Dy Tam vs. Espiritu

Absent evidence of an alleged prior marriage, the intestate’s marriage to the surviving spouse is presumed valid, and the surviving spouse’s nominee for administrator is not disqualified as hostile merely because the nominee must contest the claims of alleged children who remain mere claimants. The waiver objection was also rejected because petitioner himself had asked for the surviving spouse’s appointment.

Rafael Litam, also known as Dy Tam, was married to Marcosa Rivera on June 10, 1922, before the justice of the peace of Caloocan. Gregorio Dy Tam claimed to be a child of Litam by a prior Chinese wife, Sia Khin, whom Litam allegedly married in China in 1911. The settlement of Litam’s intestate estate is governed by Rule 79, section 6(a), on the preference in the appointment of an administrator. Marcosa Rivera was later substituted by Remedios Espiritu as counter-petitioner-appellee.

Rafael Litam, also known as Dy Tam, died on January 10, 1951, while a resident of Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal. At the time of his death, he and Marcosa Rivera lived as husband and wife, having been married on June 10, 1922, before the justice of the peace of Caloocan (Exhibit D). When the marriage was celebrated, Litam or Dy Tam professed to be single and unmarried. Gregorio Dy Tam filed the petition that initiated the proceedings for the settlement of Litam’s estate, alleging that he and the other persons named therein were children of the deceased Rafael Dy Tam by a Chinese wife named Sia Khin, whom the deceased had married in 1911 in China and who was now dead. He further claimed that the deceased contracted his marriage to Marcosa Rivera while his previous marriage to Sia Khin was subsisting. The petition prayed that Marcosa Rivera be named administratrix.

Marcosa Rivera filed a reply and counter-petition denying knowledge of the supposed prior marriage of the deceased to Sia Khin or of their alleged children. She alleged that the properties mentioned in the petition as belonging to the deceased were her own, and that instead of leaving those properties, the deceased left indebtedness to her amounting to P248,266. In her counter-petition, she alleged that the deceased left properties worth P300,000 in Casiguran, Sorsogon, consisting of the stocks, properties, assets, and business interests of a private corporation named Li Tam and Co., Inc. She claimed an interest in one-half of those properties as her share in the conjugal partnership property and proposed that her nephew Arminio Rivera be named administrator.

Gregorio Dy Tam opposed the proposal. He asserted that Arminio Rivera represented an interest adverse to that of the estate; that Marcosa Rivera was suffering from senility and was therefore disqualified to propose an administrator; and that because her marriage to the deceased was of doubtful validity, she was not entitled to the preference granted in section 6, paragraph (a), of Rule 79. He suggested that a banking institution be appointed administrator.

When the petition and counter-petition were heard, Gregorio Dy Tam did not introduce evidence of the alleged previous marriage of the deceased to Sia Khin in China in 1911, or of their alleged children. During the cross-examination of Arminio Rivera, counsel for petitioner limited himself to asking whether it was not true that, because of the previous marriage, the conjugal partnership property should not belong to the other spouse; the trial court overruled the question upon objection of adverse counsel. After satisfying itself that the administrator proposed by Marcosa Rivera had the necessary qualifications, the trial court made the appointment. That appointment became the subject of the appeal.

• Hostility and Adverse Interest: Petitioner-appellant contended that Marcosa Rivera’s nominee is hostile and has an interest adverse to the parties interested, because Marcosa Rivera, who proposed him, has a claim against the estate amounting to P197,000.
• Cross-Examination: Petitioner-appellant argued that the trial court erred in not permitting the cross-examination of Arminio Rivera to show his hostility to the interests of the parties.
• Waiver of Preference: Petitioner-appellant maintained that the preference Marcosa Rivera is entitled to under the rules has been lost by her failure to ask for an administrator within thirty days after the death of the intestate.
• Opposition to Nominee: In opposing the appointment, petitioner asserted that Arminio Rivera represented an interest adverse to the estate, that Marcosa Rivera was suffering from senility and disqualified to propose an administrator, and that her marriage to the deceased was of doubtful validity, so she was not entitled to the preference under section 6, paragraph (a), of Rule 79; he suggested a banking institution be appointed administrator.

• Denial of Prior Marriage: Marcosa Rivera denied knowledge of the supposed prior marriage of the deceased to Sia Khin or of their alleged children.
• Ownership and Indebtedness: She alleged that the properties mentioned in the petition as belonging to the deceased are her own, and that the deceased instead left indebtedness to her amounting to P248,266.
• Conjugal Share and Proposed Administrator: She alleged that the deceased left properties worth P300,000 in Casiguran, Sorsogon, consisting of the stocks, properties, assets, and business interests of Li Tam and Co., Inc.; she claimed one-half as her share in the conjugal partnership property and proposed her nephew Arminio Rivera as administrator.

• Appointment of Administrator and Presumption of Marriage Validity: Whether the trial court erred in appointing Marcosa Rivera’s nominee, Arminio Rivera, as administrator despite the claim that he was hostile and had an interest adverse to the estate, where the alleged prior marriage of the deceased to Sia Khin had not been proved.
• Cross-Examination: Whether the trial court erred in disallowing the cross-examination of Arminio Rivera intended to show his hostility to the interests of the parties.
• Waiver of Preference: Whether Marcosa Rivera lost the preference to nominate an administrator by failing to ask for an administrator within thirty days after the death of the intestate.

• Appointment of Administrator and Presumption of Marriage Validity: No. The appointment was proper; absent evidence of the alleged prior marriage, the intestate’s marriage to Marcosa Rivera was presumed valid, and petitioner and his siblings were mere claimants, so the nominee’s duty to protect the estate against them did not make him hostile.
• Cross-Examination: No. The proposed cross-examination was predicated on the unproved prior marriage and the unproved status of petitioner as heir; the trial court did not err in disallowing it.
• Waiver of Preference: No. The waiver contention merits scant consideration because petitioner himself had asked for Marcosa Rivera’s appointment.

• Appointment of Administrator and Presumption of Marriage Validity: The trial court had the duty to presume that the intestate’s marriage to Marcosa Rivera is valid, no evidence of his supposed prior marriage to Sia Khin having been submitted or offered. Petitioner’s contention that Marcosa Rivera’s nominee is hostile to the interests of the parties in interest was predicated on the existence of the alleged previous marriage and the consequence that petitioner and his brothers and sisters are children of the intestate. But the supposed marriage had not been proved, and neither was the claim that petitioner and his brothers and sisters are children and heirs of the deceased. While these were not shown or proved in the manner provided for by law, the court could not assume that the marriage with Marcosa Rivera is null and void. It is dangerous to consider petitioner as a party in interest on the basis of his allegation alone, especially as the supposed marriage is contrary to the intestate’s own conduct at the time of the marriage with Rivera and thereafter. Under this state of things, petitioner and his brothers and sisters must be considered for the present as mere claimants, and the principal and immediate concern of the administrator would be to contest their right to the estate. It cannot be said, therefore, that the nominee is hostile to the interests of the estate, for it will be his duty to protect it against these pretended heirs.
• Cross-Examination: The cross-examination question was limited to asking Arminio Rivera if it is not true that because of the previous marriage the conjugal partnership property should not belong to the other spouse. The trial court overruled it upon objection. The Supreme Court found no error because the question assumed the existence of the alleged previous marriage, which had not been proved; the claim of hostility depended on that unproved premise. Thus, the disallowance was justified.
• Waiver of Preference: The contention that Marcosa Rivera waived her right to be appointed for her failure to file a petition for administration merits scant consideration, as petitioner himself had asked for her appointment. Therefore, the alleged failure to ask for an administrator within thirty days did not defeat the appointment.

• Presumption of Validity of Marriage — A court must presume the validity of a marriage absent evidence of a prior subsisting marriage. In this case, the trial court had the duty to presume that the intestate’s marriage to Marcosa Rivera was valid because no evidence of his supposed prior marriage to Sia Khin was submitted or offered.
• Mere Claimants and Hostility of Administrator — Alleged heirs whose status is not proved are mere claimants; an administrator’s duty to protect the estate against such claimants does not make the administrator hostile or disqualified. The Court applied this by treating petitioner and his siblings as mere claimants and holding that the nominee’s duty to contest their claims did not disqualify him.
• Preference in Appointment of Administrator; Waiver — The preference of the surviving spouse to nominate an administrator is not lost on the ground of failure to file a petition for administration where the petitioner himself had asked for her appointment. The Court found the waiver contention merits scant consideration.
• Cross-Examination on Unproved Premise — Cross-examination intended to show hostility may be disallowed where it assumes an unproved fact. The trial court’s disallowance was upheld because the question assumed the alleged prior marriage, which had not been proved.

• "The trial Court had the duty to presume that the intestate's marriage to Marcosa River is valid, no evidence of his supposed prior marriage to Sia Khin having been submitted or offered." — This states the presumption of marriage validity that controlled the appointment of the administrator.
• "Under this state of things, petitioner-appellant and his brothers and sisters must be considered for the present as mere claimants, and the principal and immediate concern of the administrator would be the contest their right (of these claimants) to the estate." — This defines the status of the alleged heirs and explains why the administrator’s duty to contest their claims did not make him hostile.
• "It can not be said, therefore, that the nominee is hostile to the interests of the estate, for it will be his duty to protect it against these pretended heirs." — This is the ratio for rejecting the objection to the nominee’s appointment.
• "The contention of petitioner-appellant that Marcosa Rivera waived her right to be appointed for her failure to file a petition for administration merits scant consideration, as petitioner-appellant himself had asked for her appointment." — This disposes of the waiver issue.

• Section 6, paragraph (a), Rule 79 — Cited as the source of the preference in the appointment of an administrator. Petitioner argued Marcosa Rivera was not entitled to that preference because her marriage to the deceased was of doubtful validity and because she failed to ask for an administrator within thirty days after death; the Court rejected the waiver contention because petitioner himself had asked for her appointment.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A. Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L. JJ., concur.