Dizon vs. Lopez

Mere reading of the dispositive portion is not valid promulgation of a criminal judgment; the complete judgment containing the facts and law must be rendered within three months from submission, and a judgment rendered without such statement, subject to later supplementation, is a prohibited sin perjuicio judgment.

Respondent was the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, while complainant was the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 for falsification of private document pending before her court. Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution requires all other lower courts to decide cases within three months from submission, and Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure prescribes the form, contents, and promulgation of judgments in criminal cases.

Complainant Engineer Fernando S. Dizon was the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 for falsification of private document before respondent's court. On April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered convicting him, and promulgation consisted of reading the dispositive portion sentencing him to imprisonment, without service of a copy of the decision. The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy, but although complainant and his father by turns went to the court, no copy was obtained.

Thereafter, to protect his rights, complainant filed a partial motion for reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his right to submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. When the motion was set for hearing on May 12, 1993, the case was not called, complainant's counsel being told that the decision had not yet been finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant filed an Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss the case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing that motion, complainant was finally served a copy of the decision dated April 22, 1993, whose dispositive portion found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 4, and sentenced him to imprisonment of two years, four months and one day to six years and a fine of P5,000.00.

On December 26, 1994, after receiving the full decision, complainant filed another motion for reconsideration, and on January 3, 1995, moved to disqualify respondent from hearing the motions. Respondent voluntarily inhibited herself and ordered the case forwarded for re-raffle, after which it was assigned to Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113. The record showed that despite destruction of records by fire in Pasay City Hall on January 18, 1992, the parties had been required to submit memoranda simultaneously on August 18, 1992, and that respondent, during January to December 1993, disposed of 285 cases amid heavy criminal, civil, land registration, and special proceedings dockets with only two stenographers.

• Violation of Constitution on Form and Period of Decision: Complainant alleged that failure to furnish a copy of the decision until almost one year and eight months after promulgation of its dispositive portion violated Article VIII, Section 14 requiring decisions to state clearly and distinctly the facts and law, and Section 15 requiring lower courts to render decisions within three months from submission.
• Denial of Speedy Trial: Complainant alleged denial of the right to speedy trial under Article III, Section 14(2) by reason of the prolonged delay in completing the decision.
• Falsification and Addition of Penalty: Complainant alleged that respondent falsified her decision by antedating it and including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00 not contained in the sentence read on April 22, 1993.

• Prior Preparation and Prevention of Leakage: Respondent claimed that on April 22, 1993 her decision was already prepared, although she withheld its dispositive portion until promulgation to prevent leakage, and thereafter gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo for typing and incorporation into the text.
• Unintentional Delay Due to Workload and Personal Misfortunes: Respondent maintained that delay in furnishing a copy was unintentional, caused by having only two stenographers, disposing of 285 cases in January to December 1993 with heavy morning and afternoon hearings, deaths of her niece Gloria Lopez Roque, mother Margarita Lopez on March 1, 1992, and father on September 17, 1993, her own diabetes and hypertension requiring leave from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994, and family financial reverses due to estafa.
• Power to Modify Incomplete Decision: Respondent contended that because the decision was not complete it could still be modified to add the P5,000.00 fine even if not included in the oral sentence of April 22, 1993, citing Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia.

• Timeliness and Validity of Promulgation: Whether respondent violated Article VIII, Section 15(1) by promulgating only the dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 and furnishing the complete decision only on December 16, 1994.
• Speedy Trial: Whether the delay deprived complainant of his constitutional right to speedy trial.
• Prejudice to Appeal and Falsification: Whether the delay prejudiced complainant's right to appeal or seek reconsideration and whether antedating the decision and adding a fine constituted falsification and serious misconduct.
• Administrative Liability and Penalty: Whether respondent is administratively liable for inefficiency and what penalty is appropriate in light of mitigating circumstances.

• Timeliness and Validity of Promulgation: Yes. Only the dispositive portion was read in 1993 and the complete judgment was served only after one year and eight months, constituting failure to render decision within three months and a prohibited sin perjuicio judgment.
• Speedy Trial: No. The delay was not vexatious, capricious, and oppressive, and the reading of sentence, albeit defective as promulgation, put an end to trial.
• Prejudice to Appeal and Falsification: No. The period to appeal did not run until actual receipt on December 16, 1994, so no prejudice to appellate remedies resulted, and falsification and serious misconduct were not established for lack of malice.
• Administrative Liability and Penalty: Yes for inefficiency. Respondent was reprimanded with warning, mitigated by unblemished service, heavy workload, bereavement, ill health, and financial reverses.

• Timeliness and Validity of Promulgation: Under Rule 120, judgment means adjudication of guilt with imposition of penalty, must be personally prepared, signed, and contain clearly and distinctly the facts proved or admitted and the law upon which based, and is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused. Merely reading the dispositive portion does not satisfy this requirement; promulgation occurred only on December 16, 1994 when the complete decision was served. Although promulgation of the dispositive portion occurred within three months of submission, completion after one year and eight months breached Article VIII, Section 15(1). The claim that only incorporation of the dispositive portion remained undermined respondent's position, as such incorporation should not have required that length of time, and extension of time should have been sought instead. What was rendered was a sin perjuicio judgment — a judgment without statement of facts to be later supplemented — disapproved since 1923 for its uncertainty and implied reservation of modification. While withholding the dispositive portion during preparation to prevent leakage is approved, secrecy has no justification at promulgation, when the complete decision must be promulgated.
• Speedy Trial: Despite destruction of records by fire on January 18, 1992, simultaneous memoranda were required on August 18, 1992, and no vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay within the meaning of Que vs. Cosico was shown. Trial ended with the reading of sentence on April 22, 1993 even if non-compliant with promulgation requirements.
• Prejudice to Appeal and Falsification: An accused must receive a copy of the decision to intelligently prepare appeal or reconsideration, but pursuant to Director of Lands vs. Sanz, the period therefor did not begin until actual receipt on December 16, 1994, leaving remedies intact. Complainant suffered only anxiety from inability to refute an unexplained conviction. Absence of malice negated serious misconduct and falsification, consistent with the Deputy Court Administrator's evaluation.
• Administrative Liability and Penalty: Failure to furnish a copy within reasonable time after promulgation established inefficiency and negligence. Culpability was mitigated by more than 13 years as trial judge and 17 years as NBI legal officer and State Prosecutor without prior complaint, lack of stenographers, disposition of 285 cases amid heavy dockets, deaths in the family, personal illness and leaves, and financial reverses. Following Mangulabnan vs. Tecson, where a 19-month delay in delivery due to misfiling drew reprimand on less excusable grounds, reprimand was deemed appropriate.

• Sin perjuicio judgment — A judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion, to be later supplemented by the final judgment with implied reservation of modification, is prohibited. It was disapproved as early as 1923 because of uncertainties entailed. Respondent's promulgation of only the dispositive portion, later supplemented after one year and eight months with added fine, was such a judgment.
• Promulgation and form of criminal judgment — Judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared and signed by the judge, containing clearly and distinctly the facts proved or admitted and the law upon which based, and is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused. Reading only the dispositive portion does not constitute valid promulgation.
• Constitutional period for deciding cases — All cases must be decided within twenty-four months for the Supreme Court, twelve months for lower collegiate courts unless reduced, and three months for all other lower courts from submission. Promulgation of the complete judgment beyond that period violates Article VIII, Section 15(1).
• Computation of period to appeal in criminal cases — The accused's period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration does not begin to run until actual receipt of a copy of the complete judgment, so delayed service, while censurable as inefficiency, does not by itself prejudice appellate rights.
• Right to speedy trial — A violation requires vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. Ordinary delay in furnishing the written decision after sentence has been read, which ends the trial, does not establish such denial.

• "All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower courts." — States the constitutional mandate applied to find respondent's one-year-and-eight-month completion violative of the three-month rule.
• "It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is based." — Articulates the core ratio that promulgation requires the complete judgment, not its dispositive portion alone.
• "What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a "sin perjuicio" judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment." — Defines the prohibited practice for which respondent was held liable.
• "The delay, if any, was not such "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay" as to justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial." — States the standard negating the speedy-trial claim.

• Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117 (1923) — Followed as authority both for disapproval of sin perjuicio judgments and for the rule that the period to appeal runs from actual receipt of the judgment, thereby negating prejudice to complainant's remedies.
• Mangulabnan vs. Tecson, 101 SCRA 810 (1980) — Followed as precedent for penalty, where a six-month delay in decision and 19-month delay in delivery resulted in reprimand, supporting reprimand here on more mitigating grounds.
• Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia, 162 SCRA 665 (1988) — Cited by respondent to justify modification to add a fine before finality; the Court treated the invocation as confirming that the April 22, 1993 promulgation was incomplete.
• Castaños vs. Escaño, 251 SCRA 174 (1995) — Cited to distinguish permissible withholding of the dispositive portion during preparation to prevent leakage from impermissible withholding at promulgation, when the complete decision must be read.
• Que vs. Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 (1989) — Cited for the standard of vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay, which was not met to establish denial of speedy trial.

• Article VIII, Section 15(1), 1987 Constitution — Requires other lower courts to decide cases within three months from submission; applied to hold that service of the complete judgment after one year and eight months violated the mandate.
• Article VIII, Section 14, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits decisions without clearly and distinctly expressing facts and law; invoked by complainant but deemed satisfied by the eventual written decision stating its basis.
• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees speedy trial; invoked but found not violated absent vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.
• Rule 120, Sections 1, 2 and Promulgation, Rules on Criminal Procedure — Defines judgment, requires written facts and law personally prepared and signed, and requires promulgation by reading the same in the accused's presence; applied to invalidate promulgation by reading only the dispositive portion.
• Article 172, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 4, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes falsification of private document, the offense of which complainant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of two years, four months and one day to six years and P5,000.00 fine.

Romero, J., Puno, J., and Torres, Jr., J., concur. Regalado, J., is on leave. No separate concurring opinions with additional reasoning appear in the text.