Distrito vs. Court of Appeals

A co-owner who was actually present and actively participated in the consummation of the sale of the property is deemed to have actual notice of the sale, rendering the written notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code unnecessary. However, for a co-owner who was not present and received only verbal notice of the sale, such verbal notice is not sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement, and the co-owner may exercise the right of legal redemption within thirty days from the time of such verbal notice.

The case involves a parcel of land, Lot No. 716-B-2 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, originally owned by the deceased Simeona Amistad, whose heirs were Eufrocina Potenciana, Librada, Catalina, Gabina, and Anecito, all surnamed Villamil. The lot was previously the subject of a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, which adjudicated the land to the six heirs of Simeona Amistad with one-sixth (1/6) pro-indiviso shares each. The property is located in the heart of Dumaguete City, where Librada's house was constructed and where her husband and children, as well as Pacita Miquiabas-Samson and her children, were residing.

The property in question, Lot No. 716-B-2 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, was originally owned by Simeona Amistad, now deceased, whose heirs were Eufrocina Potenciana, Librada, Catalina, Gabina, and Anecito, all surnamed Villamil. The lot is situated in the heart of Dumaguete City, and Librada's house was constructed thereon, where Librada's husband and children presently stay after Librada's death. Plaintiff Pacita Miquiabas-Samson, who works in Dumaguete City together with her children who study there, also lives in Librada's house, and Pedro Miquiabas stays in the house when he visits Dumaguete City from the island of Siquijor.

The whole Lot 716 of the Dumaguete Cadastre was previously the subject of a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, which adjudicated to the six heirs of Simeona Amistad Lot No. 716-B-2, the land in litigation, with one-sixth (1/6) pro-indiviso shares. On April 16, 1976, the petitioners acquired by purchase one-half (1/2) portion pro-indiviso of Lot No. 716-B-3 from Atty. Marcelo Flores, which the latter acquired as payment of his attorney's fees in the civil case. Subsequently, upon the representation of Pedro Miquiabas, who acted as middleman, the petitioners bought the shares of Catalina and Anecito Villamil. On April 30, 1975, the instrument of sale was notarized by Juan A. Lapisan, Jr., who testified that Pedro Miquiabas accompanied Eduardo Distrito and himself to Siaton, Negros Oriental, where Catalina Villamil was living, in order for the latter to sign the document, as Catalina was too old to travel to Dumaguete City. Pedro Miquiabas also offered to sell his share and that of his sister to the petitioners, but the latter hesitated. Eduardo Distrito testified that he and his co-defendant also bought the share of Eusebio Amistad, who owns the adjoining lot, through the representations of Pedro Miquiabas.

Pacita Miquiabas-Samson testified that she had bought the share of Librada Villamil and agreed with the heirs of Gabina Villamil to buy their respective shares, and would like to redeem the shares of Catalina and Anecito, both surnamed Villamil, to preserve the family lot for sentimental reasons. The plaintiffs-appellants claimed that they only came to know about the sale of the lot in question in July 1984, when Eduardo Distrito notified them that the defendants were constructing a building on the portion they bought from Catalina Villamil and Anecito Villamil. However, Pacita Miquiabas-Samson refused, as the shares of Catalina Villamil and Anecito Villamil had not yet been segregated, there being no partition over the lot in question. The plaintiffs-appellants offered to redeem the land in the amount of P4,566.00, but the defendants-appellees refused. Hence, a tender of payment was made with the court, and notice of consignation was sent to the defendants-appellees. On August 3, 1984, Pacita Miquiabas filed a complaint for legal redemption in court and at the same time deposited the amount of P4,588.85 with the court as the purchase price.

• Actual Notice to Pedro Miquiabas: Petitioners argued that private respondent Pedro Miquiabas acted as middleman and was present when the vendor signed the deed of sale, and thus had actual knowledge of the sale, making written notice under Article 1623 of the Civil Code unnecessary.
• Verbal Notice to Pacita Miquiabas: Petitioners maintained that Pacita Miquiabas was verbally notified of the sale in July 1984, and since the law requires written notice, such verbal notice was not sufficient compliance with the requirement of Article 1623.

• Right to Redeem as Co-Owners: Private respondents argued that they are entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption as co-owners of the property, having offered to redeem the land and made a tender of payment and consignation with the court.
• Timeliness of Redemption: Private respondents contended that they only came to know about the sale in July 1984 when Eduardo Distrito notified them of the construction of a building, and that they filed the complaint for legal redemption within thirty days from such notice, on August 3, 1984.

• Actual Notice to Pedro Miquiabas: Whether written notice under Article 1623 of the Civil Code is necessary when the co-owner was actually present and acted as an active intermediary in the consummation of the sale.
• Sufficiency of Verbal Notice to Pacita Miquiabas: Whether verbal notice of the sale to a co-owner who was not present during the sale is sufficient compliance with the written notice requirement of Article 1623, and whether her redemption within thirty days from such verbal notice was timely.

• Actual Notice to Pedro Miquiabas: No. Written notice under Article 1623 of the Civil Code is not necessary when the co-owner was actually present and was even an active intermediary in the consummation of the sale of the property, as he is and must be considered to have had actual notice of the sale.
• Sufficiency of Verbal Notice to Pacita Miquiabas: No, verbal notice is not sufficient compliance with the written notice requirement. However, since Pacita Miquiabas filed the complaint for legal redemption within thirty days from the time she was verbally notified thereof by petitioners, her right to redeem the property as co-owner must be sustained.

• Actual Notice to Pedro Miquiabas: Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides that the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The law does not prescribe any particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner was informed in writing, he has no cause to complain. In De Conejero vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the furnishing of a copy of the disputed deed of sale to the redemptioner was equivalent to the giving of written notice required by law. In Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that as an exception to the general rule, co-heirs who lived with the purchasers in the same lot are deemed to have received actual notice of the sale. In this case, private respondent Pedro Miquiabas acted as middleman and was present when the vendor signed the deed of sale, making it obvious that he had actual knowledge of the sale. The only purpose of such written notice is to insure that all the co-owners shall be actually notified of the sale and to remove all doubt as to the perfection of the sale. When the co-owner was actually present and was even an active intermediary in the consummation of the sale of the property, he is and must be considered to have had actual notice of the sale, and a written notice is no longer necessary.

• Sufficiency of Verbal Notice to Pacita Miquiabas: As to private respondent Pacita Miquiabas, she was not present when the aforesaid sale of the property was undertaken, and there is no evidence that she was informed or that she ever learned about the sale soon thereafter. It was only in July 1984 that she was notified by petitioners of their intention to construct a building on a portion of the property in question which they bought. Within thirty days thereafter, on August 3, 1984, she filed a complaint for legal redemption in court and at the same time deposited the amount of P4,588.85 with the court as the purchase price. As the law requires a written notice of such sale to the co-owners, such actual notice to private respondent Pacita Miquiabas is not sufficient compliance with the requirement. Moreover, she filed the complaint for legal redemption within thirty days from the time she was verbally notified thereof by petitioners. Hence, her right to redeem the property as co-owner must be sustained.

• Actual Notice as Equivalent to Written Notice — A co-owner who was actually present and actively participated in the consummation of the sale of the property is deemed to have had actual notice of the sale, rendering the written notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code unnecessary. The only purpose of the written notice requirement is to insure that all co-owners shall be actually notified of the sale and to remove all doubt as to the perfection of the sale. When the co-owner was actually present and was even an active intermediary in the consummation of the sale, he is and must be considered to have had actual notice of the sale.

• Verbal Notice Insufficient for Absent Co-Owner — For a co-owner who was not present during the sale and received only verbal notice, such verbal notice is not sufficient compliance with the written notice requirement of Article 1623 of the Civil Code. However, the co-owner may still exercise the right of legal redemption within thirty days from the time of such verbal notice, as the filing of the complaint for legal redemption within that period satisfies the statutory requirement.

• "When as in this case the co-owner was actually present and was even an active intermediary in the consummation of the sale of the property he is and must be considered to have had actual notice of the sale. A written notice is no longer necessary." — This passage articulates the Court's ruling that actual presence and active participation in the sale obviates the need for written notice under Article 1623, establishing the exception to the written notice requirement.

• "As the law requires a written notice of such sale to the co-owners, such actual notice to private respondent Pacita Miquiabas is not sufficient compliance with the requirement. Moreover, said respondent filed the complaint for legal redemption within thirty (30) days from the time she was verbally notified thereof by petitioners. Hence, her right to redeem the property as co-owner must be sustained." — This passage states the Court's reasoning that verbal notice alone is insufficient under the law, but the co-owner's timely filing of the redemption complaint within thirty days from such verbal notice preserves her right to redeem.

• "The only purpose of such written notice is to insure that all the co-owners shall be actually notified of the sale and to remove all doubt as to the perfection of the sale." — This passage defines the purpose of the written notice requirement under Article 1623, explaining why actual notice can substitute for written notice in certain circumstances.

• Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526 (1962) — Cited as the case that deemed the method of written notice under Article 1623 as exclusive, establishing the general rule that written notice is required for legal redemption.
• Etcuban vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 507 (1983) — Cited for the proposition that the law does not prescribe any particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner.
• De Conejero vs. Court of Appeals, 16 SCRA 775 (1966) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that the furnishing of a copy of the disputed deed of sale to the redemptioner is equivalent to the giving of written notice required by law.
• Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 259 (1987) — Cited as an exception to the general rule, holding that co-heirs who lived with the purchasers in the same lot are deemed to have received actual notice of the sale.

• Article 1623, Civil Code — Provides that the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be, and that the deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The Court applied this provision to determine whether the co-owners had properly exercised their right of legal redemption within the thirty-day period.

Justices Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea concurred with the decision.