Domingo vs. Scheer

A permanent resident alien may not be summarily deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation and given a hearing; the expiration or cancellation of his passport does not obviate deportation proceedings where the deportation order rests on other grounds such as undesirability, and the subsequent issuance of a new passport renders the summary deportation order moot and academic and the resolution denying reconsideration devoid of legal basis.

Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent visitor to the Philippines whose application for permanent resident status was granted on July 18, 1986, in whose favor the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-396907 dated September 16, 1987 and Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 256789 dated February 24, 1988. He married widowed Filipina Edith delos Reyes, with whom he had two daughters, and settled in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, where he established and managed the Bavaria Restaurant. The entry and stay of aliens in the Philippines is governed by the Immigration Act of 1940 (Commonwealth Act No. 613), as amended, and by Office Memorandum Order No. 34 (series of 1989), which authorizes summary deportation where a foreign embassy cancels or refuses to reissue an alien's passport.

Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent visitor to the Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his application for permanent resident status was granted, and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation issued in his favor Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-396907 dated September 16, 1987 and Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 256789 dated February 24, 1988. He married widowed Filipina Edith delos Reyes, with whom he had two daughters; a son, Herbert Scheer, Jr., passed away on November 13, 1995. The family resided in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, where Scheer established and managed the Bavaria Restaurant, and on May 21, 1991 he was appointed Confidential Agent by then NBI Director Alfredo S. Lim.

In a letter dated June 29, 1995, Vice Consul Jutta Hippelein informed the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn, Germany, that Scheer had police records and financial liabilities in Germany. The Department of Foreign Affairs thereafter received from the German Embassy in Manila Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995, informing it that Scheer was wanted by the German Federal Police, that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him, and that he would be served with an official document requesting him to turn over his German passport to the Embassy, which had been invalidated on July 2, 1995. The Embassy requested the Department of Foreign Affairs to inform the competent Philippine authorities of the matter.

The Board of Commissioners (BOC) thereafter issued a Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995, ordering (a) the cancellation of Scheer's permanent residence visa, (b) his summary deportation and permanent exclusion from the Philippines, and (c) the inclusion of his name in the Bureau's blacklist, subject to the proviso that the summary deportation be held in abeyance should he have a pending final and executory criminal conviction imposing imprisonment, or a pending criminal, civil or administrative action with a hold departure order, in which instances he would remain in the custody of the Bureau. In issuing the order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from the German Vice Consul, its speculation that the German Embassy was unlikely to issue a new passport to Scheer, the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany for insurance fraud, and the alleged illegal activities of Scheer in Palawan, and concluded that he was not only an undocumented but also an undesirable alien.

When apprised of the deportation order, Scheer aired his side to then BID Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles, who allowed him to remain in the Philippines and gave him time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the German Embassy. Presidential Assistant Teodorico K. Imperial wrote a Testimonial dated November 24, 1995 in his behalf. On December 5, 1995, Scheer, through counsel, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order, alleging that he had been denied notice and the opportunity to be heard; that Note Verbale No. 369/95 did not state that he was involved in insurance fraud or illegal activities; and that he was not an undesirable alien, having stayed in the country for more than ten years, married a Filipina, established a business in Palawan, and having no police record. The BOC did not resolve the motion, and Scheer was neither arrested nor deported.

On February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case against Scheer for physical injuries. The German Embassy issued a temporary passport, and in a letter dated March 1, 1996, Scheer informed Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been renewed following the dismissal of the case and reiterated his request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order and the restoration of his permanent resident status. On March 12, 1996, the German Embassy issued him a regular passport to expire on March 11, 2006. The BOC still failed to resolve the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the March 1, 1996 letter. Scheer remained in the Philippines and maintained his business; on March 20, 1997, the Department of Labor and Employment approved his application for an Alien Employment Registration Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant.

Petitioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office as Immigration Commissioner and wrote the German Embassy inquiring whether Scheer was wanted by the German police; on April 12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that he was not. At about midnight on June 6, 2002, marine operatives and BID agents apprehended Scheer in his residence on orders of the petitioner, and he was taken to the BID Manila Office and there held in custody while awaiting deportation; despite entreaties from his wife and employees, the petitioner refused to release him. Scheer's counsel filed a motion for bail with the BID, and on June 11, 2002 filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. In the meantime, the BOC ruled that its September 27, 1995 Order had become final and executory after the lapse of one year, citing Sy vs. Vivo and Lou vs. Vivo, and that it was not competent to reverse the order, citing Immigration Commissioner vs. Fernandez; it declared that Scheer could seek a waiver of his exclusion through the exceptions provided by Section 29(a)(15) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, but that his application presupposed his prior removal from the Philippines. Scheer procured a certification from the NBI in Puerto Princesa City that he had no pending criminal record, and a certification from the PNP that he had no pending criminal or derogatory records.

On June 26, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting Scheer on a bond of ₱100,000.00. On July 18, 2002, the BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente lite denying Scheer's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance and Letter dated June 11, 2002, and ordering his summary deportation, his permanent exclusion under Section 40(a)(15) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, his inclusion in the Immigration Black List, and the forfeiture of his bail bond. During the July 22, 2002 hearing on the plea for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that the State had no opposition to Scheer's re-entry and stay in the Philippines, provided that he leave the country first and re-apply for admission and residency status. On July 24, 2003, Scheer's counsel received a letter from the petitioner dated July 16, 2002 stating that the BOC was in the course of reviewing the deportation case against Scheer and that its findings would be given in due time.

The Court of Appeals found that the German Embassy's subsequent issuance of a passport to Scheer before the BOC's issuance of its Omnibus Resolution had mooted the September 27, 1995 Summary Deportation Order as well as his arrest and detention; that since the grounds cited by the BOC no longer existed, there was no factual and legal basis to disqualify him from staying in the country; and that the circumstances surrounding the Omnibus Resolution — dated June 14, 2002 but filed only on July 18, 2002, three days after the petitioner had assured respondent's counsel that the Board was still evaluating the case — gave reason to suspect that the resolution had been antedated.

• Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party: Petitioner maintained that respondent's petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed because he failed to implead the Board of Commissioners, the real party-in-interest, as mandated by Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court; the inclusion of the BOC as respondent was necessary so that its actions could be directly attacked and for the court to acquire jurisdiction over it, and the fact that Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo was impleaded as the sole respondent was not enough, as she is only one of the four Commissioners and the assailed orders were issued by the Board and not by her alone.
• Writ of Mandamus: Petitioner argued that the writ of mandamus does not lie against the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration to resolve respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order, considering that it is the Board of Commissioners, and not the Commissioner alone, which has authority to make said resolution.
• Writ of Certiorari: Petitioner argued that the writ of certiorari does not lie against the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, considering that it is the Board of Commissioners, and not the Commissioner alone, which issued the Summary Deportation Order and the Omnibus Resolution.
• Writ of Prohibition: Petitioner argued that the writ of prohibition does not lie against the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration prohibiting the implementation of the Summary Deportation Order and the Omnibus Resolution, considering that the Board of Commissioners was not impleaded as party-respondent in the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 71094.
• Absence of Grave Abuse of Discretion in the BOC: Petitioner contended that, assuming the Board of Commissioners was properly impleaded, the Summary Deportation Order and the Omnibus Resolution were not issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Absence of Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Commissioner: Petitioner contended that, assuming the Board was properly impleaded, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in implementing the Summary Deportation Order and the Omnibus Resolution.
• Effect of the New Passport: Petitioner asserted that the German Embassy's issuance of a new passport did not legalize respondent's stay in the country, which became illegal on July 2, 1995 when his passport expired, and that the allowance by then Commissioner Leandro Verceles for respondent to renew his passport and secure clearances, even if proved, was not binding on the Board.
• Finality of the 1995 Order: Petitioner asserted that the September 27, 1995 Order of the Board had already become executory when respondent filed his petition in the Court of Appeals.

• Estoppel on Non-joinder: Respondent countered that petitioner is already estopped from raising the issue of non-joinder, since in quite a number of jurisprudence only the Immigration Commissioner is impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay in the country or not; the petitioner, as head of the Bureau of Immigration, was more than fully heard on its institutional position, a Bureau which speaks with a single voice in this case, and she is in estoppel for not raising the issue earlier, either in a timely Comment or during the oral argument.
• Curable Defect and Leave Ad Cautelam: Respondent argued that even as the Court of Appeals did not require him to implead the Board, he in fact begged leave, ad cautelam, in his Reply Memorandum dated July 31, 2002 to implead the Board, which speaks with a single voice anyway in this case, so that no claim can be made that a valid point of view has not been heard.
• Petitioner as Instrumentality of the Bureau: Respondent argued that the petitioner is clearly the BID's chosen instrumentality for the relevant purpose, and that what he ultimately questioned were the acts or orders of the petitioner for his arrest and immediate deportation by way of implementing the BOC's Summary Deportation Order.
• Mootness of the Deportation Order: Respondent argued that with the issuance of a new passport, there was no more basis for his deportation, and prayed for the nullification of the Summary Deportation Order and the Omnibus Resolution, as well as his immediate release even on his counsel's recognizance.

• Indispensable Party: Whether the Board of Commissioners is an indispensable party to a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing its Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution, and whether its non-joinder warrants the dismissal of the petition.
• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, or whether the issue of the power to deport aliens is beyond its competence to resolve.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the BOC: Whether the Board of Commissioners committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Commissioner: Whether the petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in causing the arrest and detention of the private respondent.
• Mootness: Whether the issuance of a new and regular passport to the respondent rendered the Summary Deportation Order moot and academic and the Omnibus Resolution of the Board lacking in legal basis.

• Indispensable Party: Yes, the Board of Commissioners was an indispensable party, but its non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of the petition. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the joinder of indispensable parties, but under Section 11 the court may order their inclusion at any stage, and the defect was cured by the Solicitor General's representation of the Board's position.
• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: Yes. The petition did not call for a substitution of the President's discretion on deportation but alleged grave abuse of discretion in the arrest and detention; Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and Section 4, Rule 65 authorize the Court of Appeals to review acts of a quasi-judicial agency for grave abuse of discretion.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the BOC: Yes. The Summary Deportation Order was issued without any hearing and rested on speculation and unsupported conclusions that respondent had committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan, in violation of Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 and paragraphs 4 and 5 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Commissioner: Yes. The arrest and detention of respondent on June 6, 2002, based on a 1995 Summary Deportation Order whose motion for reconsideration had remained unresolved for more than six years, were premature, unwarranted and arbitrary.
• Mootness: Yes. The German Embassy's issuance of a new and regular passport to respondent rendered the Summary Deportation Order moot and academic and the Omnibus Resolution lacking in legal basis, there being no remaining factual or legal ground to disqualify him from staying in the country.

• Indispensable Party: The respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the Board of Commissioners, and the petitioner caused that arrest in obedience to the said Order. Respondent's Memorandum prayed that the Court of Appeals annul not only the Summary Deportation Order but also the Board's Omnibus Resolution, and that a writ of mandamus issue to compel the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration — a motion that had to be resolved by the Board, since the order sought to be reconsidered was issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the Board may not be exercised by its individual members. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires indispensable parties to be joined, and the joinder is mandatory; without the presence of indispensable parties, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality, strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment, and the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for lack of authority to act not only as to the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action; parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action, and only if the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court may the complaint be dismissed. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. The Court of Appeals' reliance on Vivo vs. Arca and Vivo vs. Cloribel was misplaced, since the acts subject of the petitions in those cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not of the Board, so that the Board was neither a necessary nor an indispensable party therein. The Court may cure the defect by ordering the amendment of the petition to implead the Board as party-respondent, and it may no longer be necessary to do so given the unique backdrop of the case involving an issue of public interest. The Office of the Solicitor General represented the petitioner both in the instant proceedings and in the appellate court and maintained the validity of the deportation order and the Omnibus Resolution, so the State cannot claim that the Board was not afforded its day in court simply because only the petitioner, the Chairperson of the Board, was the respondent in the Court of Appeals. As held in Alonso vs. Villamor, there is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents; their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.

• Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: The petitioner's contention that the issue before the Court of Appeals — the power of the President to determine whether an alien may remain or be deported — was beyond the appellate court's competence rested on a wrong premise. The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting international relations is vested in the political department of the government and is to be regulated by treaty or by an act of Congress and executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except insofar as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution, to intervene. The judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom or the justice of the measures executed by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred on it. Congress may, by statute, allow the decision or order of the Immigration Commissioner or the Board to be reviewed by the President or by the courts on the grounds and in the manner prescribed by law. Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, including the Court of Appeals. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch, and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment in place of that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department violates the law or the Constitution. The Court cited Harvy Bridges vs. I.F. Wixon, where the United States Federal Supreme Court reversed an order of deportation made by the Attorney General for insufficiency of evidence and improper admission of evidence; Nging vs. Nagh, where the United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) held that conclusions of administrative offices on issues of fact are invulnerable in courts only when rendered by fair-minded men and are otherwise arbitrary; and Toon vs. Stump, where the Court ruled that courts may supervise the actions of administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain them. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the Court of Appeals as provided by law or by the Rules of Court. In this case, the respondent alleged that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, contrary to law and with grave abuse of discretion in causing his arrest and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration had yet to be resolved; that there was no factual or legal basis for his deportation considering that he was a documented alien and a law-abiding citizen; and he prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner, as Chairperson of the Board, to resolve the said motion. The petition before the Court of Appeals did not involve the act or power of the President to deport or exclude an alien from the country, and so did not call for a substitution of the President's discretion with that of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals therefore had jurisdiction.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the BOC: The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace, not absolute nor permanent and may be revoked; however, aliens may be expelled or deported only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto. In Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, the Court held that by Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation, and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein without distinction of any kind, that everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating fundamental rights, and that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. In this case, the Board ordered the private respondent's deportation on September 27, 1995 without even conducting summary deportation proceedings, relying merely on the June 29, 1995 letter of the German Vice Consul and the German Embassy's Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995, allegedly under paragraph 3 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34 dated August 21, 1989, which provides that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country under Sections 10 and 15 of the Immigration Act, and that the automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings, in which instance the Board of Commissioners may issue a summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. However, as gleaned from the Summary Deportation Order, the respondent was ordered deported not only because his passport had expired; the Board speculated that he had committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in the Philippines and would not, thus, be issued a new passport, which caused it to conclude that he was an undesirable alien. Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, provides that no alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation or without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. Under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34, an alien cannot be deported unless he is given a chance to be heard in a full deportation hearing with the right to adduce evidence in his behalf, and in all cases the right of the alien to be informed of the charges against him, to be notified of the time and place of hearing when necessary, to examine the evidence against him, and to present evidence in his own behalf shall be observed. The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all; the Board simply concluded that he committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan without any evidence, and he was not afforded a chance to refute the charges. He cannot, thus, be arrested and deported without due process of law as required by the Bill of Rights. In Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied, and the provisions of the Rules of Court particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings. The respondent was a permanent resident before his passport expired on July 2, 1995. In Chew vs. Colding, the United States Federal Supreme Court ruled that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident and remains physically present, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment and may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; although it may later be established that he can be expelled and deported, yet before his expulsion he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. As Justice Murphy said in his concurring opinion in Bridges vs. Wixon, the Bill of Rights belongs to aliens as well as to all citizens and protects them as long as they reside within the boundaries of the land. According to Vattel, an alien who is a permanent resident in a country is a member of the new society, at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of inferior order from the native citizens but is nevertheless limited and subject to the society without participating in all its advantages; such a permanent resident may be classified as a "denizen," a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural-born subject, partaking of both. Paraphrasing Justice Brewer in his dissenting opinion in Fong Yue Ting vs. United States, when the right to liberty and residence is involved, some other protection than the mere discretion of the petitioner or the Board is required. The Court recalled the warning of the United States Supreme Court in Boyd vs. United States that illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure, that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed, and that the duty of the courts is to be watchful for constitutional rights against stealthy encroachments, their motto being obsta principiis. In sum, the arrest and detention of the respondent and his deportation under the Summary Deportation Order of the Board for insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan violated his constitutional and statutory rights to due process.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Commissioner: The Immigration Commissioner is mandated to implement a legal and valid Summary Deportation Order within a reasonable time, but in this case the arrest of the respondent in his house at near midnight and his subsequent detention were premature, unwarranted and arbitrary. Like a thunderbolt in the sky, the BID agents and marines arrested the respondent on June 6, 2002 on orders of the petitioner based on the September 27, 1995 Summary Deportation Order; under the basic rudiments of fair play and due process, the petitioner was required to first resolve the respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, which had been filed more than six years before, or on December 5, 1995. It may be argued that the filing of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration did not ipso facto suspend the efficacy of the deportation order, but such an argument cannot be sustained because of the extant and peculiar factual milieu: more than six years had elapsed from the time the Summary Deportation Order was issued until the respondent was finally arrested, and supervening facts and circumstances rendered the arrest and detention unjust, unreasonable, and barren of factual and legal basis. The Board should have set the motion for hearing to afford the respondent a chance to be heard and adduce evidence in support thereof; it was bad enough that the Board issued its Summary Deportation Order without a hearing, and it dealt the respondent a more severe blow when it refused to resolve his motion for reconsideration before causing his arrest on June 6, 2002. The Board had ordered the deportation on the following grounds: (a) the respondent's German passport had expired; (b) there was a pending criminal case for physical injuries against him in Germany; (c) the respondent indulged in illegal activities in Palawan; (d) that in all likelihood his passport would not be renewed by the German Embassy as he was wanted for insurance fraud in Germany; and (e) he was an undesirable alien. But in response to the written query of no less than the petitioner herself, the German Embassy declared that the respondent was not wanted by the German police for any crime, including insurance fraud, which could only mean that the warrant of arrest issued by the German Federal Police mentioned in Note Verbale No. 369/95 had been lifted and that he was not involved in any illegal activities in Germany; the criminal case for physical injuries, which does not involve moral turpitude, was dismissed by the German District Court; and there was no evidence of insurance fraud against him. The Board issued its Summary Deportation Order without affording the respondent the right to be heard on his motion and to adduce evidence thereon, and merely concluded that he was involved in "illegal activities in Palawan"; worse, it indulged in sheer speculation that the German Embassy was unlikely to issue a new passport. The deportation of aliens should not be based on mere speculation or a mere product of procrastinations. As it turned out, the German Embassy re-issued the respondent's passport — a temporary passport and thereafter a regular passport yet to expire on March 12, 2006 — and the petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this matter because the respondent himself, six years before he was arrested, informed then Commissioner Verceles in a letter dated March 1, 1996, which forms part of the records of the Board. There is no evidence on record that the respondent committed any illegal activities in Palawan; he was even designated as special agent of the NBI and was in fact issued clearances by the PNP and the NBI. What is most nettlesome is the apparent antedating of the Board's Omnibus Resolution: the petitioner sought to assuage the respondent's concern on the belated resolution of his pending urgent motion in a letter to the latter's counsel dated July 18, 2002 assuring him that the case was being evaluated by the Board and that the results of its collegial action would be provided in due time, yet the Omnibus Resolution was dated June 14, 2002 although on its face it was filed with the Records Division of the BID only on July 18, 2002. The petition of the respondent in the Court of Appeals must have jolted the petitioner and the Board from their stupor, because it came out with its Omnibus Resolution on July 18, 2002, which was, however, dated as early as June 14, 2002. The Board's wanton acts amounted to an abdication of its duty to act on and resolve cases and incidents with reasonable dispatch, recalling the ruling in Board of Commissioners vs. De la Rosa, citing Sheor vs. Bengson, that the inaction or oversight on the part of immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the party involved. The petitioner and the Board should have taken to heart the pronouncement in Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez that while the deportation proceeding may be purely administrative in nature, such a circumstance does not excuse the serving of notice, there being cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of administrative character, the first of which is the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof; and since the proceedings affected the alien's status and liberty, notice should have been given. The Board did not bother to review its own records in resolving the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, anchoring its Omnibus Resolution only on the change in the membership of the Board, on Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, and on the claim that the September 27, 1995 Order had become final and could no longer be reviewed and reversed after the lapse of one year. The rulings cited by the petitioner are not applicable, as the cases cited involve appeals to the Board from the decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI); in Sy vs. Vivo and Lou vs. Vivo, the Court ruled that under Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, the decision of the Board of Commissioners on appeal from the decision of the BSI becomes final and executory after one year. In Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez, the Court held that the Board composed of new members is precluded from reversing, motu proprio, the decision of the Board on appeal from a BSI decision, but not to be ignored was the ruling that at any rate the issue of authority should be made in accordance with the procedure established by law, with a view to protecting the rights of individuals. In this case, the Summary Deportation Order was issued by the Board in the exercise of its authority under Office Memorandum Order No. 34, and not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over BSI decisions; there is no law nor rule providing that a Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board in the exercise of that authority becomes final after one year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for reconsideration of any order or decision of the Board. The Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner to deportation proceedings, and under Rule 37 a motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order may be filed by the aggrieved party. Neither is there any law or rule providing that the Board, composed of new members, cannot revise a Summary Deportation Order previously issued by a different body of Commissioners; the Board that issued the Summary Deportation Order and the Board that resolved the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration are one and the same government entity, with the same powers and duties regardless of its membership. Similarly, an RTC judge who replaces another judge who presided over a case may review the judgment or order of his predecessor as long as the said judgment or order has not as yet become final or executory; the act subject of review is not the act of the judge but the act of the court. The petitioner's contention that it failed to resolve the respondent's motion for reconsideration because of the change of administration in the Board was branded by the Court of Appeals as flimsy, if not bordering on the absurd, because the resolution was issued three days after the petition was filed on June 11, 2002, or almost seven years from the time the motion for reconsideration was filed, and because the excuse that it took such time to resolve the motion because it was only later discovered due to the change of administration was flimsy.

• Mootness: A foreign embassy's cancellation of the passport it had issued to its citizen, or its refusal to issue a new one in lieu of a passport that has expired, will result in the loss of the alien's privilege to stay in the country and his subsequent deportation. But even the Board asserted in its Summary Deportation Order that an embassy's issuance of a new passport to any of its citizens may bar the latter's deportation, citing the resolution of the Court in Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago. Commissioner Verceles was mandated to cause the arrest of the respondent preparatory to his deportation, but there was no fixed period in the Order within which to comply; the Commissioner is not mandated to deport an alien immediately upon receipt of the Board's deportation order, and it is enough that the Commissioner complies with the Order within a "reasonable time," which in Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons was held to depend upon the circumstances, especially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the governments concerned, and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away, with the warning that under established precedents too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. In this case, the Board had yet to act on the respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and the respondent was given a chance to secure a clearance and a new passport with the German Embassy; after all, the possibility that the German Embassy would renew his passport could not be ruled out. This was exactly what happened: the German Embassy issued a new passport to the respondent on March 12, 1996 after the German District Court dismissed the case for physical injuries. Thus, the respondent was no longer an undocumented alien, nor was he an undesirable one for that matter. The petitioner even admits that there is no longer a legal or factual basis to disqualify the respondent from remaining in the country as a permanent resident, yet the Office of the Solicitor General insists that he has to be deported first so that the Board's Summary Deportation Order could be implemented. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, observing that the Solicitor General had manifested in open court that the State had no opposition to the respondent's stay provided he first leave and re-enter and re-apply for residency, which seemed preposterous, if not ridiculous, because an individual's human rights and rights to freedom, liberty and self-determination recognize no boundaries in the democratic, free and civilized world and follow him wherever he may be; if presently there is no factual or legal impediment to disqualify the respondent from staying in the country other than those relied upon in the Summary Deportation Order of 1995, which had ceased to exist, requiring him to leave the country and re-enter and re-apply for residency makes little or no sense at all, more so in the case of one who for many years had lived in the country and nurtured a family that is Filipino. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Summary Deportation Order had been rendered moot and academic upon the German Embassy's issuance of a new passport to the respondent. The respondent had been in the Philippines as a permanent resident since July 18, 1986 and had married a Filipino citizen with whom he has two children; he is not a burden to the country nor to the people of Palawan; he put up and has been managing the Bavaria Restaurant with about thirty employees; he has no pending criminal case nor any derogatory record; he was allowed by then Commissioner Verceles to renew his passport and was given time to secure a clearance from the German Embassy, which he was able to do; and the case against him for physical injuries was dismissed by the German District Court. Thus, the inceptual basis for the respondent's deportation had ceased to exist. The power to deport is a police matter against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good, but the deportation of the respondent late in the day did not achieve that purpose; the petitioner admitted that there is no longer a factual and legal basis to disqualify the respondent from staying in the country, he is not an undesirable alien, nor is his presence injurious to the public good, and he is even an entrepreneur and a productive member of society. Arrest, detention and deportation orders of aliens should not be enforced blindly and indiscriminately, without regard to facts and circumstances that will render the same unjust, unfair or illegal. To direct the respondent to leave the country first before allowing him re-entry is downright iniquitous: if he does leave, he would thereby be accepting the force and effect of the Board's Summary Deportation Order with its attendant infirmities, he would lose his permanent resident status and admit the efficacy of the cancellation of his permanent resident visa, and his entry into the country would be subject to such conditions as the petitioner may impose. The deportation of an alien is not intended as a punishment or penalty, but in a real sense it is; in Bridges vs. Wixon, Justice Murphy declared that the impact of deportation upon the life of an alien is often as great if not greater than the imposition of a criminal sentence, and that in dealing with deportation there is no justifiable reason for disregarding the democratic and human tenets of the legal system and descending to the practices of despotism. As Justice Brewer opined in Fong Yue Ting vs. United States, deportation is a punishment because it requires first, an arrest, a deprivation of liberty, and second, a removal from home, from family, from business, from property; to be forcibly taken away from home, family, business and property and sent across the ocean to a distant land is punishment, and that oftentimes is most severe and cruel. It would be putting salt on the respondent's woes occasioned by the Board's ineptitude; considering the peculiar backdrop and the equities in this case, the respondent's deportation and the cancellation of his permanent resident visa as a precondition to his re-entry into the country is severe and cruel, and is a form of punishment. The ruling in Vivo vs. Cloribel has no application, precisely because the factual milieu is entirely different: in that case, the Commissioner of Immigration required the respondents to leave the country on or before September 12, 1962 because their stay in the country as approved by the Secretary of Justice had been cancelled. The ruling in Bing vs. Commission on Immigration even buttresses the case for the respondent, since the Court ruled therein that an alien entitled to a permanent stay cannot be deported without being accorded due notice and hearing.

• Indispensable Party in Deportation Proceedings — An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action and without whom no final determination can be had. The Board of Commissioners is an indispensable party to a petition assailing its Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution, because the powers and duties of the Board may not be exercised by its individual members and the order sought to be reconsidered was issued by the Board and not by the Commissioner alone. The Court applied the rule to hold that the respondent should have impleaded the Board, but that the defect was curable and did not warrant dismissal.

• Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party — The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The responsibility of impleading all indispensable parties rests on the petitioner or plaintiff; parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and at such times as are just; and only if the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court may the complaint or petition be dismissed. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. The Court applied the doctrine by declining to dismiss the petition notwithstanding the non-joinder, noting that the Solicitor General had represented the Board's position and that the case involved an issue of public interest.

• Judicial Review of Deportation Orders — The authority to exclude or expel aliens is vested in the political department of the government, to be regulated by treaty or by an act of Congress and executed by the executive authority, except insofar as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution, to intervene. Courts may not express an opinion on the wisdom or justice of the measures executed by Congress, but they may look into and resolve whether the judgment or order was made with grave abuse of discretion, or whether the act of the legislative or executive department violates the law or the Constitution. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari and prohibition, since the petition did not involve the President's power to deport but alleged grave abuse of discretion in the arrest and detention.

• Due Process in Deportation Proceedings — Under Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, no alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation or without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. Under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34, an alien cannot be deported unless he is given a chance to be heard in a full deportation hearing with the right to adduce evidence in his behalf, and in all cases the alien's right to be informed of the charges, to be notified of the time and place of hearing when necessary, to examine the evidence against him, and to present evidence in his own behalf shall be observed. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, so that the constitutional right to due process should not be denied and the provisions of the Rules of Court particularly on criminal procedure are applicable. The Court applied the doctrine to hold that the Summary Deportation Order, issued without any hearing and based on speculation, violated the respondent's constitutional and statutory rights.

• Summary Deportation under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 — Where a foreign embassy cancels an alien's passport or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country under Sections 10 and 15 of the Immigration Act, and the automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings, allowing the Board of Commissioners to issue a summary judgment of deportation that is immediately executory. The Court held, however, that the summary procedure was unavailable in this case because the respondent was ordered deported not only because his passport had expired but also because the Board had concluded, on speculation and without evidence, that he was an undesirable alien who had committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan.

• Rights of a Permanent Resident Alien — A lawful permanent resident alien remains within the protection of the due process guarantee and may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process; before expulsion, he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. Such an alien may be classified as a "denizen," a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural-born subject, partaking of both. The Court applied the doctrine to hold that the respondent, a permanent resident since July 18, 1986, could not be arrested and deported without due process.

• Reasonable Time in Implementing a Deportation Order — The Commissioner is not mandated to deport an alien immediately upon receipt of the Board's deportation order; it is enough that the Commissioner complies within a reasonable time, the meaning of which depends upon the circumstances, especially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the governments concerned, and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Court applied the doctrine in holding that the arrest and detention of the respondent more than six years after the issuance of the Summary Deportation Order, while his motion for reconsideration remained unresolved, were premature, unwarranted and arbitrary.

• Mootness of a Summary Deportation Order upon Issuance of a New Passport — The issuance by a foreign embassy of a new passport to its citizen bars the latter's deportation and renders the summary deportation order moot and academic, there being no remaining factual or legal basis to disqualify the alien from staying in the country. The Court applied the doctrine to hold that the German Embassy's issuance of a new and regular passport to the respondent on March 12, 1996, after the dismissal of the criminal case against him, mooted the Summary Deportation Order and deprived the Omnibus Resolution of legal basis.

• Finality of Board of Commissioners Decisions under Section 27(b) — Under Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, the decision of the Board of Commissioners on appeal from the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry becomes final and executory after one year. This rule does not apply to a Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board in the exercise of its authority under Office Memorandum Order No. 34, and no law or rule provides that such an order becomes final after one year or bars the aggrieved party from filing a motion for reconsideration. The Court applied the doctrine to reject the Board's reliance on Sy vs. Vivo, Lou vs. Vivo and Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez.

• Change in Membership of a Collegial Body — The Board of Commissioners that issued the Summary Deportation Order and the Board that resolved the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration are one and the same government entity, with the same powers and duties regardless of its membership; a new set of Commissioners may revise a Summary Deportation Order previously issued by a different body of Commissioners, just as an RTC judge who replaces another may review the judgment or order of his predecessor as long as it has not become final or executory, the act subject of review being the act of the court and not of the judge.

• Deportation as Punishment — Deportation is not intended as a punishment or penalty, but in a real sense it is, because it requires first an arrest and a deprivation of liberty and second a removal from home, from family, from business, and from property; the impact of deportation upon the life of an alien is often as great if not greater than the imposition of a criminal sentence. The Court applied the doctrine in holding that requiring the respondent to leave the country and re-apply for residency as a precondition to re-entry, and cancelling his permanent resident visa, would be severe and cruel and a form of punishment.

• Liberal Construction of Constitutional Guarantees (Obsta Principiis) — Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure; constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed, and courts must be watchful against stealthy encroachments on constitutional rights, their motto being obsta principiis.

• "No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation or without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration." — Quoting Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, the statutory basis for the holding that the Summary Deportation Order, issued without any hearing, violated the respondent's right to due process.

• "However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just." — The ratio of the ruling on the procedural issue: although the Board of Commissioners was an indispensable party, its non-joinder did not warrant dismissal, and the defect could be cured by amendment.

• "The meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away; but the Court warned that 'under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.'" — Quoting Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, the standard against which the Court measured the six-year delay between the Summary Deportation Order and the respondent's arrest, which it found premature, unwarranted and arbitrary.

• "Arrest, detention and deportation orders of aliens should not be enforced blindly and indiscriminately, without regard to facts and circumstances that will render the same unjust, unfair or illegal." — The Court's own formulation of the controlling principle on the enforcement of deportation orders, cited in support of the affirmance of the permanent injunction against the respondent's deportation.

• "To be forcibly taken away from home, family, business and property and sent across the ocean to a distant land is punishment; and that oftentimes is most severe and cruel." — Paraphrasing Justice Brewer's opinion in Fong Yue Ting vs. United States, cited to explain why requiring the respondent to leave the country and re-apply for residency as a precondition to re-entry would be severe and cruel.

• Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 71 (1951) — Cited for two propositions: that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects all human beings against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; and that "reasonable time" for implementing a deportation order depends on the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, diplomatic arrangements, and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away, with too long a detention justifying habeas corpus.
• Chew vs. Colding, 344 U.S. 571 (1953) — Cited as controlling authority that a lawful permanent resident alien is within the protection of the due process guarantee and is entitled, before expulsion, to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal.
• Bridges vs. Wixon, 89 L. Ed. 2103 (1945) — Cited for the ruling that courts may reverse deportation orders for insufficiency of evidence and improper admission of evidence, and for Justice Murphy's concurring opinion that the Bill of Rights protects aliens as well as citizens and that the impact of deportation is often as great as a criminal sentence.
• Fong Yue Ting vs. United States, 149 U.S. 905 (1893) — Cited for the rule that the authority to exclude or expel aliens is vested in the political department, and for Justice Brewer's dissenting opinion that deportation is punishment because it requires arrest, deprivation of liberty, and removal from home, family, business and property.
• Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 762 (1989) — Cited for the ruling that although a deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature, it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, so that the constitutional right to due process may not be denied and the Rules of Court on criminal procedure are applicable.
• Sy vs. Vivo, 95 SCRA 876 (1980) and Lou vs. Vivo, 18 SCRA 145 (1969) — Distinguished. These cases involved appeals to the Board of Commissioners from decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry, to which the one-year finality rule under Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 applies; they do not govern a Summary Deportation Order issued under Office Memorandum Order No. 34.
• Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez, 11 SCRA 184 — Distinguished in part and relied upon in part. The ruling that a newly composed Board of Commissioners is precluded from reversing motu proprio a decision on appeal from a Board of Special Inquiry was held inapplicable, but the pronouncement that cardinal primary rights must be respected even in administrative proceedings — including the right to present one's own case and submit evidence — was invoked in support of the respondent.
• Vivo vs. Arca, 19 SCRA 878 (1963) and Vivo vs. Cloribel, 22 SCRA 159 (1968) — Distinguished. The acts subject of the petitions in those cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not of the Board of Commissioners, so the Board was neither a necessary nor an indispensable party therein; Vivo vs. Cloribel was further held inapplicable because the factual milieu was entirely different.
• Caruncho III vs. COMELEC, 315 SCRA 693 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the non-joinder of an indispensable party or real party-in-interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition; the court must first require the joinder of such party, and it is noncompliance with that order that would be a ground for dismissal.
• Salvador vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 239 (1995) — Cited for the rule that the Court has full powers, apart from its inherent power, to amend processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest.
• Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910) — Cited for the principle that there is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents, their sole purpose being to facilitate the application of justice.
• Board of Commissioners vs. De la Rosa, 197 SCRA 883 (1991) — Cited for the ruling that the inaction or oversight of immigration officials creates an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the party involved, and for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court to deportation proceedings.
• Schonemann vs. Santiago, G.R. No. 81461, May 30, 1989 — Cited by the Board itself in its Summary Deportation Order for the proposition that an embassy's issuance of a new passport to its citizen may bar the latter's deportation.
• Bing vs. Commission on Immigration, 52 O.G. 6551 (1956) — Cited for the ruling that an alien entitled to a permanent stay cannot be deported without being accorded due notice and hearing.
• Boyd vs. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) — Cited for the warning that illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure, and that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed.
• Arocha vs. Vivo, 21 SCRA 538 (1967) — Cited for the rule that the powers and duties of the Board of Commissioners may not be exercised by its individual members.
• Servicewide Specialists, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 70 (1995); Manliquin Integrated Food Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 490 (1996); Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975); Arcelona vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 80 (1997); Vesagas vs. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 508 (2001) — Cited collectively for the rules that without indispensable parties the judgment cannot attain real finality, that strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment, that the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, that the responsibility of impleading rests on the petitioner, and that the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
• Harvy Bridges vs. I.F. Wixon, 89 L. Ed. 2103 (1945); Nging vs. Nagh, 27 F. 2d 848 (1928); Toon vs. Stump, 232 F. Reporter 194 (1946) — Cited to establish that courts may review deportation orders of administrative offices for insufficiency of evidence, improper admission of evidence, or arbitrary conclusions, and may reverse rulings not sustained by evidence.

• Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court, as amended — Requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants; the joinder is mandatory, and without the presence of indispensable parties the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Applied to hold that the Board of Commissioners should have been impleaded in the petition before the Court of Appeals.
• Section 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court, as amended — Provides that parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and at such times as are just. Applied to hold that the non-joinder of the Board of Commissioners was curable and did not require dismissal.
• Rule 37, Rules of Court — Governs motions for reconsideration of a decision or final order. Applied suppletorily to deportation proceedings to hold that the respondent was not barred from filing a motion for reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court, as amended — Provides that a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the Court of Appeals when acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved. Applied to affirm the appellate court's jurisdiction over the respondent's petition.
• Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts established by law. Cited to establish that the Court of Appeals may review acts of the executive department for grave abuse of discretion, when the act violates the law or the Constitution.
• Article II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. Quoted in Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons and relied upon in holding that the respondent's arrest and detention without due process violated his constitutional and statutory rights.
• Section 37(c), Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended (Philippine Immigration Act of 1940) — Provides that no alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation or without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. Held to have been violated by the Board's issuance of the Summary Deportation Order without any hearing.
• Section 27(b), Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended — Provides that the decision of the Board of Commissioners on appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry becomes final and executory after one year. Held inapplicable to a Summary Deportation Order issued under Office Memorandum Order No. 34.
• Section 40(a)(15), Commonwealth Act No. 613 — The provision under which the Board ordered the respondent's permanent exclusion from the Philippines and the forfeiture of his bail bond in its Omnibus Resolution.
• Section 29(a)(15), Commonwealth Act No. 613 — The provision cited by the Board as the basis for a possible waiver of the respondent's exclusion, which the Board held presupposed his prior removal from the Philippines.
• Sections 10 and 15, Immigration Act (as cited in Office Memorandum Order No. 34) — The provisions under which an alien loses the privilege to remain in the country upon the cancellation or non-reissuance of his passport by his embassy.
• Office Memorandum Order No. 34 (series of 1989), paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 — Paragraph 3 authorizes the Board to issue a summary judgment of deportation, immediately executory, where a foreign embassy cancels or does not reissue the alien's passport. Paragraphs 4 and 5 require that all other cases be tried in a full deportation hearing and that, in all cases, the alien's right to be informed of the charges, to be notified of the time and place of hearing when necessary, to examine the evidence against him, and to present evidence in his own behalf be observed. The Court held that paragraph 3 did not apply because the deportation order rested on other grounds, and that paragraphs 4 and 5 were violated.
• Section 10, Power to Countermand Decisions of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration — Provides that the decision of the Board of Commissioners which has jurisdiction over all deportation cases shall become final and executory after thirty days from promulgation, unless within such period the President shall order the contrary. Cited by the Court in rejecting the Board's claim that its Summary Deportation Order had become final after one year.

Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.