Dionisio vs. Ortiz

A party seeking a preliminary mandatory injunction must show a clear right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ, and a claimed easement of right of way does not supply the clear right where the right of way has expired and the claimant's isolation resulted from its own acts. Compliance with the writ does not render moot a certiorari petition that challenges the validity of the order granting it.

Petitioners Adriana Dionisio, et al. and private respondents Pablo Tan Gonzaga, et al. are neighboring co-owners of lots in the Sitio of Kangkong, District of Balintawak, Quezon City. Under an agreement between the lot owners and the Quezon City Industrial Estates Association (QCIEA), a right of way over Howmart Road, a private road traversing petitioners' lots, was granted to QCIEA members in return for compensation that QCIEA paid to petitioners.

Petitioners' lots are contiguous to one another, and respondents own lots that adjoin petitioners'. Respondents' Lot 272-B, with an area of 1,427 square meters, was later subdivided into two lots, and Lot 272-A was assigned to Chua Lee and Chua Bun Tong under a memorandum agreement executed between them. Respondents also own a 914-square-meter lot at the upper portion of Lot 272-B.

Respondents reached Howmart Road through a gate in their 914-square-meter lot and another gate in Lot 272-A. After the subdivision of Lot 272, respondents opened a new gate in Lot 272-B that also fronts Howmart Road, and that new gate is the one in dispute. Respondents maintained that the subdivision forced them to open it. The SC, reviewing the records, found that a wall had been constructed between the two lots, leaving only a small passageway between them, and attributed that construction to respondents.

On October 5, 1989, under the instructions of Maxima Dionisio, certain persons dug four holes in a parallel line and afterwards set up steel posts welded to a steel plate in front of respondents' newly constructed gate, despite respondents' protests. Petitioners claim that the gate, which they describe as surreptitiously constructed, opened directly into Maxima Dionisio's house and exposed them to air and noise pollution from respondents' delivery trucks and service vehicles. On November 7, 1989, respondents filed a civil action for damages against petitioners, and their complaint sought the immediate issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering petitioners to remove the barricade in front of the iron gate.

Respondents' claim to passage rested on the QCIEA arrangement. According to respondents, as bona fide QCIEA members they could use Howmart Road to reach EDSA under a standing oral contract of easement of right of way between petitioners and QCIEA, and that contract still subsisted after its alleged expiration in December 1988, as evidenced by two letters requesting an increase in compensation. Those letters were signed by Maxima Dionisio and by Atty. Telesforo Poblete, counsel for the Dionisio family, and addressed to QCIEA. On that basis, respondents contended that petitioners had no right to place the barricade in front of their gate.

On January 8, 1990, Judge Rodolfo Ortiz of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, granted the prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The order directed petitioners to remove the barricade within 24 hours of receiving the writ, and if they failed, it allowed respondents to remove the barricade at petitioners' expense upon posting a ₱20,000 bond within five days. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the order. Fifteen days later, after failing to obtain a temporary restraining order from the CA enjoining the RTC from implementing its order, petitioners removed the barricade in front of respondents' gate.

The records, as the SC read them, show that respondents have two gates giving direct access to EDSA, a northern gate opening directly onto EDSA and a southern gate along Howmart Road. They also show that petitioners and the other lot owners had earlier prohibited QCIEA members from opening new gates, and that the right of way over Howmart Road expired in December 1988, with the owners tolerating continued use while the terms were renegotiated. The RTC order had stated that respondents showed a clear right to the writ, a statement the SC later characterized as inaccurate.

• Mootness: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in holding that their compliance with the January 8, 1990 order rendered the certiorari petition moot and academic, because the CA could still grant practical relief by recalling or lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
• Preemption by the Writ: Petitioners argued that the issuance of the writ and their compliance with it should not preempt resolution of the validity of the January 8, 1990 order granting the writ.
• Basis for the Barricade: Petitioners maintained that the gate opened directly into Maxima Dionisio's house, exposing them to air and noise pollution from respondents' delivery trucks and service vehicles.

• Easement by Oral Contract: Respondents countered that, as bona fide QCIEA members, they had every right to use Howmart Road as a passageway to EDSA under a standing oral contract of easement of right of way between petitioners and QCIEA, and that the contract subsisted despite its alleged expiration in December 1988, as evidenced by two letters requesting increased compensation.
• Subdivision as Cause of the New Gate: Respondents maintained that the subdivision of Lot 272 forced them to open the new gate in Lot 272-B, so that they could reach Howmart Road.

• Easement of Right of Way: Whether the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road.
• Entitlement to the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction: Whether the private respondents established the requisites for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
• Mootness: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the certiorari petition as moot and academic because petitioners complied with the RTC order.

• Easement of Right of Way: No. The right of way over Howmart Road expired in December 1988, and under Article 649 of the Civil Code an easement is not compulsory where the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
• Entitlement to the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction: No. The writ requires a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage, and respondents showed neither.
• Mootness: No. Compliance with the writ did not moot the certiorari petition, because the validity of the order was the very subject of that petition and the CA retained power to recall or lift the writ.

• Easement of Right of Way: Article 649 of the Civil Code entitles the owner of an immovable surrounded by other immovables, without adequate outlet to a public highway, to demand a right of way upon payment of indemnity, but its final paragraph provides that the easement is not compulsory where the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. The right of way over Howmart Road was granted to QCIEA members for compensation and, according to the records, expired in December 1988. QCIEA members' continued use after that date rested on the owners' mere tolerance while the terms were renegotiated, as the two letters requesting higher compensation show. Absent an agreement of the parties on consideration, among other terms, no easement contract was validly entered into, citing Robleza vs. Court of Appeals. "Thus, the private respondents' claim of an easement of right of way over Howmart Road has no legal or factual basis." The SC also held that respondents could not assert a right of way where their own voluntary act caused the isolation of their property. Petitioners and other lot owners had previously prohibited QCIEA members from opening new gates, and the claim that the subdivision forced the new gate was untenable. The wall between the two lots, which left only a small passageway, is an act imputable to respondents and precludes the assertion of a right of way. Convenience alone does not support a right of way, as Ramos, Sr. vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc. holds, and the new gate would be convenient to respondents but mere convenience is not enough.

• Entitlement to the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction: A party seeking an injunctive writ must show an unquestionable right over the premises that has been violated, and a party applying for a preliminary injunction must establish three requisites, citing Rivera vs. IAC, Buayan Cattle Co. Inc. vs. Quintillan, Director of Forest Administration vs. Fernandez, and Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Delos Angeles. Respondents had no clear right over Howmart Road, so the RTC's statement that they had shown a clear right was inaccurate. Respondents also failed the requisite of urgent and paramount necessity, because the records show two gates through which they have direct access to EDSA. The writ was therefore not justified by the facts and circumstances of the case.

• Mootness: Certiorari lies to correct the abuse of discretion committed by a lower court in issuing an injunction, citing Maguan vs. Court of Appeals. When petitioners filed their certiorari petition, the CA had the task of examining whether the RTC order was proper, and it instead dismissed the petition because petitioners had complied with the order. The SC held that the granting of the writ and the subsequent compliance could not preempt the determination of the issue raised in the petition. Quoting Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, the SC explained that a restraining order preserves the status quo until the propriety of an injunction is determined, and that granting, denying, or lifting it does not preempt the court's power to decide the main action. The CA has the power to recall or lift a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction if it finds that the party is not entitled to it. By dismissing the petition, the CA in effect affirmed the RTC's finding that respondents were entitled to the writ, a finding the SC had already held unsupported.

• Requisites for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction — An injunctive writ requires the applicant to show an unquestionable right over the premises that has been violated. The SC enumerated three requisites for a preliminary injunction: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Respondents failed the clear-right requisite because they had no established right over Howmart Road, and they failed the urgency requisite because two gates gave them direct access to EDSA.

• Compulsory Easement of Right of Way and Isolation by the Proprietor's Own Acts — Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, the owner of an immovable surrounded by others and lacking adequate outlet to a public highway may demand a right of way upon payment of indemnity, but the easement is not compulsory if the isolation is due to the proprietor's own acts. The SC applied this to the wall constructed between respondents' lots, which left only a small passageway, and held that mere convenience in opening a new gate does not establish a right of way.

• Consideration as an Element of an Easement Contract — Absent an agreement of the parties as to the consideration, among other terms, no contract of easement of right of way is validly entered into. The SC applied this to the QCIEA arrangement, holding that after the right of way expired in December 1988, the continued use by QCIEA members was merely tolerated by the owners while the compensation was renegotiated.

• Mootness of Certiorari Against an Injunctive Writ — Compliance with a writ does not moot a certiorari petition that challenges the validity of the order granting it, because the grant, denial, or lifting of a restraining order does not preempt the court's power to decide the main action. The SC applied this to hold that the validity of the RTC order was the very subject of the petition, so the CA could not dismiss it as moot.

• "The party applying for preliminary injunction must show that (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage." — This sets out the three requisites the SC applied to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case.

• "This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts." — This is the final paragraph of Article 649 of the Civil Code, which the SC applied to bar respondents' claimed right of way because the isolation resulted from their own acts.

• "The validity of the Order was precisely the subject of the petition for certiorari." — This is the SC's reason for holding that the petition was not rendered moot by petitioners' compliance with the writ.

• Robleza vs. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 354 (1989) — Cited with a "see" signal as authority that no easement of right of way contract is validly entered into absent an agreement on consideration, among other terms.

• Rivera vs. IAC, 169 SCRA 307 (1989) — Cited, together with Buayan Cattle Co. Inc. vs. Quintillan, for the rule that an injunctive writ requires an unquestionable right over the premises that has been violated.

• Buayan Cattle Co. Inc. vs. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 276 (1984) — Cited with Rivera vs. IAC for the unquestionable-right requirement for an injunctive writ.

• Director of Forest Administration vs. Fernandez, 192 SCRA 121 (1990) — Cited, together with Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Delos Angeles, as the source of the three requisites for a preliminary injunction that the SC applied.

• Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Delos Angeles, 164 SCRA 543 (1988) — Cited with Director of Forest Administration vs. Fernandez for the three requisites for a preliminary injunction.

• Ramos, Sr. vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., 154 SCRA 703 (1987) — Cited for the rule that mere convenience is not enough to serve as the basis for asserting a right of way.

• Maguan vs. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 107 (1986) — Cited for the rule that certiorari will lie to correct the abuse of discretion committed by a lower court in issuing an injunctive writ.

• Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983) — Quoted at length for the distinction between a restraining order and an injunction and for the rule that granting, denying, or lifting a restraining order does not preempt the power to decide the main action; the SC applied it to the mootness issue.

• Article 649, Civil Code — Grants the owner of an immovable surrounded by others and lacking adequate outlet to a public highway a right of way upon payment of indemnity, but provides that the easement is not compulsory if the isolation is due to the proprietor's own acts. The SC applied the final paragraph to hold that the wall constructed between respondents' lots, and their voluntary opening of a new gate, precluded them from asserting a right of way over Howmart Road.