Djumantan vs. Domingo

An alien who entered the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements may not be deported under Section 37(a)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1940 unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises, pursuant to Section 37(b). The revocation of a permanent resident visa, effectively rendering the alien an overstaying alien subject to arrest and deportation, constitutes deportation for purposes of the prescriptive period.

Bernard Banez, a Filipino contract worker married to Marina Cabael in the Philippines, went to Indonesia where he converted to Islam and married petitioner Djumantan, an Indonesian citizen, under Islamic rites in 1974. Petitioner and her two children with Banez entered the Philippines in January 1979 as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940, with Banez executing an affidavit of guaranty and support falsely representing them as family friends rather than as his wife and children. In 1982, petitioner's immigration status was changed from temporary visitor to permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. The legal framework governing this case includes the Immigration Act of 1940, particularly Sections 9, 13(a), 37(a), and 37(b), which respectively govern admission of temporary visitors, adjustment to permanent residency, grounds for deportation, and the prescriptive period for deportation proceedings.

Bernard Banez, a Filipino contract worker married to Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia for employment. On April 3, 1974, he embraced Islam and was converted to that faith. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner Djumantan, an Indonesian citizen, in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez — two-year-old Marina and nine-month-old Nikulas — arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as the "guests" of Banez. Banez made it appear that he was merely a friend of petitioner's family and was repaying the hospitality extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. He executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support" stating that he was the guarantor for the entry of Mrs. Djumantan and her two minor children, all Indonesian citizens coming as temporary visitors, and that he guaranteed their support, behavior, and voluntary departure upon termination of their authorized stay. Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met petitioner and the children at the airport. Petitioner and her children were admitted as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 and lived in Banez's house.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship between her husband and petitioner and filed a complaint for concubinage with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which was dismissed for lack of merit. On March 25, 1982, petitioner's immigration status was changed from temporary visitor to permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act, and on April 14, 1982, she was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez's eldest son, Leonardo, subsequently filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who referred it to the CID. On the basis of that letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell and later released pending deportation proceedings after posting a cash bond. She initially manifested a willingness to depart voluntarily but later changed her position and moved for dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen.

On September 27, 1990, the CID found the second marriage of Banez to petitioner irregular and not in accordance with Philippine laws, and revoked the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her. The CID denied reconsideration on January 29, 1991. On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father had died on August 14, 1994, and that he and his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident visa to petitioner. The Supreme Court found that petitioner's entry and change of immigration status were obtained through misrepresentation, as the marriage to Banez was never disclosed to immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa and permanent residency.

• Validity of Marriage and Right to Live Together: Petitioner claimed that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argued that under Articles 109 of the Civil Code, Article 68 of the Family Code, and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, husband and wife are obliged to live together, and under Article 110 of the Civil Code, the husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She contended that public respondents had no right to order the couple to live separately.
• Deportation Power Has Prescribed: Petitioner, through the Solicitor General's position, argued that the CID could not order her deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

• Revocation, Not Deportation: Public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien, and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her.

• Immigration Status: Whether petitioner was lawfully admitted into the country and lawfully acquired permanent residency.
• Prescription of Deportation Power: Whether the CID's power to deport petitioner had prescribed under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
• Nature of Visa Revocation: Whether the revocation of a permanent resident visa constitutes deportation for purposes of the prescriptive period under Section 37(b).

• Immigration Status: No. Petitioner's entry and change of immigration status were obtained through blatant misrepresentation, as the marriage to Banez was never disclosed to immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa and permanent residency.
• Prescription of Deportation Power: Yes. The power to deport had prescribed because more than five years elapsed between November 19, 1980, when the cause for deportation arose, and September 27, 1990, when the deportation order was issued, in violation of Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
• Nature of Visa Revocation: Yes. The revocation of the permanent residence visa effectively ordered petitioner's arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien, and thus constituted deportation for purposes of Section 37(b)'s prescriptive period.

• Immigration Status: The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on the part of immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen who is married to another woman. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing admission and exclusion of aliens. Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa, and under Section 13, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Entry and admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if legally married to Filipino citizens. All privileges of entry and permanent residency were obtained through misrepresentation, as the marriage to Banez was never disclosed.

• Prescription of Deportation Power: Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an alien who enters the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements is subject to deportation. Section 37(b) provides that deportation under clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 of Section 37(a) shall not be effected unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises. Petitioner was admitted on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading statements. Leonardo C. Banez first complained to the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner of petitioner's admission. Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the deportation order on September 27, 1990. Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of aliens, and the five-year limitation under Section 37(b) applies to deportation under clause 1 of Section 37(a).

• Nature of Visa Revocation: Respondents argued that what they ordered was not deportation but merely revocation of the Section 13(a) visa. The Court rejected this characterization, holding that the "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation, and that when respondents revoked the permanent residence visa, they in effect ordered petitioner's arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien. The revocation was thus tantamount to deportation for purposes of the prescriptive period.

• Prescription of Deportation Power — Under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, deportation of an alien under clauses of Section 37(a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 shall not be effected unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises. For clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, deportation may be effected at any time after entry. The Court applied this doctrine by tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when the CID was first informed of petitioner's illegal entry, and finding that more than five years had elapsed before the deportation order of September 27, 1990.

• Marriage to a Filipino Citizen Does Not Exempt from Immigration Laws — The fact of marriage by an alien to a Filipino citizen does not withdraw the alien from the operation of the immigration laws governing admission and exclusion. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from failure to depart upon expiration of her authorized stay. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted or given permanent residency.

• Admission of Aliens Is a Matter of Permission, Not Right — The right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry. The admission of aliens into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance, creating no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay. The interest an alien has in being admitted or allowed to reside is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it.

• "There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation." — This passage states the Court's finding that petitioner's entry and change of status were procured through misrepresentation, establishing the factual predicate for the deportation ground under Section 37(a)(1).

• "The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed." — This is the decisive ruling of the case: despite the fraudulent entry, the CID's power to deport was barred by the five-year prescriptive period under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

• "When public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien." — This passage resolves the semantic dispute over whether visa revocation constitutes deportation, holding that the practical effect of revocation is deportation for purposes of the prescriptive period.

• Shiu Shin Man vs. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 (1961) — Cited in support of the proposition that immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow entry of a woman who claims marriage to a Filipino citizen already married to another woman.
• Joaquin vs. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 (1970) — Cited for the doctrine that marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from failure to depart upon expiration of her authorized stay.
• Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991) — Cited for the principle that under Section 37(b), deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years after the cause for deportation arises. The dissenting opinions of Justices Feliciano and Davide in that case were quoted to clarify that the five-year limitation applies only to clauses of Section 37(a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12.
• Lam Shee vs. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953) — Cited as controlling authority: an alien who fraudulently gained entrance could no longer be deported because more than five years had elapsed from the date of her admission, directly paralleling the factual situation in the present case.

• Section 9(a), Immigration Act of 1940 — Governs admission of temporary visitors. Petitioner and her children were admitted under this section as temporary visitors, a status obtained through misrepresentation of their relationship to Banez.
• Section 13(a), Immigration Act of 1940 — Governs adjustment of status to permanent residency for the spouse of a Philippine citizen. Petitioner's status was changed to permanent resident under this provision on March 25, 1982, which the CID later revoked.
• Section 37(a)(1), Immigration Act of 1940 — Provides that any alien who enters the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements is subject to deportation. Petitioner's entry fell under this clause because she concealed her marriage to Banez.
• Section 37(b), Immigration Act of 1940 — Provides that deportation under clauses of Section 37(a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12 shall not be effected unless the arrest in deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises. This provision was the decisive basis for granting the petition, as more than five years had elapsed.
• Article 27, P.D. No. 1085 (Muslim Code) — Petitioner cited this provision as recognizing the practice of polyandry by Muslim males to validate her marriage to Banez. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the validity of the marriage.
• Articles 109 and 110, Civil Code; Article 68, Family Code; Article 34, Muslim Code — Petitioner cited these provisions on the mutual obligation of spouses to live together and the husband's right to fix the conjugal residence. The Court did not rule on these arguments.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concurred.