Director of Lands vs. Abaja, et al.

The ten-year period under Act No. 4043 is counted from the date the cadastral judicial proceedings were instituted, not from the date the decision declaring the land public was rendered. Thus, claimants cannot invoke Act No. 4043 where the cadastral proceedings were instituted more than ten years before its effectivity.

The Director of Lands and the claimants Roman de Arruza and Mario Luzuriaga are on opposite sides of a cadastral adjudication over land in Ilog, Occidental Negros. The cadastral system under Act No. 2259 allowed the Director of Lands to ask the courts to settle and adjudicate titles to lots. Act No. 4043, which took effect in 1933, allowed claims to parcels that had been declared public land by judicial decisions, and it was preceded by Act No. 3059 (1923) and Act No. 3672 (1930) and followed by Act No. 4195 (1934). The dispute turns on how the period fixed by Act No. 4043 is computed.

The facts are undisputed. On July 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of Lands filed in the CFI of Occidental Negros a petition praying that the titles to a tract of land containing about 23,443,355 square meters, divided into lots and situated in the municipality of Ilog, Occidental Negros, be settled and adjudicated under Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act. The case was docketed as Cadastral Case No. 22, G.L.R.O. Record No. 174. After due hearing, the lower court, in a decision dated August 15, 1925, declared Lot No. 712, comprising about 1,322 square meters, public land because no one appeared to claim it.

On January 25, 1934, Roman de Arruza and Mario Luzuriaga, through their attorney, filed a motion in the same court praying that the decision be set aside as to Lot No. 712, that a new trial be granted, and that they be allowed to present their claim under Act No. 4043. On February 2, 1934, the provincial fiscal of Occidental Negros, on behalf of the government, filed an opposition contending that the CFI had no jurisdiction to reopen the case as to Lot No. 712 because the motion was not filed within the time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043.

On April 20, 1934, the judge denied the motion. The order interpreted Act No. 4043 and held that the opposition was well founded. It computed that from June 12, 1919, when the cadastral proceedings were initiated, to February 18, 1933, when Act No. 4043 entered into force, thirteen years, eight months, and six days had elapsed; therefore, persons claiming property within the cadastral case could no longer avail themselves of Act No. 4043 to ask for reopening.

The appellants assigned three errors, all of which raised one legal question: whether the ten-year period mentioned in Act No. 4043 should be counted from the date the decision was rendered or from the date judicial proceedings were instituted in the cadastral case.

• Computation of the Ten-Year Period: Appellants Roman de Arruza and Mario Luzuriaga argued that the ten-year period in Act No. 4043 should be counted from the date the decision was rendered, not from the date the cadastral judicial proceedings were instituted.
• Executive Construction: Appellants contended that Executive Proclamation No. 549’s reference to the rendition of judicial decisions as the starting point amounted to a contemporaneous construction by the Executive Department entitled to great weight and respect.

• Jurisdiction and Time Limit: The provincial fiscal, for the government, countered that the CFI had no jurisdiction to reopen the case as to Lot No. 712 because the motion was not filed within the time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043.

• Computation of Period under Act No. 4043: Whether the ten-year period mentioned in Act No. 4043 should be counted from the date the decision was rendered or from the date judicial proceedings were instituted in the cadastral case.

• Computation of Period under Act No. 4043: From the institution of the cadastral judicial proceedings, not from the rendition of the decision. The repeated reference in Act No. 4043 and related statutes to judicial proceedings instituted controls, so the motion to reopen was barred.

• Computation of Period under Act No. 4043: The SC began from the rule that legislative intent may be gathered from prior laws and the legislative history of the statute. Act No. 4043 was one of four statutes—Acts Nos. 3059, 3672, 4043, and 4195—that allowed claims to parcels declared public land. Although the titles of Acts Nos. 4043 and 4195 referred to “judicial decisions rendered,” the bodies of all four Acts referred to parcels that “have been, or are about to be, declared land of public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted.” The discrepancy was explained by Act No. 4043’s legislative history: it began as House Bill No. 949, whose title and body referred to judicial decisions, but the Legislature ultimately adopted the language of Acts Nos. 3059 and 3672 referring to the institution of judicial proceedings, without changing the title. The repeated and consistent reference to the institution of judicial proceedings as the starting point showed the Legislature’s intent to count the period from that date. The SC also held that counting from the decision would make the phrase “are about to be declared land of public domain” meaningless and lead to an absurdity. Executive Proclamation No. 549 did not amount to a contemporaneous construction because it merely copied the title of the statute. The SC further held that Act No. 4195, which repealed Act No. 4043, could not be availed of because the cadastral proceedings were instituted on June 12, 1919, more than fifteen years before the approval of Act No. 4195; nevertheless, since the other provisions of the Act appeared complied with—actual possession at the time of survey, justifiable reason for failure to file the claim, land not yet alienated or disposed of by the Government, and payment of taxes, interests, and penalties—the claimants could bring the matter to the proper administrative authorities. The SC did not pass upon the other questions raised by counsel.

• Statutory Construction — Legislative Intent from Prior Laws and History — When a statute’s title and body diverge, legislative intent may be ascertained from prior laws on the same subject and the statute’s legislative history. The SC used Acts Nos. 3059, 3672, and 4195 and the history of House Bill No. 949 to conclude that Act No. 4043 counted the ten-year period from the institution of judicial proceedings.
• Act No. 4043 — Computation of the Ten-Year Period — The ten-year period under Act No. 4043 is counted from the date the cadastral judicial proceedings were instituted, not from the date the decision declaring the land public was rendered. Because the proceedings in this case were instituted more than ten years before Act No. 4043 took effect, the claimants could not reopen Lot No. 712 under that Act.
• Contemporaneous Construction — An executive proclamation that merely copies the title of a statute does not amount to a contemporaneous construction entitled to great weight. Executive Proclamation No. 549 did not alter the statutory body’s clear reference to the institution of judicial proceedings.
• Absurdity as an Aid in Construction — A statutory interpretation that leads to an absurdity must be rejected. Counting the period from the decision would make the phrase “are about to be declared land of public domain” meaningless.
• Administrative Relief under Act No. 4195 — Although Act No. 4195 repealed Act No. 4043 and could not be availed of because the cadastral proceedings were instituted more than fifteen years before its approval, the SC noted that claimants may bring the matter to the proper administrative authorities if (1) at the time of the survey they were in actual possession of the parcel; (2) for some justifiable reason they were unable to file their claim in the proper court during the period established by law; (3) the land has not yet been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government; and (4) all taxes, interests, and penalties have been paid.

• "The fact that in all the four Acts so far passed by the Philippine Legislature on the subject there has been a repeated and consistent reference to the institution of judicial proceedings as the starting point in the computation of the period of ten years (or fifteen years as regards Act No. 4195) therein laid down is, in our opinion, significant." — The SC relied on this consistent legislative pattern to hold that the period runs from the institution of the proceedings.
• "The fact that the construction placed upon the statute by the appellants would lead to an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it" — The SC rejected counting from the decision because it would render the phrase “are about to be declared land of public domain” meaningless.
• "All that the proclamation did was to copy the title of the statute to which it referred." — The SC dismissed the claim that Executive Proclamation No. 549 was a contemporaneous construction of Act No. 4043.
• "The more recent Act No. 4195 repeals act No. 4043. But the provisions of Said Act No. 4195 can not be availed of by the claimants and the appellants herein, because the cadastral proceedings in question were instituted on June 12, 1919, or more than fifteen years before the approval of that Act." — The SC held that Act No. 4195 could not be invoked by the appellants.

• Loewenstein vs. Page, 16 Phil. 84 (1910) — Cited for the rule that legislative intent may be determined from prior laws and the legislative history of the statute.
• U.S. vs. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 416 (1915) — Cited to the same rule on legislative intent.
• Go Chioco vs. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923) — Cited to the same rule.
• Portillo vs. Salvani, 54 Phil. 543 (1930) — Cited to the same rule.
• Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720 (1903) — Cited for the principle that courts must administer the law as they find it, without regard to consequences.
• In re Allen, 2 Phil. 630 (1903) — Cited for rejecting a statutory construction that leads to an absurdity.
• City of Manila vs. Lyric Music House, 62 Phil. 125 (1935) — Cited to the same absurdity principle.
• U.S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1 (1912) — Cited for the rule that the wisdom or expediency of a statute is not for the courts to determine.

• Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act) — The Assistant Director of Lands filed the cadastral petition under this Act to settle and adjudicate titles to lots in Ilog, Occidental Negros.
• Act No. 4043 — Authorized claims to parcels declared public land by judicial decisions; the SC held its ten-year period runs from the institution of judicial proceedings, so the appellants’ 1934 motion was barred.
• Act No. 3059 — Prior statute on claims to parcels declared public land; its body referred to judicial proceedings instituted and was used to show the legislative intent behind Act No. 4043.
• Act No. 3672 — Prior statute on the same subject; its body referred to judicial proceedings instituted and was used for the same purpose.
• Act No. 4195 — Later statute that repealed Act No. 4043; its fifteen-year period could not be availed of because the cadastral proceedings were instituted more than fifteen years before its approval.
• Section 288, Code of Civil Procedure — Cited for the duty to give effect to the Legislature’s intention as disclosed by the statute.
• Executive Proclamation No. 549 — Invoked by the appellants as a contemporaneous construction; the SC held it merely copied the title of Act No. 4043 and did not control the computation.