Encarnacion Go vs. The People of the Philippines

An accused may be convicted only of the offense, and in the capacity, alleged in the Information; a conviction as a corporate officer or as owner of the offending vessel, where the Information charged only direct participation in the prohibited act, violates the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Encarnacion Go was a stockholder of ASB Fishing Development Corporation, which owned and operated the fishing vessel F/V Prince Arnold, and in 1999 she was appointed the corporation's treasurer. Section 92 of Republic Act No. 8550, The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, prohibits fishing with gear or methods destructive to coral reefs, seagrass beds, and other fishery marine habitats, expressly banning muro-ami and its variations, while Section 4 of the Fishery Administrative Code No. 90, Series of 1994 permits pa-aling fishing only within prescribed limits on the number of fisherfolks, the mesh size of the net, and the age of those engaged as fisherfolk. The statutory distinction between the two fishing methods, and the capacity in which a corporate officer may be prosecuted for a vessel's prohibited fishing, supply the backdrop against which the charge arose.

On November 20, 1999, members of the Philippine Navy aboard the BRP Ismael Lomibao spotted the fishing vessel F/V Prince Arnold with seven small boats in tow off Brooke's Point, Palawan. When the Navy vessel drew closer for a routine check, F/V Prince Arnold tried to evade inspection, prompting a chase that ended with the vessel being accosted. In a Joint Affidavit dated November 22, 1999, the boarding party, including Boarding Officer Arnulfo C. Tintero, stated that F/V Prince Arnold was owned and operated by ASB Fishing Development Corporation (ASB); a Boarding Certificate and receipts for confiscated or seized articles, however, listed Encarnacion Go as the owner of the vessel.

Joegie Baldado, a prosecution witness, testified that when he was about sixteen or seventeen years old, his neighbor in Bais City, Negros Occidental, Roger Cortes, recruited him to engage in muro-ami fishing, promising earnings of P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 in about two months and telling him that he would be working for ASB on board F/V Prince Arnold, which sailed with four other airboats. According to Baldado, about 400 people, some of them minors, took part in the operation — 180 to 190 as surface swimmers and about 200 as divers. The surface swimmers, using hose devices with about five kilos of weight at the end, pounded the seabed to scare fish away from their habitats and into an awaiting net, while the divers made sure the hoses did not become entangled in the seabed during the pounding. Their group had already completed three such operations when, on November 20, 1999, the boat captain, Jose Cabulao, ordered the operation stopped because the authorities had discovered them; they tried to escape, but the Philippine Navy overtook the vessel. Baldado eluded arrest, but on December 15, 1999 he executed a Gisumpaang Salaysay before a lawyer of the Environment Legal Assistance Center Inc. in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

In an Information dated January 12, 2006, petitioner Encarnacion Go and ASB were charged with violation of Section 92 of Republic Act No. 8550 before Branch 62 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21026. The Information alleged that on or about November 20, 1999, at about 10:30 in the morning, in Brooke's Point, Palawan, the accused, "while on board Fishing Vessel Prince Arnold," fished in the waters of Brooke's Point using the method of muro-ami, which required diving and other physical and mechanical acts to pound and destroy coral reefs and other fishery marine habitats in order to entrap, gather, or catch fish and other fishery species. At the pre-trial conference of April 19, 2007, petitioner and the prosecution stipulated that (a) ASB was engaged in the business of fishing through pa-aling in 1999; (b) F/B Prince Arnold was owned and managed, and its fishing operation operated, by ASB in 1999; (c) F/B Prince Arnold was apprehended at the municipal waters of Brooke's Point, Palawan in November 1999 without a warrant while conducting a fishing operation; (d) the fishing vessel was licensed; and (e) by virtue of the inventory, an investigation report was submitted by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources in Manila and in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor during the preliminary investigation.

After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner testified in her own behalf. She admitted being one of the stockholders of ASB, the owner of F/V Prince Arnold, but denied that the vessel was engaged in muro-ami fishing, insisting that it employed the pa-aling system. She stated that in 1999 she was appointed treasurer of ASB only for the purpose of facilitating the corporation's business and that she did not in actuality perform the functions of that position; she likewise disclaimed any hand in hiring the vessel's employees, pointing to her brothers as the ones who engaged the boat's workers. Finally, she denied being on board F/V Prince Arnold when the Philippine Navy apprehended it.

The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution had established through Baldado's testimony that ASB utilized muro-ami and not pa-aling, crediting his account that about 400 people constantly pounded the seabed with hose devices to whose ends five kilos of pamatos or weights were tied in order to drive fish toward a waiting net; it held petitioner liable as treasurer and director of ASB, finding that she was generally aware of the corporation's business activities through her attendance at board meetings, had the opportunity to prevent the violation but did not, and benefited from the illegal activity as a part owner. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that even under the pa-aling method the law imposed limits that F/V Prince Arnold did not observe — the number of fisherfolks should not exceed 250, the number of stones and chains should not exceed 10, and the mesh size of the net should not exceed 3.38 centimeters — and that the vessel's employment of about 400 workers, some of them minors, and a net with the mesh size of a ten-centavo coin proved that it had in fact committed muro-ami.

• Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation: Petitioner argued that her conviction violated her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, because the Information alleged that she was directly involved in the muro-ami operations of F/V Prince Arnold, but the court a quo convicted her for purportedly doing nothing, as an officer of ASB, to prevent the commission of the offense; she faulted the RTC for holding her liable because she derived benefits from the vessel's muro-ami operations, a circumstance not alleged in the Information and neither proven during trial.
• Absence from the Vessel: Petitioner emphasized that while the Information alleged her direct involvement in muro-ami and claimed that she was present during the commission of the offense, the prosecution and her counsel had previously stipulated during pre-trial that she was never on board the vessel when it was apprehended; her absence alone during the operation of the Philippine Navy against the vessel should therefore suffice to merit her acquittal.
• Nature of the Fishing Method: Petitioner maintained that F/V Prince Arnold utilized the pa-aling method of fishing, and not muro-ami.
• Conviction on Mere Presumption and Erroneous Finding of Operator Status: Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in convicting her based on a mere presumption, and that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that she was the operator of F/V Prince Arnold; she further asserted that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the lower courts departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.

• Procedural — Questions of Fact Under Rule 45: The Office of the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it raised questions of fact, which are not allowed in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• Sufficiency of Evidence — Muro-Ami Was Employed: The OSG stood by the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court that, based on the testimony of Baldado, there was no doubt as to the method of fishing employed by F/V Prince Arnold, namely muro-ami.
• Liability as Director and Corporate Officer: The OSG argued that petitioner was correctly convicted for her role as director and corporate officer of ASB, since Article 92 of RA 8550 expressly punishes the person or corporation for violation of the provisions therein.

• Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation: Whether petitioner's conviction for violation of Section 92 of RA 8550, rendered on the ground that she was an officer or owner of the offending vessel, violated her constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, where the Information charged her with taking a direct part in muro-ami fishing while on board F/V Prince Arnold.
• Nature of the Fishing Method: Whether F/V Prince Arnold employed muro-ami fishing rather than the pa-aling method.
• Review of Questions of Fact Under Rule 45: Whether the petition may be entertained notwithstanding that it raises questions of fact, which are generally prohibited in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: Whether petitioner's guilt of the offense charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation: Yes. The Information charged petitioner with direct participation in muro-ami fishing while on board F/V Prince Arnold, yet she was convicted as treasurer and director of ASB and, on appeal, as the vessel's owner — capacities never alleged; a conviction in a capacity not charged violates the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Nature of the Fishing Method: Yes. F/V Prince Arnold employed muro-ami and not pa-aling, the operation having involved about 400 fisherfolks, some of them minors, and a net with the mesh size of a ten-centavo coin, in excess of the limits prescribed for pa-aling by Section 4 of the Fishery Administrative Code No. 90, Series of 1994.
• Review of Questions of Fact Under Rule 45: No. The rule limiting a petition for review on certiorari to questions of law is not religiously followed in penal cases, an appeal in a criminal case throwing the whole case wide open for review and empowering the Court to correct errors whether assigned or not.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: No. Although the muro-ami operation of the vessel was established, petitioner's guilt of the offense as charged was not proven, she having shown that she had no direct hand in the commission of the offense and was not on board the vessel as the Information alleged.

• Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation: The Constitution guarantees every person accused in a criminal prosecution the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and it is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information so that the accused may suitably prepare a defense, the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the designation of the offense or the particular law alleged to have been violated, but from the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. The Information against petitioner alleged that the accused, "while on board Fishing Vessel Prince Arnold," fished off Brooke's Point using muro-ami, which required diving and other physical and mechanical acts to pound and destroy coral reefs and other fishery marine habitats. That recital charged petitioner with taking a direct part in the commission of muro-ami fishing by allegedly being on board the vessel; she was not indicted as an officer or director of ASB nor as the owner of the vessel. Her defense therefore properly revolved around her actual and physical role in the commission of the offense, and during trial she established that she did not have a direct hand in it and was not even on board the vessel when the offense was committed, which sufficed to acquit her. The trial court's reliance on People vs. Tan Boon Kong and Sia vs. People was misplaced, because in both cited cases the informations indicted the accused in their capacity as officers of the corporations charged with wrongdoing, whereas nowhere in the Information was petitioner charged as treasurer, director, operator, or owner of F/V Prince Arnold. The Court of Appeals' holding that the defect was cured by the documents attached to the Information was rejected: the joint affidavit of the Philippine Navy officers mentioned ASB as the owner of the vessel, while the Boarding Certificate and the Receipts for Confiscated or Seized Articles mentioned petitioner as the owner, and these inconsistent disclosures only made the matter more offensive to petitioner's defense, since they highlighted the defect in the charge vis-à-vis her constitutional right.
• Nature of the Fishing Method: Section 4 of the Fishery Administrative Code No. 90, Series of 1994 imposes restrictions on pa-aling, including a maximum of 250 fisherfolks, a net mesh size of not less than 3.38 centimeters, and a prohibition against engaging any person below eighteen years of age as a fisherfolk. Prosecution witness Baldado testified that about 400 other people worked on F/V Prince Arnold during his time there, some of them minors, and that they used a net with the mesh size of a ten-centavo coin, narrower than the prescribed minimum. They worked by pounding the seabed with hoses to which five kilos of weight were attached at the end, driving fish away from their habitat and into a waiting net. This is essentially the essence of muro-ami and not pa-aling fishing, a matter of which the Court can take judicial notice. The concurrent findings of the RTC and the CA that the vessel employed muro-ami were thus affirmed.
• Review of Questions of Fact Under Rule 45: Although Rule 45 mandates that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, and although the Court generally gives great respect to the factual findings of the trial court, that rule is not religiously followed in penal cases. Criminal cases involve the constitutional right to liberty and the constitutional guarantee of the presumption of innocence, and an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, rendering the reviewing court competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the appropriate penal law provision. The Court may review the factual findings of the trial court if it is not convinced that they are conformable to the evidence of record and to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses, particularly where significant facts and circumstances may have been overlooked which, if properly considered, could affect the result of the case. Petitioner having correctly raised the issue of due process, the procedural objection of the Office of the Solicitor General did not bar review.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: The commission of muro-ami by the crew of F/V Prince Arnold was clearly established, but the conviction of petitioner could not be sustained without violating her constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Because the Information charged her with active participation in the offense, allegedly having been on board the vessel at the time of its commission, her defense naturally revolved around her actual and physical role in the commission thereof, and during trial she established that she did not have a direct hand in the offense and was not on board the vessel when it was committed. She could not be convicted in a capacity that the Information never alleged, and to do so would be the same as disregarding her constitutional rights as an accused in a criminal prosecution.

• Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation — No less than the Constitution guarantees every person accused in a criminal prosecution the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her, and it is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the elements of a crime to be set out in the Information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare a defense, the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. In this case, the Information charged petitioner with direct participation in muro-ami fishing while on board F/V Prince Arnold, but she was convicted as treasurer and director of ASB and, on appeal, as owner of the vessel; because these capacities were never alleged, the conviction was set aside.
• Real nature of the criminal charge determined by the recital of facts — The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information, nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated, these being mere conclusions of law, but from the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment; no Information for a crime is sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Applied here, the recital of facts charged direct participation aboard the vessel, so petitioner could not be convicted as an officer or owner of the vessel.
• Conviction only for the offense and in the capacity charged — An accused may be convicted only of the offense alleged in the Information, and only in the capacity therein charged; a conviction on a theory or in a capacity not alleged — such as corporate officer, operator, or owner of the offending vessel — violates the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence on the uncharged theory.
• Corporate officer liability requires indictment in that capacity — The rule that when a corporation violates a law all who participated therein may be held liable, as held in People vs. Tan Boon Kong and reiterated in Sia vs. People, applies only where the Information indicts the accused in his or her capacity as an officer of the corporation charged with the wrongdoing. Where the Information charges the accused solely with direct participation in the prohibited act, conviction as a corporate officer is impermissible.
• Rule 45's bar on questions of fact is not religiously applied in penal cases — Although Rule 45 of the Rules of Court mandates that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, the rule is not religiously followed in criminal cases, which involve the constitutional right to liberty and the presumption of innocence. An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and imposes on the Court the duty to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether assigned as errors or not, and the Court may review factual findings that are not conformable to the evidence of record.
• Judicial notice of the nature of muro-ami fishing — The Court may take judicial notice of the essential nature of muro-ami fishing, which consists of pounding the seabed with weighted hoses to drive fish away from their habitat and into a waiting net, as distinguished from pa-aling fishing, which is permitted only within the limits prescribed by Section 4 of the Fishery Administrative Code No. 90, Series of 1994.

• "No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him [or her]. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information." — Quoted from Canceran vs. People, this passage states the constitutional standard on which the acquittal rests and is the canonical formulation of the requirement that every element of the offense be alleged in the Information.
• "There is no mistaking that the foregoing excerpt from the Information charges petitioner with taking a direct part in the commission of muro-ami fishing by allegedly being on board the vessel. She was not indicted as an officer or a director of ASB nor as the owner of the said vessel." — This is the ratio decidendi of the acquittal: the Court characterizes the actual recital of facts in the Information and contrasts it with the capacities in which petitioner was convicted.
• "Nowhere in the Information was she charged as treasurer, director, operator, or owner of F/V Prince Arnold, and thus she could not be convicted in such capacity. To do otherwise would be the same as disregarding her constitutional rights as an accused in a criminal prosecution." — The passage states the operative rule that an accused may be convicted only in the capacity charged, and explains why the trial court's reliance on Tan Boon Kong and Sia was misplaced.
• "It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and that it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are assigned as errors or not." — Quoted from Ferrer vs. People, this passage supplies the procedural justification for the Court's review of the factual findings notwithstanding Rule 45.

• People vs. Tan Boon Kong, 54 Phil. 607 (1930) — Relied upon by the trial court in convicting petitioner as treasurer and director of ASB; distinguished by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Information in that case indicted the accused in his capacity as an officer of the corporation charged with wrongdoing, unlike the Information against petitioner.
• Sia vs. People, 208 Phil. 571 (1983) — Also relied upon by the trial court as reiterating Tan Boon Kong; likewise distinguished for the same reason, that the accused therein was indicted in his capacity as a corporate officer.
• Canceran vs. People, 762 Phil. 558 (2015) — Quoted with approval for the rule that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information, and that an accused cannot be convicted of a crime not charged in the Information regardless of the evidence presented during trial.
• Domingo vs. Rayala — Quoted for the rule that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the designation of the offense, but from the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
• Atty. Constantino vs. People, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019 — Cited for the treatment of criminal appeals under Rule 45, including the principle that the Court may review factual findings of the trial court if not convinced that they are conformable to the evidence of record.
• Ferrer vs. People — Cited for the rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, conferring on the reviewing court full jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the appropriate penal law provision.

• Section 92, Republic Act No. 8550 (The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998) — Declares it unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to fish with gear or methods that destroy coral reefs, seagrass beds, and other fishery marine life habitats, and expressly prohibits muro-ami and any of its variations and similar gear and methods requiring diving or other physical or mechanical acts to pound coral reefs and other habitats to entrap, gather, or catch fish; penalizes the operator, boat captain, master fisherman, and recruiter or organizer of fishworkers with imprisonment of two (2) to ten (10) years and a fine of not less than P100,000.00 to P500,000.00, or both, and requires confiscation of the catch and gear. This was the provision under which petitioner was charged, and the Court held that the Information's recital charged direct participation under this provision, not liability as a corporate officer or vessel owner.
• Section 4 (35), Republic Act No. 8550 — Defines a "Fishery Operator" as one who owns and provides the means, including land, labor, capital, fishing gears, and vessels, but does not personally engage in fishery. The Court of Appeals invoked this definition in holding that petitioner's presence on or absence from the vessel was irrelevant; the Supreme Court nonetheless acquitted petitioner because that capacity was not alleged in the Information.
• Section 4, Fishery Administrative Code No. 90, Series of 1994 — Imposes restrictions on pa-aling fishing, including a maximum of 250 fisherfolks, a net mesh size of not less than 3.38 centimeters, and a prohibition against engaging any person below eighteen (18) years of age as a fisherfolk. The Court used these limits to conclude that F/V Prince Arnold's operations — about 400 workers, some of them minors, and a net with the mesh size of a ten-centavo coin — constituted muro-ami and not pa-aling.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Mandates that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The Court held that this rule is not religiously followed in penal cases, given the constitutional right to liberty and the presumption of innocence, and reviewed the factual findings of the lower courts.
• Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation — Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information so that the accused may suitably prepare a defense. The Court applied this guarantee in setting aside petitioner's conviction, which had been rendered on a capacity — corporate officer and vessel owner — never alleged in the Information.

Hernando (Acting Chairperson), Zalameda, and Marquez, JJ., concur. Perlas-Bernabe, J., was on official business.