Ebba Ingeborg Johnson vs. Victor Johnson et al.

Statutory publication in a probate proceeding in rem satisfies due process, and the allowance of a will is conclusive as to its due execution; section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure extends to wills of citizens of the United States and its States, and residence in the Philippines does not divest a naturalized citizen of citizenship in the State of naturalization.

Emil H. Johnson was a Swedish-born naturalized citizen of the United States who resided in Manila and whose estate became the subject of probate proceedings. His daughter by Rosalie Ackeson, Ebba Ingeborg Johnson, was the applicant-appellant; Victor Johnson and others, Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, and Simeona Ibañez were among the appellees. The governing statutory framework included section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which required three witnesses for the ordinary wills of inhabitants, and section 636, which permitted probate of a will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another state or country if executed according to the law of that state or country. The proceeding also implicated the due process guarantee of the Philippine Bill and the remedial provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, including sections 113, 275, and 625.

Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the City of Manila on February 4, 1916, leaving a will dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate estimated by him at P231,800. The document was holographic, written in the testator's own handwriting, and signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of the three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the will, he gave his brother Victor one hundred shares of corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, P75 per month if she remained single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per month if she remained single; and the rest of the property to his five children, Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor, and Alberto.

Johnson was born in Sweden on May 25, 1877, and emigrated to the United States, living in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the United States Army. A daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after the marriage and was christened in Chicago on October 16, 1898. After his discharge, Johnson remained in the Philippine Islands; on November 20, 1902, Rosalie Johnson obtained a divorce from him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. He later visited the United States and on January 10, 1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago, after which he visited Sweden and was photographed with his father, mother, and Ebba Ingeborg. He then returned to Manila, where he prospered in business. In Manila, he entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children: Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor, baptized December 9, 1907. The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to him by Simeona Ibañez.

On February 9, 1916, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila for probate of the will on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and that it could therefore be probated under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The hearing was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks' publication of notice was ordered in the Manila Daily Bulletin; due publication was made. On March 6, 1916, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will, and on March 16, 1916, the document was declared legal and admitted to probate. At the same time, Victor Johnson and John T. Pickett were nominated as administrators with the will annexed; Pickett later declined to serve, and Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.

On June 12, 1916, about three months after the will had been probated, attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the order admitting the will to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved to vacate the March 16 order and various other orders in the case. The purpose of the proceeding was to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thereby preparing the way for Ebba Ingeborg's claim as the sole legitimate heir of her father. The grounds alleged were that Johnson was a resident of Manila and not of Illinois when the will was executed; that the will was invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in Illinois; that the order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to Ebba Ingeborg; and that the order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The trial court reframed these into two principal propositions: first, that the order was beyond jurisdiction and void for lack of notice; and second, that the judgment should be set aside because the testator was not a resident of Illinois and the will did not conform to Illinois law.

The order of probate recited that upon the date of execution Johnson was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of Illinois. The evidence before the trial court included the certificate of naturalization granted on January 10, 1903, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and oral testimony that Johnson had lived in Illinois until he came to the Philippine Islands as a soldier; no evidence showed that he had abandoned Illinois as his permanent domicile. The trial court denied the motion to vacate on February 20, 1917, and the present appeal was perfected from that denial.

• Due Process and Notice: Petitioner maintained that the order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because made without notice to her; the court knew she lived in the United States and, as daughter and heir, was interested in the probate, and should have postponed the hearing to permit her to appear, the failure to do so being an infringement of the due process provision of the Philippine Bill.
• Citizenship and Residence: Petitioner argued that Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the City of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will was executed, so the will could not be probated under section 636.
• Validity Under Illinois Law: Petitioner argued that the will was invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois.
• Scope of Section 636: Petitioner argued that section 636 was applicable only to wills of aliens, not to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands, relying on the epigraph referring to a will made by an alien and the uncapitalized word "state."
• Legitime and Philippine Law: Petitioner insisted that the will was not properly admissible to probate because it contained provisions that could not be given effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine Islands, and that as a legitimate heir she could not be deprived of the legitime to which she was entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in the Islands.

• Due Process and Jurisdiction: Whether the order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because made without notice to petitioner, despite statutory publication and the remedy under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Scope of Section 636: Whether section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies only to wills of aliens or also to the will of a citizen of the United States and of an American State.
• Citizenship of the Testator: Whether Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of the State of Illinois at the time the will was executed, such that his will could be probated under section 636.
• Conformity with Illinois Law: Whether the will was executed in conformity with the laws of Illinois and whether the probate court properly relied on the law of Illinois.
• Conclusiveness of Probate: Whether the order of probate may be set aside for supposed error in the findings or in the due execution of the will, and whether the intrinsic validity of the will or the petitioner's legitime may be determined in the probate proceeding.
• Timeliness Under Section 113: Whether petitioner's motion to vacate the order of probate was filed within the six-month period allowed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Review of Evidence: Whether the evidence supporting the original order of probate may be reviewed on appeal from the order denying the motion to vacate.

• Due Process and Jurisdiction: No. The probate proceeding was in rem, and the statutory publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction and constitute due process; section 113 supplied a remedy to set aside the order, and petitioner in fact appeared within the period.
• Scope of Section 636: Yes. The words "another state or country" include the United States and the States of the American Union; the epigraph and capitalization do not limit the operative text.
• Citizenship of the Testator: Yes. The probate order and the naturalization certificate established that Johnson was a citizen of Illinois; residence in the Philippine Islands did not divest him of that citizenship.
• Conformity with Illinois Law: The finding of conformity stood. Any supposed error in taking judicial notice of Illinois law was unavailable because petitioner neither alleged facts showing a different Illinois law nor raised the point on appeal.
• Conclusiveness of Probate: No. The allowance of the will was conclusive as to its due execution under section 625; probate did not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, which would be governed by the law of Illinois.
• Timeliness Under Section 113: No. The order of probate was dated March 16, 1916, while the motion to vacate was filed on October 31, 1916, beyond the six-month period allowed by section 113.
• Review of Evidence: No. On appeal from an order refusing to vacate a judgment, the evidence upon which the original judgment was based cannot be reviewed; review of the evidence is available only by appeal from the original order.

• Due Process and Jurisdiction: Probate of a will is essentially a proceeding in rem; the State may determine the character of constructive notice to be given to the world where it has possession of the res. The record showed all steps prescribed by law were complied with: three weeks' publication in the Manila Daily Bulletin was ordered and made, witnesses were examined, and the will was admitted. The fact that the court knew petitioner lived in the United States did not make publication insufficient. In re Davis held that publication prescribed by statute constituted due process in an in rem probate proceeding, and O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge where the statute allowed the will to be contested within a year. In the Philippines, no special provision other than appeal allowed relief from an improper allowance or disallowance, but section 113 authorized relief from a judgment, order, or other proceeding within six months. The word "party" in section 113 includes any person having an interest in the subject matter who may be concluded by the order. Petitioner could have applied within six months from March 16, 1916, and in fact appeared by counsel on June 12, 1916. Although the period was short, the remedy existed and was practicable; therefore the proceedings constituted due process and the order was not void for lack of notice.
• Scope of Section 636: Section 636 permits a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, executed in accordance with the law of that state or country and provable there, to be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Islands with the same effect as if executed according to local law. Petitioner argued that the section applied only to aliens because its epigraph referred to a will made by an alien and the word "state" was not capitalized. The Court rejected this: punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree and cannot control against the intelligible meaning of the written words; an epigraph is merely a convenient index and cannot limit the operative text. The words "another state or country" include the United States and the States of the American Union. Thus, if Johnson was a citizen of the United States and Illinois, his will was provable under section 636 if executed in accordance with Illinois law.
• Citizenship of the Testator: The order of probate recited that Johnson was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in Illinois, Cook County, and that the will was executed in conformity with Illinois law. This was equivalent to a finding that he was a citizen of Illinois. The naturalization laws require residence in the United States and in the state where naturalization is granted; absent clear proof to the contrary, a person naturalized in a state becomes a citizen of that state as well as of the United States. The Fourteenth Amendment declares naturalized persons to be citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. The petition did not assert that Johnson was not a citizen of Illinois; it alleged only that he was never a resident of Illinois after 1898 and became a resident of Manila. Residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois. There was no law by which a foreign native could become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands, so Johnson could not expatriate himself from the United States or change his political status. He retained his Illinois citizenship. The evidence—the January 10, 1903 naturalization certificate and testimony that he lived in Illinois until he came as a soldier, with no proof of abandonment—supported the finding.
• Conformity with Illinois Law: The probate order found that the will was executed in conformity with Illinois law. It did not affirmatively appear that a witness was examined on Illinois law; the trial judge may have examined section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois and assumed he could take judicial notice under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was mistaken: section 275 authorizes judicial notice of acts of the legislative department of the United States, meaning Acts of Congress, not the multifarious laws of the various American States; the proper rule requires proof of state statutes when their provisions are determinative. Nevertheless, the supposed error was not available to petitioner. The petition did not state any fact showing that Illinois law differed from what the court found, and the assignment of error and argument on appeal raised no question based on that supposed error. The judgment could not be set aside unless it was affirmatively shown that the conjecture was wrong. Petitioner's general statement that the will was invalid and inadequate under Illinois law was a conclusion of law; the affidavits contained no reference to the subject, and no authority was cited. The point could not be urged as of serious moment.
• Conclusiveness of Probate: Section 625 provides that the allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution. Due execution includes the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator or someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument before the required number of witnesses. Probate is conclusive as to each of these requisites. The reported cases contain no intimation that a will probated according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled in another proceeding for any supposed irregularity or defect in execution or for error in the court's action upon the proof. Fraud was not alleged. The probate order's recitals placed the judgment on an unassailable basis, and after jurisdiction was acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction is presumed to have been rightly done. The Court of First Instance had original and general jurisdiction in probate as in ordinary contentious litigation and could determine the facts upon which probate depended. As to intrinsic validity, probate does not affect the intrinsic validity of the will's provisions; the decree is conclusive only as to due execution. If a legacy or disposition is contrary to the applicable law, the will must yield. But the intrinsic validity of the provisions must be determined by the law of Illinois under article 10 of the Civil Code, not by the general Philippine provisions on testamentary succession. Petitioner's claim that she could not be deprived of her legitime was therefore not a ground for setting aside the probate.
• Timeliness Under Section 113: Section 113 permits relief from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, provided application is made within a reasonable time but in no case exceeding six months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was taken. The order of probate was made on March 16, 1916; the motion to vacate was filed on October 31, 1916, beyond the six-month period. Even if the petition were considered as an application for a rehearing based on new evidence in the affidavits, it was subject to this fatal defect. The petition was therefore insufficient to warrant setting aside the probate.
• Review of Evidence: The only proceeding in which a review of the evidence can be secured is by appeal, and the case was not before the Court on appeal from the original order admitting the will to probate. The present proceeding was by petition to set aside the order of probate, and the appeal was from the order denying that relief. On appeal from an order refusing to vacate a judgment, it is not possible to review the evidence upon which the original judgment was based; to permit this would unduly protract the right of appeal. Although the Court examined the evidence for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case, it did so while ignoring the expiration of the six-month period, and the examination confirmed the sufficiency of the findings and the insufficiency of the petition.

• Probate proceeding in rem and due process — A proceeding for the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and the State may prescribe constructive notice to the world because it has absolute possession of the res. Publication prescribed by statute satisfies due process where the law also affords a remedy to contest or set aside the probate. In this case, three weeks' publication in the Manila Daily Bulletin and the remedy under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure were held sufficient, even though petitioner lived in the United States and the six-month period was short.
• Conclusiveness of probate as to due execution — Under section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the allowance of a will of real or personal property is conclusive as to its due execution. Due execution covers the testator's age and mental capacity, signing, and acknowledgment before the required witnesses. The probate cannot be collaterally attacked for supposed defects in execution or error in the probate court's appreciation of proof, absent fraud. The Court applied this to bar petitioner's attempt to annul the probate.
• Scope of section 636: "another state or country" includes American States — Section 636 allows probate in the Philippine Islands of a will made here by a citizen or subject of another state or country if executed according to the law of that state or country and provable there. The Court held that the phrase includes the United States and the States of the American Union and is not limited to aliens. An epigraph or heading is a mere index and cannot limit the operative text; punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in statutory interpretation.
• Citizenship of naturalized Americans residing in the Philippines — A person naturalized in a court of a State becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the United States, and residence in the Philippine Islands does not divest that State citizenship. Because no law allowed a foreign native to become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands, the testator could not expatriate himself from the United States by residing in Manila. The Court applied this to uphold the finding that Johnson was a citizen of Illinois.
• Judicial notice of laws of American States — Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes judicial notice of Acts of the legislative department of the United States, meaning Acts of Congress, not the laws of the various American States. When the provisions of a State statute are determinative of an issue in Philippine courts, they must be proved. The Court noted the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of Illinois law, but the error was not available because petitioner did not show a different law or raise the point.
• Relief from judgment under section 113 — Section 113 allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, provided application is made within a reasonable time not exceeding six months. The word "party" includes any person having an interest in the subject matter who may be concluded by the proceeding, including an heir in an in rem probate. The Court applied the six-month limit to find petitioner's October 31, 1916 motion late as to the March 16, 1916 probate order.
• Intrinsic validity governed by national law of decedent — Under article 10 of the Civil Code, legal and testamentary successions, including the order of succession, amount of successional rights, and intrinsic validity of provisions, are regulated by the law of the nation of the person whose succession is in question. Probate does not determine intrinsic validity; it is conclusive only as to due execution. The Court applied this to hold that the will's intrinsic validity, including any legitime question, was to be governed by Illinois law, not the general Philippine law on testamentary succession.
• Presumption of regularity of judicial proceedings — After jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction is presumed to have been rightly done, and if the record is silent as to a fact necessary to the court's action, it is presumed that the fact was properly brought to its knowledge. The Court applied this to the Court of First Instance's probate order and its recitals.

• "the proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res." — Quoted from In re Davis and adopted by the Court; it states the due process rationale for constructive notice in probate.
• "the allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution." — Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, quoted by the Court; it is the basis for holding that the probate could not be collaterally attacked for defects in execution.
• "It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words." — The Court's statutory interpretation rule in rejecting the argument that section 636 applied only to aliens.
• "It would be novel doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose their citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity." — The Court's statement on citizenship, supporting the finding that Johnson remained a citizen of Illinois despite residence in Manila.

• In re Davis, 136 Cal., 590, 596 — Cited for the rule that a will probate proceeding is in rem and that statutory publication may constitute due process; the Court relied on it to uphold the sufficiency of notice.
• O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien, 199 U.S., 89 — Cited for the rejection of a due process challenge to probate without personal notice where the statute allowed the will to be contested within a year; the Court used it to support the sufficiency of publication and available remedy.
• Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676 — Cited collectively for the rule that probate is conclusive as to the due execution of a will.
• Austrua vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. Rep., 180, 184 — Cited as suggesting, without deciding, that relief might be granted if probate were procured by fraud; the Court noted fraud was not alleged.
• Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. Rep., 921 — Cited for the presumption that after jurisdiction is acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction is presumed rightly done.
• Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395 — Cited for the rule that probate does not affect the intrinsic validity of the will's provisions.
• Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U.S., 449 — Cited with Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca for the presumption of regularity of judicial acts after jurisdiction.
• Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs. Muir, 151 Cal., 363 — Cited in connection with the Davis due process rule on constructive notice in probate.

• Section 618, Code of Civil Procedure — Required three witnesses for a will executed by an inhabitant; Johnson's holographic will had only two, so it could not be proved under this section.
• Section 636, Code of Civil Procedure — Permitted a will made in the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, executed according to the law of that state or country and provable there, to be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Islands. The Court applied it to Johnson as a citizen of the United States and Illinois.
• Section 625, Code of Civil Procedure — Declared the allowance of a will of real or personal property conclusive as to its due execution. The Court used it to bar the attack on the probate.
• Section 113, Code of Civil Procedure — Allowed relief from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, provided application is made within a reasonable time not exceeding six months. The Court held the remedy existed but petitioner's motion was late.
• Section 275, Code of Civil Procedure — Authorized judicial notice of certain matters, including acts of the legislative department of the United States. The Court held it did not authorize judicial notice of the laws of the various American States.
• Section 614, Code of Civil Procedure — Cited with section 625 for the rule that probate does not affect the intrinsic validity of the will's provisions.
• Article 10, Civil Code — Provided that legal and testamentary successions, including the order of succession, amount of successional rights, and intrinsic validity of provisions, are regulated by the law of the nation of the person whose succession is in question. The Court applied it to hold that Illinois law governed intrinsic validity.
• Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution — Declares that naturalized persons are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. The Court used it to support Johnson's Illinois citizenship.
• Due process provision of the Philippine Bill — Petitioner invoked it against probate without personal notice; the Court held statutory publication and the section 113 remedy satisfied due process.

Torres, Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., concurred.