DOJ v. Mislang (Judicial Clemency)

A petition for judicial clemency, though filed after the five-year minimum period prescribed in Re: Ong, must be denied when it fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of genuine remorse and reformation, as evidenced by the petitioner's persistent assertion of innocence up to the eve of filing and the submission of only pro-forma, unsubstantiated certifications of post-dismissal socio-civic activity.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF/Pag-IBIG Fund) filed separate administrative complaints against RTC Presiding Judge Rolando G. Mislang of Pasig City, Branch 167, for Gross Ignorance of the Law arising from his handling of an injunction petition filed by Delfin S. Lee of Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation. Lee was under preliminary investigation by the DOJ for syndicated estafa in connection with fraudulent housing loans obtained from HDMF. The complaints arose from Mislang's issuance of a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction, and a status quo order that effectively enjoined the DOJ from proceeding with its criminal investigation and prosecution of Lee, on the theory that a civil case for specific performance filed by Lee against HDMF before the Makati RTC posed a prejudicial question. Mislang had previously been found administratively liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law in two earlier cases.

In 2010, the DOJ conducted a preliminary investigation against Delfin S. Lee and other officers of Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation for fraudulent loans taken out by Globe Asiatique's agents on behalf of fake borrowers from the Pag-IBIG Fund, causing damages amounting to ₱6.5 billion. This was docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10J-00319 (the first DOJ case). The NBI Anti-Graft Division separately recommended the filing of criminal charges against Lee and others for syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage, later docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-10L-00363 (the second DOJ case).

Meanwhile, Lee and Globe Asiatique filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against HDMF before the RTC of Makati City, praying that HDMF be compelled to comply with its obligations under the agreements governing their housing loan program. Lee subsequently filed a petition for injunction with application for a temporary restraining order before the RTC of Pasig City, seeking suspension of the proceedings in the second DOJ case on the ground that the issues in the specific performance case posed a prejudicial question. Judge Mislang, as handling judge, granted the TRO on August 16, 2011.

On August 25, 2011, Lee filed an amended petition to likewise enjoin the DOJ from filing an Information in the first DOJ case. Despite the DOJ's opposition, Mislang granted a TRO on August 26, 2011, enjoining the conduct of the first DOJ case. He then converted that TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction in an Order dated September 5, 2011. The DOJ assailed this Order before the Court of Appeals, which annulled it on April 16, 2012 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

On April 26, 2012, Lee filed an Urgent Motion seeking a status quo order against the DOJ based on a supervening favorable summary judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the specific performance case, which allegedly foreclosed the criminal prosecutions. On the same date, the DOJ filed the Information before the RTC of Pampanga; Lee then filed a Supplemental Motion to enjoin the Office of the Clerk of Court from raffling the criminal case. On April 27, 2012, Mislang issued a status quo order enjoining the OCC from raffling the criminal case.

HDMF and the DOJ filed administrative disciplinary complaints against Mislang, alleging that his actions constituted Gross Ignorance of the Law. In a Decision promulgated July 26, 2016, the Supreme Court found Mislang guilty, ruling that no prejudicial question existed, that the petition before him was prematurely filed, and that he lacked jurisdiction. The Court noted that this was not his first infraction: he had been fined ₱20,000 in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2104 and suspended for six months in A.M. No. RTJ-15-2434, both for Gross Ignorance of the Law, with warnings that repetition would merit more severe penalties. He was accordingly dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits (except leave credits) and disqualification from reemployment.

Mislang filed four motions for reconsideration, the first three denied and the fourth noted without action. He also sent a letter-request to the Office of the President dated January 31, 2019 seeking executive assistance regarding the Court's inaction on his fourth motion, and a letter-request to the Court En Banc dated June 3, 2021 reiterating his appeal. In both letters, he maintained his innocence and asserted that his administrative cases were politically or personally motivated by then Chief Justice Sereno, then Secretary De Lima, and Deputy Court Administrator Villanueva. On September 22, 2021, he filed the instant Petition for Judicial Clemency, praying for retirement with full benefits and lifting of his disqualification from reemployment, citing a long government service record, mounting indebtedness, and ailing health.

• Innocence and Unfairness of Dismissal: Petitioner maintained his innocence throughout the proceedings, asserting in multiple motions for reconsideration and in letter-requests to the Court En Banc and the Office of the President that his administrative cases were politically or personally motivated by then Chief Justice Sereno, then Secretary De Lima, and Deputy Court Administrator Villanueva.
• Disproportionate Penalty: Petitioner alternatively posited that the penalty of dismissal was not commensurate to the offense committed.
• Remorse and Reformation: Petitioner claimed in the clemency petition that he had expressed heartfelt apology and remorse for his misdeeds and had accepted the Court's verdict, and that after dismissal he rendered free legal advice to needy individuals and assisted the Lord's Vineyard Covenant Community in socio-civic legal services.
• Economic and Health Hardship: Petitioner cited mounting indebtedness as primary breadwinner of his family, enormous costs for his son's medical procedure, and costs for his own maintenance medicine as circumstances justifying clemency.

• Prima Facie Case for Clemency: Whether the petition for judicial clemency sufficiently demonstrates a prima facie case of genuine remorse and reformation warranting referral to a fact-finding commission or outright grant.

• Prima Facie Case for Clemency: No. The petition failed to establish a prima facie case of genuine remorse and reformation, as the petitioner persistently maintained his innocence until only three months before filing the clemency plea and submitted only a generally worded, unsubstantiated certificate of post-dismissal socio-civic service.

• Prima Facie Case for Clemency: Judicial clemency is neither a right nor a privilege but rests in the sound discretion of the Court, balanced against preservation of public confidence in the judicial system. Under the Re: Diaz guidelines, clemency requires proof of remorse and reformation, sufficient lapse of time, productive years remaining, showing of promise and potential for public service, and other relevant factors. The Re: Ong refinements added a five-year minimum period before dismissal can be the subject of clemency and required that petitions first be evaluated for prima facie merit, with only those demonstrating such merit referred to a fact-finding commission. While the petitioner filed his petition more than five years after the July 26, 2016 promulgation, satisfying the minimum period, the five-year requirement is merely a reasonable estimation of the minimum period necessary for reflection and does not dispense with the need for proof of genuine remorse. The Court found no prima facie showing of remorse: the petitioner had insisted on his innocence as recently as June 3, 2021 — only three months before filing the clemency petition — and had sought presidential intervention in a matter wholly within judicial discretion. His bare statement of remorse in the petition appeared belated and self-serving. The Certificate from the Lord's Vineyard Covenant Community was generally worded and lacked specific details on the scope, extent, and frequency of the alleged socio-civic legal services, failing the Re: Ong requirement that supporting documents contain specific details on one's actions after dismissal. While economic hardship and health concerns are relevant factors, the grant of clemency must be delicately balanced with preserving public confidence in the courts; without genuine remorse and reformation, such personal circumstances cannot override the public interest. Citing Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Villalon-Pornillos, the Court observed that a petitioner who insists on innocence and self-righteousness evinces a lack of remorse and does not deserve clemency.

• Judicial Clemency Guidelines (Re: Diaz) — The Court established five operative guidelines for resolving requests for judicial clemency: (1) proof of remorse and reformation, supported by certifications or testimonials from IBP officers, judges' associations, and prominent community members; (2) sufficient time lapsed from imposition of penalty to ensure a period of reformation; (3) age showing productive years ahead that can be put to good use; (4) showing of promise and potential for public service; and (5) other relevant factors and circumstances justifying clemency. A subsequent finding of guilt for the same or similar misconduct gives rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

• Re: Ong Refinements — For judicial employees, including judges, the Court refined the clemency guidelines by requiring: (a) a five-year minimum period before dismissal or disbarment can be the subject of any kind of clemency, unless extraordinary reasons exist; and (b) a prima facie evaluation of the petition, with referral to a fact-finding commission only if prima facie circumstances exist. The commission receives evidence with due notice to the offended party and the public, and determines whether substantial evidence supports the allegations. If no prima facie case is shown, the plea is dismissed. This procedure was held to apply prospectively from January 19, 2021.

• Prima Facie Standard in Clemency Petitions — A prima facie case for judicial clemency exists when the petition sufficiently demonstrates, on its face, that the petitioner has sincerely expressed remorse for past infractions, has convincingly reformed, and is forthwith deserving of the relief prayed for. Allegations must be supported by proof — not merely pro-forma documents but those containing specific details on the petitioner's actions after dismissal. Self-serving allegations without corresponding evidence cannot sustain a prima facie finding.

• "Judicial clemency cannot be subjective. The more we have personal connections with one who pleas for clemency, the more we should seek to distance ourselves. It is also anticipated that pleas for judicial clemency are largely self-serving." — This passage articulates the Court's concern with subjectivity in clemency determinations and the rationale for the fact-finding commission procedure introduced in Re: Ong.

• "Clemency is in the nature of pardon based on mercy. Pardon and mercy translate to the commutation of the penalty, either wholly or partially. Pardon and mercy are, therefore, uniquely personal to the wrongdoer. However, the act of granting clemency should not go against a public or moral good." — This defines the nature of judicial clemency as an act of mercy tempered by public interest, establishing the balancing test between individual compassion and institutional integrity.

• "the grant of clemency should not excuse or remove the fault of the offender's past acts, nor should it amount to a condonation. Clemency is not blind acceptance or tolerance of a wrongful act." — This formulation clarifies that clemency does not erase prior misconduct and cannot be granted where the petitioner has not genuinely accepted the Court's judgment.

• Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, 560 Phil. 1 (2007) — Controlling precedent establishing the five operative guidelines for judicial clemency, applied here as the baseline framework for evaluating the petition.

• Re: Allegations Made under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021 — Controlling precedent refining the clemency guidelines for judicial employees by adding the five-year minimum period and the prima facie screening and fact-finding commission procedure. Applied here as the governing standard since the petition was filed after Re: Ong's promulgation.

• Nuñez vs. Ricafort, A.C. Nos. 5054 and 6484, March 2, 2021 — Followed for its parallel elaboration of the clemency procedure with respect to lawyers, particularly the rationale for the five-year minimum period as a reasonable estimation of the minimum period necessary for reflection and the institutional problem of subjective analysis without a fact-finding mechanism.

• Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Villalon-Pornillos, 805 Phil. 688 (2017) — Applied to deny clemency where the petitioner insisted on innocence and self-righteousness, evincing lack of remorse; used here as analogous authority for denying Mislang's petition on the same ground.

• DOJ vs. Mislang, 791 Phil. 219 (2016) — The prior Decision of the Court finding Mislang guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and imposing dismissal, the subject of the present clemency petition.

• Section 6, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court — Cited in the 2016 Decision as the rule governing petitions for suspension of criminal action based on a prejudicial question, requiring that such petition be filed before the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation, or if an information has already been filed, before the court where the information was filed. Mislang's failure to apply this provision was a basis for the finding of Gross Ignorance of the Law.

Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.