Domagas vs. Jensen

An action for forcible entry is a real action and in personam, requiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, which can be acquired through valid substituted service only if the summons is left at the defendant's residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein.

Filomena Domagas and Vivian Layno Jensen were disputing ownership and possession of a parcel of land in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Domagas claimed to be the registered owner, while Jensen's property allegedly encroached upon it. Jensen, a Filipino married to a Norwegian citizen, resided in Oslo, Norway, but owned a house in Barangay Buenlag which she had leased to Eduardo Gonzales.

On February 19, 1999, Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against Vivian Layno Jensen before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Domagas alleged that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, and that on January 9, 1999, Jensen, by means of force, strategy, and stealth, gained entry into the property by excavating a portion thereof and constructing a fence, depriving Domagas of a 68-square meter portion along the boundary line. The summons and complaint could not be served personally on Jensen because she was apparently out of the country, as relayed to the Sheriff by her brother, Oscar Layno, who was at Jensen's house at the time. The Sheriff left the copies with Oscar Layno, who received them on April 5, 1999.

On May 17, 1999, the MTC rendered judgment ordering Jensen to vacate the disputed area and pay monthly rentals, actual damages, attorney's fees, and exemplary damages. Jensen failed to appeal, and a writ of execution was issued on September 27, 1999. On August 16, 2000, Jensen filed a complaint against Domagas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City for the annulment of the MTC decision. Jensen alleged that she was in Oslo, Norway, at the time of service, and had leased her house to Eduardo Gonzales. She claimed her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely visiting the house to collect rentals and was not a resident thereof, nor was he authorized to receive summons on her behalf.

Domagas countered that Jensen was a resident of Barangay Buenlag and that substituted service on Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of the same barangay, was proper. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Jensen, declaring the MTC decision null and void for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The RTC found that there was no valid service of summons, considering Jensen was in Norway and her brother was never authorized to receive the documents. Domagas appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint for ejectment was an action quasi in rem, and since the defendant was temporarily out of the country, extraterritorial service under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court should have been followed. Domagas then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioner insisted that the complaint for forcible entry is an action in personam, not quasi in rem as the CA held, and therefore substituted service of summons under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is valid.
• Validity of Substituted Service: Petitioner asserted that Oscar Layno was a resident and registered voter of Barangay Buenlag, and was residing in the house of the respondent on April 5, 1999; thus, service of summons through him was valid, and the fact that the house was leased to Eduardo Gonzales was of no moment. She also invoked the presumption that the Sheriff performed his duty properly.

• Nature of the Action: Respondent asserted that the action for forcible entry filed against her was an action quasi in rem, requiring extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court because she was out of the country.
• Invalidity of Substituted Service: Respondent maintained that she was not a resident of Barangay Buenlag at the time but of Oslo, Norway, and had leased her house to Eduardo Gonzales; her brother Oscar Layno was merely visiting the house to collect rentals, was not a resident thereof, and was never authorized to receive the summons and complaint on her behalf.

• Nature of Forcible Entry Action: Whether an action for forcible entry is an action in personam or quasi in rem.
• Validity of Substituted Service: Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons on the respondent through her brother, Oscar Layno.

• Nature of Forcible Entry Action: Yes. An action for forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant to vacate the property and restore physical possession.
• Validity of Substituted Service: No. The substituted service was invalid because the Sheriff's return lacked the requisite details, and Oscar Layno was merely a visitor at the respondent's leased house, not a resident thereof.

• Nature of Forcible Entry Action: The aim and object of an action determine its character. A proceeding in personam is one to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person, aiming to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the defendant. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a person deprived of possession may bring an action for restitution. By its nature and purpose, an action for forcible entry is in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code to vacate the property, restore possession, and pay damages. The CA erred in classifying it as quasi in rem.
• Validity of Substituted Service: In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary. If the defendant is temporarily out of the country, substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 may be resorted to, provided it is done strictly. The summons must be left at the defendant's residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein. "Residence" refers to the place where the defendant is living at the time of service. Here, the Sheriff's return did not state that the house was the respondent's residence or that Oscar Layno was residing there. Evidence showed the house was leased to Eduardo Gonzales, and Layno was merely a visitor collecting rentals. Thus, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the respondent, rendering its decision null and void.

• Nature of Actions (In Personam vs. Quasi In Rem) — A proceeding in personam is one to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person, based on the jurisdiction of the person, to impose responsibility or liability directly upon the defendant. An action quasi in rem is brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of claims. The aim and object of an action determine its character. An action for forcible entry is a real action and in personam because it seeks to enforce a personal obligation on the defendant to vacate and restore possession.
• Substituted Service of Summons — Under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, if the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Strict compliance is required. "Dwelling house" or "residence" refers to the place where the defendant is living at the time of service. Service on a person at a place where he is merely a visitor is not valid substituted service. The Sheriff's return must state the pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service.

• "From the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very nature and purpose, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the nature of ejectment cases, classifying them as in personam rather than quasi in rem.
• "Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective." — This defines the strict standard for substituted service of summons, emphasizing that any deviation renders the service ineffective and deprives the court of jurisdiction.
• "Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant." — This clarifies the requisites of substituted service, specifically the definition of "residence" and the requirement that the person receiving the summons must be residing in the defendant's house at the time of service.

• Asiavest Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539 (1998) — Cited to explain that in an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary, and if the defendant is temporarily out of the country, substituted service may be resorted to.
• Hamilton vs. Levy, 344 SCRA 821 (2000) — Cited to emphasize that the Sheriff's return must state the pertinent facts and circumstances of the service, and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of substituted service renders it ineffective.
• Keister vs. Narcereo, 77 SCRA 209 (1977) — Cited to define "dwelling house" or "residence" as the place where the defendant is living at the time of service, even if temporarily out of the country.
• Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 637 (1999) — Cited in relation to the nature of forcible entry as an action in personam enforcing a personal obligation under Article 539 of the Civil Code.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Defines who may institute proceedings for forcible entry and unlawful detainer and the one-year prescriptive period. Applied to show that the action is for restitution of possession and damages, indicating its in personam nature.
• Section 7, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Governs substituted service of summons, requiring that copies be left at the defendant's residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein. Applied to determine the validity of the service on the respondent's brother.
• Article 539, New Civil Code — Provides that every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession and protected or restored to it if disturbed. Applied to establish that the obligation to vacate and restore possession in a forcible entry case is a personal obligation, making the action in personam.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.