Duran vs. Tan

Theft is triable only in the court of the place where the offense was committed or where an essential ingredient thereof took place; the later presence of the stolen property in another locality does not make that locality a proper venue because asportation is not an essential ingredient of theft.

On August 26, 1948, an information for qualified theft was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal City against Simplicio Duran and others. It charged them with having stolen an automobile belonging to Ned C. Cook which was parked in Port Area, City of Manila, on August 25, 1948, and which was later found in San Juan Street, Rizal City.

During the trial, after the prosecution had presented its evidence, the defense moved for dismissal of the information on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the case. The motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied, and the defense was ordered to present its case. After presenting its evidence, the defense again pressed the motion, which was denied. Petitioners then filed this petition, insisting that because the offense charged was allegedly committed in Manila, the Court of First Instance of Rizal City had no jurisdiction to try the case.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that the offense charged was allegedly committed in Manila, so the Court of First Instance of Rizal City had no jurisdiction to try the case.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the CFI of Rizal City has jurisdiction to try a qualified theft where the automobile was stolen in Manila and later found in Rizal City.

• Jurisdiction: No. The offense was fully committed in Manila where the automobile was allegedly stolen; the fact that it was later found in Rizal City is not an essential ingredient of the crime and cannot confer jurisdiction. Rule 106, sections 9 and 14(a), require trial where the offense or an essential ingredient took place.

• Jurisdiction: Rule 106, sections 5, 9, and 14(a), of the Rules of Court provide that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the place where the offense was committed; that it is sufficient if it can be understood that the offense or some essential ingredient occurred within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place is an essential element of the offense or necessary for identifying the offense charged; and that criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. From these provisions and settled jurisprudence, the commission of an offense is triable only in the courts of the place where the offense was allegedly committed. In this case, the offense charged was fully committed in the City of Manila where the automobile was allegedly stolen from its parking place in Port Area. The fact that the automobile was later found in Rizal City is not an essential ingredient of the crime but a mere circumstance which could add nothing to the nature of the offense or to its consummation; it cannot be made determinative of the trial court's jurisdiction. The SC relied on People vs. Mercado, where the defendant stole an animal in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and later took it to Candaba, Pampanga, where it was found; the SC held that the taking to Pampanga did not give the court of that province concurrent jurisdiction because the consummation of the theft was completed when the animal was taken from the owner in Nueva Ecija, and its taking to Pampanga added nothing to the nature or consummation of the offense. The American rule that larceny is a continuing offense does not apply to theft because "carrying away," one of the characteristics of larceny, is not an essential ingredient of theft. If every moment's continuance of the thief's possession were a new taking and asportation, then criminal action would never prescribe against a thief in possession of the stolen thing.

• Venue and jurisdiction in criminal cases — Criminal actions must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any essential ingredient took place. The SC applied this by holding that the CFI of Rizal City could not try the qualified theft because the taking occurred in Manila.
• Theft is not a continuing or transitory offense — Unlike common-law larceny, theft is consummated by taking; asportation or carrying away is not an essential ingredient. Thus, the thief's later possession or transportation of the stolen property into another locality does not amount to a new taking and does not create jurisdiction there.
• Later finding of stolen property is not an essential ingredient — The presence of the stolen automobile in Rizal City was a mere circumstance that added nothing to the nature or consummation of the offense; it could not be made determinative of the trial court's jurisdiction.
• Non-applicability of the American larceny rule — The American rule treating larceny as a continuing offense, under which the thief may be prosecuted where he carries the stolen goods, does not apply in the Philippines because it is not in force here and because Philippine theft does not require asportation. The SC also reasoned that treating every moment of possession as a new taking would mean that prescription would never run against a thief in possession of the stolen thing.

• "From the foregoing provisions and in accordance with settled jurisprudence, the commission of an offense is triable only in the courts of the place where the offense was allegedly committed." — The majority states the general venue rule that controls criminal prosecutions.
• "The fact that said automobile was later found in Rizal City is not essential ingredient of the crime but a mere circumstance which could add nothing to the nature of the offense or to its consummation." — This is the majority's application of the venue rule to the facts: the later finding of the stolen car did not make Rizal City a proper venue.
• "The American rule that larceny is a continuing offense does not apply to theft" — The majority refuses to transplant the American larceny rule because Philippine theft does not require asportation.

• People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, 666 — Controlling precedent relied on and reaffirmed; held that taking a stolen animal to another province did not give that province jurisdiction because theft was consummated where the animal was taken from the owner.

• Rule 106, Section 5, Rules of Court — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states, among others, the place where the offense was committed. The SC used this as part of the venue framework.
• Rule 106, Section 9, Rules of Court — The information is sufficient if it can be understood that the offense or some essential ingredient occurred within the court's jurisdiction, unless the place is an essential element of the offense or necessary for identifying the offense charged. Applied: no essential ingredient of the theft occurred in Rizal City.
• Rule 106, Section 14(a), Rules of Court — Criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or any essential ingredient took place. Applied: the action should have been tried in Manila, not Rizal City.

• Justice Feria (Concurring) — He concurred in the majority and emphasized that Rule 106, section 14, is declaratory of the settled principle that every offender must be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where the crime was committed. The American common-law and statutory rule allowing prosecution where stolen property is carried is not in force in the Philippines and cannot be applied; Philippine theft is not a continuing or transitory offense because asportation is not essential. He also disputed the dissent's inconvenience argument, saying that ordinarily the prosecution need not prove the thief's later possession, and that recent possession is only an exceptional case.

• Justice Bengzon (Dissenting), joined by Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes — He argued that the CFI of Rizal had jurisdiction because the information alleged that the car was stolen from Manila Port Area and brought to Rizal City. He would apply the American rule that larceny is a continuing offense: since legal possession remains in the owner, every moment's continuance of the trespass and every act of removal is a new taking and asportation, making the offense triable in any county into which the stolen property is brought. He found the rejection in People vs. Mercado based on premises he disputed, said the transitory theory permits rather than requires prosecution in the place where the loot was carried, and argued that rejecting it is unfair to the victim and contrary to the intention of the justices in Mercado.