency or the BFP; and that the BFP’s dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, being a resolution of a government agency, was a judgment on the merits that barred further administrative prosecution.
• Substantial Evidence and Credibility: Petitioner claimed that the findings were based on a misapprehension of facts; that respondents’ dismissal from service rendered their credibility questionable; that the testimonies of respondents should not be given weight; and that the Sworn Statements of his witnesses—including Mrs. Angelina Calanoc, Carlito Umali, Myrna Villanueva, and Supt. Tutaan—should have been given weight.
• Affidavit of Desistance: Petitioner alleged that respondent Agustin executed an Affidavit of Desistance on 9 June 2006 and was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and that respondents admitted in the affidavit that the cases were filed out of a misapprehension of facts and a misunderstanding between the parties.

• Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping: Respondents countered that a certificate of non-forum shopping is not required if the one who files the formal charge is the head of agency.
• Different Causes of Action: Respondents argued that the case filed with the BFP was in the nature of a violation under R.A. No. 3019, whereas the case filed before the CSC was in violation of R.A. No. 6713; a single act may result in two or more unlawful transgressions punishable under different laws.
• Findings of Administrative Agencies: Respondents argued that the CSC’s findings, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon the Supreme Court.

• Forum Shopping: Whether respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.
• Administrative Liability: Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.

• Forum Shopping: No. The dismissal of the BFP complaint was not a judgment on the merits and did not constitute res judicata; the BFP proceedings were merely investigative or fact-finding, not quasi-judicial, so forum-shopping did not exist.
• Administrative Liability: Yes. Substantial evidence supported the finding that petitioner demanded ₱5,000 in exchange for non-reassignment; the acts constituted grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and dismissal was the proper penalty.

• Forum Shopping: Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires identity of parties, identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for founded on the same facts, and identity with respect to the two preceding particulars such that any judgment in the pending case would amount to res judicata in the other. The dismissal of the BFP complaint did not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO complaint. Res judicata requires a final former judgment rendered by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, a judgment on the merits, and identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The BFP dismissal was not a judgment on the merits because it resulted from a fact-finding investigation to determine whether a formal charge should be filed; no rights and liabilities were determined with finality. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. A quasi-judicial proceeding involves taking and evaluating evidence, determining facts based on the evidence, and rendering an order or decision supported by the facts; it involves adjudication of rights and obligations. The BFP proceedings were purely administrative and investigative, aimed at determining whether there was sufficient ground to file an administrative offense. This is analogous to a public prosecutor’s preliminary investigation, which is merely inquisitorial and not quasi-judicial, as held in Bautista vs. Court of Appeals and MERALCO vs. Atilano. Thus, the dismissal of the BFP complaint could not operate as res judicata, and forum-shopping was unavailing.
• Administrative Liability: Findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with absent grave abuse of discretion or lack of substantial evidence; when affirmed by the CA, they are accorded great respect and finality, and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The CSC and CA found that respondents’ testimonies established petitioner’s demand of ₱5,000 in exchange for non-reassignment. The alleged dismissal of respondents from service did not suffice to discredit them; even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself discredit a witness, and convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying. Respondents’ testimonies were consistent and were tested by cross-examination, while petitioner offered mere denials and self-serving statements. Supt. Tutaan’s admission that he gave reassignment instructions did not disprove extortion, and petitioner’s witnesses’ testimonies were irrelevant because they related to respondents’ supposed illegal activities, not the extortion. Even assuming an Affidavit of Desistance was executed, it did not exonerate petitioner; reconciliation in an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of jurisdiction, and atonement merely obliterates the personal injury of the parties without erasing the offense against the public service. A complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance cannot be withdrawn at any time, as administrative proceedings should not depend on the whims of complainants who are only witnesses. Petitioner’s act of demanding money in exchange for non-reassignment constituted grave misconduct, defined as a transgression of an established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer, and grave if it involves corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of established rules, established by substantial evidence. It also constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, of the same gravity as acts such as misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to keep public records and property safe, making false entries in public documents, and falsification of court orders. Grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal even for the first offense, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is punishable by suspension for the first offense and dismissal for the second. Because petitioner was found guilty of two offenses, the penalty corresponding to the most serious offense—dismissal—was properly imposed.

• Forum Shopping — Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires (1) identity of parties, or at least parties representing the same interests; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party succeeds, would amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, no forum-shopping existed because the BFP complaint and the CSCRO complaint did not satisfy these requisites; the BFP dismissal was not res judicata.
• Res Judicata — Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided, or a thing settled by judgment. It requires (a) a final former judgment; (b) rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) a judgment on the merits; and (d) identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the first and second actions. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical, or dilatory objections, or after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment upon a preliminary, formal, or merely technical point. The BFP dismissal was not a judgment on the merits because it was the result of a fact-finding investigation to determine whether a formal charge should be filed.
• Quasi-Judicial vs. Investigative or Administrative Functions — A quasi-judicial proceeding involves taking and evaluating evidence, determining facts based upon the evidence presented, and rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved; it involves adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties. An administrative body exercises quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act essentially executive or administrative in nature, where the power is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of its duty. The test is whether the body is authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties; if the only purpose is to evaluate evidence and the agency cannot make a final pronouncement, there is no judicial discretion and judgment. The BFP proceedings were merely investigative and fact-finding, akin to a public prosecutor’s preliminary investigation, and not quasi-judicial.
• Finality of Administrative Findings of Fact — Findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts absent grave abuse of discretion or lack of substantial evidence. When affirmed by the CA, they are accorded not only great respect but even finality and are binding upon the Supreme Court, unless the administrative body arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion. The Court is not a trier of facts, and administrative agencies have special knowledge and expertise over matters within their jurisdiction. The CSC and CA findings of extortion were upheld.
• Credibility of Witnesses; Dismissal from Service — The alleged dismissal of respondents from service did not suffice to discredit them as witnesses. Even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself discredit a witness; the testimony must be assayed and scrutinized in the same way as other witnesses’ testimonies for relevance and credibility. Convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying as long as they can perceive and make known their perceptions to others. The rule applies with even more force where the challenge is merely dismissal from service, not criminal conviction.
• Effect of Desistance or Withdrawal in Administrative Proceedings — The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement in administrative cases merely obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense committed against the public service. A complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance against a public servant cannot be withdrawn at any time for any reason, because administrative proceedings should not depend on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein. The alleged Affidavit of Desistance did not exonerate petitioner.
• Grave Misconduct — Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. It is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Petitioner’s demand for money in exchange for non-reassignment constituted grave misconduct.
• Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service — No concrete description is provided under the Civil Service Law and rules. The Court has outlined acts constituting this grave offense, including misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to keep in safety public records and property, making false entries in public documents, and falsification of court orders. Petitioner’s offense was of the same gravity or odiousness as those acts and likewise amounted to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
• Penalty for Multiple Administrative Offenses — Grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. The penalty of dismissal includes forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service and bar from taking civil service examinations. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is likewise a grave offense but carries suspension of six months and one day to one year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count, and the rest shall be considered aggravating circumstances. Because petitioner was found guilty of two offenses, dismissal—the penalty for the most serious offense—was properly imposed.

• "Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case." — This passage, quoted from Yu vs. Lim, states the requisites of forum-shopping and litis pendentia and supplies the framework for the ruling that respondents did not commit forum-shopping.
• "A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;"or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point."" — This definition of a judgment on the merits was applied to hold that the BFP dismissal was not a judgment on the merits and could not bar the CSCRO complaint.
• "The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment." — This test distinguished the BFP’s fact-finding investigation from quasi-judicial proceedings and supported the conclusion that res judicata did not apply.
• "Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence." — This definition supplied the standard under which petitioner’s demand for money was held to constitute grave misconduct.

• Yu vs. Lim, G.R. No. 182291, 22 September 2010, 631 SCRA 172 — Cited for the requisites of forum-shopping and litis pendentia; applied to hold that respondents did not commit forum-shopping.
• Selga vs. Brar, G.R. No. 175151, 21 September 2011, 658 SCRA 108 — Cited for the definition of res judicata as a matter adjudged and the rule that a final judgment on the merits is conclusive on the parties.
• Chu vs. Sps. Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011, 657 SCRA 379 — Cited for the requisites of res judicata.
• Cabreza vs. Cabreza, G.R. No. 181962, 16 January 2012, 663 SCRA 29 — Cited for the definition of a judgment on the merits.
• Heirs of Derla vs. Heirs of Derla, G.R. No. 157717, 13 April 2011, 648 SCRA 638 — Cited for the rule that res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.
• Bedol vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179830, 03 December 2009, 606 SCRA 554 — Cited for the nature of quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power and the test for determining whether an administrative body exercises judicial or investigatory functions.
• Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001, 413 Phil. 159 (2001) — Cited by analogy to hold that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
• MERALCO vs. Atilano, G.R. No. 166758, 27 June 2012, 675 SCRA 112 — Cited to reiterate that a public prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not exercise a quasi-judicial function.
• People vs. Dominguez, G.R. No. 100199, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 170 — Cited for the rule that even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself discredit a witness.
• Gomez vs. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, 06 February 2007, 514 SCRA 475 — Cited for the rule that convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying.
• Flores vs. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 & A.M. No. P-03-1752, 06 October 2008, 567 SCRA 342 — Cited for the rule that atonement in administrative cases does not erase the offense against the public service.
• Guro vs. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827 (2003) — Cited for the rule that a complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance cannot be withdrawn at any time and that administrative proceedings should not depend on the whims of complainants.
• Philippine Retirement Authority vs. Rupa, 415 Phil. 713 (2001) — Cited for the acts that constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
• Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010, 615 SCRA 186, 203-204 — Cited for the definition of grave misconduct.
• Catmon Sales International Corporation vs. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, 15 January 2010, 610 SCRA 236 — Cited for the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with absent grave abuse of discretion or lack of substantial evidence.
• Raniel vs. Jochico, G.R. No. 153413, 02 March 2007, 517 SCRA 221 — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
• Sps. Ricardo, Jr. vs. Cinco, G.R. No. 174143, 28 November 2011, 661 SCRA 311 — Cited for the rule that administrative agencies have special knowledge and expertise over matters within their jurisdiction.

• Section 46(b)(4) and (27), Book V, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — These provisions list misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as grounds for disciplinary action. Petitioner was found administratively liable under these offenses.
• Section 46(b)(1), Book V, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Lists dishonesty as a ground for disciplinary action. Petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, although the CSC found him liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
• Section 4(c) [should be Section 4(A)(c)], Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — The CSCRO complaint alleged violation of this provision on justness and sincerity. The Court noted the complaint erroneously cited Section 4(c) instead of Section 4(A)(c). This provision formed the basis of the CSCRO complaint, distinct from the BFP complaint.
• Republic Act No. 6975 (Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990) — The BFP complaint alleged illegal transfer of personnel under this law. This was the cause of action in the BFP complaint.
• Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The BFP complaint was later docketed for preliminary investigation for violation of this law. The CA and CSC characterized the BFP complaint as a case under R.A. No. 3019, distinct from the CSCRO complaint under R.A. No. 6713.
• Section 8, Rule I, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases — Petitioner invoked this provision as requiring a certificate of non-forum shopping. The CA held that the certificate was not required because the administrative proceedings were initiated by the formal charge filed by the proper disciplining authority, not by the letter-complaint.
• Section 52(A)(3), Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Provides that grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Applied to petitioner.
• Section 58, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Provides that the penalty of dismissal includes forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service and bar from taking civil service examinations. Applied to petitioner.
• Section 52(A)(20), Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Provides that conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is a grave offense punishable by suspension of six months and one day to one year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Applied in determining the penalty.
• Section 55, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Provides that if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count, and the rest shall be considered aggravating circumstances. Applied because petitioner was found guilty of two offenses, so dismissal was imposed.

Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Mario Marvic Victor F. Leonen concurred. Lucas P. Bersamin and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe took no part.