Domondon vs. Lopez

A judge commits gross ignorance of the law by dismissing a complaint on the merits without trial based solely on unverified factual allegations in the defendant’s responsive pleadings, thereby conflating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under Rule 16 with a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33. A judge likewise incurs administrative liability for undue delay by resolving an application for a preliminary mandatory injunction only after the event it sought to prevent has supervened, and the delay cannot be excused by the opposing party’s belated filing of pleadings.

Complainants were members of the editorial board of Dataline, the official student publication of AMA Computer College in Quezon City. In December 1996 they published a spoof edition titled Amable Tonite. The school’s student Disciplinary Tribunal investigated the matter and recommended their expulsion. Alleging that the expulsion was despotic, violated due process and free speech, and contravened Republic Act No. 7079 (Campus Journalism Act of 1991), complainants filed an action for damages with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 78, presided by respondent Judge Percival Mandap Lopez. The prayer for injunction sought to compel the school to allow complainants to attend classes and take examinations during the impending enrollment for the first trimester of school year 1997-1998.

• The Publication and Expulsion: Complainants, students of AMA Computer College and members of the editorial board of the official school publication Dataline, published a spoof edition they called Amable Tonite on December 7, 1996. After an investigation, the student Disciplinary Tribunal recommended their expulsion. Complainants alleged they were expelled in a despotic and oppressive manner, in violation of their constitutional rights to due process and free speech and of Republic Act No. 7079 (Campus Journalism Act of 1991).

• Filing of Civil Case: On March 14, 1997, complainants, together with other editorial board members, filed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 for damages with a prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction against AMA Computer College and its Dean of Student Affairs, Mauricia Herrera, in the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78. They sought to be readmitted and to be allowed to attend classes and take examinations pending trial. The injunction was urgent because the enrollment period for the first trimester of school year 1997-1998 fell on the first weeks of June 1997.

• Defendants’ Responsive Pleadings: On March 25, 1997, defendants filed an "Opposition" (not an answer or motion to dismiss), alleging that the articles were slanderous and derogatory; that complainants were given due process; and that complainants committed libel, vulgar acts, and unauthorized disbursement of publication funds. The Opposition was unverified. Complainants filed a reply, and defendants subsequently filed a Rejoinder on June 2, 1997, well beyond the May 9, 1997 deadline. The Rejoinder included a prayer for dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

• Urgent Calls for Resolution: Complainants repeatedly urged immediate resolution of the injunction application before the enrollment period lapsed. On June 7, 1997, they pressed the matter, attributing the delay to the defendants’ late filing.

• Resolution Dismissing the Case: On June 14, 1997, respondent judge issued a Resolution that did not merely rule on the injunction but dismissed the entire complaint on the merits. He found that complainants were expelled for cause after due investigation, that their articles did not conform to the school manual's guidelines for selecting articles, and that the expulsion was valid under school regulations and R.A. No. 7079. He relied on factual allegations in the defendants’ unverified pleadings, including the findings of the disciplinary tribunal and a prior complaint before the Commission on Higher Education that was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

• Post-Dismissal Motions: Complainants moved for reconsideration and sought the judge’s disqualification. The motion was denied on September 26, 1997. Complainants alleged they received the denial only on February 19, 1998, nearly five months later, suggesting the order was antedated.

• Administrative Complaint: Complainants filed the present administrative case, charging respondent judge with undue delay for failing to resolve the injunction before the enrollment period ended, and with gross ignorance of the law for dismissing the case on the merits without trial based solely on unverified pleadings. The Office of the Court Administrator found the judge guilty and recommended a fine of P2,000.00.

• Undue Delay: Complainants argued that respondent judge deliberately delayed the resolution of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, allowing the issue to become moot because by June 14, 1997 the enrollment period had already closed. They insisted that the judge should have resolved the application promptly after the defendants failed to file their rejoinder on time.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Complainants maintained that the judge dismissed the complaint on the merits without legal or procedural basis, as no answer or motion to dismiss had been filed. They contended that the pleadings and evidence on record pertained only to the injunctive relief, that the defendants’ factual averments were unverified, and that complainants were never given an opportunity to present evidence. The dismissal thus deprived them of their day in court.

• Procedural Irregularity and Delayed Service: Complainants further claimed that the September 26, 1997 resolution denying reconsideration was received only on February 19, 1998, raising the suspicion of antedating. They also alleged that no hearing was actually conducted on March 31, 1997 despite the court’s schedule.

• No Undue Delay: Respondent judge denied delay, asserting that the issue was submitted for resolution only upon the filing of the defendants’ rejoinder on June 6, 1997, and that his resolution was issued just eight days later on June 14, 1997. He saw no urgency for the injunction because complainants were already expelled and the status quo favored the school, not all complainants were graduating, and the articles were indecent.

• Dismissal Was Proper: Respondent judge contended that the defendants’ rejoinder contained a prayer for dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, which he treated as tantamount to a motion to dismiss. He argued that the dismissal was thus procedurally warranted and that he merely accepted the affirmative defenses raised.

• Undue Delay: Whether respondent judge committed undue delay in resolving the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, rendering it moot.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether respondent judge was guilty of gross ignorance of the law by dismissing the complaint on the merits without trial, based solely on the unverified pleadings of the defendants.

• Delay in Service of Resolution: Whether respondent judge was accountable for the nearly five-month delay in the service of the September 26, 1997 resolution upon complainants.

• Undue Delay: Respondent judge unduly delayed the resolution of the prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Although no fixed period applies, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates prompt disposition of court business. The judge was aware that complainants sought the writ to be allowed to enroll for the first trimester of school year 1997-1998 and that the enrollment period expired in early June. Despite the exigency, he deferred resolution until June 14, 1997, by which time the injunction had become useless. The delay could not be justified by the defendants’ late filing of their rejoinder; respondent judge should have deemed the rejoinder waived and resolved the matter before the enrollment lapsed. His procrastination gave rise to suspicion of partiality.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: The dismissal of the complaint on the merits was a manifest display of gross ignorance of elementary procedural law. The defendants filed an Opposition and a Rejoinder, not a motion to dismiss under Rule 16. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is determined solely from the allegations of the complaint, without reference to evidence aliunde. In contrast, a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 is filed after the plaintiff has rested his case and is resolved on the basis of the plaintiff’s evidence. By treating the defendants’ unverified factual allegations as proof and resolving factual issues without trial, respondent judge conflated these distinct procedural remedies. Factual matters—such as whether complainants were expelled solely for the articles, the conduct of the disciplinary hearing, and the composition of the tribunal—required the presentation of evidence. The defendants’ unverified allegations did not rise to the dignity of proof. The judge’s failure to grasp this basic distinction constituted gross ignorance of the law.

• Delay in Service of Resolution: Respondent judge did not deny the allegation that complainants received the September 26, 1997 resolution only on February 19, 1998. Given the distance between counsel’s Makati office and the Quezon City court, a five-month service delay was implausible. As the judge bears the responsibility to ensure prompt dispatch of court business, the delay was attributable to him. This finding was compounded by his prior reprimand in A.M. No. RTJ-92-840 for similar delay in service of a decision.

• Distinction between dismissal for failure to state a cause of action (Rule 16) and demurrer to evidence (Rule 33) — A motion to dismiss under Rule 16, §1(g) tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint and is resolved without examining evidentiary matters or the truth of the facts alleged. A demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 is filed after the plaintiff has concluded his presentation of evidence and challenges whether the evidence so presented sufficiently establishes the cause of action; it involves an evaluation of the truth and falsity of the allegations. A judge cannot dismiss a case on the merits under the guise of a Rule 16 dismissal by relying on the defendant’s unverified factual narratives without trial.

• Judicial duty of prompt disposition — Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct obliges judges to decide motions and cases with dispatch. Failure to resolve an application for a writ of preliminary injunction before the supervening event renders it moot amounts to undue delay and subjects the judge to administrative discipline.

• Gross ignorance of elementary law — When the law involved is basic and the judge’s lack of awareness amounts to a patent disregard of well-known procedural rules, the judge is guilty of gross ignorance. Judges are required to possess more than a modicum of knowledge of statutes and procedural rules.

• "The first [situation where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action] is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matters aliunde. The second [situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged] is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim. The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises precisely because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the evidence wanting."

• "Without evidence as to their truthfulness or veracity, the allegations in the opposition filed by the defendants remained mere allegations and did not rise to the dignity of proof."

• "When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. Judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules."

• China Road and Bridge Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 401 (2000) — Cited as the controlling authority distinguishing between a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and a demurrer to evidence for lack of cause of action; its definition was quoted verbatim to explain respondent judge’s error.

• Enojas v. Commission on Elections, 283 SCRA 229 (1997) — Referred to for the rule that a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 is filed only after the plaintiff rests his case.

• Fernandez v. International Corporate Bank, 316 SCRA 326 (1999) — Cited for the principle that the filing of a responsive pleading seeking affirmative relief and setting up defenses negates the intent to file a motion to dismiss.

• Espino v. Salubre, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1255, Feb. 26, 2001 — Applied for the standard that ignorance of elementary law constitutes gross ignorance.

• Miranda v. Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-92-840 — Respondent judge’s prior administrative case; his reprimand for undue delay in serving a decision was used to justify a higher penalty for failing to heed a prior warning.

• Rule 16, §1(g), 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure (then applicable) — A motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; such motion is resolved solely from the face of the complaint.

• Rule 33, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — A demurrer to evidence is filed after the plaintiff rests his case and tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

• Canon 3, Rule 3.05, Code of Judicial Conduct — Judges must dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods; invoked to hold the judge liable for the delay in resolving the injunction.

• Republic Act No. 7079 (Campus Journalism Act of 1991) — Referred to in the underlying civil case as the law allegedly violated; its provisions on editorial guidelines and protection from expulsion solely based on published articles formed part of the factual dispute that required trial.

Bellosillo, and Corona, JJ., concur. Quisumbing, J., abroad on official business.