Drilon vs. Court of Appeals

Final judgments rendered by military commissions against civilians during martial law may not be retroactively nullified to authorize reprosecution in civilian courts, the Olaguer doctrine being applied prospectively only; and a prisoner's voluntary release by the President after partial service of sentence constitutes an implied commutation, extinguishing criminal liability and precluding reinvestigation.

Rodolfo Ganzon and Raul Paredes were civilians charged with double murder for the deaths of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during the early martial law period. They were tried before Military Commission No. 34, a tribunal created under President Marcos' general orders exercising legislative powers during martial rule. The constitutional invalidity of military trials of civilians for common crimes was later declared in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 (1987), but the Court subsequently limited that doctrine's application in Tan vs. Barrios and Cruz vs. Enrile to prospective effect only, preserving the operative fact of prior military proceedings. In 1988, after the change in administration, the Department of Justice initiated a preliminary investigation to file new informations against both men before the civilian Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, prompting the private respondents to seek prohibition in the Court of Appeals.

Sometime in 1973, Rodolfo Ganzon and Raul Paredes were charged with double murder before Military Commission No. 34 for the deaths of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez. On July 27, 1973, the military commission promulgated its decision: Paredes was acquitted and released from custody, while Ganzon was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. Ganzon was made to serve his sentence until he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest under guard. The records do not show that either Ganzon or Paredes had objected to the military commission's jurisdiction over them; they had submitted to it, with Ganzon accepting the verdict of conviction and Paredes that of acquittal.

In 1985, Ganzon joined the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, the party in power, and was designated as campaign manager. After the change in administration, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez directed State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against both private respondents for the same murders. The private respondents moved for dismissal — Ganzon on the ground that he had been extended an absolute pardon by President Ferdinand Marcos and, having been previously convicted, could no longer be tried anew, and Paredes on the ground that he had already been acquitted. Trampe denied both requests, and reconsideration was likewise denied.

The private respondents then filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the petition, invoking Cruz vs. Enrile, and commanded the fiscal to desist from filing criminal informations. The Department of Justice elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion: Ganzon had not adequately proved the fact of presidential pardon; no evidence existed in government files to prove the pardon; Ganzon's copy was a bare machine copy and he had failed to establish loss of the original; the alleged pardon had not been properly sealed, authenticated, or executed on official Malacañang stationery; and the disposition of the murder cases by the military did not preclude the filing of new informations by the civilian government.

As to the pardon, the Court of Appeals had received testimony from former Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin Venus, Jr. and former Presidential Executive Assistant Juan Tuvera, who confirmed that President Marcos signed an absolute pardon in favor of Ganzon on January 27, 1986 in Iloilo City. The Court of Appeals found their testimony trustworthy and deserving of full faith and credit, noting that if Ganzon had not been pardoned, he should have remained incarcerated or under house arrest, and the government had not explained why he had enjoyed unrestrained freedom since that date.

• Insufficiency of Proof of Pardon: Petitioners argued that Ganzon had not adequately proved the fact of presidential pardon, that no evidence existed in government files to prove the pardon, and that Ganzon's copy was a bare machine copy with loss of the original unestablished.
• Defective Form of Pardon: Petitioners contended that the alleged pardon had not been properly sealed and authenticated, nor executed on official Malacañang stationery.
• Military Disposition Does Not Bar Civilian Prosecution: Petitioners maintained that the disposition of the murder cases by the military commission did not preclude the filing of new informations by the civilian government.

• Prior Acquittal (Paredes): Respondent Paredes argued that he had already been acquitted by Military Commission No. 34 and could no longer be tried anew.
• Presidential Pardon (Ganzon): Respondent Ganzon argued that he had been extended an absolute pardon by President Marcos and, having been previously convicted, could no longer be retried.
• Prohibition Against Reprosecution: Respondents invoked Cruz vs. Enrile for the proposition that civilians who had already served sentence, been acquitted, or been amnestied should not be subjected to the ordeal of another trial.

• Prospective Application of Olaguer: Whether the government may proceed criminally against the private respondents despite the verdict earlier rendered by Military Commission No. 34.
• Implied Commutation of Sentence: Whether Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment constituted a commutation of sentence by President Marcos, thereby precluding reinvestigation.
• Validity of Presidential Pardon: Whether Ganzon had adequately proved the fact of presidential pardon, rendering the pardon a bar to reprosecution.

• Prospective Application of Olaguer: No. The government may not proceed with criminal actions against the private respondents. Applying Tan vs. Barrios and Cruz vs. Enrile, the Olaguer doctrine is applied prospectively only, and final judgments rendered by military courts against civilians before Olaguer should not be retroactively nullified to authorize reprosecution.
• Implied Commutation of Sentence: Yes. Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment, ordered by President Marcos, constituted an implied commutation of his life sentence to six years, extinguishing criminal liability and precluding reinvestigation.
• Validity of Presidential Pardon: Moot. The question of whether Ganzon was pardoned became moot and academic, since he had already served his commuted sentence by virtue of his 1978 release, rendering the pardon issue unnecessary to resolve.

• Prospective Application of Olaguer: The Court reiterated its ruling in Tan vs. Barrios, which gave Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 prospective application only. Final judgments — whether of conviction or acquittal — rendered by military courts against civilians before Olaguer was promulgated should not be retroactively nullified. The trial of thousands of civilians before military tribunals during martial rule is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored; the belated declaration of unconstitutionality did not erase the reality of its consequences. The Court reasoned that it would be a cruel distortion of Olaguer to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians who, unlike Olaguer, had been accorded a fair trial and had already been acquitted and released, or had accepted and commenced serving their sentences. The private respondents' case fell squarely within Tan's ruling: Paredes had been acquitted, and Ganzon had accepted the verdict and served time. Neither should be dragged through a second trial.

• Implied Commutation of Sentence: The Court found that Ganzon served six years in military stockades as a result of his conviction, and was then released in 1978 and placed under house arrest. These twin developments were significant: if President Marcos ordered Ganzon's release after six years, he unavoidably commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six years, albeit with the condition of house arrest. The Court held that commutation of sentence need not be in a specific form; it was sufficient that Ganzon was voluntarily released in 1978 with no terms or conditions except that he remain under house arrest. House arrest could not be considered a continuation of sentence, because arrest is not a penalty but merely a means of taking a person into custody. Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the President's pardoning power — including commutation — is final and unappealable. Commutation extinguishes criminal liability partially and changes the penalty to a lesser one. Having served his commuted sentence fully, Ganzon could no longer be reinvestigated for the same offense.

• Validity of Presidential Pardon: Because the Court concluded that Ganzon had already served his commuted sentence as early as 1978, the question of whether he was pardoned in 1986 became moot and academic. The Court therefore declined to rule on the adequacy of proof of the pardon, noting that whatever "pardon" the former President may have extended did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, Ganzon was already a free man by virtue of the implied commutation.

• Prospective Application of the Olaguer Doctrine — The declaration in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 that military commissions had no jurisdiction to try civilians for common crimes is applied prospectively only. Final judgments of conviction or acquittal rendered by military courts against civilians before Olaguer was promulgated should not be retroactively nullified. Only where the convicted person or the State shows a serious denial of constitutional rights should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial ordered — and that nullity rests on the constitutional violation, not on the Olaguer doctrine. The Court applied this by holding that Ganzon and Paredes, whose cases were final before Olaguer, could not be reprosecuted in civilian courts.

• Operative Fact Doctrine — The trial of civilians before military tribunals during martial rule is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration of unconstitutionality does not erase the reality of consequences that occurred before the decision. The Court relied on Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito to support the proposition that nullification does not wipe out all acts of a body thus abolished.

• Implied Commutation of Sentence — Commutation of sentence need not be in a specific form. It is sufficient that the prisoner was voluntarily released by the President after partial service of sentence, with or without conditions. The President's release of a convict after partial service constitutes an implied commutation, reducing the penalty to the period already served. The Court applied this by holding that Marcos' 1978 release of Ganzon after six years constituted commutation of his life sentence, extinguishing criminal liability and barring reinvestigation.

• Options Under Cruz vs. Enrile — Civilians serving sentences imposed by military courts may be given the option either to complete the service of their sentence or to be tried anew by civil courts. Upon conviction in a new trial, they should be credited for the period of previous imprisonment; upon acquittal, they should be set free. The Court found that Ganzon had apparently accepted the option to complete service of his sentence and rejected the option of retrial.

• "In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olague should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases an cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision." — This passage, quoted from Tan vs. Barrios, articulates the controlling rule on prospective application of the Olaguer doctrine and forms the ratio decidendi for barring reprosecution of the private respondents.

• "It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already been acquitted and released, or have accepted sentences imposed on them and commenced serving the same." — This passage defines the limits of the Olaguer doctrine and explains why civilians who submitted to military jurisdiction and received final judgments should not be subjected to a second trial.

• "The Court does not believe, in Ganzon's case, that commutation of sentence need be in a specific form. It is sufficient, to mind, that Ganzon was voluntarily released in 1978 wit terms or conditions, except that he should remain under house arrest." — This passage establishes the doctrine of implied commutation, holding that executive release of a convict after partial service constitutes commutation without need of formal documentation.

• Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987) — The landmark decision declaring that military commissions had no jurisdiction to try civilians for common crimes during martial law. The Court limited its application to prospective effect only in this case.
• Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 (1988) — Established guidelines for civilians tried by military commissions, giving them the option to complete service of sentence or be tried anew by civil courts. The Court applied its framework to the private respondents.
• Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686 (1990) — Held that Olaguer should be applied prospectively only, with no retroactive nullification of final military court judgments. This was the controlling precedent directly applied to bar reprosecution.
• Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 5 — Cited for the operative fact doctrine, supporting the proposition that declaration of nullity does not erase all prior acts and consequences.
• People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) — Cited for the principle that commutation of sentence is final and unappealable, and that it extinguishes criminal liability partially and changes the penalty to a lesser one.

• Article IX, Section 13, 1973 Constitution / Article VII, Section 19, 1987 Constitution — Grants the President the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures. The Court applied this provision to hold that Marcos' release of Ganzon constituted an exercise of the pardoning power through implied commutation, which is final and unappealable.
• Article 94, Revised Penal Code — Defines the total extinction of criminal liability. The Court cited this provision in connection with commutation partially extinguishing criminal liability.
• Article 96, Revised Penal Code — Provides the effect of commutation, changing the penalty to a lesser one. The Court applied this to conclude that Ganzon's life sentence was commuted to six years.
• Rule 113, Section 1, Rules of Court — Defines arrest as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense. The Court relied on this definition to hold that house arrest is not a penalty and cannot be considered a continuation of sentence.

Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Feliciano, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur in the result. Regalado, J., Pro hac vice.