Ebarle vs. Sucaldito

Executive Order No. 264 applies exclusively to administrative complaints against public officials and employees and is not a condition precedent to criminal preliminary investigation or prosecution. A criminal complaint for preliminary investigation before the fiscal may thus proceed without prior compliance with that Order, even when filed by a person who is not the offended party.

Bienvenido A. Ebarle was the incumbent provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur seeking reelection in the 1971 local elections. Rufino Labang was City Fiscal of Pagadian City, with State Prosecutors Meneleo Mesina, Arturo Guillermo, Alberto S. Lim, Jr., and Jesus Acebes participating, while Judges Melquiades B. Sucaldito and Asaali S. Isnani presided over the Courts of First Instance concerned. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. acted as private complainant under Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and pertinent Revised Penal Code provisions. Executive Order No. 264, outlining procedure for complaints charging government officials with irregularities, supplied the invoked administrative framework.

Bienvenido A. Ebarle was the provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, with Santiago Eisma, Mirufo Celerian, Jose Sayson, Cesar Tabiliran, and Maximo Adlawan impleaded as co-respondents in the earlier investigations as members of the bidding committee or private participants. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. commenced a series of complaints with the City Fiscal of Pagadian City. On September 26, 1970, it filed I.S. No. 1-70 alleging that on or about October 10, 1969, respondents simulated bidding for gravel and sand, made it appear Tabiliran Trucking Company won, executed the award and contract in its favor, gave unwarranted advantage through manifest partiality, and facilitated collection of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654 despite disapproval in audit and made it appear Tecson Trucking Company collected it.

On the same date it commenced I.S. No. 2-71 alleging that on April 8, 1970, bidding for the right wing of the Capitol Building was manipulated to favor Codeniera Construction, allegedly owned by the brother-in-law of Ebarle's wife, with the abstract of bids falsified to show another bidder uninterested. Thereafter, on January 26, 1971, it instituted I.S. No. 4-71 alleging that on April 4, 1967, Ebarle testified falsely under oath in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-468, claiming purchase of Lot No. 2545 from Brigido Sanchez when the lot was owned by the provincial government and occupied by the provincial jail. On February 10, 1971, it filed I.S. No. 5-71 alleging that on June 16, 1970, respondents conducted an unpublished simulated bidding for gravel and sand, excluded Jesus Teoson's seasonably submitted bid, and awarded the contract to Cesar Tabiliran.

While the first Supreme Court petition was pending, the League filed three Circuit Criminal Court complaints on April 26, 1971, docketed as CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS, alleging that on December 18, 1969, Ebarle appointed Elizabeth Ebarle Montesclaros, daughter of his brother, as Private Secretary, and Teresito Montesclaros, husband of his niece, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, and certified falsely that promotion, seniority, and nepotism rules had been observed. Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, it brought I.S. No. 6-71 charging five counts of nepotism and unwarranted preference involving Mario Ebarle, Teresito Montesclaros, Elizabeth Ebarle Montesclaros, and Zacarias Ugsod, Jr., influence exerted on August 19, 1967 upon the presiding judge to award Lot 2545 to Ebarle, and falsification under Article 171(4). On September 21, 1971, it instituted I.S. No. 7-71 charging appointments of Boninda Ebarle, Jesus Ebarle, and Phenina Codinera as laboratory technician, driver, and confidential assistant. Petitioner moved to dismiss the fiscal investigations without success, resorted to prohibition actions before Judges Sucaldito and Isnani who both dismissed his petitions, and then elevated both dismissals to the Supreme Court where restraining orders were issued.

• Executive Order No. 264 Compliance: Petitioner maintained that the City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with Executive Order No. 264 outlining procedure for complaints against government officials, preliminary to criminal recourse, warranting dismissal or enjoinment of the investigations and prosecutions.
• Standing of Private Complainant: Petitioner assailed the standing of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. to commence the series of prosecutions below in G.R. No. L-33628, implying it was not the proper party to initiate them.
• Scope of Restraining Order and Grave Abuse: Petitioner contended that the respondent Fiscal in G.R. No. L-34162, in giving due course to the later complaints notwithstanding the restraining order issued in G.R. No. L-33628, which allegedly applied thereto, committed grave abuse of discretion.
• Political Motivation: Petitioner submitted that the prosecutions were politically motivated, initiated by rivals while he was a candidate for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in the 1971 local elections.

• Applicability of Executive Order No. 264: Whether Executive Order No. 264, outlining procedure for complaints against public officials, must be complied with as a condition precedent to criminal preliminary investigation and prosecution for Anti-Graft and Revised Penal Code violations.
• Personality to Initiate Preliminary Investigation: Whether the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., not being the offended party, may validly file complaints for preliminary investigation by the fiscal.
• Scope of Restraining Order: Whether the temporary restraining order issued in G.R. No. L-33628 embraced the distinct complaints subject of G.R. No. L-34162 so as to bar proceedings therein.
• Enjoining Politically Motivated Prosecutions: Whether criminal prosecutions allegedly tainted with political motivation and multiplicity may be enjoined by prohibition and injunction.

• Applicability of Executive Order No. 264: No. Executive Order No. 264 applies exclusively to administrative complaints, not criminal offenses, and is not a condition precedent to preliminary investigation or court action.
• Personality to Initiate Preliminary Investigation: No bar. A complaint for preliminary investigation before the fiscal, involving an offense prosecutable de oficio, may be filed by any competent person, not only the offended party.
• Scope of Restraining Order: No. The G.R. No. L-33628 restraint covering I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71 did not stay the factually distinct nepotism, influence, and falsification charges in CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71.
• Enjoining Politically Motivated Prosecutions: No. Injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions, none of the recognized exceptions having been shown; alleged harassment is for the preliminary investigation to resolve.

• Applicability of Executive Order No. 264: The Order's title refers to commission of irregularities, without mention of criminal offenses or crimes, and its perambulatory and operative paragraphs merely restate existing administrative disciplinary procedures for presidential appointees, subordinate officials under the Civil Service Act, elective local officials under the Decentralization Act, and police members under the Police Act of 1966. No reference to judicial or fiscal preliminary investigation appears as a required prior resort, while mention of court action after exhaustion of administrative remedies contemplates civil suits, and language of removal or vindication rather than conviction or acquittal confirms administrative intent. Construing it as amending Republic Act No. 5180 on preliminary investigations would, under the 1935 Constitution vesting legislation exclusively in Congress, create a constitutional anomaly.
• Personality to Initiate Preliminary Investigation: Unless the offense is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation purposes, following Hernandez vs. Albano. The offended-party requirement in Section 2, Rule 110 contemplates a complaint filed in court to commence judicial action, where the aggrieved party must start the proceeding, whereas a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to judicial action, leading to an information filed by the fiscal, is not so restricted.
• Scope of Restraining Order: Although both sets invoked the Anti-Graft Law or Revised Penal Code, comparison showed major differences: G.R. No. L-33628 concerned simulated gravel-and-sand biddings, manipulated capitol-building bidding, and false testimony over Lot 2545, while G.R. No. L-34162 concerned nepotistic appointments under Sections 3(c) and (j), influence under Section 4(b) regarding Lot 2545/2645, and untruthful certifications under Article 171(4). Restraint of I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71 therefore did not extend to the later Circuit Criminal Court cases and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71.
• Enjoining Politically Motivated Prosecutions: Determination of harassment belongs to the fiscal in preliminary investigation, not to injunction proceedings. The general rule against enjoining criminal prosecutions admits only narrow exceptions — orderly administration of justice, preventing oppressive use of law, avoiding multiplicity, protecting constitutional rights, or void statute — none of which was perceived on the record, the deluge of complaints alone not establishing oppressive or vindictive prosecution.

• Administrative character of Executive Order No. 264 — Executive Order No. 264, outlining procedure for complaints charging officials with irregularities, governs only administrative disciplinary complaints through the Office of the President, department heads, local executives, or police boards of investigators, and does not impose exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to criminal preliminary investigation or prosecution.
• Complaint for preliminary investigation vs. complaint in court — A complaint filed with the fiscal for preliminary investigation may be filed by any competent person where the offense is prosecutable de oficio; the requirement that a complaint be filed by the offended party applies to a complaint filed in court to commence a criminal action, distinct from the fiscal's information.
• Non-enjoinment of criminal prosecutions — As a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions, subject only to exceptions for orderly administration of justice, prevention of oppressive and vindictive use of law, avoidance of multiplicity, protection of constitutional rights, and unconstitutionality or voidness of the statute relied upon.

• "It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints." — States the ratio decidendi rejecting reliance on Executive Order No. 264 as a bar to criminal preliminary investigation.
• "A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the 'offended party.'" — Defines the controlling rule sustaining the Anti-Graft League's capacity to initiate fiscal investigations.
• "But more than that, and as a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions." — Articulates the doctrine denying injunctive relief against the challenged Anti-Graft and falsification prosecutions.
• "whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes is a question we are not in a position to decide. The proper venue, we believe, for the petitioner's complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he wishes blocked here." — Explains why alleged political motivation must be raised before the fiscal rather than by prohibition.

• Hernandez vs. Albano, No. L-17081, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 607 — Followed as authority that a complaint for preliminary investigation, unless the offense is not prosecutable de oficio, may be filed by any competent person, and that the offended-party rule applies to complaints filed in court.
• Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, No. L-17169, Nov. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 619 — Cited to show the President's power of control over appointees, supporting the view that paragraph 2 of Executive Order No. 264 restates existing administrative doctrine.
• Asutilla vs. Philippine National Bank, No. L-51354, Jan. 15, 1986, 141 SCRA 40; Guingona, Jr. vs. City Fiscal of Manila, No. L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577 — Followed for the general rule that injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions and its five exceptions.

• Executive Order No. 264 (1970) — Outlining procedure for written, sworn, particularized complaints against presidential appointees, subordinates, elective local officials, and police; construed as consolidating administrative remedies only, not requiring prior resort before criminal preliminary investigation.
• Section 3(c) and (j) and Section 4(b), Republic Act No. 3019 — Anti-Graft provisions invoked for nepotistic appointments, causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, and inducing a judge to perform an irregular act; held prosecutable without prior Executive Order No. 264 compliance.
• Articles 171, 171(4), 182, 183, 213, and 318, Revised Penal Code — Falsification, false testimony, and related offenses charged over simulated biddings, false certificates of compliance with nepotism rules, and false cadastral testimony; treated as criminal matters outside Executive Order No. 264.
• Section 2, Rule 110, Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure) — Requiring a court complaint to be filed by the offended party; distinguished from a fiscal complaint for preliminary investigation which any competent person may file.
• Section 33, Republic Act No. 2260; Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185; Section 15, Republic Act No. 4864; Republic Act No. 5180 — Civil Service, Decentralization, Police, and preliminary investigation laws; cited to show Executive Order No. 264 merely reiterated administrative jurisdictions and could not amend preliminary investigation procedure.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.