Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Hon. Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr., et al.

Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction the splitting of a cause of action so that a party may avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court, and it governs only national government infrastructure projects; for local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts may issue provisional injunctive reliefs only when (1) there are compelling and substantial constitutional violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) the public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending far outweighs the inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded and the public benefits that will result from the completion of the project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders issued by trial courts should be strictly followed, and no preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to support the injunctive relief is clear and convincing.

The Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and Awards Committee, undertook the "Construction Shoreline Protection Project" — the construction of a 1,050-lineal-meter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality's shoreline — under the Local Governnment Finance and Development (LOGOFIND) project, with funding and procurement guidelines involving the World Bank. Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. and HLJ Construction and Enterprise were among the contractors that secured bidding documents and participated in the bidding. The procurement was governed by Republic Act No. 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act, and its Article XVII, Section 58, which vests jurisdiction over final decisions of the head of the procuring entity in the Regional Trial Court and preserves any law conferring on the Supreme Court sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and injunctions relating to infrastructure projects of government — a reference to Republic Act No. 8975 and Presidential Decree No. 1818.

On December 28, 2005, the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and Awards Committee, published an invitation to bid for the construction of a 1,050-lineal-meter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality's shoreline, an infrastructure venture known as the "Construction Shoreline Protection Project." On January 17, 2006, the Bids and Awards Committee conducted a pre-bid conference attended by six prospective contractors, including Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. On January 31, 2006, three of the seven contractors that had secured bidding documents submitted letters of withdrawal, leaving four bidders whose bids were opened: Mig-wells Construction Corporation at P35,561,015.33 as the highest bidder; ADP Construction & Supply at P34,778,496.72 as the third lowest; Dynamic Builders at P29,750,000.00 as the lowest bidder; and HLJ Construction and Enterprise at P31,922,420.27 as the second lowest bidder.

On March 27, 2006, the Bids and Awards Committee issued Resolution No. 6 recommending the award in favor of HLJ Construction and Enterprise. On April 18, 2006, the Municipality of Valladolid received a "NO OBJECTION" letter from the World Bank through the LOGOFIND project director, advising the Bids and Awards Committee to proceed with the issuance of the notice of award, letter of acceptance, signing of contract, and notice to proceed. On April 21, 2006, the Bids and Awards Committee issued Resolution No. 7 affirming the award of contract to HLJ Construction and Enterprise for the construction of the project amounting to P31,922,420.37. On April 25, 2006, Bids and Awards Committee Chairperson Celina C. Segunla wrote Engr. Raul F. Balandra of Dynamic Builders and the other participating losing bidders, ADP Construction and Mig-Wells Construction Corporation, to inform them of the Bids and Awards Committee's findings and decision. Dynamic Builders was informed that its bid proposal had been found to be "not substantially responsive," and it received this decision on May 11, 2006.

Dynamic Builders alleged that on May 5, 2006, it submitted a letter dated April 7, 2006 containing a request for the Bids and Awards Committee to furnish it with all submitted bid documents and relevant Bids and Awards Committee resolutions, but this was denied by a letter dated May 5, 2006 invoking confidentiality under Section 2.46 of the LOGOFIND guidelines. On May 15, 2006, the Bids and Awards Committee received a letter from Dynamic Builders seeking reconsideration of the April 25, 2006 decision declaring its bid as not substantially responsive. On May 22, 2006, the Bids and Awards Committee wrote Dynamic Builders denying the request for reconsideration and informing it of the post-evaluation examination results showing its failure in its Financial Contracting Capability.

On June 6, 2006, Dynamic Builders lodged a formal protest with Mayor Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr., as head of the procuring entity, to set aside the Bids and Awards Committee decision declaring its bid as not substantially responsive. Mayor Presbitero dismissed the protest in a Decision dated June 12, 2006. According to that Decision, the bidders underwent preliminary examination and were subjected to the criteria of Verification, Eligibility, Bid Security, Completeness of Bid, Substantial Responsiveness, and Acceptance for Detailed Examination; Mig-wells Construction Corporation did not pass the preliminary examination, while the remaining three that passed were subjected to detailed examination, all three of which passed and qualified for post-evaluation examination. During the post-evaluation examination, the three bidders submitted their financial statements for the last five years and other documents expressly provided in Volume 2 of the Procurement Guidelines Manual of LOGOFIND World Bank. The examination showed that Dynamic Builders had a negative Financial Contracting Capability of P64,579,119.13 due to numerous other contractual commitments or balance of works; HLJ Construction and Enterprise had a positive Financial Contracting Capability of P30,921,063.86; and ADP Construction had a positive Financial Contracting Capability of only P12,770,893.78. Section 4.5.e of the Instruction To Bidders requires a minimum Financial Contracting Capability of P13,000,000.00. Mayor Presbitero denied Dynamic Builders' Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated June 30, 2006.

On September 4, 2006, and pursuant to Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, Dynamic Builders filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, Negros Occidental, assailing Mayor Presbitero's Decision and Resolution. Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders filed the present Petition dated September 4, 2006 for prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, which was received on September 6, 2006. The Petition alleged that respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise had already commenced construction and obtained the release of the 15% advance for mobilization costs as well as partial payments for the portion completed. The lower courts' factual findings that matter to the Supreme Court's analysis are that the Construction Shoreline Protection Project had commenced as early as May 8, 2006 and had been ongoing for four months at the time the Petition was filed in September 2006, and that the project was almost near completion.

• Simultaneous Remedies Under Section 58: Petitioner argued that Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 implicitly allowed it to simultaneously file a Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court assailing the protest case on the merits, and another Petition before the Supreme Court for injunctive remedies.
• Scope of the "Law" in Section 58: Petitioner maintained that the "law conferring on the Supreme Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and injunctions relating to Infrastructure Project of Government" refers to Republic Act No. 8975 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1818.
• Extension to Local Government Projects: Petitioner submitted that while Republic Act No. 8975 appears to apply only to national government infrastructure projects, the resulting amendment to Presidential Decree No. 1818 by virtue of Sections 3 and 9 of Republic Act No. 8975, removing any restriction upon the Supreme Court to issue injunctive relief, would similarly apply to the infrastructure projects subject of or covered by Presidential Decree No. 1818, which would include those undertaken for or by local governments.
• J.V. Lagon Construction vs. Pangarungan: Petitioner asserted that this case clarified that Regional Trial Courts can issue injunctive relief when it is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, but argued that the ruling was an obiter dictum and that the case involved a national government project; thus, it only exercised prudence when it took twin remedial routes.
• Extreme Urgency and Constitutional Violations: Petitioner argued that the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was of extreme urgency, as it was illegally deprived of its constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of law.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner was denied due process when the contract was awarded to private respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise without first giving the former an opportunity to avail itself of the remedies under Republic Act No. 9184.
• Violation of Section 57 of Republic Act No. 9184: The award of the contract to private respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise violated Section 57 of Republic Act No. 9184.
• Responsiveness of the Bid: Contrary to the findings of public respondents, the bid submitted by petitioner was responsive.
• Lowest Calculated Responsive Bid: For having in fact submitted the Lowest Calculated Responsive Bid, petitioner should be awarded the contract for the Construction of the 1,050 Lineal Meter Rubble Concrete Seawall of the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental.

• Splitting of a Cause of Action, Multiplicity of Suits, and Forum Shopping: Public respondents countered that petitioner grossly violated the rules against splitting a single cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.
• Improper Remedy and Hierarchy of Courts: Public respondents argued that petitioner availed of an improper remedy and disregarded the rule on hierarchy of courts.
• Prohibition Unavailable for Accomplished Acts: Public respondents maintained that the project undertaken by HLJ Construction and Enterprise was almost near completion, and prohibition was not intended to provide a remedy for acts already executed or accomplished; petitioner should have asked for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. 1459 filed before the trial court.
• Alternative Remedies: Public respondents argued that Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, Presidential Decree No. 1818, and Republic Act No. 8975 do not envision simultaneous resort to remedies before the trial court and the Supreme Court, and that Section 58 provides for alternative remedies between an action under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court and a proper action directly before the Supreme Court.
• Scope of Republic Act No. 8975: Public respondents agreed that Republic Act No. 8975 only governs national government projects but disagreed with petitioner's submission that since Republic Act No. 8975 amended Presidential Decree No. 1818 by removing the restriction on the Supreme Court to issue injunctive relief, it now covers local government projects.
• Forum Shopping (Private Respondent): Respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise similarly raised the issue of petitioner's forum shopping.
• Due Process Was Not Denied: Respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise added that due process was not denied, as public respondent notified petitioner of its findings and decision, heard petitioner's arguments, and entertained petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
• Grave Injustice and Irreparable Injury from Delay: Respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise stressed that the Construction Shoreline Protection Project's delay will only result in grave injustice and irreparable injury affecting the people of the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental.

• Simultaneous Filing and Splitting of a Cause of Action: Whether Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 contemplates simultaneous filing of a petition for prohibition seeking injunctive reliefs from the Supreme Court and a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court; consequently, whether petitioner violated the rules against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether petitioner violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
• Impropriety of the Remedy: Whether petitioner resorted to an improper remedy when it filed a petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court.
• Injunctive Relief for Local Government Projects: Whether Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, in relation to Republic Act No. 8975 and Presidential Decree No. 1818, allows Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive relief subject to the presence of certain conditions.
• Violation of the Status Quo Order: Whether respondents violated the Supreme Court's September 18, 2006 status quo Order in relation to the ongoing Construction Shoreline Protection Project.

• Simultaneous Filing and Splitting of a Cause of Action: No. Section 58 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort to this court by one that had already filed an action before the Regional Trial Court without violating the basic rules on proscription against the splitting of a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping; the petition sought the same relief through two separate petitions filed before separate courts.
• Hierarchy of Courts: No. The remedy contemplated by Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 is either an action under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court or the proper action filed before the Supreme Court, and direct resort to the Supreme Court can prosper only when the requisites for direct invocation of its original jurisdiction are present.
• Impropriety of the Remedy: Yes. Prohibition is a preventive remedy and injunctive remedies will not lie for acts already accomplished; the project had already commenced and had been ongoing at the time petitioner filed this case, and the merits of the alleged grave abuse of discretion were already the subject of the Petition before the trial court.
• Injunctive Relief for Local Government Projects: Yes. The Regional Trial Court can issue injunctive relief against government infrastructure projects, even those undertaken by local governments, considering that the prohibition in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 only mentions national government projects, subject to the conditions of compelling constitutional violations, a clear right, grave and irreparable injuries, and a public interest that outweighs the inconvenience or costs to the party awarded the project.
• Violation of the Status Quo Order: No. Relying in good faith on the ordinary meaning of status quo as differentiated from status quo ante, respondents pushed through with the construction, which had been the existing state of affairs at the time the September 18, 2006 Resolution was issued.

• Simultaneous Filing and Splitting of a Cause of Action: Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action, while Section 4 provides that if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. The splitting of a cause of action violates the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. The Petition sought to enjoin the execution of public respondent's Decision and Resolution on the protest — the same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence, petitioner sought the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before separate courts, violating the rule against forum shopping under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for, and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. The second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 simply means it does not preclude a direct filing before the Supreme Court in proper cases, but the remedy contemplated is either an action under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court or the proper action filed before the Supreme Court.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The Rules of Court provides for original concurrent jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court in entertaining petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. However, parties must adhere to the principle of hierarchy of courts, as discussed in Dimson (Manila), Inc., et al. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration: the proper recourse to a court action from decisions of the Bids and Awards Committee is to file a certiorari not before the Supreme Court but before the regional trial court which is vested by Republic Act No. 9184 with jurisdiction to entertain the same. While the certiorari jurisdiction of the regional trial court is concurrent with the Supreme Court's, that fact alone does not allow an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum; a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue the writ will be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The doctrine with respect to hierarchy of courts was designed so that the Supreme Court will have more time to focus on its constitutional tasks without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the lower courts' competence. The Court acts on petitions for extraordinary writs under Rule 65 only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

• Impropriety of the Remedy: Prohibition is a preventive remedy, and the Court has held that injunctive remedies will not lie for acts already accomplished. The acts sought to be enjoined included the implementation of the Construction Shoreline Protection Project awarded to private respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise, and the project had already commenced and had been ongoing at the time petitioner filed this case. Moreover, the issue of whether these acts infringed on petitioner's rights is a matter interrelated with the issues raised in the Petition before the trial court, emphasizing the existence of the splitting of a cause of action. Extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are prerogative writs of equity; it is within the court's sound discretion whether these writs should be granted, and it will need to ensure that there is a clear right to the relief. Prohibition is defined as an extraordinary remedy available to compel any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions to desist from further proceeding in an action or matter when the proceedings are without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion will prosper as a ground for prohibition when it is shown that there was capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or that the tribunal, corporation, board, or person has exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. First, public respondent had jurisdiction to rule on the protest since it was then head of the procuring entity. Second, the Court need not look into petitioner's allegation that its Petition before the Regional Trial Court raised grounds warranting the reversal of public respondent's Decision, because the merits of whether there was grave abuse of discretion by public respondent were already the subject of the Petition before the trial court, and petitioner cannot be allowed to seek the same relief from the Supreme Court. Rule 65 likewise requires that there be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Injunctive Relief for Local Government Projects: Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 provides for an exception to the general rule prohibiting lower courts from issuing provisional injunctive relief against national government projects. When the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, even Regional Trial Courts may grant injunctive reliefs as explained in Republic vs. Nolasco. Considering that petitioner alleged that this matter is of extreme urgency, involving the constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law, it should have prayed for injunctive relief before the trial court where its Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 was pending, together with a bond fixed by the court. Mere allegation or invocation that constitutionally protected rights were violated will not automatically result in the issuance of injunctive relief; the plaintiff or petitioner should discharge the burden to show a clear and compelling breach of a constitutional provision. Violations of constitutional provisions are easily alleged, but trial courts should scrutinize diligently and deliberately the evidence showing the existence of facts that should support the conclusion that a constitutional provision is clearly and convincingly breached; in case of doubt, no injunctive relief should issue. The Court adheres to the policy behind the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 and even issued Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 enjoining lower court judges to strictly comply with the law. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 8975 or in Presidential Decree No. 1818 that allows the simultaneous availment of legal remedies before the Regional Trial Court and the Supreme Court. The Court has set the limit on the prohibition found in Presidential Decree No. 1818 by explaining that lower courts are not prohibited from enjoining administrative acts when questions of law exist and the acts do not involve administrative discretion in technical cases. The Regional Trial Court can issue injunctive relief against government infrastructure projects, even those undertaken by local governments, considering that the prohibition in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8975 only mentions national government projects. These courts can issue injunctive relief when there are compelling constitutional violations — only when the right is clear, there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable injuries, and the public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending far outweighs the inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded. Republic Act No. 8975 mentions the constitutional provision that the use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good; statute cannot be interpreted as to violate protected rights. These safeguards are consistent with the law's policy for the expeditious implementation of government projects that ultimately benefit the public. The Petition's incorporation of its discussion on due process and equal protection arguments, as made in its Petition before the Regional Trial Court, only emphasizes the splitting of a cause of action committed. In any event, the general rule of prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 does not preclude lower courts from assuming jurisdiction when the ultimate relief prayed for is to nullify a national government infrastructure project and its implementation, because what is expressly prohibited by the statute is the issuance of the provisional reliefs of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions.

• Violation of the Status Quo Order: Private respondent HLJ Construction and Enterprise explained that it had no intention to disobey the Resolution, and its decision to continue the Construction Shoreline Protection Project was based on the definition of "status quo," meaning the present, current, existing state of affairs; the present existing condition on September 18, 2006 was the ongoing construction. Public respondent contended that the Construction Shoreline Protection Project commenced as early as May 8, 2006, and at the time the Petition was filed in September 2006, the project had been ongoing for four months; thus, the status quo as of the September 18, 2006 Resolution was that the project was ongoing. The Court has explained that the status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case; the status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy, and the status quo ante litem is the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case. The ordinary meaning of status quo is the existing state of affairs, while status quo ante refers to the state of affairs that existed previously. Relying in good faith on the ordinary meaning of status quo as differentiated from status quo ante, respondents pushed through with the construction, which had been the existing state of affairs at the time the September 18, 2006 Resolution was issued. This is consistent with Republic Act No. 8975's policy that the State shall ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance, and/or repair costs and to immediately enjoy the social and economic benefits therefrom. This policy declaration does not distinguish between national and local government infrastructure projects; delay in the project will only mean additional costs for the government and prejudice to the people of the Municipality of Valladolid who will directly benefit from the project.

• Splitting of a Cause of Action — A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action; if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. The rule violates the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that petitioner's simultaneous filing of a Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court and a Petition for Prohibition before the Supreme Court, both seeking relief against the same Decision and Resolution, constituted splitting of a cause of action.

• Forum Shopping — The practice of litigants resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for, and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. The Court found that petitioner's twin petitions sought the same relief through two separate courts, violating Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

• Hierarchy of Courts — While the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, parties must adhere to the principle of hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction will be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The doctrine was designed so that the Supreme Court will have more time to focus on its constitutional tasks without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the lower courts' competence. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the proper recourse from decisions of the Bids and Awards Committee is to file a certiorari before the Regional Trial Court vested by Republic Act No. 9184 with jurisdiction.

• Prohibition as a Preventive Remedy — Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available to compel any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions to desist from further proceeding in an action or matter when the proceedings are without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Injunctive remedies will not lie for acts already accomplished. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that prohibition was improper because the Construction Shoreline Protection Project had already commenced and had been ongoing at the time petitioner filed this case.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion as a Ground for Prohibition — Grave abuse of discretion will prosper as a ground for prohibition when it is shown that there was capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or that the tribunal, corporation, board, or person has exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The Court noted that public respondent had jurisdiction to rule on the protest since it was then head of the procuring entity, and that the merits of the alleged grave abuse were already the subject of the Petition before the trial court.

• Conditions for Injunctive Relief Against Local Government Infrastructure Projects — For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts may issue provisional injunctive reliefs only when (1) there are compelling and substantial constitutional violations; (2) there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) the public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending far outweighs (a) the inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from the completion of the project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders issued by trial courts should be strictly followed, and no preliminary injunction should issue unless the evidence to support the injunctive relief is clear and convincing.

• Scope of Republic Act No. 8975 — Republic Act No. 8975 covers only national government infrastructure projects, and does not sanction the splitting of a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court. The prohibition in Section 3 of the law only mentions national government projects; thus, Regional Trial Courts may issue injunctive relief against government infrastructure projects undertaken by local governments, subject to the enumerated conditions.

• Limit on the Prohibition Under Presidential Decree No. 1818 — Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, courts cannot be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

• Status Quo and Status Quo Ante — The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case; the status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy, and the status quo ante litem is the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case. The ordinary meaning of status quo is the existing state of affairs, while status quo ante refers to the state of affairs that existed previously. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that respondents did not violate the September 18, 2006 status quo Order because the ongoing construction was the existing state of affairs at the time of the Resolution.

• "Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order from this court. Also, this law covers only national government infrastructure projects. This case involves a local government infrastructure project." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the ponencia at the outset, framing both the procedural bar against splitting a cause of action and the limited scope of Republic Act No. 8975.

• "In other words, the Regional Trial Court can issue injunctive relief against government infrastructure projects, even those undertaken by local governments, considering that the prohibition in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8957 only mentions national government projects." — This passage articulates the Court's holding on the second issue, clarifying that Regional Trial Courts retain authority to issue injunctive relief against local government infrastructure projects because the statutory prohibition is textually limited to national government projects.

• "In essence, forum shopping is the practice of litigants resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. In determining whether forum shopping exists, it is important to consider the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different courts or fora on the same issues." — This passage supplies the canonical formulation of forum shopping applied by the Court in finding that petitioner's twin petitions violated the rule against forum shopping.

• "The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status." — This passage, quoted from Overseas Workers Welfare Administration vs. Chavez, defines the controlling concept of status quo applied by the Court in dismissing the contempt petition.

• Dimson (Manila), Inc., et al. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration, 645 Phil. 309 (2010) — Cited as the controlling precedent on hierarchy of courts, holding that the proper recourse from decisions of the Bids and Awards Committee is to file a certiorari before the Regional Trial Court vested by Republic Act No. 9184 with jurisdiction, and that a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

• Republic vs. Nolasco, 496 Phil. 853 (2005) — Cited for the rule that when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, even Regional Trial Courts may grant injunctive reliefs, and that Republic Act No. 8975 does not ordinarily warrant the outright dismissal of any complaint or petition before the lower courts seeking permanent injunctive relief from the implementation of national government infrastructure projects.

• Hernandez vs. NAPOCOR, 520 Phil. 38 (2006) — Cited for the rule that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases; on issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, courts cannot be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

• Overseas Workers Welfare Administration vs. Chavez, 551 Phil. 890 (2007) — Cited for the definition and application of status quo, holding that the status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case, and that the status quo ante litem is the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case.

• Air Material Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. vs. Manay, 575 Phil. 591 (2008) — Cited for the elements of forum shopping: identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for, and the identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

• J.V. Lagon Construction vs. Pangarungan, G.R. No. 167840, June 29, 2005 — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that Regional Trial Courts can issue injunctive relief when it is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue; petitioner argued that the ruling was an obiter dictum and that the case involved a national government project.

• Bañez, Jr. vs. Conception, G.R. No. 159508, August 29, 2012 — Cited for the doctrine on hierarchy of courts, holding that it was designed so that the Supreme Court will have more time to focus on its constitutional tasks without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the lower courts' competence.

• Chu vs. Spouses Cuncman, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011 — Cited for the rule that the splitting of a cause of action violates the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.

• Article XVII, Section 58, Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) — Provides that court action may be resorted to only after the protests contemplated in the Article shall have been completed; that the Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head of the procuring entity, with court actions governed by Rule 65; and that the provision is without prejudice to any law conferring on the Supreme Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and injunctions relating to infrastructure projects of government. The Court held that the second paragraph does not preclude a direct filing before the Supreme Court in proper cases, but that the remedy contemplated is either an action under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court or the proper action filed before the Supreme Court, and that direct resort to the Supreme Court can prosper only when the requisites for direct invocation of its original jurisdiction are present.

• Section 3, Republic Act No. 8975 — Prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit, or compel the acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way or site of any national government project; bidding or awarding of contract or project of the national government; commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, or operation of any such contract or project; termination or rescission of any such contract or project; and the undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project. The prohibition does not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise, and the applicant shall file a bond. The Court applied this provision in holding that the prohibition only mentions national government projects, and that Regional Trial Courts may issue injunctive relief against local government infrastructure projects subject to the enumerated conditions.

• Section 9, Republic Act No. 8975 (Repealing Clause) — Provides that all laws, decrees, including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818, and Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. Petitioner argued that this clause amended Presidential Decree No. 1818 such that the removal of the prohibition against the Supreme Court extended to local government projects; the Court rejected this reading, holding that nothing in Republic Act No. 8975 or Presidential Decree No. 1818 allows the simultaneous availment of legal remedies before the Regional Trial Court and the Supreme Court.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 8975 (Declaration of Policy) — Provides that Article XII, Section 6 of the Constitution states that the use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good, and that towards this end the State shall ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance, and/or repair costs and to immediately enjoy the social and economic benefits therefrom. The Court cited this policy in holding that the safeguards against lower court issuances of provisional injunctive relief are consistent with the law's policy, and that the policy declaration does not distinguish between national and local government infrastructure projects.

• Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981) — Prohibits courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure and natural resource development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. Section 1 provides that no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest, or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government. The Court held that the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.

• Rule 2, Sections 3 and 4, Rules of Court — Section 3 provides that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action; Section 4 provides that if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. The Court applied these provisions in finding that petitioner split a single cause of action.

• Rule 7, Section 5, Rules of Court — Requires the plaintiff or principal party to certify under oath that he or she has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court. The Court applied this provision in finding that petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping.

• Rule 65, Sections 2 and 4, Rules of Court — Section 2 defines prohibition as an extraordinary remedy available to compel any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions to desist from further proceeding in an action or matter when the proceedings are without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and requires that there be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; Section 4 provides for original concurrent jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court in entertaining petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. The Court applied these provisions in holding that prohibition was improper and that the hierarchy of courts must be respected.

• Article XII, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. The Court cited this provision in holding that statute cannot be interpreted as to violate protected rights, and that the conditions for injunctive relief safeguard against lower court issuances of provisional injunctive relief in cases not falling within the exception.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur. Villarama, Jr., J., was on official leave. Perlas-Bernabe, J., was on leave.