Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan

The right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive right constituting a component of due process, and requiring respondents to submit mere comments instead of counter-affidavits—without furnishing them copies of complaint-affidavits—constitutes a palpable violation of administrative procedure and due process. Furthermore, an inordinate and unjustified delay in terminating a preliminary investigation violates the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, and a mutually rescinded contract is non-existent in contemplation of law and cannot serve as the basis for a charge under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

In 1990, the Davao City government launched a computerization project, forming a committee that recommended acquiring Goldstar computers distributed by Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI). The City Council authorized the contract, which was signed, and a downpayment of P1,748,521.58 was released. Following a proposal from Goldstar, the City Council authorized the contract's cancellation, and the parties mutually rescinded it on May 6, 1991, with the downpayment fully refunded. A COA Special Audit Report later recommending rescission was rendered moot, and a civil case seeking nullification was dismissed. The Anti-Graft League subsequently filed an unverified complaint with the Ombudsman against the petitioners.

• The Computerization Contract: Davao City formed a Computerization Program Committee, which recommended acquiring Goldstar computers distributed by Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI). The City Council approved the contract and the budget. The contract was signed, and a downpayment of P1,748,521.58 was released.
• Rescission: A civil case was filed to nullify the contract. Meanwhile, Goldstar proposed cancellation. The City Council authorized the mayor to cancel, and the contract was mutually rescinded on May 6, 1991. The downpayment was refunded. The civil case was subsequently dismissed as moot.
• Ombudsman Investigation: The Anti-Graft League filed an unverified complaint. Graft Investigator Manriquez ordered the Special Audit Team to submit affidavits but simultaneously directed petitioners to submit comments on the dismissed civil case and the COA report, without attaching any complaint-affidavits. The audit team submitted affidavits on December 4, 1991, but copies were not furnished to petitioners.
• Filing of Information: Four years later, in February 1996, the Ombudsman recommended charging petitioners under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. The information was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
• Sandiganbayan Proceedings: Petitioners moved to quash, arguing denial of preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, ruling that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman cured any procedural defect.

• Petitioners maintained they were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation under A.O. No. 07 because they were directed to file comments instead of counter-affidavits and were not furnished complaint-affidavits.
• Petitioners argued that the four-year delay in terminating the investigation violated their right to due process and speedy disposition of cases.
• On the merits, petitioners contended there was no basis for the Section 3(g) charge because they acted in good faith with legal authority, the contract was mutually rescinded causing no damage, and the contract was not manifestly disadvantageous.

• The Ombudsman countered that the failure to provide complaint-affidavits was immaterial because petitioners were aware of the civil complaint and the COA report.
• The Ombudsman argued that the Tatad ruling on speedy disposition did not apply because the case lacked political motivation, and the Angchangco ruling did not apply because petitioners were not vigilant in asserting their rights.
• The Sandiganbayan ruled that petitioners' motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman cured any defect in the preliminary investigation.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation when the Ombudsman required them to submit comments instead of counter-affidavits and failed to furnish them copies of complaint-affidavits.
  • Whether the four-year delay in terminating the preliminary investigation violated petitioners' right to due process and speedy disposition of cases.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether there is a factual and legal basis to charge petitioners with violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 given the prior rescission of the contract.

• Procedural: The Court held that petitioners were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation. Under Section 4, Rule II of A.O. No. 07, if a complaint is unverified, the complainant must execute affidavits before the respondent can be required to submit counter-affidavits. The Ombudsman's order for petitioners to submit comments on a dismissed civil case and a COA report, without attaching complaint-affidavits, was a palpable non-observance of the rules. A comment is not equivalent to a counter-affidavit, and a dismissed civil complaint or audit report cannot substitute for complaint-affidavits. The right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive right, and denial thereof violates due process. Regarding the delay, the Court ruled that the four-year delay violated the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The right applies regardless of political motivation. Petitioners could not be faulted for failing to assert their right to speedy resolution because they were unaware an investigation was ongoing, having been asked only to comment. The Ombudsman failed to justify the delay.
• Substantive: The Court held that there was no basis for the charge under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. The second element of the crime—that the accused entered into a contract in behalf of the government—was absent. The contract was mutually rescinded on May 6, 1991, before the COA report was issued and before the complaint was filed. A rescinded contract is non-existent in contemplation of law, as if no contract was ever executed.

• Right to Preliminary Investigation — The right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive right and a component of due process in criminal justice, designed to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution and to protect the state from useless trials. To deny the accused this right deprives them of the full measure of due process.
• Procedure in Preliminary Investigation under A.O. No. 07 — When a complaint is unverified or based on official reports, the investigating officer must require the complainant to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint. Only after such affidavits are secured can the respondent be ordered to submit counter-affidavits. A mere comment is not equivalent to a counter-affidavit, and a dismissed civil case or audit report cannot substitute for complaint-affidavits.
• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases applies to all persons before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies, regardless of political motivation. Inordinate delay in terminating a preliminary investigation violates this right, particularly when the accused is unaware of the ongoing investigation due to the prosecution's irregular procedure.

• "The right to a preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of due process."
• "The comment referred to in Section 2(b) Rule II, of A.O. No. 07 is not part of or is equivalent to the preliminary investigation contemplated in Sec. 4, Rule II, of the same Administrative Order."
• "The constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases does not come into play only when political considerations are involved. The Constitution makes no such distinction."

• Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 239 SCRA 283 (1994) — Followed. Held that it is a mandatory requirement for the complainant to submit affidavits before the respondent can be compelled to submit counter-affidavits.
• Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988) — Followed. Held that undue delay in terminating a preliminary investigation violates the constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition. Clarified that political motivation is not a prerequisite for invoking this right.
• Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301 (1997) — Followed. Upheld the right to speedy disposition where the Ombudsman failed to resolve charges for over six years.
• Alviso vs. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55 (1993) — Cited. Observed that the concept of speedy disposition is relative and flexible, dependent on the length of delay, assertion of right, and prejudice caused.

• Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the crime of entering into a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government. Applied to find that the second element (entering into a contract) was absent because the contract had been rescinded prior to the complaint.
• Section 4, Rule II, Administrative Order No. 07 — Prescribes the procedure for preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman. Applied to rule that the Ombudsman failed to follow mandatory steps, specifically requiring complaint-affidavits before counter-affidavits.
• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Applied to rule that the four-year delay violated petitioners' constitutional rights.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, J., and Purisima, J.