Dulay vs. Court of Appeals

A complaint for damages against an employee and his employer for an intentional act states a cause of action in quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code even without allegations of negligence, because Article 2176 covers voluntary and intentional acts; the independent civil action under Article 33 for physical injuries, which includes consummated homicide, may proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and the employer’s liability under Article 2180 is direct and immediate.

Maria Benita A. Dulay, suing in her own behalf and for her minor children, is the widow of the late Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Benigno Torzuela was a security guard assigned at the “Big Bang sa Alabang” carnival, while Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc. and Superguard Security Corporation were the security agencies alleged to be his employers. The dispute implicated the Civil Code’s quasi-delict and employer-liability provisions, the Revised Penal Code’s civil-liability provisions, and the Rules of Court’s rules on independent civil actions.

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa. Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the carnival, shot and killed Atty. Dulay. The firearm used was a .38 caliber revolver belonging to Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc. (“SAFEGUARD”) and/or Superguard Security Corporation (“SUPERGUARD”), as reflected in a police report dated January 7, 1989.

On February 8, 1989, Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of their minor children Krizteen Elizabeth, Beverly Marie and Napoleon II, filed an action for damages against Torzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, alleged that Safeguard and Superguard were corporations; that they were impleaded as alternative defendants because Safeguard appeared to be Torzuela’s employer while Superguard impliedly acknowledged responsibility for Torzuela’s acts by extending its sympathies to petitioners; that Torzuela was an employee of Safeguard and/or Superguard and, at the time of the incident, was under their control and supervision; that on December 7, 1988 around 8:00 a.m., Torzuela, while on duty as security guard at the “Big Bang sa Alabang,” shot and killed Napoleon V. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to Safeguard and/or Superguard; and that the incident was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants, with Torzuela’s wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm as the immediate and proximate cause and the employers’ failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of their employee. Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

On March 2, 1989, Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties; that because the shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor was governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code could not lie because Article 2176 applied only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code; and that the complaint was premature because Torzuela’s conviction in the criminal case was a condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability. Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that Torzuela was not one of its employees.

Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against private respondents was based on Article 2180 of the New Civil Code; that a suit against alternative defendants was allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court; and that the inclusion of private respondents was justified by the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela was an employee of Safeguard and by Superguard’s overt acts extending its sympathies to petitioners. Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Torzuela with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.

On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting Superguard’s motion to dismiss and Safeguard’s motion for exclusion as defendant. The trial court held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict because it did not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Dulay or that the shooting was done in the performance of his duties; that mere allegations of concurring negligence without supporting facts were conclusions of law; and that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from quasi-delict. The complaint against the alternative defendants was dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and denied reconsideration, prompting petitioners to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

• Nature of Quasi-Delict: Petitioners insisted that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court; Torzuela’s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
• Employer Liability under Article 2180: Petitioners contended that under Article 2180, private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees; this liability is independent of the employee’s own liability for fault or negligence and distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Independent Civil Action: Petitioners argued that the civil action against the employer may proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court; the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of Superguard or Safeguard would be better resolved after trial.
• Article 33: Petitioners argued that Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code; the term “physical injuries” under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide; thus Torzuela’s prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action.
• Alternative Defendants: Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court; inclusion of private respondents was justified by the Initial Investigation Report showing Torzuela was an employee of Safeguard and by Superguard’s overt acts extending sympathies.

• No Quasi-Delict Without Negligence: Private respondents argued that since the act was not committed with negligence, petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code; the civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Act Beyond Scope of Duties: Private respondents maintained that Torzuela’s act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard; since Article 2180 covers only acts done within the scope of the employee’s assigned tasks, private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
• Subsidiary Liability and Prematurity: Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties; that because the shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), civil liability is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 cannot lie because Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code; and that the complaint is premature because Torzuela’s conviction in the criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability.
• Safeguard’s Exclusion: Safeguard filed a motion to be excluded as defendant on the ground that Torzuela is not one of its employees.
• Article 33 Limited: Private respondents averred that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to Marcia vs. Court of Appeals, and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex delicto.
• Intentional vs. Voluntary: Private respondents submitted that the word “intentional” in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter and should be read as “voluntary” since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Nature of Cause of Action: Whether a complaint for damages against an employer for an employee’s intentional act of shooting and killing another states a cause of action in quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, notwithstanding the absence of allegations of negligence.
• Independent Civil Action: Whether the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal prosecution for homicide under Article 33 of the New Civil Code and Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, without the employee’s prior conviction.
• Employer Liability: Whether private respondents may be held directly and immediately liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, or only subsidiarily under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Sufficiency of Complaint: Whether the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against Safeguard and/or Superguard.
• Alternative Defendants / Employment: Whether the question of whether Torzuela was employed by Superguard or Safeguard should be resolved after trial.

• Nature of Cause of Action: Yes. Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence but also acts which are voluntary and intentional; the complaint’s failure to allege negligence did not preclude a quasi-delict cause of action.
• Independent Civil Action: Yes. Article 33’s “physical injuries” includes consummated homicide, and Rule 111, Section 3 allows the independent civil action to proceed without the employee’s prior conviction.
• Employer Liability: Direct and immediate under Article 2180, not merely subsidiary under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code; the employer bears the burden of proving diligence of a good father of a family in selection and supervision.
• Sufficiency of Complaint: Yes. The complaint alleged a right, an obligation, and a breach sufficient to state a cause of action; whether the defendants are actually liable is to be resolved after trial.
• Alternative Defendants / Employment: Yes. The question of whether Torzuela was employed by Superguard or Safeguard is better resolved after trial on the merits.

• Nature of Cause of Action: The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action, not by the claim of the party filing the action made in argument or brief (Republic vs. Estenzo; De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society). The complaint invoked petitioners’ right to recover damages against private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Torzuela’s act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay. Article 2176 provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done; such fault or negligence, absent a pre-existing contractual relation, is a quasi-delict. Contrary to private respondents’ theory, there is no justification for limiting Article 2176 to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Elcano vs. Hill held that Article 2176 covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent; culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court echoed this doctrine. The extinction of civil liability under Rule 111, Section 3(e) refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or was not committed by the accused. Private respondents’ submission that “intentional” in Andamo is inaccurate obiter was rejected absent more substantial reasons.
• Independent Civil Action: Rule 111, Section 1 provides that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with it unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution presents evidence is even better than compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines vs. Court of Appeals). Petitioners did precisely that. Article 33 allows a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries; such action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines; Carandang vs. Santiago) and includes consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja vs. Caro). Although Marcia vs. Court of Appeals held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, Torzuela was charged with homicide, not reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
• Employer Liability: It having been established that the instant action is not ex delicto, petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and private respondents. Under Article 2180, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both (Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines vs. Coronado). It is incumbent upon private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
• Sufficiency of Complaint: The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals; Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Pundogar). The complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of Torzuela and respondents Superguard and/or Safeguard. It was enough that the complaint alleged that Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter’s death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either Superguard and/or Safeguard was Torzuela’s employer and responsible for his acts. This does not establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence, whether it was done within the scope of Torzuela’s duties, whether private respondents failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family, and whether the defendants are actually liable are questions better resolved after trial on the merits. The complaint need not establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this is done at trial (Del Bros Hotel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals). If the allegations furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev’t. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur vs. Provincial Board). Since petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.
• Alternative Defendants / Employment: The complaint impleaded Safeguard and Superguard as alternative defendants, and the question of whether Torzuela was an employee of Superguard or Safeguard was among the matters that could be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party could present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses.

• Article 2176 covers intentional and voluntary acts — A quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence; it covers acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. The Court applied this doctrine to allow the complaint against Torzuela and the alleged employers despite the absence of allegations of negligence.
• Independent civil action for physical injuries under Article 33 — Article 33 of the New Civil Code allows a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries; “physical injuries” includes bodily injuries causing death and consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. The action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. The Court applied this because Torzuela was charged with homicide, not reckless imprudence.
• Employer’s direct and immediate liability under Article 2180 — When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a presumption of law arises that the employer was negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of the employee, or both. The employer’s liability is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the employee’s insolvency. The employer must prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selection and supervision.
• Cause of action sufficiency — The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer. The elements are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission by the defendant violative of the plaintiff’s right or constituting a breach of the defendant’s obligation. The complaint need not establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this is done at trial.
• Nature of cause of action determined by the complaint — The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action, not by the claim of the party filing the action made in argument or brief. The purpose of an action and the law governing it are determined by the complaint itself, its allegations, and prayer for relief.
• No double recovery — The offended party may not recover damages on both delict and quasi-delict scores for the same act; if the offender is also charged criminally, the offended party is entitled only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards vary.

• “Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.” — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the coverage of Article 2176 and directly rejects the respondents’ theory that quasi-delict requires negligence.
• “The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee” — This passage defines the nature of employer liability under Article 2180 and explains why the action may proceed directly against the employer.
• “Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.” — This passage distinguishes Marcia and explains why Article 33 applies to the present case.
• “Article 2176, where it refers to ‘fault or negligence,’ covers not only acts ‘not punishable by law’ but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.” — This passage, quoted from Elcano vs. Hill, is the canonical formulation of the doctrine that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts punishable by law.

• Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98 [1977] — Controlling precedent; held that Article 2176 covers not only acts not punishable by law but also criminal acts, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent, and that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts punishable by law.
• Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990] — Reiterated Elcano; held that Article 2176 covers criminal acts whether intentional and voluntary or negligent, and that a civil action lies against the offender whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, subject to the prohibition on double recovery.
• Yakult Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990] — Held that filing an independent civil action before the prosecution presents evidence is even better than compliance with the requirement of express reservation.
• Marcia vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 193 [1983] — Distinguished; held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence; inapplicable because Torzuela was charged with homicide, not reckless imprudence.
• Capuno vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965] — Construed “physical injuries” in Article 33 to include bodily injuries causing death.
• Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955] — Same construction of “physical injuries” under Article 33 to include bodily injuries causing death.
• Madeja vs. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983] — Held that “physical injuries” includes consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.
• Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988] — Held that Article 2180 creates a presumption of employer negligence in the selection or supervision of the employee.
• Kapalaran Bus Lines vs. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989] — Held that the employer’s liability under Article 2180 is direct and immediate and is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the employee or a prior showing of insolvency.
• Del Bros Hotel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 33 [1992] — Stated the elements of a cause of action and held that the complaint need not establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset.
• Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993] — Cited for the elements of a cause of action.
• Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988] — Held that the nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint.
• De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982] — Held that the purpose of an action and the law governing it are determined by the complaint itself, its allegations, and prayer for relief.
• Rava Dev’t. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] — Held that if the allegations in a complaint furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.
• Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991] — Cited in Rava for the same principle on sufficiency of allegations.
• Azur vs. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969] — Held that to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.

• Article 2176, New Civil Code — Defines quasi-delict; the Court held that it covers not only negligent acts but also voluntary and intentional acts, including criminal acts.
• Article 2180, New Civil Code — Makes employers liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks; creates a presumption of employer negligence in selection or supervision; the Court held the liability is direct and immediate.
• Article 33, New Civil Code — Allows an independent civil action for damages in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries; “physical injuries” includes consummated homicide; the action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
• Rule 111, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provides that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with it unless waived, reserved, or instituted prior to the criminal action; includes damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code.
• Rule 111, Section 3, Rules of Court — Provides that the independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code may proceed independently of the criminal action and requires only a preponderance of evidence.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable; cited by respondents to argue that the civil liability was delict-based.
• Article 103, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the subsidiary civil liability of employers; respondents invoked it, but the Court held the action was not ex delicto and employer liability under Article 2180 was direct.
• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines quasi-offenses or criminal negligence; respondents invoked it to limit Article 2176, but the Court rejected that limitation.
• Rule 3, Section 13, Rules of Court — Allows a suit against alternative defendants; petitioners invoked it to justify impleading Safeguard and Superguard.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.