Disini vs. Republic of the Philippines

A private close associate of former President Marcos may be held liable to return ill-gotten wealth acquired through undue influence or relationship in connection with a government project, even if the commissions were paid by private contractors and without a finding that Marcos himself received or conspired in them; however, the exact amount of the ill-gotten wealth cannot be established by an unauthenticated private document or in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.

Herminio T. Disini was a close associate of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant project was awarded in 1976 to Westinghouse Electric Corporation as main contractor and Burns & Roe, Inc. as architect-engineer, and the plant remains inoperable. The 1986 Freedom Constitution and Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A created the Presidential Commission on Good Government and empowered it to recover ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, close associates, dummies, agents, or nominees. The Republic, through the PCGG, filed the present civil action to recover alleged commissions received by Disini in connection with the BNPP project.

Herminio T. Disini was a close personal and business associate of former President Ferdinand Marcos. His wife was the personal physician and cousin of Imelda Marcos. Disini owned or controlled Herdis Group, Inc., Asia Industries, Inc., and Technosphere Consultants Group, Inc., among other companies. The BNPP project was a nuclear power plant project awarded in 1976 to Westinghouse as main contractor and B&R as architect-engineer; it remains inoperable.

According to the Republic, Westinghouse sought Disini's influence because of his closeness to Marcos. Vergara, then President of AII, testified that after Westinghouse lost the Malaya II project, he and Westinghouse officials recruited Disini as SSR; Disini initially hesitated but agreed when told the project could cost as much as $600 million and yield about $30 million in commissions. Westinghouse agreed to pay Disini 3% of the total contract price, and B&R agreed to pay about 10% through TCI, a Herdis company, for Disini's influence in securing the BNPP project. Vergara arranged meetings between Disini and B&R; Jacob, President of Herdis, confirmed written agreements under which Herdis would receive 3% of the Westinghouse contract price and TCI about 10% of the B&R contract price. Neither Herdis nor TCI rendered material services aside from Disini's efforts to obtain the award.

Westinghouse and B&R made commission payments beginning 1976. According to Jacob, upon Disini's instructions, the commissions were not recorded in the books of Herdis or Technosphere; they were remitted to Rene Pasche in Switzerland for deposit in Swiss banks. After the U.S. Department of Justice investigation in 1978, Westinghouse remitted payments directly to Manila through Interbank accounts in which Disini and Jacob were authorized signatories. A substantial portion was transferred to overseas accounts in Switzerland under the names "965 Summa" and "735 Phil," with Pacencia Disini and Jacob as authorized signatories. Vergara testified that AII, despite its own SSR agreement with Westinghouse, did not receive commissions because they were paid or transferred to Herdis; Disini acquired AII for approximately $2.5 million because of its SSR agreement and his confidence that Westinghouse would be awarded the BNPP project.

On July 23, 1987, the Republic, through the PCGG, filed a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against Disini, former President Marcos, and Imelda Marcos, alleging that Disini received special concessions and substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R for the award and execution of the BNPP contract. The complaint was later amended to implead Rafael Sison, who was later dropped as a state witness along with Rodolfo Jacob. Disini was declared in default after summons remained unserved and summons by publication was completed; the default order was sustained by the Supreme Court in a July 5, 2010 Decision that became final and executory on November 18, 2010. Only the Republic presented evidence ex parte.

The Republic presented witnesses including Manahan, Vergara, Jacob, and Sison, and documentary evidence consisting largely of photocopies. The Sandiganbayan found that Disini was a close personal and business associate of Marcos based on his appearances in Malacañang, phone calls from Marcos, aide memoires, and requests for loan approvals; that Disini served as SSR of Westinghouse and B&R in exchange for substantial commissions; that he used his association with Marcos to ensure the award of the BNPP project to Westinghouse and B&R; and that he received the commissions. The Sandiganbayan relied on Exhibit E-9, a one-page tabulation of commissions attached to Manahan's affidavit, to arrive at $50,562,500.00, but gave no probative value to documentary evidence on the Swiss bank accounts because they were mere photocopies, unauthenticated, and not properly translated. It found no evidence that former President Marcos and Imelda received any commissions.

• Authentication of Exhibit E-9: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule on authentication of documents under Section 20 of Rule 132 when it admitted and relied on Exhibit E-9, a private document attached to Manahan's affidavit; no one authenticated, signed, or identified it, and Manahan allegedly disowned it in his deposition in Criminal Case Nos. 28001-02. He maintained that the Sandiganbayan should not have ignored evidence from a related case, as doing so violated fairness and denied a defaulting party due process.
• No Civil Law Cause of Action: Petitioner maintained that the Republic had no civil law cause of action because there was no contract or quasi-contract violated; he was never a public official and could not be liable for breach of public trust; no evidence showed the commissions were part of the purchase price paid by the Republic; and the NJDC and ICA found no bribery or agency relationship. He argued that he could not be liable for breach of trust without a public officer also held liable as conspirator, and that EO Nos. 1, 2, and 14-A merely authorized the PCGG and vested jurisdiction but did not create a civil cause of action.
• Existence of Westinghouse and B&R Contracts: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it concluded that the Westinghouse contract existed even though it was never produced, presented, or seen by any witness; the Republic could not relitigate the validity of the contracts because the ICA and NJDC decisions found no illegalities in their procurement, award, negotiation, and execution.
• Receipt and Amount of Commissions: Petitioner averred that the Sandiganbayan violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it concluded that he received $50,562,500.00 despite lack of proof; Jacob did not specifically quantify the total commissions; no bank documents showed remittances to Interbank or transfers to Switzerland; and the Sandiganbayan failed to explicitly state the facts upon which its conclusion was based.
• Best Evidence and Witnesses: Petitioner contended that the Republic did not offer the Westinghouse and B&R contracts, which were the best evidence of the amount of commissions; the witnesses had no personal knowledge of the contracts, as Vergara was not present at the negotiation of the final draft and signing, and Jacob did not categorically testify that the amounts he remitted pertained to commissions from particular transactions.
• Liberal Application of Rules: Petitioner opined that procedural rules should be liberally applied and that the petition should be given due course because it is of transcendental importance.

• Valid Cause of Action: Respondent argued that the complaint for recovery of ill-gotten wealth was founded on EO Nos. 1, 2, and 14-A; the PCGG was tasked to recover ill-gotten wealth amassed by Marcos, his close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees; and under EO No. 14-A, the PCGG, with the assistance of the OSG and other agencies, is empowered to file and prosecute all ill-gotten wealth cases investigated under EO Nos. 1 and 2.
• Grave Abuse of Right and Unjust Enrichment: Respondent maintained that even if Disini was not a public official or fiduciary agent, his receipt of substantial commissions by reason of his influence and close relationship with Marcos constituted grave abuse of right and power, resulting in unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Republic and the Filipino people.
• Exhibit E-9: Respondent argued that the Sandiganbayan correctly relied on Exhibit E-9 because Manahan attested to its veracity; the document is a one-page tabulation of commissions on Disini's stationery, part of Manahan's affidavit; although the amount is not expressly stated, adding Items I to IV yields $50,562,500.00; and Disini, being in default, was barred from presenting Manahan's alleged disavowal in Criminal Case Nos. 28001-02.
• Existence and Receipt: Respondent argued that the existence of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and Disini's receipt of commissions were satisfactorily established by the testimonies of Jacob, Manahan, and Vergara; their testimonies were credible because of their close business relationship with Disini; and Disini was estopped from questioning the existence of the contracts because he invoked the NJDC and ICA decisions, thereby admitting their existence.
• Timeliness: Respondent alleged that the petition should be dismissed as filed out of time; Disini received a copy of the October 24, 2012 Resolution on November 7, 2012 and had only 15 days to file a petition for review on certiorari, but filed it more than two months later, making it an afterthought.

• Cause of Action: Whether the Republic, through the PCGG and the OSG, has a valid cause of action against Disini, a private individual and alleged close associate of President Marcos, for recovery of ill-gotten wealth consisting of commissions from Westinghouse and B&R relative to the BNPP project.
• Existence of Contracts and Commission Agreements: Whether the Sandiganbayan violated the Best Evidence Rule and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in concluding that the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and their corresponding commission agreements existed despite non-presentation of the original contracts.
• Receipt of Commissions: Whether the Republic proved by preponderance of evidence that Disini received substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R in connection with the BNPP project.
• Authentication and Amount (Exhibit E-9): Whether the Sandiganbayan violated the rule on authentication of private documents and the Best Evidence Rule in admitting and relying on Exhibit E-9 to establish the amount of $50,562,500.00.
• Damages: Whether the Republic is entitled to actual, moral, nominal, temperate, and exemplary damages, and if so, in what amounts, given the failure to prove the exact amount of commissions.

• Cause of Action: Yes. EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, rooted in the Freedom Constitution, authorize the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth from Marcos's close associates even if private and even absent Marcos's liability.
• Existence of Contracts and Commission Agreements: Yes, sufficiently established. The Best Evidence Rule is not applicable because the testimonies proved existence and execution, not contents; the affidavits of Vergara and Jacob proved due execution.
• Receipt of Commissions: Yes. Preponderance of evidence through the credible, categorical, and corroborated testimonies of Vergara and Jacob established receipt of substantial commissions, despite the lack of documentary proof.
• Authentication and Amount (Exhibit E-9): No. Exhibit E-9 was an unauthenticated private document and a mere photocopy; it was inadmissible under Rule 132, Section 20 and the Best Evidence Rule and cannot support $50,562,500.00. The order to reconvey that amount is deleted.
• Damages: Partly yes. Actual, moral, and nominal damages were not awarded; temperate damages of P1,000,000,000.00 and exemplary damages of P1,000,000.00 were awarded due to proven pecuniary loss but uncertain amount, with legal interest at 6% per annum from finality.

• Cause of Action: The ruling rests on the Freedom Constitution and EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A. Section 1(d) of the Freedom Constitution mandated the President to continue exercising legislative power and to enact measures for the recovery of ill-gotten properties amassed by leaders and supporters of the previous regime. EO No. 1 created the PCGG to assist in recovering all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including business enterprises owned or controlled by them, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of public office and/or using powers, authority, influence, connections, or relationship. EO No. 2 froze assets and required disclosure. EO No. 14 directed the PCGG to file civil or criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan. EO No. 14-A allowed civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 or for restitution, reparation, or indemnification under the Civil Code to proceed independently of criminal proceedings and to be proved by preponderance of evidence. The Amended Complaint was one for recovery of ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG Rules define ill-gotten wealth to include receipt, directly or indirectly, of any commission from any person or entity in connection with any government contract or project, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, or influence for personal gain. Jurisprudence defines ill-gotten wealth as assets originating from the government and taken by Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means. Although the commissions were paid by private corporations Westinghouse and B&R, ill-gotten wealth includes property derived indirectly from government funds or properties through the use of power, influence, or relationship resulting in unjust enrichment and grave damage to the people. Disini's private status is not a defense; EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A allow recovery from close associates, dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, and business associates whether or not Marcos is also held liable.
• Existence of Contracts and Commission Agreements: The Court acknowledged that a Rule 45 petition generally raises only questions of law and that the issues on authenticity, existence of contracts, and receipt of commissions are factual. However, exceptions apply, including when findings are grounded on speculation, misappreciation of facts, or conclusions without citation of specific evidence. The Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 requires the original document when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, subject to exceptions. But when evidence concerns external facts such as existence, execution, or delivery of a writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked and secondary evidence may be admitted. The Republic sufficiently proved the existence and execution of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and their corresponding commission agreements through the testimonies and affidavits of Vergara and Jacob. Vergara narrated how Disini was recruited as Westinghouse's SSR, how Westinghouse agreed to pay 3% of the total contract price, how B&R agreed to pay commissions through TCI, and how Disini used his influence with Marcos to secure the award. Jacob corroborated the written agreements: Herdis would receive 3% of the Westinghouse contract price; TCI would receive about 10% of the B&R contract price; and neither Herdis nor TCI rendered material services aside from Disini's efforts. Thus, the existence of the contracts and commission agreements was duly proved without needing to prove their contents.
• Receipt of Commissions: The Republic had the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence that Disini received the commissions. Although Disini was in default and presented no evidence, the Republic still had to prove its case. Preponderance of evidence means the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to that of the other; it is the greater weight of credible evidence. The testimonies and affidavits of Vergara and Jacob were categorical, credible, and corroborative. Vergara testified that Disini received millions of dollars in commissions from Westinghouse and B&R, that commissions began to accrue after the Westinghouse-NPC contract was signed in February 1976, that AII did not receive its commissions because they were paid or transferred to Herdis, and that Disini acquired AII because of its SSR agreement and his confidence in securing the BNPP project. Jacob, as President of Herdis, testified that he was responsible for invoicing and arranging payments, that commissions beginning 1976 were not recorded in Herdis's books, that they were remitted to Rene Pasche in Switzerland, and later to Interbank accounts where Disini and Jacob were signatories, and that a substantial portion was transferred to Swiss accounts "965 Summa" and "735 Phil" with Pacencia Disini and Jacob as authorized signatories. The Sandiganbayan correctly gave no probative value to the photocopied foreign bank documents, but the testimonial evidence remained sufficient. The lack of a definite amount did not negate the fact of receipt. Yuchengco vs. Sandiganbayan teaches that credible, categorical, and corroborated testimonial evidence may be given credence even without documentary proof, though it does not make testimonial evidence superior to documentary evidence. Republic vs. Spouses Gimenez likewise allows testimonial evidence and exhibits offered as part of witnesses' testimonies to be considered. Thus, receipt of substantial commissions was proved by preponderance.
• Authentication and Amount (Exhibit E-9): The exact amount of $50,562,500.00 was not proved. To establish the amount, the best evidence would be the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and their commission agreements, but the Republic offered no justification for not presenting them. Exhibit E-9, a certified xerox copy of a one-page tabulation attached to Manahan's affidavit, was a private document. Under Rule 132, Section 20, a private document offered as authentic must have its due execution and authenticity proved by anyone who saw it executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Manahan only authenticated his affidavit, not Exhibit E-9; his statement that it was a one-page tabulation typed on Disini's stationery did not authenticate it. The Sandiganbayan itself admitted Exhibit E-9 only as part of Manahan's testimony, and a document admitted as part of a witness's testimony does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein; its probative force depends on the credibility of the testimony. Yet the Sandiganbayan relied on Exhibit E-9 to compute the amount by adding Items I to IV. Exhibit E-9 was vague, lacked a date and author, used unexplained acronyms, omitted a "1/3 Share" of $2.67, and was inconsistent with the testimony that Westinghouse would pay 5% of a $600 million project, which would be $30 million, not the $19,562,500 shown as "W Commission." The Republic also failed to explain why Exhibit E-9 fell under any exception to the Best Evidence Rule. Thus, Exhibit E-9 was inadmissible and had no probative value for the amount. Disini could not rely on Manahan's deposition in Criminal Case Nos. 28001-02 because, as a party in default, he had lost the right to present evidence; his appeal was limited to grounds such as failure to prove material allegations, decision contrary to law, or excessive/different judgment. The Court nevertheless held that a defaulting party's right must be protected and that judgment must rest on competent evidence, which is why the reliance on Exhibit E-9 was overturned.
• Damages: Although the exact amount of commissions was not proved, the Republic's right to recover was upheld under the principle of unjust enrichment. Article 22 of the Civil Code requires a person who acquires something at the expense of another without just or legal ground to return it. Disini unjustly enriched himself by receiving substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R for acting as SSR and using his influence with Marcos, without rendering any service for the benefit of the BNPP project. Actual damages, however, must be supported by evidence and cannot be left to the court's discretion; the Republic failed to prove the definite amount of pecuniary loss. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be determined with certainty. Considering the public interest, the inoperable BNPP, the public funds invested, the length of litigation, and the inflation and purchasing power of the peso, the Court awarded P1,000,000,000.00 as temperate damages. With temperate damages granted, exemplary damages may be imposed under Article 2229; they are not recoverable as a matter of right and are designed to deter socially deleterious conduct. The Court awarded P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages. Nominal damages were not awarded because they are incompatible with temperate damages, and moral damages were not proved. The monetary awards earn legal interest at 6% per annum from finality until full satisfaction.

• Ill-gotten wealth — Defined under the PCGG Rules and jurisprudence as any asset, property, business enterprise, or material possession acquired by persons within EO Nos. 1 and 2, directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, or business associates, by means such as misappropriation of public funds, receipt of commissions in connection with a government contract or project, or taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, or influence for personal gain. Jurisprudence requires that it (a) originated from the government and (b) was taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means. The Court applied this to hold that commissions from Westinghouse and B&R in connection with the BNPP project, though paid by private corporations, were ill-gotten wealth because they were derived indirectly from government funds through Disini's undue influence and close association with Marcos.
• Recovery of ill-gotten wealth from private close associates — EO Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A authorize the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth from former President Marcos's immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates, notwithstanding their private status. Recovery may be had from dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, and business associates whether or not Marcos is also found liable. The Court applied this to reject Disini's argument that he could not be liable because he was not a public officer and no conspiracy with Marcos was established.
• Best Evidence Rule — Under Section 3, Rule 130, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original, subject to exceptions. The rule does not apply when the evidence concerns external facts such as the existence, execution, or delivery of a writing, without reference to its terms. The Court applied this to admit testimonial evidence proving the existence and execution of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and commission agreements, but not to prove the amount of commissions, which required the contents of the contracts and Exhibit E-9.
• Authentication of private documents — Under Rule 132, Section 20, before a private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved by anyone who saw it executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. The Court applied this to hold Exhibit E-9 inadmissible because Manahan did not authenticate it; his mere description of it as a tabulation on Disini's stationery was insufficient.
• Admissibility vs. probative value — Admissibility refers to whether evidence is to be considered at all; probative value refers to whether admitted evidence proves an issue. A document admitted as part of a witness's testimony does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein and has no independent status; its probative force depends on the credibility of the testimony. The Court applied this to hold that even if Exhibit E-9 was admitted as part of Manahan's testimony, it could not prove the amount of commissions.
• Party in default — A party in default loses the right to present evidence, control the proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. It retains the right to appeal, but the grounds are limited to failure of the plaintiff to prove material allegations, the decision being contrary to law, and the judgment being excessive or different in kind from that prayed for. The court must still protect the defaulting party's right by rendering judgment in accordance with the evidence required by law and not relying on incompetent evidence. The Court applied this to bar Disini from invoking Manahan's deposition and the foreign decisions, while still rejecting Exhibit E-9 as incompetent.
• Preponderance of evidence — In civil cases, the party with the burden of proof must establish its case by a preponderance of evidence, determined by the court considering all facts and circumstances, the witnesses' manner of testifying, intelligence, means and opportunity of knowing the facts, nature of the facts, probability or improbability of testimony, interest, and personal credibility. The Court applied this to hold that the testimonies of Vergara and Jacob sufficiently proved Disini's receipt of substantial commissions despite the absence of documentary proof.
• Unjust enrichment — Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, every person who through an act or performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of another without just or legal ground shall return the same. The Court applied this to uphold the Republic's right to recover the commissions, even though the exact amount was not proved.
• Temperate damages — Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be determined with certainty. The Court applied this to award P1,000,000,000.00 because the Republic proved pecuniary loss from Disini's ill-gotten wealth but not its exact amount.
• Exemplary damages — Under Articles 2229 and 2233 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right and are awarded by way of example or correction for the public good when moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages are granted. The Court applied this to award P1,000,000.00 as a deterrent against socially deleterious conduct.

• "In sum, in order to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, they must have: (a) originated from the government; and (b) been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means." — This states the two requisites of ill-gotten wealth and anchors the Court's holding that the commissions, though paid by private contractors, were recoverable because they were indirectly derived from government resources through Disini's undue influence.
• "However, when the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked." — This is the controlling exception that allowed the testimonies of Vergara and Jacob to prove the existence and execution of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and commission agreements despite non-presentation of the originals.
• "A document admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein. It merely forms part of the testimony of the witness and does not have an independent status. Its probative force depends entirely on the credibility of the testimony of which it is a part of." — This defines the limited evidentiary status of Exhibit E-9 and explains why the Sandiganbayan erred in relying on it to establish the amount of $50,562,500.00.
• "Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of: the case, be determined with certainty." — This is the canonical formulation of temperate damages applied to award P1,000,000,000.00 despite the failure to prove the exact amount of commissions.

• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 663 Phil. 212 (2011) — Defined ill-gotten wealth as the "vast resources of the government" amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates; only the part originating from government resources is included.
• Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 234 Phil. 180 (1987) — Defined ill-gotten wealth as property acquired through improper or illegal use or conversion of government funds or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment.
• Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Tan, 564 Phil. 426 (2007) — Cited the same definition of ill-gotten wealth and applied it to the recovery of assets from Marcos associates.
• Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 360 Phil. 133 (1998) — Stated the definition of ill-gotten wealth and the requisites that it originate from the government and be taken by Marcos, his family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means.
• Yuchengco vs. Sandiganbayan, 515 Phil. 1 (2006) — Held that credible, categorical, and corroborated testimonial evidence may be given credence even without documentary proof in ill-gotten wealth cases; distinguished because the amount of commissions remained contested and required documentary proof.
• Republic vs. Spouses Gimenez, 776 Phil. 233 (2016) — Held that the court may consider testimonial evidence and exhibits offered as part of the witnesses' testimonies in an action for acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
• Patula vs. People, 685 Phil. 376 (2012) — Explained the classification of documents as public or private and held that private documents require authentication before admission.
• Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008) — Held that a document admitted as part of a witness's testimony does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.
• Otero vs. Tan, 692 Phil. 714 (2012) — Held that a party in default loses the right to present evidence and control the proceedings, but the court must still render judgment in accordance with the evidence required by law and not rely on incompetent evidence.
• Araneta vs. Bank of America, 148-B Phil. 124 (1971) — Explained temperate damages under Article 2224 as damages recoverable when pecuniary loss is shown but its amount cannot be determined with certainty.
• Seven Brothers Shipping Corp. vs. DMC-Construction Resources, Inc., 748 Phil. 692 (2014) — Enumerated cases where temperate damages were awarded despite lack of definite proof of the amount of loss.
• University of the Philippines vs. PHILAB Industries, Inc., 489 Phil. 693 (2004) — Held that unjust enrichment is a prerequisite for restitution and not itself a theory of reconveyance.
• Reyes vs. Lim, 456 Phil. 1 (2003) — Applied equity jurisdiction to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution where the law is silent or insufficient.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Applied the legal interest rate of 6% per annum on monetary awards from finality until satisfaction.

• Section 1(d), 1986 Provisional (Freedom) Constitution — Mandated the President to continue exercising legislative power and to enact measures for the recovery of ill-gotten properties amassed by leaders and supporters of the previous regime; this was the constitutional basis for EO No. 1 and the PCGG's mandate.
• Executive Order No. 1 (1986) — Created the PCGG and tasked it to assist in recovering all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates, whether in the Philippines or abroad, including business enterprises owned or controlled by them, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of public office or using powers, authority, influence, connections, or relationship.
• Executive Order No. 2 (1986) — Froze assets and properties in which former President Marcos, his wife, close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees had any interest; prohibited transfers, conveyances, encumbrances, concealment, or dissipation; and required disclosure by nominees, agents, or trustees.
• Executive Order No. 14 (1986) — Directed the PCGG to file all civil or criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan to recover assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Marcos, his wife, close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees.
• Executive Order No. 14-A (1986) — Provided that civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification under the Civil Code may proceed independently of criminal proceedings and may be proved by preponderance of evidence.
• Section 1(A), PCGG Rules and Regulations Implementing Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2 — Defined ill-gotten wealth to include property acquired through receipt, directly or indirectly, of any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback, or other pecuniary benefit from any person or entity in connection with any government contract or project, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, or influence for personal gain.
• Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Invoked by petitioner as requiring the Sandiganbayan to state clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which its conclusions on the existence of the Westinghouse contract and receipt of $50,562,500.00 were based.
• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law; the Court applied this general rule but recognized exceptions because the factual findings were based on misappreciation and conclusions without citation of specific evidence.
• Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court — States the Best Evidence Rule: when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original, subject to exceptions. The Court applied it to exclude Exhibit E-9 as proof of the amount of commissions and to allow testimonial evidence only for the existence and execution of the contracts.
• Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Requires proof of due execution and authenticity of a private document by anyone who saw it executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. The Court applied it to hold Exhibit E-9 unauthenticated.
• Section 19, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Classifies documents as public or private; public documents are self-authenticating, while private documents require authentication. The Court used this to classify Exhibit E-9 as a private document.
• Section 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Defines preponderance of evidence and the factors the court may consider in determining where the superior weight of evidence lies. The Court applied it to uphold the testimonial evidence of Vergara and Jacob.
• Article 22, Civil Code — Provides that every person who acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of another without just or legal ground shall return the same. The Court applied it to uphold the Republic's right to recover the commissions under unjust enrichment.
• Article 2224, Civil Code — Allows temperate or moderate damages when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be determined with certainty. The Court applied it to award P1,000,000,000.00.
• Article 2216, Civil Code — Provides that no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary for moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary damages, and the assessment is left to the court's discretion. The Court cited it in assessing temperate damages.
• Article 2229, Civil Code — Provides for exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good. The Court applied it to award P1,000,000.00.
• Article 2233, Civil Code — States that exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. The Court cited it in awarding exemplary damages only because temperate damages were granted.
• Article 9, Civil Code — Mandates courts to make a ruling despite silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws; cited in Reyes vs. Lim to justify equity jurisdiction preventing unjust enrichment.

Gesmundo, C.J., took no part. Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Carandang, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, M. V., Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario, and Lopez, J.Y., JJ., concurred. Lazaro-Javier, J., took no part.