Edrial vs. Quilat-Quilat

Parties who were granted repeated postponements and squandered ample opportunities to present evidence cannot demand reopening of trial on due process grounds. Postponement remains a matter of sound judicial discretion, reversible only upon clear abuse resulting in denial of substantial justice.

Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao, all surnamed Quilat-Quilat, filed against petitioners Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Ildefonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean, all surnamed Edrial, and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela an action for recovery of a parcel of land, docketed as Civil Case No. 6315 before Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. Through counsel Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, respondents began presenting evidence in 1981, offering first witness Atilano Ramirez on July 10, 1981 with continuations on July 16, 1981, August 24, 1982 and November 20, 1984, second witness Ignacio Tomias on February 28, 1984, and respondent Pedro Quilat-Quilat on direct examination on August 21, 1985.

Thereafter the proceedings were marked by prolonged interruptions. On December 16, 1986 the Citizen Legal Assistance Office entered appearance after Atty. Lituanas withdrew, and hearings from 1987 to 1989 were repeatedly reset or aborted for amendment of the complaint, required certification from the Bureau of Forest Development, counsel's illness or conference attendance, absence of the report, and suspension of Pedro Quilat-Quilat's testimony when he lacked reading eyeglasses. On September 20, 1990, petitioners' counsel having failed to appear despite due notice, respondents rested their case.

What followed was a cycle of submissions for decision and revivals at petitioners' instance. The case was submitted for decision on December 11, 1990 after repeated non-appearance, again on October 30, 1992 after recall of Ramirez for cross-examination was waived for petitioners' non-appearance, and revived for petitioners to present evidence in 1993. From April 1993 to April 1996, petitioners presented only two witnesses, Flaviano Umbac on July 2, 1993 and Atty. Bongaciso on October 7, 1993, while obtaining postponements for resetting, recall of witnesses, settlement talks, conflicting schedules, training conferences, unavailability of counsel and witnesses, and judicial leave. After submission for decision a third time on February 27, 1995, reconsideration with stern warning, further non-appearances on September 8 and November 16, 1995, withdrawal of counsel on February 12, 1996, and non-appearance on April 26, 1996, the case was submitted for decision a fourth time. On July 8, 1996 petitioners moved to reopen, which was denied on September 6, 1996, with reconsideration denied on October 2, 1996.

• Wrong Addresses and Non-Receipt of Notices: Petitioner argued that counsel's file addresses for his clients were incorrect, so notices and communications were not received, a fact allegedly discovered only after he filed his withdrawal as counsel.
• Equal Fault in Delay: Petitioner maintained that denial of reopening was plainly capricious and oppressive because private respondents were equally guilty of delay and procrastination.
• Substantial Due Process: Petitioner argued that allowing presentation of remaining evidence was required in the interest of substantial due process and humane justice.
• Difficulty Presenting Witnesses: Petitioner averred that Atty. Roque Bonganciso could not be readily presented because of prior commitments conflicting with trial dates, while the last witness Mauro Edrial Jr. could not be contacted due to the wrong address on file.

• Squandered Opportunities: Respondent countered that the trial court thrice reconsidered its order submitting the case for decision and gave petitioners several opportunities to present evidence, which they squandered.
• Intentional Delay: Respondent argued that petitioners were intentionally seeking to delay resolution because they were in physical possession of the disputed land.

• Due Process and Reopening of Trial: Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to reopen to complete presentation of evidence, allegedly in violation of petitioners' right to due process.

• Due Process and Reopening of Trial: No. Denial of reopening was proper, petitioners having been afforded more than ample time and having squandered repeated opportunities, with postponement resting in sound judicial discretion absent clear abuse.

• Due Process and Reopening of Trial: Due process is satisfied where parties are given ample opportunity to ventilate claims; failure to take advantage thereof, absent grave abuse of discretion, bars renewed chances. Respondents rested as early as September 1992, petitioners were allowed from April 12, 1993 until April 26, 1996 — three years — yet presented only two witnesses despite liberal grants of postponement, and the case was submitted for decision on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, February 27, 1995 and April 26, 1996 after non-appearances. Counsel's excuses were unsatisfactory: the duty to know correct addresses could not be invoked only after withdrawal, non-receipt by clients did not excuse counsel's own non-appearance, order of witnesses could have been adjusted, and three years was not needed to find an available date for Atty. Bonganciso. Respondents' own continuances did not excuse petitioners as ultimately to blame for inexcusable delay.

• Due process as opportunity to be heard — Due process requires only ample opportunity to ventilate claims, not endless opportunity; a party given several chances but failing to utilize them cannot complain of violation when reopening is denied absent grave abuse of discretion. Applied to sustain refusal to reopen after three years, two witnesses, and four submissions for decision.
• Postponement as judicial discretion — Postponement is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, undisturbed on appeal absent clear or manifest abuse resulting in denial of substantial justice. Applied to uphold the trial judge's termination of liberally granted continuances and the CA's finding of no grave abuse.
• Lawyer's duty of diligence and candor to the court — After obtaining extensions, lawyers shall not let the period lapse without submitting the pleading or explaining failure, shall avoid undue delay and misuse of processes, and as officers of the court shall advance speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication. Applied to condemn repeated motions for continuance followed by non-appearance and unexplained failure to complete evidence.

• "Parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and caused repeated delays cannot ask for the reopening of the trial for the purpose of presenting additional evidence." — States the controlling ratio on reopening after squandered postponements and frames the due process analysis.
• "Postponement is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion." — Defines the canonical standard governing continuances and appellate deference absent clear abuse.
• "Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice." — Anchors counsel's ethical duty to promote speedy adjudication and avoid obstructive delay, as reiterated from the CA reminder.
• "The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their failure." — Expresses disapproval of dilatory practice, extended more forcefully to motions for continuance.

• Inciong Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 578, June 26, 1996 — Cited as authority that parties failing to take advantage of opportunities to ventilate claims may no longer be accorded the same chances absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Achacoso vs. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 424, June 28, 1973; Casals vs. Cusi Jr., 52 SCRA 58, July 12, 1973 — Cited for disapproval of repeatedly seeking extensions and then letting the period lapse without pleading or explanation.
• Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 518, December 2, 1998; Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 543, February 6, 1997 — Cited for the rule that postponement is discretionary and undisturbed absent clear abuse resulting in denial of substantial justice.
• People vs. Compendio Jr., 258 SCRA 254, July 5, 1996 — Cited in connection with the Code of Professional Responsibility duty after obtaining extensions not to let the period lapse without submission or explanation.

• Rule 12.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires a lawyer, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, not to let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering explanation; invoked to fault counsel's repeated continuances and failures to appear or explain.
• Rule 12.04, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires lawyers to avoid any action unduly delaying a case, impeding execution of judgment, or misusing court processes; invoked to condemn the pattern of postponements delaying completion of petitioners' evidence.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.