Edillo vs. Dulpina

Substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court may be recognized where the factual background of the case can be found within the four corners of the petition and its incorporated annexes, provided that the underlying appeal has prima facie merit. A motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading in summary procedure cases and does not stop the running of the period for appeal, such that a judgment becomes final and executory upon the lapse of the appeal period, rendering the appellate court without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal therefrom.

The parties were litigants in a forcible entry case over a 235-square meter residential lot and house in Poblacion, San Isidro, Surigao del Norte. The plaintiffs-respondents claimed ownership through a Deed of Sale from Wencelito Camingue dated May 14, 1990, while the defendants-petitioners claimed acquisition through three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale from other individuals. The case was governed by the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure (RRSP), which applies to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases to prevent undue delays in their disposition.

On February 21, 2006, plaintiffs-respondents Spouses Norberto and Desideria Dulpina filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against defendants-petitioners Spouses Heber and Charlita Edillo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Del Carmen-San Isidro-San Benito, Surigao del Norte. The plaintiffs-respondents alleged that they purchased from Wencelito Camingue a 235-square meter residential lot and house located in Poblacion, San Isidro, Surigao del Norte, through a Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1990. On August 8, 2005, defendant-petitioner Heber Edillo, without their consent and against their express prohibition, suddenly fenced off and occupied a 50-square meter portion of the western part of the disputed property while uttering threats against plaintiffs-respondents. On January 26, 2006, they sent the defendants-petitioners a notice to vacate the disputed property, but the defendants-petitioners refused to comply.

In their Answer dated March 1, 2006, the defendants-petitioners countered that the Complaint stated no cause of action because the plaintiffs-respondents failed to allege that they were in prior physical possession of the disputed property. They also alleged that they acquired the disputed property through three separate Deeds of Absolute Sale from Apolinar Saragoza, Felomino Forcadilla, and Wenceslao Caunzad.

On May 23, 2007, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint and ordered the plaintiffs-respondents to pay the defendants-petitioners ₱10,000.00 as actual damages and another ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees. The plaintiffs-respondents' counsel received a copy of the MCTC Judgment on May 31, 2007. On June 5, 2007, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the MCTC denied in its Resolution of June 8, 2007. On July 30, 2007, the plaintiffs-respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the MCTC, which the latter granted. On August 15, 2007, the plaintiffs-respondents filed their Appeal Memorandum with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

The RTC decided the appeal on November 7, 2007, setting aside the MCTC judgment and ordering the defendants-petitioners to vacate the subject property and to restore the plaintiffs-respondents to their possession, with payment of ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of suit. After the RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, the defendants-petitioners elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 42, arguing that the plaintiffs-respondents' appeal with the RTC was filed out of time since the RRSP prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

The CA dismissed the Petition in its Resolution of January 28, 2009, on the ground that it did not contain a statement of the factual background of the case, in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. A special division of five justices, with Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson dissenting, rendered the resolution. The defendants-petitioners moved to reconsider the dismissal, to amend the petition, and to admit their First Amended Petition. The CA denied the motions in its Resolution of June 11, 2009, noting that the amended petition did not correct the infirmity of the original petition.

• Substantial Compliance with Rule 42: The defendants-petitioners argued that the CA's outright dismissal of the petition was unwarranted since the Petition for Review and the Amended Petition sufficiently recited the factual background of the case.
• Annexes as Source of Facts: They submitted that the annexes to the original and amended petitions, consisting of the Complaint, the Answer, the other pleadings, and the MCTC and RTC Decisions, also contain this factual background.
• Relaxation of Technical Rules Justified by Merit: They pointed out that a relaxation of technical rules is justified by the merits of the case—the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs-respondents' appeal because the MCTC Decision had become final and executory.
• Prohibited Pleading: They argued that the Motion for Reconsideration the plaintiffs-respondents filed is a prohibited pleading in summary proceedings and did not stop the running of the period for the decision's finality.

• Mandatory Requirements of Rule 42: The plaintiffs-respondents submitted that the requirements set forth in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court are mandatory and the defendants-petitioners have no discretion but to comply, citing Galang vs. Court of Appeals and Tan vs. Court of Appeals.

• Substantial Compliance with Rule 42: Whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the defendants-petitioners' Petition for Review for failure to state the factual background of the case despite the facts being found within the petition and its annexes.
• Jurisdiction of the RTC over the Appeal: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs-respondents' appeal from the MCTC judgment when the plaintiffs-respondents filed a prohibited motion for reconsideration that did not stop the running of the appeal period.

• Substantial Compliance with Rule 42: Yes. The CA erred in dismissing the petition outright. There was substantial compliance with the Rules because the background facts could be found within the four corners of the petition and its incorporated annexes, and the underlying appeal had prima facie merit.
• Jurisdiction of the RTC over the Appeal: No. The RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. A motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the RRSP and Section 13(c) of Rule 70, and its filing did not stop the running of the appeal period, rendering the MCTC judgment final and executory.

• Substantial Compliance with Rule 42: The Court acknowledged that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege that must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law, and failure to comply with requirements leads to dismissal. However, the Court also recognized that the right to appeal is an essential part of the judicial process, and courts should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to appeal. The Rules of Court itself calls for liberal construction to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action. The Court distinguished Galang vs. Court of Appeals and Tan vs. Court of Appeals, noting that these cases involved direct failures to comply with CA directives or due process concerns, and in both cases the underlying cases lacked merit. The Court applied the principle from Deloso vs. Marapao, which held that substantial compliance exists where the facts are integrated in the petition's discussion/argument portion and the lower court's decision containing the facts was attached to the petition. The Court assessed preliminarily whether the appeal was meritorious on its face and found that it was, given the basic question of law raised regarding the RTC's jurisdiction.

• Jurisdiction of the RTC over the Appeal: The Court agreed with the defendants-petitioners that the plaintiffs-respondents' filing of a motion for reconsideration of the MCTC judgment did not stop the running of the period for appeal since a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the RRSP. Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases belongs to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The RRSP applies to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, and Section 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Section 13(c) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court consider a motion for reconsideration of a judgment a prohibited pleading. Thus, when the plaintiffs-respondents filed on June 5, 2007 a Motion for Reconsideration of the MCTC Judgment, the motion did not stop the running of the period for appeal. With the continuous running of this period, the May 23, 2007 MCTC judgment (received through counsel on May 31, 2007) had long lapsed to finality when the plaintiffs-respondents filed their Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2007.

• Doctrine of Immutability: A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable; it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. While there are recognized exceptions—correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, void judgments, and circumstances transpiring after finality rendering execution unjust and inequitable—none applied to the present case. The lapse of the appeal period rendered the RTC without jurisdiction to entertain, much less grant, the plaintiffs-respondents' appeal from the final and immutable MCTC judgment.

• Substantial Compliance with Procedural Rules — The Rules of Court calls for liberal construction of its provisions, with the objective of securing for the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Courts may relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard. Liberal construction may be invoked where there is some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. The Court applied this doctrine to find substantial compliance with Rule 42 where the factual background was integrated in the petition and its annexes, and the appeal had prima facie merit.

• Prohibited Pleadings in Summary Procedure — Under Section 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Section 13(c) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a motion for reconsideration of a judgment is a prohibited pleading in summary procedure cases. The filing of such a prohibited pleading does not stop the running of the period for appeal. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the plaintiffs-respondents' Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 5, 2007 did not interrupt the appeal period, causing the MCTC judgment to become final and executory.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable; it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. Recognized exceptions include the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and circumstances transpiring after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the final MCTC judgment.

• "An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals reveals that while it does not contain a separate section on statement of facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition particularly in the discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the decision of the DARAB which contains the facts of the case was attached to the petition and was even quoted by the appellate court. The petition also sufficiently discusses the errors committed by the DARAB in its assailed decision." — This passage from Deloso v. Marapao, quoted by the Court, establishes the standard for substantial compliance with the factual background requirement in appellate petitions.

• "It is settled that liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice." — This passage articulates the governing principle for liberal construction of procedural rules, which the Court applied to find substantial compliance in the present case.

• "Litigation must at some time end, even at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of the courts to resolve justiciable controversies with finality." — This passage articulates the public policy rationale behind the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, which the Court applied to nullify the RTC's decision.

• Galang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76221, July 29, 1991, 199 SCRA 683 — Distinguished by the Court. The case involved dismissal for nonpayment of costs within three days from notice of the order, a direct failure to comply with a CA directive, which the Court found vastly different from the question of sufficiency posed in the present case.
• Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 1058 (1998) — Distinguished by the Court. The case involved a motion for reconsideration considered a mere scrap of paper for lack of a notice of hearing, a due process concern, unlike the present case.
• Deloso vs. Marapao, G.R. No. 144244, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 585 — Followed as controlling precedent. The Court applied its holding that substantial compliance with the factual background requirement exists where the facts are integrated in the petition and the lower court's decision containing the facts was attached to the petition.
• Colby Construction and Management Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 170099, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 159 — Cited for the principle that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of law.
• Lanaria vs. Planta, G.R. No. 172891, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 79 — Cited for the principle that courts should proceed with caution in order not to deprive a party of the right to appeal.
• Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang vs. Gaviola, G.R. No. 156809, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 565 — Cited for the principle that the RRSP applies to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, and the filing of certain pleadings, including a motion for reconsideration, is prohibited.
• Lucas vs. Fabros, 381 Phil. 1 (2000) — Cited for the principle that Section 19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Section 13(c) of Rule 70 consider a motion for reconsideration of a judgment a prohibited pleading.
• Peña vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383 — Cited for the doctrine that a judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable, and for the recognized exceptions to this doctrine.
• Siy vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154 — Cited for the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and its recognized exceptions.
• Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 394 Phil. 22 (2000) — Cited for the public policy rationale that litigation must at some time end and that unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of the courts.

• Section 2, Rule 42, Rules of Court — Prescribes the form and contents of a Petition for Review to the CA from an RTC Decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, including the requirement to set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors, and the reasons or arguments relied upon. The Court found substantial compliance with this provision.
• Section 3, Rule 42, Rules of Court — Provides that failure to comply with the requirements regarding payment of docket fees, deposit for costs, proof of service, and contents of and documents accompanying the petition shall be sufficient ground for dismissal. The Court held that this provision should not be applied rigidly where there is substantial compliance and the appeal has merit.
• Section 6, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Calls for liberal construction of the Rules to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The Court relied on this provision to justify relaxing the technical requirements of Rule 42.
• Section 19(c), Rules of Summary Procedure — Considers a motion for reconsideration of a judgment a prohibited pleading in summary procedure cases. The Court applied this provision to hold that the plaintiffs-respondents' Motion for Reconsideration did not stop the running of the appeal period.
• Section 13(c), Rule 70, Rules of Court — Considers a motion for reconsideration of a judgment a prohibited pleading in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. The Court applied this provision to the same effect.
• Section 1(A), Revised Rule on Summary Procedure — Provides that jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases belongs to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The Court cited this provision to establish the MCTC's jurisdiction over the case.

Carpio, J. (Chairperson), Del Castillo, J., Abad, J., and Perez, J. concurred in the decision.

• Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson — Dissented in the CA's Resolution of January 28, 2009 dismissing the Petition for Review, and maintained his dissent in the Resolution of June 11, 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The text does not provide the specific grounds of his dissent.