Ebreo vs. Ebreo

An annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged deed of sale is not sufficient proof of the transfer of title to property. The subject of inquiry being the contents of the deed, the original or a copy thereof must be produced under the best evidence rule; secondary evidence — including the recollections of witnesses and the annotation itself — is inadmissible absent proof of any of the exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Tax declarations and the payment of taxes do not conclusively prove ownership but are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926, survived by his five children — Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, and Felipa — who became the parties' common ancestors-in-interest. Felipa predeceased the dispute, leaving as her heirs Genoveva, Homobono, and Eleuteria, all surnamed Cueto; Genoveva died in 1991 without issue. Petitioner Antonio Ebreo is the son of petitioner Felino Ebreo, one of Felipe's five children, and petitioner Evelyn P. Beraña is Antonio's wife. The estate consisted of an untitled parcel of land in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, covered by Tax Declaration No. 39949 S-1953, with an area of 31,781 square meters more or less and an assessed value of ₱950.00, known as Lot No. 9046 of the Batangas cadastre.

Felipe Ebreo died intestate in 1926, leaving as his heirs his five children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, and Felipa. Felipa subsequently died, leaving behind her heirs Genoveva, Homobono, and Eleuteria, all surnamed Cueto; Genoveva died in 1991 without issue. Petitioner Antonio Ebreo is the son of petitioner Felino Ebreo, and petitioner Evelyn P. Beraña is Antonio's wife. Felipe left to his children an untitled parcel of land situated in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, described in Tax Declaration No. 39949 S-1953 as having an area of 31,781 square meters more or less, with an assessed value of ₱950.00, and known as Lot No. 9046 of the Batangas cadastre.

Pursuant to the subdivision made by their father Felipe, Lot No. 9046 was subdivided into six lots identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E, and F. On 11 September 1967, the five heirs of Felipe Ebreo, through themselves and their representatives, executed and signed a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa," by which they extrajudicially partitioned the property except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. As agreed upon by the heirs, Lot No. 9046-F, with an area of 13,799 square meters, would remain under the co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, and the heirs of Felipa Ebreo. The plaintiffs later discovered that Lot 9046-F had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of defendant Antonio Ebreo, and they alleged that they had never sold, ceded, conveyed, or transferred their rights, shares, and co-ownership over the lot.

The defendants countered that, after the execution of the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, Lot No. 9046-F was sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo, by virtue of which the corresponding real property tax declaration was transferred in Puyo's name; the deed of sale evidencing the transaction, however, was never presented. As narrated by the defendants, Tax Declaration No. 39241, beginning in 1969, covered Lot No. 9046-F under the names of the heirs of Felipe Ebreo. Upon the sale of the lot to Santiago Puyo, Tax Declaration No. 39241 was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 48221, dated 15 January 1973, was issued in Puyo's name, on which the alleged sale by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Puyo was annotated. Tax Declaration No. 48221 was then cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4042 for the year 1974, still in the name of Santiago Puyo. Upon the sale by Puyo of Lot No. 9046-F to Antonio Ebreo on 23 July 1976, Tax Declaration No. 4042 was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 50669 for the year 1977 was issued in the name of Antonio Ebreo; this declaration was later revised and cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 075-534 upon the marriage of Antonio Ebreo to Evelyn Beraña. From 1977 up to 1994, the spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraña religiously paid the taxes due on the land. The defendants further alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot No. 9046-F by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was executed and ratified sometime in 1968 before Attorney Doroteo M. Chavez of Batangas City; that from 1968 to 1976 Puyo possessed the lot peacefully, continuously, publicly, and in the concept of owner; and that on 23 July 1976 the lot was sold by Puyo by way of absolute sale to Antonio Ebreo through a "Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa" duly executed and ratified before Attorney Meynardo L. Atienza.

At trial, the defendants, now petitioners, claimed that the copy of the Deed of Sale on file with the Office of the City Assessor could not be presented because it was lost in the fire that gutted the building housing that office in 1979. Antonio Pajilan of the City Assessor's Office of Batangas City testified on the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221, which reads: "Deed of sale / D.V. ₱2,500.00 / Doc. on file / Doc. No. 312 / Page No. 17 / Book No. VI / Series of 1967," and stated that the office's copy of the deed could no longer be located because of the fire. Felino Ebreo testified that the heirs of Felipe Ebreo sold Lot No. 9046-F to Santiago Puyo, and that the document of sale was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto, who refused to return it and even got angry when he demanded its return; by his account, three copies of the missing deed existed. Asuncion Aguado, stepdaughter of Santiago Puyo, testified that her stepfather bought the subject lot from the Ebreo heirs.

The trial court found the testimonies of Pajilan, Felino Ebreo, and Aguado insufficient. Pajilan was employed in the City Assessor's Office only in 1978; he neither made nor witnessed the causing of the annotation, was not present when the deed of sale was executed, and did not personally see the deed. Aguado was likewise not present when the deed was executed, and she could not state with specificity whether her stepfather's tax payments were made for Lot No. 9046-F. Felino Ebreo's testimony was uncorroborated by any party to the alleged deed and was directly controverted by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners Gil and Flaviano, while his claim that Eleuteria Cueto borrowed the deed and never returned it was squarely refuted by Eleuteria herself. The trial court also noted that while the alleged sale took place in 1967, the earliest tax declaration in Puyo's name was issued only in 1973 or 1974; that Tax Declaration No. 32941, issued on 7 February 1968, still carried the names of the Ebreo and Cueto heirs, with the 1968 tax paid on 29 January 1968 and no mention of Puyo; and that the typewritten annotation appeared only on Tax Declaration No. 48221 and not on Antonio Ebreo's Tax Declarations Nos. 50669 and 075-534. Gil Ebreo testified that it was his eldest brother Felino who was the caretaker of the lot and in charge of the payment of taxes, and who sold Lot No. 9046-F to his son Antonio. Clerk of Court Jose C. Corales certified that the "Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa" could not be found in the old CFI vault at the Capitol Building, Batangas City.

• Annotation as Proof of Transfer: Petitioners maintained that the annotation of the Deed of Sale appearing in Tax Declaration No. 48221 sufficiently proved the transfer of Lot No. 9046-F from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, the annotation having been entered by the City Assessor's Office in the regular performance of its official duty.
• Presumption of Regularity: Petitioners argued that Tax Declaration No. 48221 in the name of Santiago Puyo enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance, so that the annotation appearing thereon should be accepted as proof of the deed it recites.
• Admissibility of Entries in Official Records: Petitioners contended that the entries in the official records of the City Assessor's Office are admissible in evidence to establish the fact of a valid transfer of Lot No. 9046-F that effectively conveyed ownership from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo.
• Loss of the Original Deed: Petitioners explained that the Deed of Sale could not be presented because the copy on file with the Office of the City Assessor was lost in the fire that gutted the building housing that office in 1979, and that Santiago Puyo thereafter took possession, cultivated the land, exercised uninterrupted ownership, and paid real estate taxes thereon for a period of eight years until he sold the lot to Antonio Ebreo on 23 July 1976.

• Annotation in a Tax Declaration: Whether the annotation of the Deed of Sale appearing in Tax Declaration No. 48221 is sufficient proof of transfer in line with the doctrine of presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
• Entries in Official Records: Whether entries in official records are admissible in evidence to establish the fact of a valid transfer of Lot No. 9046-F that effectively conveyed ownership of the property from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo.

• Annotation in a Tax Declaration: No. The subject of inquiry being the contents of the Deed of Sale, the original or a copy thereof had to be produced under the best evidence rule, and the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221 — at most secondary evidence — was inadmissible absent proof of any exception under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• Entries in Official Records: No. The annotation merely recites the existence of a document on file in the assessor's office and does not prove the contents or the due execution of the deed; the presumption of regularity of official duty is a mere presumption, not absolute nor inflexible, and yields to contrary proof.

• Annotation in a Tax Declaration: The Court began from the settled rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, deserve respect where supported by substantial evidence on the record. Petitioners' claim of a valid transfer rested entirely on a Deed of Sale executed and ratified before Atty. Doroteo Chavez sometime in 1967 or 1968, which was never produced; only the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221 was offered as proof of the sale. Because the subject of inquiry was the contents of that deed, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court required the production of the original itself, and no evidence other than the original was admissible except in the four instances therein enumerated. Petitioners failed to bring themselves within any exception. The claimed loss of the assessor's copy through fire did not account for the other copies, since Felino Ebreo himself admitted that three copies of the missing deed existed and none was presented; neither was any effort shown to secure a copy from the notarial register of Atty. Chavez, the notary public who allegedly notarized the deed, or from the archives of the court where it should have been submitted under the notarial law. The Court reiterated the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence — (a) the execution and existence of the original, (b) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court, and (c) the unavailability of the original not being due to bad faith on the part of the offeror — and found all three unproved. The testimony of Antonio Pajilan was inconclusive: he was employed in the City Assessor's Office only in 1978, did not make or witness the annotation, was not present when the deed was executed, and never personally saw the deed. The testimonies of Pajilan, Felino Ebreo, and Asuncion Aguado were at most secondary evidence, hence inadmissible; even if admitted, they had no probative value. The testimonies of Aguado and Antonio Ebreo did not qualify under the "recollection of witnesses" mode of proving a lost writing under Section 4, Rule 130, because they were not witnesses to the execution and delivery of the document — Aguado testified only as to what her stepfather did with the property after its acquisition, and Antonio Ebreo only as to having seen the document when he purchased the lot from Puyo. Felino Ebreo's testimony lacked credulity: it was uncorroborated by any party to the alleged deed, was directly controverted by his supposed co-sellers Gil and Flaviano, was refuted by Eleuteria Cueto on the alleged borrowing of the deed, and betrayed a natural bias in favor of his son Antonio, to whom the property was transferred in 1976 by a tax declaration Felino himself signed. The Court also held that the presumption of regularity of official duty invoked by petitioners is a mere presumption, not absolute nor inflexible, and applies only in the absence of proof to the contrary. Finally, the mere fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in petitioners' names did not necessarily prove ownership, and neither did the payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for; these are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. The Court likewise sustained the finding that the "Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa" executed between Santiago Puyo and Antonio Ebreo was ineffectual to transfer ownership to Antonio, because Puyo had not acquired the lot from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo — the seller cannot transfer more than what he has, and, as hyperbolically stated, the river cannot rise above its source.

• Entries in Official Records: The annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221 detailing the particulars of the alleged deed of sale in favor of Santiago Puyo was characterized in the findings adopted by the Court as patently suspicious and a very poor ersatz for the primary document. The trial court's findings, quoted with approval, noted that while the sale allegedly took place in 1967, the deed was annotated only on a tax declaration that begins with the year 1973; that Tax Declaration No. 32941, issued on 7 February 1968, still carried the names of the Ebreo and Cueto heirs and showed the 1968 tax as paid on 29 January 1968 without any mention of Santiago Puyo despite his alleged acquisition the previous year; that the annotation appeared only on Tax Declaration No. 48221 and on no other tax declaration in the record, not even on Antonio Ebreo's Tax Declarations Nos. 50669 and 075-534, which carried no annotation identifying the notarial document by which he supposedly acquired the property; and that the issuance of a new tax declaration in Puyo's name six or seven years after the alleged sale naturally cast a slur on the veracity of the sale. Because the subject of inquiry remained the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent upon petitioners to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; in the absence of that document, the entries in the official records could not substitute for it, and petitioners' assertions regarding the existence of the deed had to fail.

• Best Evidence Rule — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in the four instances enumerated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: (a) when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. The Court applied the rule to the alleged Deed of Sale, holding that the annotation in the tax declaration could not be admitted in lieu of the original or a copy of the deed because the contents of the deed were precisely the fact in issue.
• Requisites for the Admission of Secondary Evidence — Before a party may adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the offeror must prove with the requisite quantum of evidence: (a) the execution and existence of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (c) that the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. Where two or more originals exist, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced before secondary evidence may be given of any one. Petitioners failed to establish any of these requisites, and the testimonies they offered were held to be at most secondary evidence, inadmissible, and without probative value even if admitted.
• Presumption of Regularity of Official Duty — Under Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court, official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed. The Court held that this is a mere presumption, not absolute nor inflexible, and applies only in the absence of proof to the contrary. The presumption could not sustain the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221, given the inconclusive testimony of the assessor's employee and the failure to produce the deed itself.
• Tax Declaration and Payment of Taxes as Proof of Ownership — A tax declaration does not prove ownership; it is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership, and the payment of taxes does not conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the tax declarations issued in the name of Antonio Ebreo and the taxes he and his wife paid from 1977 to 1994 did not establish his ownership of Lot No. 9046-F.
• Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — A seller cannot transfer more than what he has; as the trial court put it, the river cannot rise above its source. Because Santiago Puyo never validly acquired Lot No. 9046-F from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo, the subsequent "Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa" in favor of Antonio Ebreo was ineffectual for the purpose of transferring ownership.
• Co-Ownership and Prescription — A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners. The Court of Appeals so held in the decision affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court, rejecting the claim that the defendants-appellants' open, adverse, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for several years amounted to ownership, since they were co-owners under the "Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa."
• Respect for the Factual Findings of the Trial Court — Findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, deserve to be respected and affirmed by the Supreme Court provided they are supported by substantial evidence on the record. The Court applied this principle in declining to disturb the factual findings that the alleged Deed of Sale was never proven.

• "Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently prove conveyance of title to a property? This is the issue presented to Us in the present petition." — The opening statement of the ponencia, framing the single controlling question on which the entire disposition turns and which the Court answers in the negative.
• "Besides, the mere fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of the petitioners does not necessarily prove ownership. In the same manner, neither does the payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for." — The canonical formulation of the tax-declaration doctrine as applied in this case, disposing of petitioners' reliance on Tax Declarations Nos. 50669 and 075-534 and on their tax payments from 1977 to 1994.
• "Under this rule, it is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of the said deed or document." — The ratio of the evidentiary holding, explaining why the alleged 1979 fire at the City Assessor's Office did not excuse the non-production of the deed when Felino Ebreo himself admitted that three copies existed.
• "In sum, considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of the said document, the exhortations of petitioners regarding the existence of said deed of sale must fail." — The concluding synthesis of the decision, restating the dispositive rule that ties the best evidence rule to the insufficiency of the tax-declaration annotation.

• Santos vs. Santos, 396 Phil. 928 (2000) — Cited as the source of the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence: the execution and existence of the original, its loss and destruction or non-production in court, and the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror; also cited for the proposition that secondary evidence, even if admitted, has no probative value.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 852 (1996) — Cited in support of the holding that secondary evidence, even if admitted, has no probative value.
• Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 78 — Cited by the Court of Appeals, in the passage quoted in the decision, for the rule that it is essential that the seller be the owner of the property he is selling; applied to render the sale from Santiago Puyo to Antonio Ebreo ineffectual.
• Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188 — Cited by the Court of Appeals, in the passage quoted in the decision, for the rule that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to them.
• Bartolome vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76792, 12 March 1990, 183 SCRA 102; Del Rosario vs. Republic of the Philippines, 432 Phil. 824 (2002); Seriña vs. Caballero, G.R. No. 127382, 17 August 2004, 436 SCRA 593 — Cited together for the rule that neither a tax declaration nor the payment of taxes conclusively proves ownership of land.
• Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, 2 March 1993, 219 SCRA 339; Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 57 (1995); San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57667, 28 May 1990, 185 SCRA 722; Heirs of Brusas vs. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 47 (1999) — Cited together for the rule that a tax declaration is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.
• Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 368 (1999); Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 72 (1986); Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 229 Phil. 20 (1986); Cabatbat Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-69679, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA 451 — Cited together as authority for the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are respected where supported by substantial evidence.

• Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court — The best evidence rule and its four exceptions. Applied to require the production of the original or a copy of the alleged Deed of Sale, the contents of that deed being the subject of inquiry; petitioners' failure to prove any exception rendered the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221 and the testimonies of their witnesses inadmissible.
• Section 4, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that the contents of a lost writing may be proved, among other means, by the recollection of witnesses. Applied to disqualify the testimonies of Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo, neither of whom was a witness to the execution and delivery of the deed of sale.
• Rule 131, Section 3(m), Rules of Court — The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Applied and held to be a mere presumption, not absolute nor inflexible, and operative only in the absence of proof to the contrary, so that it could not validate the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221.
• Sections 2 and 3, Rule 69, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Cited in the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision, affirmed by the Supreme Court, ordering the parties-in-interest to partition Lot No. 9046-F among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance and, in default thereof, to have the partition conducted in accordance with the rule.
• Article VIII, Section 13, 1987 Constitution — Invoked in the certification accompanying the decision, attesting that the conclusions therein were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
• Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez
• Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.