Dycoco vs. Court of Appeals

Certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal; where the right to appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is available but allowed to lapse, a party cannot invoke grave abuse of discretion to resort to certiorari under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals' dismissal of a petition for review filed beyond the extended reglementary period constitutes a proper exercise of discretion, not grave abuse thereof.

Petitioner-spouses Jesus and Joela Dycoco are the registered owners of Lot No. 216, a 38,157-square-meter parcel of land in Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered by OCT No. VH-5187. Private respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio Berma, along with several other individuals, entered the property, registered themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes, and occupied and cultivated portions thereof. The dispute arose within the framework of Presidential Decree No. 27, which governs the transfer of agricultural land from landowners to tenant-beneficiaries under Operation Land Transfer, and the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) over matters arising thereunder.

Petitioner-spouses Jesus and Joela Dycoco are the absolute and registered owners of Lot No. 216, a 38,157-square-meter parcel of land situated at Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered by OCT No. VH-5187. On November 23, 1994, they filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of certificates of land transfer, damages, and injunction against Nelly Siapno-Sanchez, Inocencio Berma, and five other individuals before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB in Albay. They alleged that the respondents had taken advantage of their liberality, entered the property, registered themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes, and occupied and cultivated the land without paying rentals due either to petitioner-spouses or to the Land Bank, and that the respondents had further violated agrarian reform laws by subleasing their respective landholdings to other persons.

Two of the respondents — Pablo Bonde, Sr. and Rogelio Siapno — answered and showed that they already owned their portions of the property through Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27, petitioner-spouses having executed deeds of transfer in their favor resulting in emancipation patents and, subsequently, OCT No. E-2333 and OCT No. E-2334, respectively. The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision on June 27, 1995 finding private respondents Siapno-Sanchez, Talagtag, and Berma "not worthy to become beneficiaries" under PD 27, ordering their ejectment, dismissing the case against Eusebio Siapno for lack of evidence, and awarding nominal damages and attorney's fees. A writ of execution was issued on November 22, 1995.

Petitioner-spouses subsequently filed a motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution and to cite respondents in contempt, alleging that private respondents had returned to the property despite having been ordered ejected. Private respondents countered with a motion to quash or suspend implementation of the writ, asserting that they were already owners of their respective portions by virtue of Operation Land Transfer under PD 27 — petitioner-spouses having executed deeds of transfer in their favor resulting in emancipation patents and, subsequently, OCT No. E-2332 in the name of Siapno-Sanchez and OCT Nos. E-2335 and E-2336 in the name of Berma. They further asserted that the ejectment decision was not yet executory because they had filed a notice of appeal on August 29, 1996.

The Provincial Adjudicator, in an order dated October 16, 1996, found that the copy of the June 27, 1995 decision was sent by registered mail to and received on July 10, 1995 by Crispina Berma Penaranda, daughter of private respondent Berma, who resided in a different barangay. The Provincial Adjudicator nonetheless ruled that Berma was bound by his daughter's receipt and that the decision was final and executory as to him, making his notice of appeal out of time. As to Siapno-Sanchez, there was no showing she had been served a copy of the decision before she procured one from the Provincial Adjudicator's office on August 26, 1996, so her notice of appeal was filed on time. The motion to quash was denied as to Berma and granted as to Siapno-Sanchez. Berma's motion for reconsideration was denied, but he joined the appeal memorandum filed by Siapno-Sanchez in the DARAB.

The DARAB, in a decision dated March 20, 2000, found that both private respondents were beneficiaries of PD 27 and were no longer tenants but owners of their respective portions, as evidenced by the OCTs issued in their names. Ejectment would not lie because landholdings covered by Operation Land Transfer under PD 27 do not revert to the original owner. The DARAB reversed and set aside the Provincial Adjudicator's decision as to private respondents and ordered their immediate reinstatement and restoration as owner-beneficiaries. Petitioner-spouses received a copy of the DARAB decision on April 3, 2000 and had until April 18, 2000 to appeal. They sought a 30-day extension from the Court of Appeals, which granted only 15 days, expiring on May 3, 2000. They filed their petition by registered mail on May 8, 2000 — five days beyond the extended period. The Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the petition for late filing on June 2, 2000, and denied reconsideration on January 10, 2001. Petitioner-spouses received the denial of reconsideration on January 19, 2001, giving them until February 5, 2001 to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court. They allowed that period to lapse and instead filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on March 16, 2001.

• Liberality in Construction of Procedural Rules: Petitioner-spouses invoked the rule of liberality, arguing that their petition was filed late only because they engaged new counsel on April 10, 2000 — just a week before the expiration of the appeal period — who still needed time to study the voluminous records.
• Compelling Reasons: Petitioner-spouses claimed compelling reasons justified giving their petition due course despite the five-day delay, namely: (a) they were deprived of their property without just compensation from either the tenant-beneficiaries or the government, and (b) they were denied due process when the DARAB took cognizance of private respondents' appeal despite it having been filed more than one year after the Provincial Adjudicator's decision had become final and executory.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner-spouses alleged that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying due course to their petition for review and in denying their motion for reconsideration, characterizing the assailed resolutions as "unjust and arbitrary."

• Propriety of Remedy: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the Court of Appeals' dismissal of a petition for review filed beyond the reglementary period, when the right to appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was available.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner-spouses' petition for late filing and denying reconsideration.
• Compelling Reasons — Just Compensation and Due Process: Whether the alleged deprivation of property without just compensation and denial of due process constitute compelling reasons warranting relaxation of procedural rules.

• Propriety of Remedy: No. The proper remedy was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal and lies only where no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available in the ordinary course of law.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Court of Appeals merely applied Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when it dismissed the petition filed five days beyond the extended deadline. The dismissal was a proper exercise of discretion, not a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic act equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
• Compelling Reasons — Just Compensation and Due Process: No. The issue of just compensation was raised for the first time on appeal and was not substantiated; it also falls under the DARAB's primary, original, and exclusive jurisdiction. The due process claim failed because petitioner-spouses were given ample opportunity to be heard at every level, and the notice of appeal was in fact filed on time by both private respondents.

• Propriety of Remedy: The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated June 2, 2000 and January 10, 2001 were final and appealable judgments that disposed of petitioner-spouses' appeal in a manner leaving nothing more to be done by the Court of Appeals. The right recourse was to appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner-spouses received the January 10, 2001 Resolution on January 19, 2001 and had until February 5, 2001 to file such an appeal, but they allowed the period to lapse and instead filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on March 16, 2001. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits resort to certiorari, because one of the requisites for the latter is the unavailability of appeal. The failure to file the proper appeal cannot be remedied by merely alleging grave abuse of discretion to invoke certiorari under Rule 65.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court of Appeals granted petitioner-spouses a 15-day extension in accordance with Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, moving the deadline from April 18, 2000 to May 3, 2000. Petitioner-spouses filed on May 8, 2000 and admitted the five-day delay. The Court of Appeals simply applied the rules while petitioner-spouses concededly failed to observe them. Grave abuse of discretion requires a showing that the court acted in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction — an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Petitioner-spouses made only cursory claims that the resolutions were "unjust and arbitrary" but failed to demonstrate with definiteness any such patent and gross abuse.

• Compelling Reasons — Just Compensation and Due Process: While petitioner-spouses are entitled to just compensation for property taken under PD 27, they did not raise the issue in their complaint or position paper before the Provincial Adjudicator, raising it for the first time only in their petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The settled rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal defeats the alleged compelling nature of the claim. Moreover, the DARAB has primary, original, and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving payments for lands awarded under PD 27, so the issue could not validly be presented for the first time in the Court of Appeals. In any event, the right to just compensation does not include reacquisition of ownership, as lands acquired under PD 27 do not revert to the landowner. As to due process, petitioner-spouses were given ample opportunity to be heard: they submitted comments and oppositions to the motion to quash before the Provincial Adjudicator and a counter-memorandum with motion to dismiss before the DARAB, all arguing that the notice of appeal was filed out of time. Due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, which was satisfied. Furthermore, it was established that the notice of appeal was filed on time as to Siapno-Sanchez (no prior service of the decision) and as to Berma (service upon his daughter in another barangay did not constitute valid service under Sections 4 and 9, Rule V of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, since Berma had neither counsel nor duly authorized representative at the time). Questioning the timeliness finding would raise a question of fact, which cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari. The liberal construction rule is not a license to disregard procedural requirements; petitioner-spouses caused their own predicament by changing counsel just a week before the appeal deadline expired.

• Certiorari as remedy of last recourse — The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is a limited form of review available only where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot serve as a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper even if the ground is grave abuse of discretion. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner-spouses, having allowed the period for Rule 45 appeal to lapse, could not resort to Rule 65 certiorari by merely alleging grave abuse of discretion.

• Grave abuse of discretion defined — Grave abuse of discretion means capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction — an evasion of positive duty, a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. The abuse must be patent and gross. The Court found that the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the late-filed petition was a proper exercise of discretion and did not meet this standard.

• Issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal — Questions, theories, and issues not presented in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as fairness and due process dictate that evidence and issues not presented below cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal. The Court applied this rule to bar petitioner-spouses' just compensation claim, which was never alleged in their complaint or position paper before the Provincial Adjudicator.

• Lands acquired under PD 27 do not revert to the landowner — Property transferred to tenant-beneficiaries pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 does not revert to the original landowner, even if just compensation has not been paid. The right to just compensation does not include reacquisition of ownership and possession. The Court invoked this principle to reject petitioner-spouses' attempt to regain possession of the landholdings.

• Due process as opportunity to be heard — Due process, in its basic concept, is simply the opportunity to be heard; in administrative proceedings, it means the opportunity to explain one's side or seek reconsideration. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, due process was not denied. The Court found that petitioner-spouses had submitted pleadings at every level arguing their position on the timeliness of the notice of appeal, satisfying this standard.

• Liberal construction rule is not a license to disregard procedural rules — Procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. The Court refused to relax the rules because petitioner-spouses caused their own predicament by changing counsel one week before the appeal deadline.

• "The failure of petitioner-spouses to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be remedied by the mere expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that certiorari under Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost appeal under Rule 45, even when grave abuse of discretion is alleged.

• "Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine that certiorari does not lie as a substitute for a lapsed appeal, frequently cited in Philippine remedial law jurisprudence.

• "The 'liberal construction rule' is not a license to disregard procedural requirements. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure." — This passage defines the limits of the liberal construction doctrine and is commonly cited when courts decline to relax procedural rules for self-inflicted procedural lapses.

• "As it was not received by private respondent Berma but by his daughter who resided in another barangay, there was no proper and completed service of the Provincial Adjudicator's decision on Berma." — This passage applies the DARAB New Rules of Procedure on service by registered mail, establishing that service upon a relative residing in a different barangay does not constitute valid service on the addressee party, and thus the notice of appeal was filed on time.

• Balayan vs. Acorda, 523 Phil. 305 (2006) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the doctrine that certiorari is a remedy of last recourse and cannot be allowed when a party fails to appeal despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal.

• Bugarin vs. Palisoc, 513 Phil. 59 (2005) — Followed. Cited for the principle that the proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits is appeal, even if the error ascribed is lack of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion.

• Yu vs. Judge Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341 — Followed. Cited for the precise definition of "grave abuse of discretion" as requiring a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, patent and gross enough to warrant striking down an act through certiorari.

• Abedes vs. Court of Appeals, 562 Phil. 262 (2007) — Followed. Cited for the standard that grave abuse of discretion must be established by showing the respondent court acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

• Republic vs. Kenrick Development Corporation, 529 Phil. 876 (2006) — Followed. Cited for the principle that the liberal construction rule is not a license to disregard procedural requirements and that rules should be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons.

• Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso vs. Perez, G.R. No. 173926, March 6, 2013 — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that lands acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27 do not revert to the landowner.

• De la Cruz vs. Quiazon, G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 681 — Followed. Cited together with Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso vs. Perez for the principle that the right to just compensation does not include reacquisition of ownership and possession of property transferred under PD 27.

• Section 4, Rule 43, Rules of Court — Governs the period of appeal to the Court of Appeals from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies. Provides a 15-day period to file the petition for review, with the Court of Appeals authorized to grant an additional 15-day extension upon proper motion and payment of docket fees. No further extension is allowed except for the most compelling reason, not to exceed 15 days. The Court of Appeals applied this provision in granting the 15-day extension and dismissing the petition filed beyond the extended period.

• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Defines the special civil action of certiorari, available only when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and where there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court held this remedy was unavailable because appeal under Rule 45 was the proper recourse.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Authorizes a party to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order, or resolution of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court by filing a verified petition for review on certiorari raising only questions of law. The Court identified this as the remedy petitioner-spouses should have pursued instead of Rule 65 certiorari.

• Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that the petition under Rule 45 shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order, with the Supreme Court authorized to grant a 30-day extension for justifiable reasons. The Court computed that petitioner-spouses had until February 5, 2001 to file under this rule but allowed the period to lapse.

• Sections 4 and 9, Rule V, DARAB New Rules of Procedure (1994) — Section 4 provides that summons, notices, and copies of resolutions, orders, or decisions shall be served personally or by registered mail upon the party himself, his counsel, or his duly authorized representative. Section 9 provides that service by registered mail is completed upon receipt by the addressee, his counsel, or duly authorized representative or agent. The Court applied these provisions to hold that service of the Provincial Adjudicator's decision upon Berma's daughter, who resided in another barangay and was neither his counsel nor duly authorized representative, did not constitute valid service, making Berma's notice of appeal timely.

• Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Court found this provision satisfied because petitioner-spouses were given ample opportunity to be heard.

• Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Court acknowledged petitioner-spouses' entitlement to just compensation but held that the issue was belatedly raised and that the right to compensation does not include reacquisition of ownership.

• Presidential Decree No. 27 — Governs the transfer of agricultural land to tenant-beneficiaries under Operation Land Transfer. The Court held that lands acquired under this decree do not revert to the landowner, and that the DARAB has primary, original, and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving payments for lands awarded thereunder.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson), Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred with the decision of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro. No separate concurring opinions were written.