Elgar vs. Judge Santos, Jr.

A judge's persistent and overbearing efforts to compel parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, conducted outside the bounds of official proceedings and in contravention of established mediation rules, constitute simple misconduct and gross inefficiency when such efforts unduly delay the disposition of the case and cast doubt on the judge's impartiality and integrity. Furthermore, a judge commits gross ignorance of the law when he disregards the mandatory nature of filing pre-trial briefs under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court by giving a party the option to submit such brief at his discretion.

This is an administrative matter arising from a complaint filed by Susan R. Elgar against Judge Soliman M. Santos, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Nabua-Bato, Camarines Sur. The complaint charged Judge Santos with gross ignorance of the law and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics relative to Special Proceedings No. 1870, entitled "In Re: Petition for the Allowance of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa by the Late Wenceslao Elgar." The case involved a petition for the allowance of a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, which is governed by the rules on the Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons under the Rules of Court, and which constitutes a mediatable case under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA. The Court had previously admonished Judge Santos in Borromeo vs. Santos (A.M. No. MTJ-15-1850) for initiating a conference among parties in a pending case, which cast doubt on his impartiality.

Complainant Susan R. Elgar alleged that her deceased husband, Wenceslao F. Elgar, executed on August 18, 1999 a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa giving her two parcels of agricultural land located in San Jose, Nabua, Camarines Sur. On January 7, 2010, she filed a petition for the allowance of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the MCTC, Nabua-Bato, Camarines Sur, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1870. Acting Presiding Judge Bernhard B. Beltran declared the petition sufficient in form and substance and assumed jurisdiction over the probate case. However, before the initial hearing, Judge Santos assumed his post as the regular presiding judge of the MCTC.

On August 19, 2010, Wenceslao V. Elgar, Jr. (oppositor), the deceased's son by his first marriage, appeared and opposed the petition. Judge Santos issued an Order of even date resetting the proceedings to October 28, 2010 for preliminary conference and directing the parties to submit position papers and propose specific terms and conditions for possible amicable settlement. Complainant alleged that Judge Santos had an ardent advocacy to amicably settle and terminate cases, as evidenced by notices and writings posted on the walls of the courtroom and staff room promoting amicable settlement, and papers issued to lawyers and litigants advocating the same. Judge Santos continuously sent text messages to complainant's counsel urging settlement, and at times asked complainant and her counsel to meet him for a conference in the morning on the day of the hearing itself.

On October 15, 2010, Judge Santos issued an Order advising the oppositor to bring before the court his siblings, who were all residents of the USA and outside the court's jurisdiction, so that all the rightful heirs may have their respective shares in the estate. After complainant submitted her Pre-Trial Brief, Judge Santos issued an Order dated October 28, 2010 resetting the preliminary conference to January 18, 2011 because he wanted the parties to amicably settle and all the heirs to have their respective shares. Judge Santos opined that the proceedings should not be confined to the determination of the validity of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa since this could result in a bloody and prolonged litigation. On January 18, 2011, the preliminary conference did not push through due to the absence of the oppositor's counsel, but Judge Santos talked to complainant and her counsel inside his chambers and proposed several options for a settlement when none had been offered by the parties.

On February 23, 2011, Judge Santos directed the parties to submit information and documents clarifying the status of seven parcels of land which were earlier adverted to by complainant, apparently in preparation for an amicable settlement, despite the fact that the petition did not include these parcels and their combined assessed values were outside the jurisdiction of the MCTC. On March 9, 2011, Judge Santos again reset the preliminary conference to May 17, 2011, and directed the parties and their counsel to confer with him inside his chambers, during which the oppositor made a general proposal for the swapping of properties which complainant did not accept. Complainant was surprised when Judge Santos issued an Order dated April 26, 2011 identifying the properties for swapping and prescribing the requirements for the written agreement as if the parties already agreed.

The preliminary conference scheduled on May 17, 2011 did not materialize due to the absence of oppositor and his counsel, and the June 29, 2011 conference was postponed on account of a motion for postponement by complainant's counsel. The oppositor filed a Motion for Recusal followed by a Manifestation accusing Judge Santos of impropriety when they accidentally met in Naga City on August 4, 2011 and Judge Santos insisted that the case be settled. Judge Santos denied the motion for recusal in his Resolution dated August 15, 2011. On November 8, 2011, the preliminary conference proceeded and Judge Santos again discussed amicable settlement. Complainant informed Judge Santos that her counsel was not available and insisted that she should not participate, making it clear that she would not sign anything and was not amenable to any proposal. At this point, Judge Santos banged his arm on the table and only stopped badgering complainant when she started to cry.

After several more resettings, the final mediation conference was scheduled on March 21, 2012, at which the oppositor manifested that he was not amenable to any settlement. The preliminary conference, which started on October 28, 2010, was finally terminated when Judge Santos set the presentation of evidence for the petitioner in his Order dated June 21, 2012. However, on August 7, 2012, Judge Santos issued an Order reversing his June 21, 2012 Order and mandating the parties to undergo pre-trial hearing, enumerating matters for stipulations and admissions, documents to be submitted, and issues to be taken up. On August 28, 2012, Judge Santos insisted that the pre-trial hearing be conducted first, and when complainant's counsel opposed, he claimed he was being proactive. He also stated that the oppositor had the option to file his pre-trial brief and that its expected contents could be inferred from previously filed pleadings. Complainant filed a motion for inhibition, which Judge Santos denied, reasoning that since he denied the oppositor's motion for recusal, he should likewise deny complainant's motion.

Feeling hopeless with her case, complainant moved for the withdrawal of her petition, which Judge Santos granted on December 11, 2012. However, eight days later, Judge Santos issued an Extended Order dated December 19, 2012 castigating complainant's counsel and casting aspersions against her character, discussing "pride and prejudice" aspects of counsel's conduct and advising her to reflect on the same as it may have implications for her law practice. Complainant averred that there was no reason for the issuance of the Extended Order as there was no pending incident.

In his Comment, Judge Santos argued that he was not ignorant of the rules, that his persistence to arrive at an amicable settlement was directed at both parties, and that applying some pressure was normal in any amicable settlement as long as it was not undue or improper. He justified his acts of directing the oppositor to bring his co-heirs, not limiting his actions to determining the validity of the Deed, and requiring information on the seven parcels of land, explaining that the oppositor claimed the case concerned all compulsory heirs and their rightful shares. He admitted to constantly texting complainant's counsel but argued there was nothing unethical in his actions. He defended his ex parte meetings as mediation techniques sanctioned under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, and denied banging his arm on the table and badgering the complainant. He blamed the delay on the insincerity of the parties and their counsel, and argued that the pre-trial was proper under Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Complainant alleged that Judge Santos willfully disobeyed and ignored both substantial and remedial law in the guise of equity, particularly by directing the oppositor to bring co-heirs residing in the USA, not limiting the proceedings to the validity of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, and requiring information on seven parcels of land outside the jurisdiction of the MCTC.

• Improper Pressure to Settle: Complainant averred that Judge Santos continuously pressured her to agree to an amicable settlement against her will through text messages to her counsel, ex parte meetings inside his chambers, and proposals for settlement that the parties never offered, which reflected badly on the judiciary.

• Undue Delay: Complainant alleged that the preliminary conference, which started on October 28, 2010, was only terminated on June 21, 2012 — almost two years later — due to Judge Santos' insistence on amicable settlement, and that the case never proceeded beyond the pre-trial stage before she withdrew her petition.

• Improper Issuance of Extended Order: Complainant averred that there was no reason for the issuance of the Extended Order dated December 19, 2012 castigating her counsel and casting aspersions against her character, as there was no pending incident after the withdrawal of the petition.

• Justification of Acts as Mediation Techniques: Judge Santos argued that his persistence to arrive at an amicable settlement was directed at both parties, that applying some pressure was normal in any amicable settlement as long as it was not undue or improper, and that his acts were mediation techniques sanctioned under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC.

• Judicial Discretion in Appreciation of the Case: Judge Santos explained that he directed the oppositor to bring his co-heirs, did not limit his actions to determining the validity of the Deed, and required information on the seven parcels of land because the oppositor claimed that the case concerned all compulsory heirs of the decedent and their rightful share in the estate.

• Propriety of Text Messages and Ex Parte Meetings: Judge Santos admitted to constantly texting complainant's counsel and conducting meetings sometimes with one or the other party separately, but argued that there was nothing unethical in his actions as he was merely trying to bring the parties to a fair and just amicable settlement.

• Delay Attributed to the Parties: Judge Santos argued that the delay should not be attributed to him as he must be given discretion in determining whether a settlement is still possible, and blamed the delay on the insincerity of some parties and their counsel, unusual postponements, non-appearances, and changes in handling counsels.

• Propriety of Pre-Trial in Special Proceedings: Judge Santos argued that conducting a pre-trial was in accordance with the Rules of Court since Section 2, Rule 72 provides that the rules for ordinary actions shall be applicable in special proceedings as far as practicable, and that complainant was estopped from questioning the pre-trial since she submitted her pre-trial brief.

• Denial of Motion for Inhibition: Judge Santos referred to his Resolutions wherein he denied both the oppositor's Motion to Recuse and complainant's Motion for Inhibition, discussing that he remained impartial and that complainant did not present extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose.

• Referral to the Philippine Mediation Center: Whether Judge Santos committed an administrative offense in failing to refer Special Proceedings No. 1870 to the Philippine Mediation Center despite it being a mediatable case under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA.

• Propriety of Settlement Efforts: Whether Judge Santos' acts of texting complainant's counsel, conducting an ex parte meeting with complainant and her counsel inside his chambers, and convincing the oppositor to settle during an accidental meeting in Naga City constituted improper conduct violating Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

• Undue Delay in Proceedings: Whether Judge Santos' overbearing persistence to make the parties settle amicably caused undue delay in terminating the preliminary conference amounting to gross inefficiency.

• Issuance of the Extended Order: Whether Judge Santos' issuance of the Extended Order dated December 19, 2012 castigating complainant's counsel after the withdrawal of the petition exceeded the bounds of propriety.

• Mandatory Nature of Pre-Trial Brief: Whether Judge Santos committed gross ignorance of the law in giving the oppositor the option of submitting his pre-trial brief in contravention of the mandatory nature of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

• Referral to the Philippine Mediation Center: Yes. Judge Santos failed to take cognizance of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA in failing to refer the case to the Philippine Mediation Center, constituting a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a less serious charge.

• Propriety of Settlement Efforts: Yes. Judge Santos' acts of texting complainant's counsel, conducting an ex parte meeting inside his chambers, and convincing the oppositor to settle during an accidental meeting in Naga City exceeded the bounds of propriety and amounted to simple misconduct under Section 9(7), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, there being no corrupt or wrongful motive.

• Undue Delay in Proceedings: Yes. Judge Santos' overbearing persistence to make the parties settle amicably caused undue delay in terminating the preliminary conference, amounting to gross inefficiency or undue delay under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a less serious charge.

• Issuance of the Extended Order: Yes. Judge Santos' issuance of the Extended Order unduly castigating complainant's counsel after the withdrawal of the petition exceeded the bounds of propriety and amounted to simple misconduct under Section 9(7), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

• Mandatory Nature of Pre-Trial Brief: Yes. Judge Santos committed gross ignorance of the law in giving the oppositor the option of submitting his pre-trial brief, contravening the mandatory nature of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, constituting a serious charge under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

• Referral to the Philippine Mediation Center: The Court found that Judge Santos failed to take cognizance of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, which approved the institutionalization of court-annexed mediation. Under this set of rules, mediatable cases where amicable settlement is possible must be referred by the trial courts to the Philippine Mediation Center. The case involved a petition for the allowance of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, which is governed by the rules on the Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons under the Rules of Court and is a mediatable case. Citing Re: Anonymous Complaints against Judge Bandong, the Court ruled that the judge could not have feigned ignorance of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA since the Philippine Judicial Academy frequently conducts conventions and seminars for judges regarding court-annexed mediations. As early as 2008, cases from MCTC Nabua-Bato were already being referred to the PMC, so there was no reason for Judge Santos not to refer Special Proceedings No. 1870, which was initiated in 2010.

• Propriety of Settlement Efforts: The Court found that while judges are enjoined to make the parties agree on an equitable compromise, their efforts should be within the bounds of propriety and without the slightest perception of impartiality. Judge Santos did not deny committing the following acts: sending text messages to complainant's counsel urging settlement, conducting an ex parte meeting with complainant and her counsel inside his chambers, and convincing the oppositor to settle during their accidental meeting in Naga City. Citing Borromeo vs. Santos, where the Court had previously admonished Judge Santos for similar conduct, the Court ruled that his dealings with litigants' counsel outside the courtroom gave rise to doubts as to the propriety of the act. The Court also cited OCA Circular No. 70-2003, which cautions judges to avoid ex parte chamber sessions without the other party and his counsel present. While A.M. No. 03-01-09-SC mandates judges to persuade parties to arrive at a settlement, it does not give the judge an unbridled license to do this outside the confines of official proceedings at the risk of putting into question the integrity of the judiciary.

• Undue Delay in Proceedings: The Court found that because of Judge Santos' overbearing persistence to make the parties settle amicably, he unduly hampered the proceedings. Citing Re: Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the RTC, Branch 9, Silay City, where the Court found a judge guilty of gross inefficiency for being too liberal in granting parties more than one year to amicably settle, the Court found the pronouncement applicable. The case went on from January 7, 2010 to December 11, 2012 without proceeding beyond the pre-trial stage. While some delays were attributable to the parties, the Court found that it was mainly Judge Santos' overbearing desire to convince the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement that led to the unreasonable delay. The Court did not find bad faith or ill motive, but this did not get in the way of arriving at a just and speedy disposition of the litigants' conflicting claims.

• Issuance of the Extended Order: The Court found that Judge Santos exceeded the bounds of propriety when he unduly castigated complainant's counsel in the Extended Order, which discussed "pride and prejudice" aspects of counsel's conduct and advised her to reflect on the same. The Court ruled that Judge Santos should have refrained from using his position to browbeat complainant's counsel just because he did not agree with the latter's position. Further, he should have refrained from rendering the Extended Order considering that he already granted the withdrawal of the petition, so there was no longer any occasion to issue it.

• Mandatory Nature of Pre-Trial Brief: The Court found that Judge Santos committed gross ignorance of the law. Citing Department of Justice vs. Judge Mislang, the Court explained that gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence, and that a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining their strict compliance, upends the presumption of regularity and subjects the magistrate to administrative sanctions. The Court found that Judge Santos' gross ignorance lay in giving the oppositor the privilege of submitting at his option a pre-trial brief, which contravenes Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court mandating that the filing of pre-trial briefs at least three days before the date of pre-trial is mandatory. Worse, during the pre-trial hearing, Judge Santos expressed that he was treating oppositor's previous submissions as containing the elements of a pre-trial brief, which is clearly not sanctioned by the Rules. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, which in turn results in allowing the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte. Thus, when he issued the Pre-Trial Order dated September 4, 2012, Judge Santos disregarded the mandatory nature of the submission of pre-trial briefs.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption in ignoring, contradicting, or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law; if committed in good faith, it does not warrant administrative sanction, but this applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining their strict compliance, upends the presumption of regularity and subjects the magistrate to corresponding administrative sanctions. The Court applied this doctrine in finding Judge Santos liable for giving the oppositor the option to submit a pre-trial brief, contravening the mandatory nature of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

• Judicial Errors Not Per Se Administrative Liability — A judge's failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will he be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The Court applied this doctrine in declining to hold Judge Santos administratively liable for advising the complainant to bring her co-heirs before the court, not limiting the case to the validity of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, and requiring information on lots not subject of the petition, as these acts were judicial in nature and involved his appreciation of the probate case.

• Appearance of Impropriety — A judge's official conduct and behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. Because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions, like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but also beyond suspicion. A judge has the duty to not only render a just and impartial decision, but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's integrity. The Court applied this doctrine in finding Judge Santos liable for texting complainant's counsel, conducting an ex parte meeting, and convincing the oppositor to settle during an accidental meeting, as these acts cast doubt on the integrity and impartiality of the courts.

• Mandatory Nature of Pre-Trial Brief — Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the date of the pre-trial. Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, which in turn results in allowing the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and for the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that Judge Santos' act of considering the oppositor's previous submissions as his pre-trial brief was clearly not sanctioned by the Rules, and his issuance of the Pre-Trial Order dated September 4, 2012 disregarded the mandatory nature of the submission of pre-trial briefs.

• "It is settled that a judge's failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will he administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment." — This passage, quoted from Salvador vs. Judge Limsiaco, Jr. as cited in Magdadaro vs. Judge Saniel, Jr., articulates the standard for when judicial errors give rise to administrative liability, and was applied by the Court in declining to hold Judge Santos liable for certain judicial acts.

• "Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment." — This passage, quoted from Department of Justice vs. Judge Mislang, defines the doctrine of gross ignorance of the law and was applied by the Court in finding Judge Santos liable for disregarding the mandatory nature of pre-trial briefs.

• "While the explanation of Judge Santos in holding the conference among the lawyers of the Parañal siblings is laudable, the same, however, casts doubt on his impartiality and integrity as a judge and erodes the confidence of the people in the judicial system. No matter how noble his intentions may have been, it was improper for Judge Santos to meet the lawyers in a restaurant to discuss a possible settlement, among others. Judge Santos should not have put himself in such a position as to arouse suspicion of improper conduct." — This passage, quoted from Borromeo vs. Santos, the prior administrative case against Judge Santos, establishes the principle that a judge's dealings with litigants' counsel outside the courtroom give rise to doubts as to propriety, and was applied by the Court in the present case.

• Salvador vs. Judge Limsiaco, Jr., 519 Phil. 683 (2006) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that a judge's failure to interpret the law or properly appreciate evidence does not necessarily render him administratively liable, and that only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice warrant administrative sanction.

• Magdadaro vs. Judge Saniel, Jr., 700 Phil. 513 (2012) — Cited as a case that reiterated the doctrine from Salvador vs. Judge Limsiaco, Jr. regarding the limits of administrative liability for judicial errors.

• Re: Anonymous Complaints against Judge Bandong, RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province, 819 Phil. 518 (2017) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that judges cannot feign ignorance of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regarding court-annexed mediation, since the Philippine Judicial Academy frequently conducts conventions and seminars for judges nationwide regarding its implementation.

• Borromeo vs. Santos, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1850, February 16, 2015 — Cited as a prior administrative case against the same Judge Santos, where the Court admonished him for initiating a conference among parties in a pending case, ruling that his dealings with litigants' counsel outside the courtroom gave rise to doubts as to the propriety of the act.

• Re: Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the RTC, Branch 9, Silay City, 410 Phil. 126 (2001) — Cited as a case where the Court found a judge guilty of gross inefficiency for being too liberal in granting parties more than one year to amicably settle their dispute, applied by analogy to determine the reasonableness of the delay in the present case.

• Department of Justice vs. Judge Mislang, 791 Phil. 219 (2016) — Cited as controlling precedent defining the doctrine of gross ignorance of the law, including the standard that a blatant disregard of clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute upends the presumption of regularity and subjects the magistrate to administrative sanctions.

• Sibayan-Joaquin vs. Judge Javellana, 420 Phil. 584 (2001) — Cited for the principle that a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach, and that judges should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.

• Boston Finance and Investment Corporation vs. Judge Gonzalez — Cited for the guidelines in the imposition of penalties in administrative matters involving members of the Bench, specifically that Rule 140 of the Rules of Court shall exclusively govern administrative cases involving judges, and that if the respondent is found guilty of multiple offenses, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each violation.

• Section 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Provides that the parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the date of the pre-trial, containing specified matters. The Court applied this provision in finding Judge Santos guilty of gross ignorance of the law for giving the oppositor the option of submitting his pre-trial brief, contravening its mandatory nature.

• Section 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Provides that failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, which in turn results in allowing the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and for the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. The Court cited this provision to emphasize the mandatory nature of pre-trial briefs.

• Section 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court — Provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for the ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings." The Court applied this provision in affirming the OCA's recommendation not to hold Judge Santos administratively liable for conducting a pre-trial in a special proceedings case.

• Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary — Provides that judges shall ensure that their conduct is above reproach and perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer, and that their behavior must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. The Court applied this provision in finding Judge Santos guilty of simple misconduct for his overbearing acts to make the parties settle amicably.

• A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA — The rule that approved the institutionalization of court-annexed mediation in the Philippines, requiring that mediatable cases where amicable settlement is possible must be referred by trial courts to the Philippine Mediation Center. The Court applied this provision in finding Judge Santos liable for failing to refer Special Proceedings No. 1870 to the PMC.

• A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC — The Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures, which mandates judges to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The Court applied this provision in ruling that while it mandates judges to persuade parties to settle, it does not give the judge an unbridled license to do this outside the confines of official proceedings.

• OCA Circular No. 70-2003 — Cautions judges to avoid ex parte chamber sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct. The Court applied this provision in finding that Judge Santos' ex parte meeting with complainant and her counsel inside his chambers was specifically prohibited.

• Sections 8, 9, and 11, Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC — Classifies administrative charges against members of the Bench as serious, less serious, and light, and provides the corresponding penalties. The Court applied these provisions in classifying Judge Santos' offenses and imposing the corresponding fines.

• Article 728, New Civil Code — Provides that donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession. The Court cited this provision in determining that the allowance of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa falls under the rules on the Settlement of Estate under the Rules of Court.

• Article 838, Civil Code — Provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Court cited this provision in determining that the case was a mediatable case governed by the rules on the Settlement of Estate.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred. Hernando, J., was on official leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.