Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People

The unexplained possession of goods that are the proven proceeds of robbery or theft gives rise to a prima facie presumption of knowledge that they were so derived, satisfying the knowledge element of the crime of fencing under P.D. No. 1612.

On February 12, 1988, the residence of Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion in Parañaque was robbed, and several pieces of jewelry were taken. On February 24, 1988, acting on a police tip, the Encarnacions and police officers went to a stall at Florentino Torres Street, Manila, tended by petitioner Norma Dizon-Pamintuan. They recognized and recovered three of the stolen jewelry items displayed for sale. The petitioner was subsequently charged with and convicted of fencing by the trial court.

• Nature of the Case: Petitioner was charged with fencing for knowingly possessing and selling jewelry derived from a robbery.
• The Robbery: On February 12, 1988, five armed men robbed the Parañaque residence of Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion, taking jewelry and other valuables. The incident was immediately reported to the police.
• Recovery of Items: On February 24, 1988, police operatives accompanied the Encarnacions to a jewelry stall at Florentino Torres Street, Manila, tended by the petitioner. The Encarnacions identified three of the stolen items displayed for sale: (a) an earring and diamond ring (valued at P75,000), (b) a set of diamond earrings (valued at P15,000), and (c) a gold chain with crucifix (valued at P3,000).
• Petitioner's Possession and Admission: The jewelry was recovered from the petitioner's display stall. Teodoro Encarnacion testified that the petitioner admitted getting the items but claimed she did not know they were stolen, and she surrendered them.
• Defense Version: The petitioner's brother testified that the police opened the display stall and took its contents while the petitioner was waiting to eat lunch. He claimed the stall was owned by a certain "Fredo."
• Lower Court Findings: The trial court convicted the petitioner, relying on the prima facie presumption of fencing under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 due to her possession of the stolen goods.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the judgment was based on a mere statutory presumption and that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Valuation and Penalty: Petitioner contended that the prosecution failed to prove the value of the jewelry (allegedly P93,000), which is essential for determining the proper penalty under P.D. No. 1612.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner implied that a remand for further evidence on valuation would place her in double jeopardy.

• Establishment of Elements: The Solicitor General argued that all elements of fencing were proven: (1) a robbery occurred; (2) the petitioner, not a participant, possessed and sold the stolen items; (3) she knew or should have known they were stolen; and (4) there was intent to gain.
• Presumption of Knowledge: Respondent maintained that the petitioner's possession of the stolen jewelry, coupled with its display for sale, triggered the statutory presumption of knowledge and intent to gain.
• Sufficient Valuation: Respondent asserted that the value of the jewelry was adequately proven by the victim's testimony and the list of stolen items he submitted.

• Knowledge Element: Whether the prosecution proved that the petitioner knew or should have known that the jewelry she possessed was derived from robbery.
• Valuation for Penalty: Whether there was sufficient evidence to determine the value of the recovered jewelry for the purpose of imposing the correct penalty under P.D. No. 1612.

• Knowledge Element: The petitioner's unexplained possession of the stolen jewelry, which was displayed for sale, gave rise to the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that she knew or should have known of its criminal origin. She failed to rebut this presumption, as her defense (ownership of the stall by "Fredo") was unsubstantiated and did not negate the element of knowledge.
• Valuation for Penalty: The trial court's finding that the total value of the recovered jewelry was P93,000 (later adjusted to P87,000 due to the recovery of only one earring from a pair) was based on the credible testimony of the victim and the list of stolen items he provided. This constituted sufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals erred in ordering a remand for further valuation.

• Fencing as a Malum Prohibitum Crime — Fencing under P.D. No. 1612 is a malum prohibitum offense. The law itself creates a presumption of fencing from mere possession of stolen goods and prescribes a higher penalty than that for being an accessory under the Revised Penal Code. The crimes of robbery/theft and fencing are separate and distinct.
• Presumption of Knowledge from Possession — Under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612, "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing." This presumption includes the elements of knowledge and intent to gain, and it does not offend the constitutional presumption of innocence, as there is a rational connection between the fact of possession and the presumed fact of knowledge.

• "Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that '[m]ere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing,' it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
• "The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property."

• People vs. Hon. de Guzman, G.R. No. 77368, 5 October 1993 — Cited to establish that fencing is a separate offense from robbery/theft and that an accessory can be prosecuted as a principal under P.D. No. 1612.
• United States vs. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 (1916) — Cited to support the constitutionality of statutes that create a prima facie presumption of guilt from proof of certain facts, shifting the burden of evidence to the accused.
• Diong-an vs. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 39 (1985) — Cited for the principle that knowledge, as a mental state, must be determined from overt acts, and where two inferences are plausible, the one sustaining the presumption of innocence should be chosen.
• Gorion vs. RTC of Cebu, 213 SCRA 138 (1991) — Cited for the requisites of double jeopardy.

• Section 2, P.D. No. 1612 — Defines fencing as the act of any person who, with intent to gain, buys, receives, possesses, etc., any item derived from robbery or theft, which he knows or should have known to be so derived.
• Section 3, P.D. No. 1612 — Prescribes the penalty for fencing based on the value of the property involved.
• Section 5, P.D. No. 1612 — Establishes the prima facie presumption of fencing from mere possession of goods subject of robbery or thievery.
• Section 6, P.D. No. 1612 — Requires stores dealing with goods from unlicensed dealers to secure clearance from the police before offering them for sale.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional presumption of innocence, which the Court held is not violated by the statutory presumption in P.D. No. 1612.

• Justice Florenz D. Regalado
• Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
• Justice Jose C. Vitug
• Justice Santiago M. Kapunan