Dumarpa vs. COMELEC

A legal opinion rendered by a provincial fiscal upon request of a provincial officer, even if erroneous, does not constitute contempt of the COMELEC absent any showing of deliberate intent to affront the Commission or ignore its judgments and orders; the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive, principle.

The case arose from a contested mayoralty election in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, where Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed mayor-elect by the Board of Canvassers on February 3, 1988. Two defeated candidates filed separate petitions before the COMELEC seeking annulment of the proclamation and the canvass on which it was based. While these pre-proclamation controversies were pending before the COMELEC First Division, the Secretary of Local Governments designated Maclis Balt as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Mayor, citing the election controversy. The constitutional framework at issue includes Section 3, paragraph C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that motions for reconsideration from decisions of a COMELEC Division shall be decided en banc by the Commission. The Revised Administrative Code, Section 1682, imposes upon the provincial fiscal the duty to serve as legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers and to render written opinions upon request.

On February 3, 1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers as Mayor-elect of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. Two defeated mayoralty candidates, Datu Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom and Monabai Panondiongan Balt, filed separate petitions before the COMELEC seeking annulment of the proclamation and the canvass on grounds including failure of elections, fraud, and lack of authority of the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers. While these petitions were pending before the COMELEC First Division, the Secretary of Local Governments issued a memorandum on May 1-9, 1988 designating Maclis Balt as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Mayor of Marogong, expressly citing the election controversy. Governor Saidamen Pangarungan subsequently issued a memorandum on May 23, 1988 directing all concerned to recognize the Secretary's designation, and Balt accordingly assumed the position and discharged the functions of OIC-Mayor.

The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petitions by decision rendered on July 11, 1988, affirming Dimaporo's proclamation. Motions for reconsideration were seasonably filed. Dimaporo's counsel sent a formal communication on July 18, 1988 to Governor Pangarungan, transmitting the First Division's resolution and praying that official matters involving Marogong be accorded to Dimaporo. This letter and related documents were referred by Vice-Governor-OIC Governor Sa-Aduden Alauya to the Provincial Fiscal via 3rd Indorsement dated August 1, 1988, requesting a legal opinion as to who between Dimaporo and Balt should be recognized as municipal mayor or OIC-Mayor. The request was made necessary because both claimants were asserting rights to the mayoralty, and the tension between the protagonists had reached a volatile point.

The Provincial Fiscal's office responded via 4th Indorsement dated August 5, 1988, signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao C. Danganan with the conformity of Provincial Fiscal Salic B. Dumarpa. The opinion stated that Maclis Balt was still the mayor of Marogong pursuant to Section 3, paragraph C, Article IX of the Constitution, which mandates that motions for reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the COMELEC shall be decided en banc; since a motion for reconsideration had been timely filed, the Division's decision was not yet final and executory. Upon learning of this opinion, Dimaporo filed a motion with the COMELEC en banc to hold the fiscals and the vice-governor in contempt, alleging that their conduct constituted indirect contempt tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice and unlawful interference with the COMELEC's processes.

The COMELEC en banc, by Resolution dated October 28, 1988, found the charge duly substantiated and declared the three petitioners in contempt, imposing a fine of ₱500.00 each. The Commission reasoned that the petitioners had in effect suspended the effects of Dimaporo's proclamation, prevented him from discharging the duties of his office, and paved the way for the assumption to office by an OIC who was the wife of one of the parties to the pending petitions—characterizing these as unauthorized and illegal assumption of powers pertaining exclusively to the Commission. The COMELEC en banc denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration by Resolution dated January 12, 1989, rebuking them for insisting upon an erroneous legal position and characterizing their acts as a deliberate contrivance meant to undermine the efficacy of the Commission's official acts. The petitioners then instituted the instant special civil action of certiorari.

• Good Faith and Absence of Malice: Petitioners maintained that they acted honestly, dedicatedly, and without any iota of malice or evil motive, and that Vice-Governor Alauya referred the matter to the Provincial Fiscal to act safely and correctly in good faith, given the volatile tension between the rival claimants that could have erupted into bloodshed.
• Performance of Statutory Duty: Petitioners argued that the fiscals merely performed a legal duty reposed upon them by Section 1682 of the Revised Administrative Code when they rendered the questioned legal opinion, a duty they could not have refused without incurring liability for dereliction of a defined duty.
• No Suspension of Proclamation Effects: Petitioners asserted that no suspension of the effects of Dimaporo's proclamation was or could have been effected by them, since Dimaporo had never enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the office, had never been paid his salary as mayor, and had not been accorded recognition as elected mayor by the provincial and national government; and that Balt had already been designated as OIC long before the query for legal opinion was lodged.
• Opinion Not Contumacious: Petitioners contended that the opinion merely stated the provision of the Constitution and the COMELEC's own rules on the finality of decisions, was not directed against the authority, dignity, and majesty of the Commission, and had no punitive value that could interfere with its processes or proceedings.
• No Review of COMELEC Decision: Petitioners maintained that the opinion did not constitute a review of the First Division's resolution in the sense that the fiscals did not affirm or reverse it; they merely opined that because a motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the resolution had not become final and executory.

• Deliberate Interference: The COMELEC counsel submitted that the facts manifested a firm resolve on the petitioners' part to delay, if not totally prevent, Dimaporo's assumption of office, constituting a scheme to shroud with doubt the validity and force of a proclamation while trifling with the Commission's discretion on when to annul a proclamation or suspend its effects.
• Aura of Legality for OIC Continuity: The COMELEC argued that the only perceived purpose of the request for opinion was to provide an aura of legality to the continuity in office of the designated OIC, to the exclusion of the proclaimed winner in the election.
• Deliberate Contrivance: The COMELEC characterized the petitioners' acts as a deliberate contrivance meant to undermine the efficacy of official acts of the Commission from the municipal board of canvassers to the First Division and even the Commission en banc, and that attempting to settle the matter among themselves demonstrated intention to effect disobedience to and defiance of the lawful acts and orders of the Commission.
• Should Have Sought Clarification from COMELEC: The COMELEC maintained that if clarification was needed in connection with the proclamation and the First Division's decision, it should have been sought from the Commission itself, since petitioners knew or should have known that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies.

• Contempt Liability: Whether the rendition of a legal opinion by the provincial fiscals upon the vice-governor's request, and the vice-governor's act of seeking such opinion, constitute indirect contempt of the COMELEC.
• Factual Basis for Contempt: Whether the COMELEC's findings of contempt are supported by factual basis in the record.
• Statutory Duty to Render Legal Opinion: Whether the provincial fiscals were performing a duty enjoined by law when they rendered the questioned opinion.

• Contempt Liability: No. The rendition of a legal opinion, even if erroneous, does not constitute contempt absent any showing of deliberate intent to affront the Commission or belittle its judgments and orders.
• Factual Basis for Contempt: No. The COMELEC's findings lacked factual foundation and were contradicted by the relevant facts discernible from the record, including the undisputed fact that Dimaporo had never enjoyed the powers of the office and that Balt had been designated OIC long before the opinion was sought.
• Statutory Duty to Render Legal Opinion: Yes. Section 1682 of the Revised Administrative Code expressly imposes upon the provincial fiscal the duty to serve as legal adviser of the provincial government and to render written opinions upon request; the vice-governor's act of consulting the fiscals was implicitly authorized by law.

• Contempt Liability: The power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive, principle. It is not to be meted out of pique or from an imperial sense of judicial office. The Court examined the text of the fiscal's opinion and found nothing even remotely resembling an affront to the COMELEC or a criticism of the First Division's judgment; the opinion simply paraphrased, correctly it would appear, the COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure on the finality of decisions. Even if the views expressed were clearly wrong, error alone cannot render an opinion contumacious, otherwise liability for contempt would invariably attach to every declared instance of orders or judgments rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. There was no indication in the record that the opinion was prompted by a deliberate intent to affront the Commission or ignore or belittle its judgment and orders. What appeared to be an honest difference of opinion had been blown up into something it was not—a direct and confrontational challenge to the Commission's prerogatives.

• Factual Basis for Contempt: The COMELEC's Resolution asserted that the petitioners' acts caused "chaos and confusion among National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public," suspended the effects of Dimaporo's proclamation, and paved the way for the appointment of an OIC who was "the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions." However, nothing in the challenged Resolutions or anywhere in the record demonstrated the actuality of any of these allegations. On the contrary, the petitioners asserted—and the respondents never denied or disputed—that as of the time the fiscal's opinion was solicited and even thereafter, Dimaporo had never enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the office, had never been paid his salary as mayor, and had not been accorded recognition as elected mayor by the provincial and national government; and that Balt had already been designated as OIC long before the query for legal opinion was lodged and had been discharging the functions of mayor throughout the material period. The Resolution thus not only lacked factual foundation but was contradicted by the relevant facts.

• Statutory Duty to Render Legal Opinion: The law implicitly authorized the vice-governor to seek legal advice and expressly imposed upon the fiscals the duty to give it on request. Section 1682 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers, and shall, when so requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof. All that the respondent fiscals did was perform a duty specifically enjoined by law, for the failure or refusal to do which they could appropriately have been called to account. The COMELEC's suggestion that clarification should have been sought from the Commission itself failed to explain how the Acting Governor, not being a party to the pre-proclamation controversy, could have done so, and it did not appear that the COMELEC had jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion or declaratory judgment.

• Preservative Principle of Contempt — The power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive, principle. It is not to be meted out of pique or from an imperial sense of the nature and functions of judicial office. Contempt cannot be justified absent a clear showing, either in the terms of the allegedly contumacious act or from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of any intent to denigrate the authority of the court or erode the faith and respect due its decisions, orders, or other actuations. The Court applied this principle to reverse the COMELEC's contempt ruling, finding that what appeared to be an honest difference of opinion had been improperly characterized as a direct challenge to the Commission's authority.

• Error Alone Does Not Constitute Contempt — An erroneous legal opinion or judgment, absent any indication of deliberate intent to affront the court or ignore or belittle its orders, cannot be considered contumacious. Otherwise, liability for contempt would invariably attach to every declared instance of orders or judgments rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, or otherwise attended by serious error. The Court relied on this principle to hold that even if the fiscals' opinion was wrong, error alone was insufficient to sustain a contempt conviction.

• Statutory Duty of Provincial Fiscal as Legal Adviser — Under Section 1682 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal is the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers, including the mayor and council of the various municipalities, and is duty-bound to render written opinions upon request. The Court applied this provision to hold that the fiscals were performing a duty specifically enjoined by law and could not be faulted for doing so.

• "The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held, must be exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the preservative principle. It is not to be meted out of pique, or from an imperial sense of the nature and functions of judicial office." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on the proper exercise of the contempt power, serving as the ratio decidendi for the reversal of the COMELEC's ruling.

• "What appears to be an honest difference of opinion has been blown up into something that it is not --- a direct and confrontational challenge to the puissance and prerogatives of the Commission. In a word, petitioners have been found in contempt because, to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit well with the Commission and failed to conform to its own views." — This passage crystallizes the Court's assessment of the COMELEC's misuse of its contempt power, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the limits of contempt authority.

• "But even if, as the questioned Resolution declares, the views therein expressed are clearly wrong, it cannot for that reason alone be considered contumacious otherwise, liability for contempt would invariably attach to every declared instance of orders or judgments rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, or otherwise attended by serious error of one kind or another." — This passage establishes the principle that legal error alone, absent contumacious intent, does not constitute contempt, a doctrine of enduring significance in Philippine contempt jurisprudence.

• Victorino vs. Espiritu, 5 SCRA 653 — Cited as authority for the principle that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive, principle.
• Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241 — Cited in support of the preservative principle of contempt.
• Austria vs. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247 — Cited in support of the preservative principle of contempt, itself citing Lualhati vs. Albert, Villavicencio vs. Lukban, In re: Quirino, and People vs. Rivera.
• Rivera vs. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643 — Cited in support of the preservative principle of contempt, itself citing Villavicencio vs. Lukban, Gamboa vs. Teodoro, Sulit vs. Tiangco, and Lipata vs. Tutaan.
• Romero vs. Valle Jr., 147 SCRA 197 — Cited as further authority on the proper exercise of the contempt power.
• Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Mining Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294 — Cited by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration for the proposition that the act of not implementing a decision, if at all such decision is due for implementation, does not constitute contempt.

• Section 3, paragraph C, Article IX, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that motions for reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the COMELEC shall be decided en banc by the Commission. The fiscals relied on this provision in their legal opinion to conclude that the First Division's decision was not yet final and executory due to a pending motion for reconsideration.
• Section 1682, Revised Administrative Code — Imposes upon the provincial fiscal the duty to serve as legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers, including the mayor and council of the various municipalities, and to submit written opinions upon request. The Court applied this provision to hold that the fiscals were performing a duty specifically enjoined by law.
• Section 3(c) and 3(d), Rule 71, Revised Rules of Court — Defines indirect contempt as unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court and improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. Dimaporo invoked these provisions in his motion for contempt; the Court found that the petitioners' acts did not meet the threshold for contempt under these provisions.
• Section 2, Rule 19, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division filed within five days from promulgation, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation thereof. The Court noted that the fiscal's opinion correctly paraphrased this rule.
• Section 3, Rule 39, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that decisions in pre-proclamation cases become final and executory five days after promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. The Court observed that the fiscal's opinion accurately reflected this rule.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concurred. Feliciano, J., was on leave.