Domalagan vs. Bolifer

The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate oral contracts but merely prescribes the method by which they may be proved; a contract not reduced to writing remains valid, and a party who fails to object to oral evidence offered to prove such a contract waives the protection of the statute. The contract becomes as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing when oral evidence is admitted without objection.

The plaintiff and defendant were connected by an arrangement contemplating the marriage of their respective children, Cipriano Domalagan and Bonifacia Bolifer. The plaintiff alleged that he agreed to pay the defendant P500 upon the marriage of their children, and later paid an additional P16 as a token of future marriage. The applicable law at the time was paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, which required agreements made upon the consideration of marriage, other than mutual promises to marry, to be evidenced by a writing subscribed by the party charged.

In November 1909, Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a contract whereby Domalagan agreed to pay Bolifer the sum of P500 upon the marriage of Domalagan's son, Cipriano Domalagan, with Bolifer's daughter, Bonifacia Bolifer. In August 1910, Domalagan completed his obligation under the contract by paying Bolifer the sum of P500, together with an additional P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage."

Notwithstanding the agreement, Bonifacia Bolifer was joined in lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi in August 1910. Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan immediately demanded the return of the P516 from Bolifer, together with interest and damages. The damages Domalagan claimed resulted from the fact that, in order to raise the P500, he was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him located in the Province of Bohol at a great sacrifice.

Bolifer presented a general denial to the complaint and also alleged that the facts stated therein did not constitute a cause of action. After trial, the lower court found as a fact that Domalagan delivered to Bolifer the sum of P516 sued for, and that Bolifer and Laureana Loquero received and did not return the said amount. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Domalagan for P516 with interest at 6 percent from December 17, 1910, and costs, finding that the evidence did not sufficiently show that Domalagan had suffered additional damages.

• Factual Finding on Delivery: The appellant assigned as error the lower court's holding that the fact of delivery of the P516 to the defendant was proven, presenting a question of fact for review.
• Statute of Frauds: The appellant argued that by virtue of paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, and because the agreement upon which the plaintiff relied had not been reduced to writing, the plaintiff could not recover. The appellant contended that a contract such as the one relied upon by the plaintiff must be reduced to writing in order to be valid.

N/A — The decision does not recount the appellee's specific arguments on appeal.

• Factual Finding on Delivery: Whether the lower court erred in holding that the delivery of the sum of P516 by the plaintiff to the defendant was proven.
• Validity of Oral Contract under the Statute of Frauds: Whether a verbal contract made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry, is valid and enforceable notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.

• Factual Finding on Delivery: No. The lower court's factual finding that the plaintiff delivered the sum of P516 to the defendant was not disturbed, given that the lower court saw and heard the witnesses and there was an abundance of uncontradicted proof supporting its findings.
• Validity of Oral Contract under the Statute of Frauds: Yes. The contract is valid and enforceable. Section 335 does not render oral contracts invalid; it merely provides the method by which such contracts may be proved, and a failure to object to oral evidence presented to prove the contract is a waiver of the provisions of the law.

• Factual Finding on Delivery: The first assignment of error presented a question of fact. The lower court found that a large preponderance of the evidence showed that the plaintiff had delivered the sum of P516 to the defendant in substantially the manner alleged in the complaint. Taking into consideration that the lower court saw and heard the witnesses, together with the further fact that there is an abundance of uncontradicted proof supporting the findings of the lower court, the Supreme Court was not inclined to disturb the judgment for any of the reasons given by the appellant.

• Validity of Oral Contract under the Statute of Frauds: The Court examined the record and found that the defendant did not object to any proof or any part thereof presented by the plaintiff which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged contract. The Court noted that section 335 provides that "evidence" of the agreement referred to "can not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents," yet all of the evidence relating to the agreement was admitted without the slightest objection. The Court explained that section 335 does not render oral contracts invalid; a contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of the section, the parties may be unable to prove it. The section simply provides the method by which the contract may be proved; it does not declare that contracts not reduced to writing are invalid, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5 of the section. A contract may be perfectly valid even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in conformity with the section, it cannot be proved if proper objection is made. However, a failure to except to evidence presented to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an action make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

• Statute of Frauds as a Rule of Evidence, Not of Validity — The Statute of Frauds does not invalidate oral contracts; it merely prescribes the method by which contracts mentioned therein may be proved. A contract not reduced to writing remains valid but cannot be proved if proper objection is made. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the oral contract between the parties was valid notwithstanding the absence of a writing, and that the defendant's failure to object to oral evidence of the contract during trial waived the protection of the statute.

• Waiver of the Statute of Frauds by Failure to Object — A failure to object to evidence presented to prove a contract that should have been in writing under the Statute of Frauds is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an action make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support such contracts and permit the contract to be proved by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the defendant, having failed to object to oral evidence of the contract during trial, could not invoke the Statute of Frauds on appeal.

• "Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it." — This passage articulates the core distinction between the validity of a contract and its enforceability under the Statute of Frauds, establishing that the statute operates as a rule of evidence rather than a rule of substantive validity.

• "Said section simply provides the method by which the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contract are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335)." — This passage clarifies the limited effect of the Statute of Frauds, confining its operation to the mode of proof and not to the existence or validity of the contract itself.

• "But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law." — This passage states the waiver doctrine, holding that a party who fails to object to oral evidence of a contract governed by the Statute of Frauds cannot later invoke the statute to defeat the contract's enforceability.

• "If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing." — This passage completes the Court's reasoning, establishing that the contract becomes fully binding when oral evidence is admitted without objection, as if the writing requirement had been satisfied.

• Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko, 15 Phil. Rep., 387 — Cited as authority for the proposition that a contract not conforming to the Statute of Frauds may nevertheless be proved and enforced when oral evidence is admitted without objection.
• Gallemit vs. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. Rep., 241, 246 — Cited in support of the rule that failure to object to oral evidence of a contract within the Statute of Frauds constitutes a waiver of the statute's protection.
• Kuenzle and Streiff vs. Joingco, 22 Phil. Rep., 110, 112 — Cited for the same proposition regarding waiver of the Statute of Frauds through failure to object to oral evidence.
• Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil. Rep., 485, 489 — Cited in support of the principle that oral evidence admitted without objection renders a contract as binding as if it had been reduced to writing.

• Paragraph 3, Section 335, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions — The Statute of Frauds provision requiring agreements made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry, to be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, to be enforceable. The Court interpreted this provision as a rule of evidence, not of validity, and held that the defendant's failure to object to oral evidence of the contract constituted a waiver of its protection.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Trent, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the decision.