Docena vs. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar

A permanent appointment to a public office, once issued, accepted, and assumed, becomes complete and enforceable and vests security of tenure; it cannot be recalled at will to accommodate another appointee. Recognition and admission of a lawfully appointed member of a sangguniang panlalawigan is a ministerial duty compellable by mandamus.

The controversy involved a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, a local legislative body subject to the general supervision of the President. Under Section 50 of the Local Government Code, a permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan was to be filled by the President, upon recommendation of the Minister of Local Government, with a qualified person from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy, to serve the unexpired term. The deceased member's term was to run until noon of June 30, 1992 under Article XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution. The rival claimants to the seat were Agustin B. Docena and Socrates B. Alar.

Luis B. Capito, who had been elected to and was serving as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, died in office. Agustin B. Docena was appointed to succeed him by Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government on November 19, 1990. The appointment letter stated that, pursuant to existing laws, Docena was appointed Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Province of Eastern Samar, and that he could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office upon furnishing copies of his oath of office to the Department and the Civil Service Commission. Docena took his oath of office before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives on November 22, 1990, and assumed office as member of the SPES on November 26, 1990. The record does not show why, but on November 27, 1990, private respondent Socrates B. Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Santos, to the same position already occupied by Docena.

On December 18, 1990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Member Capito. The following day, December 19, 1990, Secretary Santos addressed a letter to Alar stating that, because an appointment dated November 19, 1990 had already been issued to Docena as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan vice Luis Capito, the appointment issued to Alar dated November 27, 1990 was recalled effective the date of issue. On January 4, 1991, a First Indorsement signed by Head Executive Assistant Arturo V. Agudo, by authority of the Secretary, declared that the records showed the Secretary had appointed Docena as of November 19, 1990, had extended another appointment to Alar on November 27, 1990, and had recalled Alar's appointment on December 19, 1990; accordingly, Docena's appointment stood and should be recognized.

The SPES reacted by passing Resolution No. 1 dated January 8, 1991, reiterating its recognition of Alar and declaring that the recall order issued by Secretary Santos dated December 19, 1990 had no legal basis in fact and in law and was issued to fit his whimsical, capricious and wishy-washy desires to the detriment of decency and due process of law. On the same date, Provincial Prosecutor Dario S. Labrador rendered an opinion that the recall order was void ab initio because Alar's right to the office had become vested. It is not clear if Secretary Santos agreed with these views, but on February 20, 1991 he issued another recall order addressed to Docena, recalling the November 19, 1990 appointment effective immediately and directing Docena to turn over the office to Alar immediately upon receipt.

Docena then came to the Supreme Court in a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, and to hold them officially and personally liable in damages for their refusal to do so despite his claimed clear title to the disputed office. Pending resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on January 31, 1991, enjoining both Docena and Alar from assuming the office. The petitioner and Capito had run for the provincial board in the 1988 elections under the banner of Lakas ng Bansa; later they both joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino under the leadership of Speaker Mitra, who administered Docena's oath when he was appointed. Docena argued that he had a preferential right to the disputed office even on equitable grounds because he placed ninth in the election, next to Capito, while Alar did not even run. The respondents did not challenge Docena's qualifications, but contended that his November 19, 1990 appointment had been superseded by Alar's November 27, 1990 appointment, and that the recall of Alar's appointment on December 19, 1990 was null and void ab initio for lack of previous hearing; they did not take the same view of the recall of Docena's appointment on February 20, 1991, which was also issued without hearing.

• Preferential Right to Office: Petitioner argued that he had a preferential right to the disputed office even on equitable grounds because he placed ninth in the 1988 election, next to Capito, while Alar did not even run for the office.
• Party Affiliation and Qualification: Petitioner pointed out that both he and Capito ran for the provincial board in the 1988 elections under Lakas ng Bansa and later joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino under Speaker Mitra, who administered his oath; respondents did not challenge his qualifications.
• Mandamus to Compel Recognition: Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by virtue of a valid appointment extended to him by the Secretary of Local Government.
• Damages: Petitioner also sought to hold respondents officially and personally liable in damages for their refusal to recognize him despite his clear title to the disputed office.

• Superseding Appointment: Respondents contended that the appointment in Docena's favor on November 19, 1990 had been superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar on November 27, 1990.
• Invalid Recall of Alar: Respondents argued that the recall of Alar's appointment on December 19, 1990 was null and void ab initio for lack of previous hearing.
• Inconsistent Treatment of Recall: Respondents did not have the same view of the recall of Docena's appointment on February 20, 1991, which was also issued without hearing; they maintained silence about that recall and insisted that Alar's subsequent appointment had invalidated Docena's earlier appointment.
• Proper Remedy: Respondents argued that petitioner should have sought to enforce his claimed right in a petition for quo warranto, not mandamus, because his purpose was to challenge Alar's title to the disputed office.
• No Ministerial Duty: Respondents asserted that recognition and admission of the petitioner was not a ministerial duty, claiming discretion to review, and if they so decided, reject the Secretary's appointment.
• Qualifications Not Challenged: Respondents did not challenge the qualifications of the petitioner.

• Nature of Appointment and Security of Tenure: Whether Docena's appointment on November 19, 1990, was permanent and complete, vesting him with security of tenure, such that it could not be recalled and replaced by the later appointment of Alar.
• Power to Recall: Whether the Secretary of Local Government could recall Docena's appointment without cause and without the procedure prescribed by the Local Government Code.
• Authority of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan: Whether the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had authority or discretion to review and reject the Secretary's appointment and recognize Alar instead.
• Proper Remedy: Whether mandamus, rather than quo warranto, was the proper remedy to compel the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to recognize and admit Docena.
• Damages and Salaries: Whether Docena was entitled to damages and to salaries and other benefits from his assumption of office until actual admission or reinstatement.

• Nature of Appointment and Security of Tenure: Yes. The appointment was permanent to fill a permanent vacancy, was accepted and assumed, and became complete and enforceable; Docena acquired security of tenure and could be removed only for causes and under the procedure prescribed by the Local Government Code.
• Power to Recall: No. The appointment could not be recalled at will and replaced to accommodate Alar; no reason was given, and the requirements for removal could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.
• Authority of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan: No. The SPES had no discretion to rule on the validity of the Secretary's decisions; recognition and admission was a ministerial duty, and it should have reserved judgment for the courts.
• Proper Remedy: Mandamus was proper. Even assuming quo warranto was the proper remedy, the Court could in its discretion treat the petition as such; the requirements were met and Docena proved his right to the disputed office.
• Damages and Salaries: No damages, but yes salaries and benefits. There was no sufficient proof to overcome the presumption of good faith, but petitioner was entitled to salaries and other benefits from the time of his assumption of office until he is actually admitted or reinstated.

• Nature of Appointment and Security of Tenure: Section 50 of the Local Government Code provides that a permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be filled by the President, upon recommendation of the Minister of Local Government, with a qualified person from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy, who shall serve the unexpired term. Capito's death created a permanent vacancy. The appointment extended to Docena on November 19, 1990 was intended to be permanent, to fill that permanent vacancy, and was valid for the unexpired portion of Capito's term, who was entitled to serve until noon of June 30, 1992 under Article XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution. Docena accepted the appointment, took his oath, and assumed office, as certified by the Provincial Secretary. The appointment had therefore become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposedly superseded by Alar's appointment. Docena acquired security of tenure and could be removed only for the causes and conformably to the procedure prescribed by the Local Government Code; those requirements could not be circumvented by recalling his appointment.
• Power to Recall: Absolutely no reason was given for the recall of Docena's appointment, or for that matter the recall of Alar's appointment. After appointing Docena and later twice sustaining his title to the office, Secretary Santos simply had a change of heart and decided to award the position to Alar. That is not the way things are done in a democracy. Because Docena's appointment had been issued and accepted earlier, and because he had already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's term. The SPES's impression that the appointments were revocable at will was not based on careful legal study, and the Provincial Prosecutor's opinion that the office had become vested in Alar suffered from the same flaw and a lack of understanding of the nature of a public office. Political rather than legal considerations appeared to have influenced the provincial government's rejection of Docena's claim.
• Authority of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan: Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which the petitioner is entitled. In arguing that recognition and admission of the petitioner was not a ministerial duty, the respondents asserted discretion to review, and if they so decided, reject, the Secretary's appointment. They had no such authority. Faced with a strictly legal question, they had no right and competence to resolve it in their discretion. What they should have done was reserve their judgment on the matter, leaving it to the courts of justice to decide which of the conflicting claims should be upheld. As a local legislative body subject to the general supervision of the President, the SPES had no discretion to rule on the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Local Government acting as the President's alter ego.
• Proper Remedy: The real purpose of the present petition was to compel the respondent SPES to recognize and admit Docena as a member of the body by virtue of a valid appointment extended to him by the Secretary of Local Government. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which the petitioner is entitled. Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the Court may in its own discretion consider the present petition as such and deal with it accordingly. As a petition for quo warranto, it complied with the prescribed requirements: it was filed on time and by a proper party asserting title to the office also claimed by the respondent. Acting thereon, the Court held that Docena had proved his right to the disputed office and could not be legally replaced by Alar.
• Damages and Salaries: The Court made no award of damages because there was no sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the respondents acted in good faith albeit erroneously. Nevertheless, the petitioner was entitled to the payment of the salaries and other benefits appurtenant to the office of a Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, from the time of his assumption of office and until he is actually admitted or reinstated.

• Security of Tenure in Public Office — A permanent appointment to a public office, once issued, accepted, and assumed, becomes complete and enforceable; the appointee acquires security of tenure and may be removed only for the causes and according to the procedure prescribed by law. In this case, Docena's November 19, 1990 appointment to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was permanent and for the unexpired term of the deceased member; his later recall to accommodate Alar was invalid.
• Recall of Appointment — An appointment that has become complete and enforceable cannot be recalled at will to accommodate another appointee. The Court found no reason for the recall of Docena's appointment and held that the requirements for removal under the Local Government Code could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.
• Ministerial Duty and Mandamus — Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which the petitioner is entitled. The recognition and admission of a lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is ministerial; the local legislative body has no discretion to review and reject the Secretary of Local Government's appointment.
• No Discretion to Review Executive Appointment — A local legislative body subject to the general supervision of the President has no discretion to rule on the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Local Government acting as the President's alter ego; it should reserve judgment and leave conflicting claims to the courts.
• Quo Warranto Treated as Mandamus — Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the court may in its discretion consider a mandamus petition as one for quo warranto and resolve the title to the disputed office. In this case, the petition complied with the requirements of timely filing and proper party, and Docena proved his right to the office.
• Presumption of Good Faith — Public officers are presumed to have acted in good faith; damages may not be awarded absent sufficient proof to overcome that presumption. The Court denied damages but still awarded salaries and benefits appurtenant to the office.

• "Docena's appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. These requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the permanence of the appointment and the security of tenure that barred the recall.
• "Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which the petitioner is entitled. In arguing that the recognition and admission of the petitioner is not a ministerial duty, the respondents are asserting the discretion to review, and if they so decide, reject, the Secretary's appointment. They have no such authority." — This defines the ministerial nature of the duty to recognize and admit a lawfully appointed member and rejects the local legislative body's claimed discretion.
• "Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the Court may in its own discretion consider the present petition as such and deal with it accordingly. We find that as a petition for quo warranto, it complies with the prescribed requirements, to wit, that it be filed on time and by a proper party asserting title to the office also claimed by the respondent. Acting thereon, we hold that Docena has proved his right to the disputed office and could not be legally replaced by Alar." — This passage addresses the procedural objection and confirms that the Court may treat the mandamus petition as one for quo warranto.
• "The Court will make no award of damages, there being no sufficient proof to overcome the presumption that the respondents have acted in good faith albeit erroneously. Nevertheless, the petitioner is entitled to the payment of the salaries and other benefits appurtenant to the office of a Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, from the time of his assumption of office and until he is actually admitted or reinstated." — This passage disposes of the damages claim and awards salaries and benefits.

• Section 50, Local Government Code — Governs permanent vacancies in local sanggunians. It provides that the President, upon recommendation of the Minister of Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill a vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan; except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. The Court applied this provision to hold that Docena's appointment was permanent and for the unexpired term of Capito.
• Article XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution — Cited to establish that the deceased member was entitled to serve until noon of June 30, 1992, so that Docena's appointment to fill the vacancy was for the unexpired portion of that term.
• Sections 60, 61, 61, B.P. 337 — Cited in footnote 12 as the provisions of the Local Government Code prescribing the causes and procedure for removal. The Court used them to support its holding that Docena, having acquired security of tenure, could be removed only for those causes and conformably to that procedure, not by a mere recall of his appointment.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Sarmiento, J., was on leave.