Edillon vs. IBP
The Supreme Court granted the petition of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon for reinstatement to the bar more than two years after his disbarment for stubborn refusal to pay Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues. Edillon had originally challenged the constitutionality of the integrated bar and compulsory dues, but his adamant defiance led to disbarment. Subsequently, his communications revealed a changed attitude; he paid his delinquent dues, undertook to abide by IBP rules, and invoked his advanced age, health, and the welfare of clients who continued to rely on him. The Court, emphasizing that the power to discipline is preservative rather than vindictive and that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, restored his privilege.
Primary Holding
A disbarred lawyer may be reinstated through the plenary discretion of the Supreme Court, exercised on a preservative rather than vindictive principle, upon a showing that sufficient time has elapsed, the lawyer has demonstrated contrition and acceptance of the Court’s authority, the conditions that led to disbarment have been cured, and reinstatement is consistent with public interest and the integrity of the profession.
Background
The Supreme Court ordered the integration of the Philippine Bar on January 9, 1973, ruling that integration raised no constitutional question and was an imperative means to elevate professional standards. Atty. Marcial A. Edillon persistently refused to pay his IBP membership dues despite due notice, asserting that compelled membership and financial support of an organization he opposed violated his constitutional rights to liberty and property. The IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. 75-65, recommending his removal from the Roll of Attorneys for stubborn delinquency. After hearing, the Court unanimously disbarred Edillon on August 3, 1978. He moved for reconsideration but maintained his defiance, and the motion was denied. Thereafter, Edillon repeatedly petitioned for reinstatement, manifesting a change in attitude.
History
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The IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. 75-65 recommending removal of Atty. Edillon from the Roll of Attorneys for non-payment of dues.
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On January 21, 1976, the IBP submitted the resolution to the Supreme Court. Edillon commented, reiterating his refusal to pay; the IBP replied.
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After hearing and memoranda, the Supreme Court issued its decision on August 3, 1978, disbarring Edillon unanimously.
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Edillon moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1978; the motion was denied on November 13, 1978.
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From June 5, 1979 onward, Edillon filed several communications pleading for reinstatement.
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On October 23, 1980, the Court issued a minute resolution granting reinstatement, subject to an extended opinion.
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On December 19, 1980, the Court promulgated this extended opinion explaining the grounds for reinstatement.
Facts
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Integration of the Bar and Edillon’s Objection: The Supreme Court integrated the Philippine Bar in Administrative Case No. 526 (January 9, 1973), holding it constitutionally permissible and necessary to raise professional standards. Atty. Edillon refused to pay IBP membership dues, contending that the Court Rule and IBP By-Laws compelling membership and financial support violated his constitutional rights to liberty and property and were void.
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IBP Board’s Recommendation: Despite due notice, Edillon’s delinquency persisted. The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1, recommending that the Court remove his name from the Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay dues, pursuant to Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws and Section 10 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court.
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The Disbarment: The Supreme Court required Edillon to comment; he maintained his stance. After hearing and submission of memoranda, the Court, in a unanimous decision promulgated on August 3, 1978, penned by Chief Justice Castro, disbarred Edillon. The decision held that integration raised no constitutional issue and that Edillon’s persistent defiance warranted the extreme penalty. His motion for reconsideration, which continued to challenge the Court’s competence, was denied on November 13, 1978.
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Post-Disbarment Pleas for Reinstatement: Beginning with letters dated June 5, 1979, and followed by communications of August 7, 1979, November 13, 1979, and April 12, 1980, Edillon’s tone shifted; the defiance was gone. He invoked the state of his health, his advanced age, and the welfare of former clients who still relied on him for counsel. He fully paid his delinquent IBP membership dues and submitted to the IBP Board of Governors a verified application for reinstatement with an undertaking to abide by all IBP By-laws and resolutions.
Arguments of the Petitioners
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Changed Attitude and Compliance with Conditions: Petitioner Edillon manifested contrition, withdrew his prior defiance, paid all delinquent IBP dues, and submitted a verified undertaking to comply with the IBP By-laws and resolutions, thereby satisfying the conditions that had led to disbarment.
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Mitigating Circumstances: Petitioner invoked his advanced age, his state of health, and the continued confidence of clients who still relied on his counsel, arguing that these factors warranted the restoration of his privilege to practice law.
Arguments of the Respondents
- N/A — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines did not interpose any formal opposition to reinstatement once Edillon paid his delinquent dues and submitted the requisite undertaking.
Issues
- Reinstatement after Disbarment: Whether a lawyer who was disbarred for stubborn refusal to pay IBP dues on constitutional grounds, but who subsequently showed contrition, paid all arrears, undertook to follow IBP rules, and invoked mitigating personal circumstances, should be reinstated to the practice of law.
Ruling
- Reinstatement after Disbarment: The petition for reinstatement was granted. The Court’s full and plenary discretion to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar was underscored; all relevant factors—public interest, the integrity of the profession, and the reformation of the offender—were weighed. The power to discipline, especially when imposed through disbarment, is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle, analogous to the inherent power to punish for contempt. Edillon’s persistent defiance, which had originally warranted disbarment, had ceased; his subsequent communications evidenced due contrition, and he had cured his delinquency by paying dues and accepting the Court’s authority. Over two years had elapsed during which he was barred from practice, a period deemed sufficient for reformation. Moreover, membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions; failure to abide by them may lead to loss of the privilege, but after a sufficient time and upon clear showing of contrition, the privilege may be restored.
Doctrines
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Plenary Discretion in Reinstatement — The Supreme Court possesses full and plenary discretion to reinstate a disbarred lawyer. The exercise of this power takes into account the public interest, the integrity of the profession, and the reformation of the erring member. The disciplinary power, including disbarment, is preservative, not vindictive; its object is to protect the administration of justice, not to exact permanent retribution.
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Membership as a Privilege Burdened with Conditions — Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to comply with lawful conditions, including the payment of IBP dues, entails the loss of that privilege if the gravity of the violation warrants. However, the loss is not irretrievably final; after a sufficient lapse of time and a demonstration of contrition and renewed compliance, the privilege may be restored.
Key Excerpts
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“The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight.” — Establishes the breadth of the Court’s discretion in reinstatement cases.
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“[T]he power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.” — Anchors the rationale for reinstatement in the fundamental purpose of disciplinary authority.
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“What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege.” — Articulates the conditional nature of bar membership and the path to restoration.
Precedents Cited
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In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22 (1973) — The precedent that upheld the constitutionality of the integration of the Philippine Bar and compulsory IBP membership. This decision was the basis for rejecting Edillon’s constitutional challenge and sustaining his original disbarment.
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Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919) — Invoked for the dictum that the power to punish for contempt, and by extension the power to discipline lawyers, should be exercised on the preservative rather than the vindictive principle. The Court paraphrased Justice Malcolm’s opinion to support reinstatement.
Provisions
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Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court — Prescribes that default in payment of annual IBP dues for six months warrants suspension, and default for one year is a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. This provision served as the legal foundation for the initial disbarment and established that payment of dues is a condition for continued membership and reinstatement.
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Section 24, Article III, IBP By-Laws — Provided the procedure under which the IBP Board of Governors could recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys after continued delinquency.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Justices Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera concurred. Justice Aquino concurred in the result.
Notable Dissenting Opinions
- None.