Domingo Realty, Inc. and Ayala Steel Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Antonio M. Acero

A compromise judgment may be challenged only through a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration, appeal, or petition for relief from judgment; certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The non-inclusion of a party in a compromise agreement does not invalidate it as to the signatories, who remain bound, and the agreement is not vague where its object is determinable from the technical description of the titled property.

Domingo Realty, Inc. owned three parcels of land in Cupang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT Nos. (75600) S-107639, (67006) S-107640, and (67007) S-107643, with an aggregate area of 26,705 square meters. Antonio M. Acero conducted business under the firm name A.M. Acero Trading and occupied a portion of the land under a lease from David Victorio, who claimed ownership of the property. Ayala Steel Manufacturing Co., Inc. later acquired the lots and became a co-petitioner after its motion for substitution was not resolved. The controversy proceeded as Civil Case No. 9581-P for recovery of possession before the Pasay City RTC.

On November 19, 1981, Domingo Realty filed its November 15, 1981 Complaint with the Pasay City RTC against Antonio M. Acero, who conducted business under the firm name A.M. Acero Trading, David Victorio, John Doe, and Peter Doe, for recovery of possession of three parcels of land in Cupang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, covered by (1) TCT No. (75600) S-107639-Land Records of Rizal; (2) TCT No. (67006) S-107640-Land Records of Rizal; and (3) TCT No. (67007) S-107643-Land Records of Rizal. The lots had an aggregate area of 26,705 square meters, more or less, and Acero had constructed a factory building for the manufacture of hollow blocks on a portion of them. On January 4, 1982, Acero and Victorio filed their December 21, 1981 Answer. Acero alleged that he merely leased the land from Victorio, who claimed to own the property on which the hollow blocks factory stood. Victorio assailed the validity of Domingo Realty’s TCTs, alleging that they emanated from spurious deeds of sale, and claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest had possessed the property for more than 70 years.

On December 3, 1987, Mariano Yu representing Domingo Realty, Luis Recato Dy, and Acero, all assisted by counsel, executed a Compromise Agreement. The agreement stipulated that the defendants admitted and recognized Domingo Realty’s ownership over the property covered by TCT Nos. S-107639 (75600), S-107643 (67007), and S-107640 (67006), with a total area of 26,705 square meters; that Dy admitted his TCT No. 108027 was not genuine and that the area indicated therein was inside Domingo Realty’s property; and that Acero admitted that the property he was occupying by way of lease was encroaching on a portion of Domingo Realty’s property and undertook to vacate, remove, and clear any and all structures erected inside Domingo Realty’s property by himself and other third parties, and to deliver the portion free and clear of unauthorized structures, shanties, occupants, squatters, or lessees within 60 days from signing. Should Acero fail, Domingo Realty was entitled to a writ of execution for immediate demolition or removal of structures and ejectment of squatters, occupants, and lessees. Domingo Realty admitted that Dy bought and occupied the property in good faith and for value and that Acero leased the portion in good faith and for value, and waived all claims, including attorney’s fees; the defendants likewise waived all claims for damages; and Domingo Realty acknowledged Dy’s expenses for a perimeter fence and caretaker and agreed to pay him P100,000.00 upon approval of the agreement. Acting on the Compromise Agreement, the Pasay City RTC rendered its December 7, 1987 Decision adopting the six stipulations and approving the Compromise Agreement.

To implement the Decision, Domingo Realty filed a January 21, 1988 Motion asking the trial court for permission to conduct a re-survey of the subject properties, which was granted in the January 22, 1988 Order. On February 2, 1988, Acero filed his January 29, 1988 Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement, claiming that the January 22, 1988 Order authorizing Domingo Realty’s survey plan as the basis of a resurvey would violate the Compromise Agreement because the whole area he occupied would be adjudged as owned by Domingo Realty. On March 18, 1988, Acero filed a Motion to Resurvey, alleging that the parties had agreed to have the disputed lots re-surveyed by the Bureau of Lands. The trial court then issued the March 21, 1988 Order directing the Director of Lands to conduct a re-survey of the subject properties. In his June 9, 1989 Report, Elpidio T. De Lara, Chief of the Technical Services Division of the Lands Management Section of the National Capital Region-Department of Environment and Natural Resources, submitted Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135, under which petitioners’ TCTs covered the entire land occupied by Acero’s hollow blocks factory.

On April 10, 1990, Ayala Steel filed its March 30, 1990 Motion for Substitution, alleging that it had purchased the subject lots and attaching TCT Nos. 152528, 152529, and 152530 in its name as proof of purchase. Acero opposed the motion, claiming that the case had already been terminated by the Compromise Agreement and that substitution was no longer necessary or justified. The motion was not resolved, which is why both Domingo Realty and Ayala Steel are co-petitioners. In its December 28, 1990 Order, the trial court directed Acero to conduct his own re-survey of the lots based on the technical description in Domingo Realty’s TCTs and to have the re-survey plans approved by the Bureau of Lands, after Acero contended that he occupied only 2,000 square meters of petitioners’ property. Acero hired Engr. Eligio L. Cruz, who produced Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000185, but the Bureau of Lands rejected it because Cruz failed to comply with its requirements. On April 8, 1991, petitioners filed a Manifestation with Motion praying for denial of Acero’s Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement and for approval of Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135. The Pasay City RTC issued its December 6, 1991 Order denying Acero’s Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Execution on December 10, 1991.

On January 6, 1992, Acero filed an undated Manifestation claiming that the Compromise Agreement covered only the portion of land he occupied, about 2,000 square meters, and reiterated the same contentions in his December 21, 1991 Manifestation. On January 13, 1992, he filed a Motion to Modify Order Dated 6 December ’91, claiming that the order modified the Compromise Agreement because it allegedly involved only 1,357 square meters and not the entire lot, and that if not amended the order would deviate from the principle that no man shall enrich himself at the expense of another. In its January 15, 1992 Order, the trial court approved the issuance of a Writ of Execution to enforce the December 7, 1987 Decision. On February 3, 1992, Acero filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the January 15, 1992 Order, arguing that the order was premature and that Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135 violated the Compromise Agreement. On January 18, 1992, the Pasay City Hall was gutted by fire, destroying the lower court records, including those of this case. After reconstituting the records, the trial court issued its October 6, 1992 Order reiterating the January 15, 1992 Order and ordering the issuance of a Writ of Execution. On October 23, 1992, Acero filed a Manifestation and Compliance alleging that Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000185 had been approved by the Regional Director of the DENR, and moved for annulment of the October 6, 1992 Order granting the Writ of Execution in petitioners’ favor. Given the conflicting survey plans, the trial court issued its October 11, 1993 Order requiring the Bureau of Lands Director to determine which of the two survey plans was correct. Subsequently, Regional Technical Director Eriberto V. Almazan of the Land Registration Authority issued the November 24, 1993 Order cancelling Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000185 and declaring Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135 as the correct plan. Thereafter, petitioners filed their January 12, 1994 Ex-parte Manifestation with Motion praying for implementation of the Writ of Execution, which was granted in the January 12, 1994 Order. Acero’s Motion for Reconsideration of the January 12, 1994 Order was denied in the February 1, 1994 Order.

Aggrieved, Acero filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 against petitioners and Judge Sofronio G. Sayo, seeking to nullify and set aside the RTC Orders dated December 6, 1991, January 15, 1992, October 6, 1992, January 12, 1994, and February 1, 1994, all pertaining to execution of the December 7, 1987 Decision on the Compromise Agreement. The Court’s records timeline states that the petition was filed on April 4, 1994, although the petition itself is dated February 23, 1994. Acero did not seek annulment of the judgment but reiterated that under the Compromise Agreement he would only vacate a portion of the property he was occupying. The CA granted the petition, set aside the RTC orders and the December 7, 1987 Compromise Judgment, and directed the RTC to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 9581-P on the merits to determine the parties’ proprietary rights. In doing so, the CA found that David Victorio, Acero’s alleged lessor, was not a party to the Compromise Agreement; that the agreement was vague because it did not stipulate a mutually agreed surveyor; and that Acero’s belief that he would only vacate a portion of the property was a mistake that justified nullification. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the CA’s August 28, 1996 Resolution.

• Wrong Remedy and Timeliness: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in nullifying the Compromise Agreement and judgment even though no motion to set aside on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress was filed before the court a quo; that Acero himself had argued before the CA that the compromise judgment was final, executory, immutable, and unalterable; and that the CA entertained a certiorari petition filed beyond reasonable time and barred by laches.
• Non-Inclusion of David Victorio: Petitioners maintained that the non-inclusion of David Victorio did not nullify the Compromise Agreement, as the CA cited no law or jurisprudence supporting annulment on that ground.
• Vagueness: Petitioners argued that the Compromise Agreement was not vague because the object was determinable from the technical descriptions in the TCTs, and the Bureau of Lands had declared Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135 as the correct plan.
• Mistake: Petitioners contended that Acero’s alleged mistake was not a valid ground for annulment because he knew or should have known the boundaries and area of the property and failed to exercise ordinary diligence before signing the agreement.

• Limited Scope of Compromise: Acero maintained that the Compromise Agreement covered only the portion of the property he was occupying, about 2,000 square meters, or at most 1,357 square meters, and not the entire lot; he believed only a portion of his occupied property encroached on Domingo Realty’s land.
• Violation by Survey and Execution: He argued that using Domingo Realty’s survey plan as the basis of the resurvey would violate the Compromise Agreement because the whole area he occupied would be adjudged as owned by Domingo Realty, and that Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135 violated the agreement and rendered execution premature.
• Nullity of Compromise and Orders: He sought annulment of the RTC execution orders and asserted that the Compromise Agreement was vague and that his consent was vitiated by mistake.
• Substitution Unnecessary: He opposed Ayala Steel’s substitution, claiming that the case had already been terminated by the Compromise Agreement and that substitution was no longer necessary or justified.

• Proper Remedy and Timeliness: Whether a party challenging a compromise judgment on the ground of mistake may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and whether the petition before the CA was filed out of time or barred by laches.
• Effect of Non-Inclusion of David Victorio: Whether the non-inclusion of David Victorio would nullify the Compromise Agreement.
• Vagueness: Whether the judgment on compromise agreement should be set aside on the ground of vagueness.
• Mistake: Whether the judgment on compromise agreement should be set aside on the ground of mistake.

• Proper Remedy and Timeliness: No. Certiorari under Rule 65 was not the proper remedy; a party claiming vitiated consent must timely move for new trial or reconsideration, appeal, or, after the 15-day period, file a petition for relief from judgment. The certiorari petition was also filed out of time, as the delay of two years and four months from the December 6, 1991 Order and more than three months from the later orders was unreasonable.
• Effect of Non-Inclusion of David Victorio: No. The non-inclusion of a party in a compromise agreement does not nullify the agreement as to the signatories; it only means the non-signatory cannot be bound. The case should be remanded for proceedings against Victorio without annulling the partial judgment between petitioners and Acero.
• Vagueness: No. The object of the Compromise Agreement is determinable from the technical description in the TCTs, and the Bureau of Lands’ Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135 is controlling. The term “portion” refers to petitioners’ lot, not Acero’s, and the agreement is clear when read as a whole.
• Mistake: No. The alleged mistake arose from Acero’s negligence; he knew or should have known the boundaries and area of the leased property and failed to verify them before signing. Under Article 1333, a mistake within his knowledge or avoidable by ordinary diligence cannot invalidate the compromise.

• Proper Remedy and Timeliness: A contract with consent given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable under Article 1330. When such a contract takes the form of a compromise agreement in a civil case, the judgment rendered on it is final, unappealable, and immediately executory. A party claiming that consent was obtained through fraud, mistake, or duress must file a motion with the trial court that approved the compromise to reconsider the judgment and nullify or set aside the contract within 15 days from notice of judgment. Under Rule 37, the party may file a motion for new trial based on fraud, accident or mistake, excusable negligence, or newly discovered evidence, or a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the decision or final order is contrary to law. This motion is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy if the 15-day period has not expired. Prior to the 1997 Rules, an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration was not appealable; the remedy was to appeal from the challenged decision and assign the denial as error. If the 15-day period had lapsed, the aggrieved party could file a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 within 60 days after learning of the judgment but not more than six months after entry. Prior to 1997, denial of a Rule 38 petition was appealed from the order of denial, and the judgment could also be assailed in that appeal; under the 1997 Rules, the remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 from the order rejecting the petition for relief. Here, Acero received the December 7, 1987 Decision on December 11, 1987. His February 2, 1988 Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement, if treated as a motion for reconsideration or new trial, required him to appeal from the December 7, 1987 Decision and assign the December 6, 1991 Order denying the motion as error. He failed to appeal; the 15-day period expired on December 26, 1991. Instead, he filed a Rule 65 petition with the CA on April 4, 1994. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. He should have filed a Rule 38 petition for relief from judgment when he lost his right of appeal. Even assuming certiorari was proper, the petition was filed out of time. Before the 1997 Rules, the test was reasonableness of the time elapsed; reasonable time had been pegged at three months. The delay of two years and four months from the December 6, 1991 Order, and more than three months from the January 15, 1992 and October 6, 1992 Orders, was unreasonable. The CA should have rejected the petition outright.
• Effect of Non-Inclusion of David Victorio: The CA annulled the compromise because David Victorio, Acero’s alleged lessor and a defendant in Civil Case No. 9581-P, was not a party, reasoning that he might later assail the agreement and cause another suit. The CA cited no law or jurisprudence supporting annulment on that ground. The only legal effect of non-inclusion is that the non-signatory cannot be bound by the agreement; the compromise remains valid and binding on the parties who signed it. The issue of ownership between petitioners and Victorio can be resolved in Civil Case No. 9581-P. The proper course is to remand for continuation of proceedings between petitioners and Victorio, but not to annul the partial judgment between petitioners and Acero, which had been pending execution for 20 years.
• Vagueness: The CA found the compromise vague because it did not name a mutually agreed surveyor to determine the exact metes and bounds of the encroachment. The object of a contract need not be specified with absolute certainty; it is enough that it is determinable. Article 1349 provides that the object must be determinate as to its kind, and the fact that the quantity is not determinate does not prevent the contract’s existence if it can be determined without a new contract. Here, the TCTs contain technical descriptions that provide the metes and bounds of petitioners’ property, and those descriptions are the final determinant of the extent of the property. The Bureau of Lands determined that Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135 was the correct plan, and its findings, as an administrative agency with expertise, must be given great weight. Even if the exact area of encroachment was not specified, it could be determined from the technical description of the title that Acero admitted was correct. The alleged vagueness centered on the word “portion” in paragraph 3, read with paragraph 1. Acero interpreted it to mean that only a portion of the property he occupied encroached on petitioners’ land. That interpretation was mistaken. The agreement stated that the property Acero occupied by lease was encroaching on a portion of Domingo Realty’s property; whether only a portion or the entire lot Acero leased was affected was immaterial. What controlled was the encroachment on Domingo Realty’s lot. Acero undertook to vacate, remove, and clear any and all structures erected inside Domingo Realty’s property, an undertaking flowing from his admission of Domingo Realty’s ownership. The controlling word was “encroachment,” and “portion” referred to petitioners’ lot, not Acero’s. The terms were clear and left no doubt that Acero would vacate any and all structures inside petitioners’ property. Under Article 1370, the literal meaning of the stipulations controls. The agreement must be read as a whole to give effect to all its provisions. Vagueness therefore could not justify nullification.
• Mistake: Articles 2038 and 1330 allow a compromise to be annulled for mistake, but Article 1333 provides that there is no mistake if the party alleging it knew the doubt, contingency, or risk affecting the object of the contract. Parties are presumed to know and understand the import of their agreement. Tolentino’s commentary, cited by the Court, states that the error must be excusable, real, and arise from facts unknown to the party; a party cannot allege an error referring to a fact known to him or which he should have known by ordinary diligent examination, and a mistake caused by manifest negligence cannot invalidate a juridical act. Before executing the Compromise Agreement, Acero was aware of the technical description of Domingo Realty’s titled lots and of the boundaries and area of the lot he leased from Victorio. He could have hired a geodetic engineer to conduct a verification survey and determine the actual encroachment. Had he done so, he would have known that the entire area he occupied intruded into petitioners’ titled lot. His failure to take that precaution was palpable neglect. Moreover, he failed to state in the Compromise Agreement that he intended to vacate only a portion of the property he was leasing; because that provision would have been beneficial to him, he should have ensured it was specified. His failure was negligence and insufficient to abrogate the agreement. Under Article 1315, contracts bind the parties not only to what is expressly stipulated but also to all necessary consequences. As held in Torres vs. Court of Appeals and LL and Company Development and Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Huang Chao Chun, parties are presumed to have understood the terms they voluntarily signed; if the terms were not in consonance with their expectations, they should have objected and insisted on the provisions they wanted. Courts are not authorized to extricate parties from the necessary consequences of their acts, and the fact that the stipulations may be financially disadvantageous does not relieve them of their obligations. The mere fact that the compromise favors one party does not render it invalid. Amarante vs. Court of Appeals held that compromises are generally favored and cannot be set aside if the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions to terminate a case, even if all gains appear on one side and all sacrifices on the other. The Court commiserated with Acero but had no power to make or alter contracts to save him from adverse stipulations. It advised prospective parties to verify titles, engage a geodetic engineer, conduct ocular inspection, inquire from adjoining owners, put up signs, and take other measures to make the public aware of any alienation, lease, or encumbrance. Acero may have legal recourse against Victorio, who inveigled him into leasing a lot owned by another.

• Compromise Agreement and Compromise Judgment — A compromise is a contract; a judgment based on it is final, unappealable, and immediately executory. It may still be annulled for vices of consent or forgery. A party claiming fraud, mistake, or duress must timely file a motion for new trial or reconsideration with the approving court within 15 days from notice of judgment; after that period, the remedy is a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. Certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
• Non-Inclusion of a Party in a Compromise — The only legal effect of omitting a party from a compromise agreement is that the omitted party cannot be bound by its terms. The agreement remains valid and binding on the parties who signed it. The omitted party’s claims may be litigated separately without annulling the compromise as to the signatories.
• Determinable Object and Vagueness — A contract’s object need not be absolutely certain; it is sufficient that it is determinable. Under Article 1349, an indeterminate quantity does not invalidate the contract if it can be determined without a new agreement. Technical descriptions in Torrens titles provide the metes and bounds and make the object determinate. Administrative findings of the Bureau of Lands on the correct survey plan are given great weight.
• Mistake as Ground to Annul a Compromise — Under Articles 2038 and 1330, mistake may render a compromise voidable, but Article 1333 provides that there is no mistake if the party alleging it knew the doubt, contingency, or risk affecting the object. The error must be excusable, real, and arise from facts unknown to the party; a mistake caused by manifest negligence or avoidable by ordinary diligence cannot invalidate the contract.
• Literal Meaning and Whole-Contract Interpretation — Under Article 1370, the literal meaning of clear stipulations controls. An instrument must be construed as a whole so as to give effect to all its provisions.
• Contracts Bind Parties to Necessary Consequences — Under Article 1315, contracts are perfected by consent and bind the parties not only to express stipulations but also to all consequences that, by their nature, are in keeping with good faith, usage, and law. Courts cannot extricate parties from the consequences of their voluntary agreements merely because the terms prove disadvantageous.
• Compromises Are Favored — Compromises are generally favored and cannot be set aside if the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions to terminate a case, even if the gains appear one-sided.

• “If one of the parties claims that his consent was obtained through fraud, mistake, or duress, he must file a motion with the trial court that approved the compromise agreement to reconsider the judgment and nullify or set aside said contract on any of the said grounds for annulment of contract within 15 days from notice of judgment.” — This passage states the proper remedy and period for challenging a compromise judgment based on vitiated consent, which the Court used to reject Acero’s Rule 65 petition.
• “The only legal effect of the non-inclusion of a party in a compromise agreement is that said party cannot be bound by the terms of the agreement. The Compromise Agreement shall however be ‘valid and binding as to the parties who signed thereto.’” — This defines the limited effect of omitting a party and supports the Court’s refusal to annul the compromise as to Acero.
• “The object of a contract, in order to be considered as ‘certain,’ need not specify such object with absolute certainty. It is enough that the object is determinable in order for it to be considered as ‘certain.’” — This is the Court’s controlling formulation on determinable object, applied to uphold the compromise despite the absence of an exact area of encroachment.
• “The error must arise from facts unknown to him. He cannot allege an error which refers to a fact known to him, or which he should have known by ordinary diligent examination of the facts.” — Quoted from Tolentino, this passage explains why Acero’s alleged mistake, arising from his failure to verify boundaries, could not invalidate the compromise.

• Magbanua vs. Uy, G.R. No. 161003, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 184, 191 — Cited for the rule that a motion for new trial or reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to assail a compromise judgment for vices of consent or forgery.
• Fajardo vs. Bautista, G.R. Nos. 102193-97, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 291 — Cited, along with Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals, for the rule that certiorari is not available as a substitute for a lost appeal.
• Fernandez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 106090, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 460, 465 — Cited for the pre-1997 rule that the timeliness of a Rule 65 petition is measured by the reasonableness of the time elapsed from notice of the assailed order.
• Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, August 28, 1995, 247 SCRA 741, 759 — Cited, with People vs. Magallanes, for the rule that reasonable time for filing a Rule 65 petition may be pegged at three months.
• SMI Fish Industries, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 96952-56, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 444, 448 — Cited for the rule that the non-inclusion of a party in a compromise agreement only means that the non-signatory cannot be bound, while the agreement remains valid as to the signatories.
• Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 96191, March 4, 1994, 194 SCRA 633 — Cited, with Five J Taxi vs. NLRC and San Miguel Corporation vs. Javate, Jr., for the rule that findings of fact of administrative agencies with expertise are given great weight.
• Torres vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134559, December 9, 1999, 320 SCRA 428, 436-437 — Cited for the rule under Article 1315 that contracts bind the parties to express stipulations and all necessary consequences, and that parties are presumed to have understood the terms they voluntarily signed.
• LL and Company Development and Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Huang Chao Chun, G.R. No. 142378, March 7, 2002, 378 SCRA 612, 624-625 — Cited, along with Torres, for the same rule on the binding effect of contractual terms and the consequences of voluntary agreement.
• Amarante vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49698, May 3, 1994, 232 SCRA 104, 108 — Cited for the rule that compromises are generally favored and cannot be set aside if the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions, even if the gains appear one-sided.

• Article 1330, Civil Code — Provides that a contract is voidable where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. The Court used it to frame the remedy for challenging a compromise judgment based on vitiated consent.
• Article 2038, Civil Code — Provides that a compromise with mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents is subject to Article 1330. The Court cited it in addressing Acero’s claim that mistake warranted nullification.
• Article 1349, Civil Code — Provides that the object of a contract must be determinate as to its kind, and that an indeterminate quantity does not prevent the contract’s existence if it can be determined without a new contract. The Court applied it to hold that the compromise’s object was determinable from the TCT technical descriptions.
• Article 1333, Civil Code — Provides that there is no mistake if the party alleging it knew the doubt, contingency, or risk affecting the object of the contract. The Court applied it to reject Acero’s mistake claim because he knew or should have known the boundaries.
• Article 1370, Civil Code — Provides that the literal meaning of the stipulations controls when the terms of a contract are clear. The Court applied it to interpret the word “portion” in the compromise.
• Article 1315, Civil Code — Provides that contracts are perfected by mere consent and bind the parties not only to express stipulations but also to all consequences in keeping with good faith, usage, and law. The Court used it to hold Acero bound despite the disadvantageous terms.
• Rule 37, Rules of Court — Governs motions for new trial or reconsideration. The Court identified these motions as the proper remedy to challenge a compromise judgment within 15 days from notice.
• Rule 38, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for relief from judgment. The Court held that after the 15-day appeal period lapsed, Acero should have filed a Rule 38 petition rather than certiorari.
• Rule 41, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Proscribes appeal from an order denying a petition for relief from judgment. The Court noted that under the 1997 Rules the remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 from the order rejecting the petition.
• Rule 65, Section 4, Rules of Court — Governs where a petition for certiorari is filed and, under the present rule, the 60-day period for filing. The Court discussed the pre-1997 version, which had no prescribed period, and applied the reasonable-time standard.
• Rule 130, Section 11, Rules of Court — Cited for the rule that in interpreting contracts, an instrument must be construed so as to give effect to all its provisions. The Court used it to read the Compromise Agreement as a whole.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio-Morales, and Dante O. Tinga.