Dy vs. People

A signed check delivered in blank in payment of goods is validly issued; the holder has prima facie authority to fill the blanks under Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, and the drawer's failure to cover a check dishonored for insufficiency of funds within the statutory period establishes estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) and violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However, a check dishonored for being drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD) does not satisfy the element of insufficiency of funds, so the issuer cannot be convicted of estafa or B.P. Blg. 22 on that ground.

John Dy was a distributor of W.L. Food Products (W.L. Foods) in Naga City, Bicol, doing business as Dyna Marketing, while William Lim owned W.L. Foods. Since 1990, Dy obtained stocks of snack foods from W.L. Foods and paid in cash or by check upon pick up at its Quezon City branch or main office, sometimes through his drivers. The dispute implicated Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885 and Presidential Decree No. 818, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and the Negotiable Instruments Law on issuance and filling of blank instruments.

Since 1990, John Dy had been the distributor of W.L. Food Products (W.L. Foods) in Naga City, Bicol, under the business name Dyna Marketing. Dy would pay W.L. Foods in either cash or check upon pick up of stocks of snack foods at the latter's branch or main office in Quezon City. At times, he would entrust the payment to one of his drivers.

On June 24, 1992, Dy's driver went to the branch office of W.L. Foods to pick up stocks of snack foods. He introduced himself to the checker, Mary Jane D. Maraca, who upon confirming Dy's credit with the main office, gave him merchandise worth P106,579.60. In return, the driver handed her a blank Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Check with Check No. 553602 postdated July 22, 1992. The check was signed by Dy though it did not indicate a specific amount. Yet again, on July 1, 1992, the same driver obtained snack foods from Maraca in the amount of P226,794.36 in exchange for a blank FEBTC Check with Check No. 553615 postdated July 31, 1992. In both instances, the driver was issued an unsigned delivery receipt. The amounts for the purchases were filled in later by Evelyn Ong, accountant of W.L. Foods, based on the value of the goods delivered.

When presented for payment, FEBTC dishonored the checks for insufficiency of funds. Raul D. Gonzales, manager of FEBTC-Naga Branch, notified Atty. Rita Linda Jimeno, counsel of W.L. Foods, of the dishonor. Apparently, Dy only had an available balance of P2,000 as of July 22, 1992 and July 31, 1992. Later, Gonzales sent Atty. Jimeno another letter advising her that FEBTC Check No. 553602 for P106,579.60 was returned to the drawee bank for the reasons stop payment order and drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD), and not because it was drawn against insufficient funds as stated in the first letter. Dy's savings deposit account ledger reflected a balance of P160,659.39 as of July 22, 1992. This, however, included a regional clearing check for P55,000 which he deposited on July 20, 1992, and which took five banking days to clear. Hence, the inward check was drawn against the yet uncollected deposit.

When William Lim, owner of W.L. Foods, phoned Dy about the matter, the latter explained that he could not pay since he had no funds yet. This prompted Lim to send petitioner a demand letter, which the latter ignored. On July 16, 1993, Lim charged Dy with two counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in two Informations, and on even date also charged Dy with two counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in two Informations. The estafa Informations alleged false manifestations and fraudulent representations that the FEBTC checks were good and would be honored by the bank on maturity, while the B.P. Blg. 22 Informations alleged knowledge of insufficient funds and failure to pay or make arrangements for payment within five banking days after notice. On November 23, 1994, Dy was arrested in Naga City. On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to all charges, and the cases against him were tried jointly.

The trial court found no pre-existing obligation between the parties. The existence of prior transactions between Lim and Dy alone did not rule out deceit because each transaction was separate and had a different consideration from the others. The evidence showed that as a matter of course, Dy, or his employee, would pay W.L. Foods in either cash or check upon pick up of the stocks of snack foods at the latter's branch or main office. Despite their two-year standing business relations prior to the issuance of the subject check, W.L. Foods employees would not have parted with the stocks were it not for the simultaneous delivery of the check issued by petitioner. As to FEBTC Check No. 553602, the trial court concluded that since the balance included a regional clearing check worth P55,000 deposited on July 20, 1992, which cleared only five days later, petitioner had inadequate funds in that instance.

• Invalid Issuance of Blank Checks: Petitioner contended that the checks were ineffectively issued because they were blank and W.L. Foods' accountant had no authority to fill in the amounts.
• Failure of Consideration: Petitioner claimed that failure of consideration negated any obligation to W.L. Foods.
• No Deceit / Reliance on Business Relationship: Petitioner denied deceiving Lim, maintaining that only the two checks bounced since he began dealing with him and that it was his long-established business relationship with Lim, not the checks, that enabled him to obtain the goods.
• No Personal Liability for Delivery: Petitioner renounced personal liability on the checks because he was absent when the goods were delivered.
• B.P. Blg. 22 — Invalid Orders and Lack of Knowledge: Petitioner argued that the blank checks were not valid orders for the bank to pay the holder, that he lacked knowledge of insufficiency of funds, and that the checks could not have been issued to apply on account or for value because he did not obtain delivery of the goods.
• Reliance on Dingle and Lao: Petitioner relied on Dingle vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Lao vs. Court of Appeals to dispute notice of insufficiency of funds based on the checks being issued in blank.

• Valid Issuance: The Office of the Solicitor General averred that the delivery of the checks by Dy's driver to Maraca constituted valid issuance.
• Prima Facie Authority to Fill Blanks: The Office of the Solicitor General sustained Ong's prima facie authority to fill the checks based on the value of goods taken.
• No Violation of Instructions: The Office of the Solicitor General observed that nothing in the records showed that W.L. Foods' accountant filled up the checks in violation of Dy's instructions or their previous agreement.
• Improper Remedy: The Office of the Solicitor General challenged the petition as an inappropriate remedy to review the factual findings of the trial court.
• B.P. Blg. 22 — Guilt Proven: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, citing Maraca's acknowledgment that the checks were issued as consideration for the snacks; Lim's testimony proving that Dy received a copy of the demand letter; the bank manager's confirmation that Dy had insufficient balance to cover the checks; and Dy's failure to settle his obligation within five days from dishonor of the checks.

• Estafa — Check No. 553615: Whether John Dy is liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for FEBTC Check No. 553615.
• Estafa — Check No. 553602: Whether John Dy is liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for FEBTC Check No. 553602.
• B.P. Blg. 22 — Check No. 553615: Whether John Dy is liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for FEBTC Check No. 553615.
• B.P. Blg. 22 — Check No. 553602: Whether John Dy is liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for FEBTC Check No. 553602.
• Civil Liability/Damages: Whether the award of damages to W.L. Foods in the total sum of P333,373.96 should be sustained.

• Estafa — Check No. 553615: Yes. All the elements under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) concurred; the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and Dy failed to cover it within three days from notice, establishing deceit.
• Estafa — Check No. 553602: No. The check was dishonored for stop payment and drawn against uncollected deposit, not insufficiency of funds; the second element was absent and no prima facie deceit arose.
• B.P. Blg. 22 — Check No. 553615: Yes. The elements under Section 1 were satisfied; Dy issued the check, knew or was presumed to know of insufficient funds, and failed to pay or arrange payment within five banking days after dishonor.
• B.P. Blg. 22 — Check No. 553602: No. The check was dishonored for DAUD, not insufficiency of funds or credit; B.P. Blg. 22 does not cover uncollected deposits.
• Civil Liability/Damages: Yes, in part. The total award of P333,373.96 was sustained because the goods were admittedly delivered; civil liability may be established by preponderance even where one set of criminal charges resulted in acquittal.

• Estafa — Check No. 553615: Before an accused can be held liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, the following elements must concur: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee. These elements were present. Although the checks were delivered in blank, this alone did not invalidate issuance. Under Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, issue is the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder; delivery is the final act essential to negotiability and denotes physical transfer by the maker or drawer with intent to convey title and recognize the payee as holder. When the checks were delivered to Lim through his employee, Lim became a holder with prima facie authority to fill the blanks, which was accomplished by his accountant. Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that where an instrument is wanting in a material particular, the person in possession has prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks, and a signature on a blank paper delivered to convert it into a negotiable instrument operates as prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount. The law presumes agency to fill the blanks from possession and the missing material particular, and the burden of proving want of authority or excess of authority is on the person questioning it; petitioner failed to fulfill this requirement. Petitioner's claim of failure of consideration was also rejected because his November 10, 1992 letter expressed willingness to pay W.L. Foods or replace the dishonored checks, which was a clear acknowledgment of receipt of the goods and gave rise to his duty to maintain or deposit sufficient funds. Deceit was established for Check No. 553615, which was dishonored for insufficiency of funds; the November 10, 1992 letter showed beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received notice of dishonor for insufficiency of funds, and he failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check within three banking days from receipt of notice. The trial court found no pre-existing obligation between the parties, and prior transactions alone did not rule out deceit because each transaction was separate and had a different consideration. Even if petitioner was absent when the goods were delivered, the delivery of the checks by his driver was deemed his act under the principle of agency. Despite the two-year business relationship, W.L. Foods employees would not have parted with the stocks were it not for the simultaneous delivery of the check issued by petitioner, and the primary inducement was the issuance of the check in payment of the value of the stocks. Petitioner presented no proof of good faith, such as sincere and best efforts to pay the value of the check.
• Estafa — Check No. 553602: The same conclusion did not hold for FEBTC Check No. 553602. This check was dishonored for the reason that it was drawn against uncollected deposit. Petitioner had P160,659.39 in his savings deposit account ledger as of July 22, 1992. The RTC concluded that since the balance included a regional clearing check worth P55,000 deposited on July 20, 1992, which cleared only five days later, petitioner had inadequate funds. The Supreme Court disagreed. Since petitioner technically and retroactively had sufficient funds at the time Check No. 553602 was presented for payment, the second element of the crime—insufficiency of funds to cover the check—was absent. There was also no prima facie evidence of deceit because the check was not dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient funds. The prima facie presumption of deceit arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. The law speaks of insufficiency of funds but not of uncollected deposits, and criminal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused. The law cannot be interpreted or applied to expand its provision to encompass uncollected deposits because it would make the law more onerous on the accused. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) is committed when a check is dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account, and not against uncollected deposit. The issuer of the check is not liable for estafa if the remaining balance and the uncollected deposit, which was duly collected, could satisfy the amount of the check when presented for payment.
• B.P. Blg. 22 — Check No. 553615: The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. The case satisfied all these elements. During the joint pre-trial conference, Dy admitted that he issued the checks and that the signatures appearing on them were his. The checks were issued in blank because of the uncertainty of the volume of products to be retrieved, the discount that could be availed of, and the deduction for bad orders. What the law punishes is simply the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto. If inquiry into the reason for which the checks are issued, or the terms and conditions of their issuance, were required, the public's faith in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes would erode. The gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query is whether the law has been breached by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer. Non-fulfillment of the obligation is immaterial, so petitioner's defense of failure of consideration must fall, especially since Dy acknowledged receipt of the goods. On the second element, petitioner disputed notice of insufficiency of funds on the basis of the check being issued in blank, relying on Dingle vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Lao vs. Court of Appeals. In both actions, however, the accused were co-signatories who were neither apprised of the particular transactions on which the blank checks were issued nor given notice of their dishonor. In Lao, the accused signed the checks without knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, knowledge she was not expected or obliged to possess under the organizational structure of the corporation; she was only a minor employee who had nothing to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of checks. In contrast, petitioner was the proprietor of Dyna Marketing and the sole signatory of the checks who received notice of their dishonor. Under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, petitioner was prima facie presumed to know of the inadequacy of his funds with the bank when he did not pay the value of the goods or make arrangements for their payment in full within five banking days upon notice. His letter dated November 10, 1992 to Lim fortified such presumption. Dy violated B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553615. When said check was dishonored for insufficient funds and stop payment order, petitioner did not pay or make arrangements with the bank for its payment in full within five banking days.
• B.P. Blg. 22 — Check No. 553602: Petitioner should be exonerated for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553602, which was dishonored for the reason DAUD or drawn against uncollected deposit. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank because the check deposit made by petitioner, which would make petitioner's bank account balance more than enough to cover the face value of the subject check, had not been collected by the bank. In Tan vs. People, the Court acquitted the petitioner therein who was indicted under B.P. Blg. 22 upon a check which was dishonored for the reason DAUD, among others. The Court observed that even without relying on the credit line, the petitioner's bank account covered the check she issued because even though there were some deposits that were still uncollected, the deposits became good and the bank certified that the check was funded. To be liable under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. In the instant case, even though the check which petitioner deposited on July 20, 1992 became good only five days later, he was considered by the bank to retroactively have had P160,659.39 in his account on July 22, 1992. This was more than enough to cover the check he issued to respondent in the amount of P106,579.60. Under the circumstance obtaining in this case, petitioner had issued the check with full ability to abide by his commitment to pay his purchases. Like Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, B.P. Blg. 22 also speaks only of insufficiency of funds and does not treat of uncollected deposits. The law cannot be interpreted to expand its provision to encompass the situation of uncollected deposits because it would make the law more onerous on the part of the accused. Criminal statutes are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused.
• Civil Liability/Damages: As regards petitioner's civil liability, an accused may be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The criminal and civil liabilities of an accused are separate and distinct from each other. One is meant to punish the offender while the other is intended to repair the damage suffered by the aggrieved party. For the purpose of indemnifying the latter, the offense need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of evidence. The appellate court's award of damages to W.L. Foods in the total amount of P333,373.96 was sustained, representing the sum of the checks petitioner issued for goods admittedly delivered to his company. Even though petitioner was acquitted in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711 for estafa and Criminal Case No. Q-93-46712 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he was ordered to pay W.L. Foods the amount of P106,579.60 for goods delivered to his company. In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he was ordered to indemnify W.L. Foods in the amount of P226,794.36.

• Prima Facie Authority to Fill Blanks in Negotiable Instruments — Under Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, where an instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks; a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount. The law presumes agency to fill the blanks from possession and the missing material particular, and the burden of proving want of authority or that the authority granted was exceeded is placed on the person questioning such authority. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the blank checks issued by Dy and delivered to W.L. Foods were validly issued, and that W.L. Foods had prima facie authority to fill in the amounts; Dy failed to prove lack or excess of authority.
• Delivery and Issuance Under the Negotiable Instruments Law — Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law defines "issue" as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder. Delivery is the final act essential to the negotiability of an instrument; it denotes physical transfer of the instrument by the maker or drawer coupled with an intention to convey title to the payee and recognize him as a holder. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the delivery of the checks by Dy's driver to Maraca constituted valid issuance, and that the driver's act was imputed to Dy under the principle of agency.
• Estafa by Postdating or Issuing a Check Under Article 315, Paragraph 2(d) — The elements are: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee. Deceit is an essential element and is a specie of fraud consisting in any misrepresentation or contrivance where a person deludes another, to his hurt. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. The Court applied this doctrine to affirm conviction for Check No. 553615 and to acquit for Check No. 553602 because the latter was dishonored for DAUD, not insufficiency of funds.
• Uncollected Deposits Are Not Insufficient Funds — For purposes of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) and violation of B.P. Blg. 22, a check dishonored for being drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD) does not satisfy the element of insufficiency of funds. The law speaks only of insufficiency of funds and does not treat of uncollected deposits; criminal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused, and the law cannot be interpreted to expand its provision to encompass uncollected deposits because it would make the law more onerous on the accused. The issuer is not liable for estafa if the remaining balance and the uncollected deposit, which was duly collected, could satisfy the amount of the check when presented for payment. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit Dy for Check No. 553602.
• B.P. Blg. 22 Elements and Malum Prohibitum — The elements of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment; the offense is malum prohibitum, and the only valid query is whether the law has been breached by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without regard to criminal intent. The Court applied this doctrine to affirm conviction for Check No. 553615 and to acquit for Check No. 553602.
• Prima Facie Knowledge of Insufficient Funds Under B.P. Blg. 22 — Under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, the making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. The Court applied this presumption to Dy, who received notice of dishonor and failed to pay or arrange payment within five banking days.
• Good Faith as a Defense to Estafa by Postdating a Check — Good faith may be a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a check. It may be manifested by making arrangements for payment with the creditor and exerting best efforts to make good the value of the checks. The Court held that Dy presented no proof of good faith; there was no sufficient proof of sincere and best efforts on his part to pay the value of the check that would constitute good faith and negate deceit.
• Separate Criminal and Civil Liability — The criminal and civil liabilities of an accused are separate and distinct from each other. One is meant to punish the offender while the other is intended to repair the damage suffered by the aggrieved party. For the purpose of indemnifying the aggrieved party, the offense need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to sustain the award of damages to W.L. Foods in the total amount of P333,373.96, even though Dy was acquitted of some criminal charges.
• Penalty for Estafa Under P.D. No. 818 — Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 818, if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000, the penalty of reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty years, which shall be termed reclusion perpetua. Reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved. The Court applied this provision to the estafa conviction in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713.

• "Before an accused can be held liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, the following elements must concur: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof." — This passage states the canonical elements of estafa by postdating or issuing a check, which the Court applied to affirm one conviction and to acquit on the other check.
• "Clearly, the estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is committed when a check is dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account, and not against uncollected deposit." — This is the ratio for Dy's acquittal on the estafa charge arising from FEBTC Check No. 553602, distinguishing uncollected deposits from insufficient funds.
• "The gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum." — This passage defines the nature of the B.P. Blg. 22 offense and explains why purpose, terms, and non-fulfillment of obligation are immaterial to liability.
• "To be liable under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment." — This passage states the controlling rule for B.P. Blg. 22 liability and supports the acquittal on the check dishonored for DAUD.

• People vs. Romero, G.R. No. 112985, April 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 90, 96 — Cited for the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) and for the definition of deceit as actual fraud.
• De la Victoria vs. Burgos, G.R. No. 111190, June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 374, 379 — Cited for the rule that delivery is the final act essential to the negotiability of an instrument.
• Dingle vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75243, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 595 — Cited by petitioner on the issue of notice of insufficiency of funds; distinguished because the accused therein were co-signatories who were neither apprised of the particular transactions nor given notice of dishonor.
• Lao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 572 — Cited by petitioner; distinguished because Lao was a minor employee and co-signatory who had nothing to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of checks and was not expected or obliged to know of the insufficiency of funds, unlike Dy, who was the proprietor and sole signatory and received notice of dishonor.
• Tan vs. People, G.R. No. 141466, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 777 — Followed; the Court acquitted the petitioner therein under B.P. Blg. 22 upon a check dishonored for DAUD, among others, because the bank account covered the check and the bank certified that the check was funded.
• Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, August 1, 1994, 234 SCRA 639, 643-644 — Cited for the elements of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22.
• Cueme vs. People, G.R. No. 133325, June 30, 2000, 334 SCRA 795, 805 — Cited for the rule that the gravamen of B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check, and that the offense is malum prohibitum.
• Salazar vs. People, G.R. No. 151931, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 598 — Cited as comparative authority for the rule that estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) is committed when a check is dishonored for insufficient funds or closed account, not for uncollected deposit.
• U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil 243 (1917); People vs. Yu Hai, 99 Phil 725, 728 (1956) — Cited for the rule that criminal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused.
• Sapiera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 370, 379 — Cited for the rule that criminal and civil liabilities are separate and distinct, and that civil liability need only be proved by preponderance of evidence.
• People vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 617, 629 — Cited for the rule that reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for estafa under P.D. No. 818 but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of fraud.
• People vs. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 436, 445; People vs. Dimalanta, G.R. No. 157039, October 1, 2004, 440 SCRA 55, 61-62 — Cited for the rule that damage and deceit are essential elements of estafa and must be established with satisfactory proof, and for the good faith defense in estafa by postdating a check.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885 — Defines estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice that the check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds is prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. Applied to affirm conviction for FEBTC Check No. 553615 and to acquit for FEBTC Check No. 553602 because the latter was dishonored for DAUD, not insufficiency of funds.
• Section 191, Negotiable Instruments Law — Defines "issue" as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder. Applied to hold that the delivery of the checks by Dy's driver to W.L. Foods constituted valid issuance.
• Section 14, Negotiable Instruments Law — Provides that where an instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks, and that a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount. Applied to hold that the blank checks were validly issued and that W.L. Foods had prima facie authority to fill in the amounts.
• Section 1, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 — Penalizes any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. Applied to affirm conviction for FEBTC Check No. 553615 and to acquit for FEBTC Check No. 553602.
• Section 2, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 — Provides that the making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless the maker or drawer pays the holder the amount due or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee within five banking days after receiving notice that the check has not been paid. Applied to Dy, who received notice of dishonor and failed to pay or arrange payment within five banking days.
• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 818 — Provides that if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000, the penalty of reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty years, which shall be termed reclusion perpetua. Reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved. Applied to the estafa conviction in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713.

Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Arturo D. Brion concurred.