Donato vs. Luna

A civil action for annulment of a second marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a bigamy prosecution only if it is shown that the accused's own consent to the marriage was obtained through duress, force, or intimidation, such that the act of contracting the second marriage was involuntary and cannot serve as the basis for conviction; the mere pendency of an annulment action — especially one filed by the second spouse on the ground of deceit — does not warrant suspension of the criminal proceedings.

Leonilo C. Donato contracted a first marriage with Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978, and a second marriage with Paz B. Abayan on September 26, 1978. Prior to the second marriage, Donato and Abayan had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for at least five years, executing a joint affidavit to that effect on September 26, 1978, which dispensed with the marriage license requirement pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code on marriages of exceptional character. Abayan was unaware of Donato's prior marriage when she entered into the second one. The criminal prosecution for bigamy and the civil action for nullity of the second marriage proceeded in separate tribunals — the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, respectively — raising the procedural question of whether the civil case constituted a prejudicial question requiring suspension of the criminal case.

Leonilo C. Donato contracted a first marriage with Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. On September 26, 1978, he contracted a second marriage with Paz B. Abayan. Prior to the second marriage, Donato and Abayan had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for at least five years, as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code on marriages of exceptional character. Abayan had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to Maluping.

On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila, through Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor, filed an information for bigamy against Donato before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXII, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554, based on the complaint of Abayan. Before Donato's arraignment, on September 28, 1979, Abayan filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Donato before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627, on the ground that her consent to the marriage was obtained through deceit, as she was unaware that Donato's first marriage was still subsisting. In his answer to the civil case, Donato interposed the defense that the second marriage was void because it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence were employed by Abayan to obtain his consent.

Prior to the scheduled trial on the merits of the bigamy case, Donato filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceedings, contending that the civil action for nullity raised a prejudicial question that must first be resolved. Respondent Judge Artemon D. Luna denied the motion on April 7, 1980, citing the ruling in Landicho vs. Relova, and directed that the criminal case proceed. A motion for reconsideration was filed, citing De la Cruz vs. Ejercito as a later and more applicable precedent; it was likewise denied on April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. The records further revealed that Donato continued to live with Abayan until November 1978, when she left their abode upon learning that Donato was already previously married, and that Donato raised the claim of force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence only after the civil action for nullity was filed on September 28, 1979 — more than a year after the second marriage was solemnized.

• Prejudicial Question: Petitioner maintained that the civil action for annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent Abayan before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court raised a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for bigamy could proceed, warranting suspension of the criminal proceedings.
• Applicable Precedent: Petitioner argued that De la Cruz vs. Ejercito, being a later case than Landicho vs. Relova cited by the respondent judge, should govern the case at bar and support the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
• Void Second Marriage: Petitioner contended that his second marriage was void because it was solemnized without a marriage license and that his consent was obtained through force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence employed by private respondent.

• Prejudicial Question: Whether the pending civil action for annulment of the second marriage before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court constitutes a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy before the Court of First Instance.
• Applicable Precedent: Whether De la Cruz vs. Ejercito, as a later case, should be applied instead of Landicho vs. Relova in resolving the issue of prejudicial question.

• Prejudicial Question: No. The civil action for nullity of the second marriage did not constitute a prejudicial question because the issue therein — whether Abayan's consent was obtained through deceit — was not determinative of Donato's guilt or innocence for bigamy, and Donato had not shown that his own consent was obtained through duress, force, or intimidation.
• Applicable Precedent: No. De la Cruz vs. Ejercito was inapplicable because in that case the accused herself filed the annulment action on the ground of duress and a judgment of nullity had already been rendered, whereas in the present case the second spouse filed the action on the ground of deceit and no judgment had yet been rendered.

• Prejudicial Question: A prejudicial question arises when the resolution of an issue in a civil case is a logical antecedent of the issue in a criminal case, and the cognizance of that issue pertains to another tribunal. It must be based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action for annulment of marriage to constitute a prejudicial question to a bigamy prosecution, it must be shown that the accused's own consent to the marriage was obtained through duress, force, and intimidation, establishing that the act of contracting the second marriage was involuntary and cannot be the basis for conviction. In the present case, the civil action was filed by Abayan — the second wife — on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit, not that Donato's consent was obtained through force. Donato raised the defense of force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence only in his answer to the civil complaint, and did so more than a year after the second marriage was solemnized. His claim was belied by the joint affidavit executed by both parties stating they had lived together as husband and wife for over five years, and by the fact that he continued to live with Abayan until November 1978. The issue in the civil case was therefore not determinative of Donato's guilt or innocence for bigamy. Moreover, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity; the nullity must be declared by a competent court, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

• Applicable Precedent: De la Cruz vs. Ejercito was distinguishable on two critical grounds. First, in De la Cruz, it was the accused, Milagros de la Cruz, who filed the annulment action on the ground of duress, whereas in the present case it was the second spouse, Abayan, who filed the action on the ground of deceit. Second, in De la Cruz, a judgment had already been rendered in the civil case declaring the second marriage null and void, which was determinative of the accused's guilt or innocence; in the present case, no such judgment had yet been rendered. The doctrine in Landicho vs. Relova was therefore properly applied by the respondent judge.

• Prejudicial Question — A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For it to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil case would necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the civil action for nullity of marriage did not satisfy these requisites because the issue therein was not determinative of Donato's guilt or innocence for bigamy.

• Prejudicial Question in Bigamy Cases — For a civil action for annulment of marriage to constitute a prejudicial question to a bigamy prosecution, it must be shown that the accused's own consent to the marriage was obtained through duress, force, and intimidation, such that the act in the second marriage was involuntary and cannot be the basis for conviction. The mere pendency of an annulment action does not automatically raise a prejudicial question. The Court applied this rule from Landicho vs. Relova and found that Donato had not shown his consent was obtained through force or intimidation, the annulment having been filed by his second wife on the ground of deceit.

• Presumption of Validity of Marriage — Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity; the nullity must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court, and only when the nullity is so declared can the marriage be held void. So long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

• "The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions' are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case." — This passage, quoted from Landicho vs. Relova, articulates the controlling rule that the mere existence of annulment proceedings does not per se create a prejudicial question sufficient to suspend a bigamy prosecution.

• "Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists." — This passage establishes the presumption of validity of marriage and the principle that a party who contracts a second marriage before judicial declaration of nullity of the first assumes the risk of bigamy prosecution.

• "Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case." — This observation by the Court characterizes Donato's invocation of the prejudicial question doctrine as a dilatory tactic, reinforcing the requirement that the doctrine's requisites must genuinely obtain before suspension is warranted.

• Landicho vs. Relova, 22 SCRA 731 — Controlling precedent applied by the Court. It established the rule that an annulment action constitutes a prejudicial question to a bigamy case only if the accused's own consent to the second marriage was obtained through duress, force, and intimidation, rendering the act involuntary. The Court found this case directly applicable.
• De la Cruz vs. Ejercito, 68 SCRA 1 — Distinguished. Petitioner argued this later case should govern, but the Court found it inapplicable because in De la Cruz the accused herself filed the annulment on the ground of duress and a judgment of nullity had already been rendered, unlike the present case where the second spouse filed on the ground of deceit and no judgment had yet been issued.
• People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Isip vs. Gonzales, 39 SCRA 255; Rojas vs. People, 57 SCRA 243 — Cited for the definition of a prejudicial question as one whose resolution is a logical antecedent of the issue in the criminal case and whose cognizance pertains to another tribunal.
• Libra vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303 — Cited for the requisites of a prejudicial question: the civil case must involve facts intimately related to the criminal prosecution, and the resolution of the civil issues must necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

• Article 76, New Civil Code — Pertains to marriages of exceptional character, dispensing with the marriage license requirement where the parties have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The provision was relevant because Donato and Abayan executed a joint affidavit attesting to their five-year cohabitation, which dispensed with the marriage license for the second marriage.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concurred.