Dionaldo vs. Dacuycuy

After an accused has entered a plea of not guilty, an information for homicide cannot be amended to charge the more serious offense of murder, because the change is one of substance and not of form; the second paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13 authorizes only dismissal and the filing of a substitute information, and dismissal after such plea to file a more serious charge would place the accused in double jeopardy.

Rolando Dionaldo was the accused in Criminal Case No. 3835 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, presided over by respondent Judge Auxencio Dacuycuy. The procedural question is governed by Rule 110, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, which regulates amendments to complaints and informations before and after plea. The People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, was not made a party to the petition, although the Court noted that its participation, while necessary, was not indispensable under the circumstances.

Rolando Dionaldo was charged with the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 3835 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, presided over by respondent Judge Auxencio Dacuycuy. After Dionaldo entered a plea of not guilty, the prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the information. Attached to the motion was an amended information charging murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, a more serious offense than homicide.

The motion gave no explanation for the allegation of evident premeditation. As to treachery, it explained that the affidavit of the complaining witness indicated that the attack was sudden and that it was only after they sustained the wounds consequent to the treacherous attack that they were forced to fight back to repel further aggression. The claimed circumstance was known to the prosecution all along but was not alleged in the original information.

Counsel for the accused opposed the motion to amend, but the respondent judge granted it. Dionaldo then filed a petition to nullify the respondent judge's action.

• Amendment After Plea: Petitioner invoked the first paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13, Rules of Court, in support of the position that the information for homicide could not be amended to charge the more serious offense of murder after he had entered a plea of not guilty.

• Second Paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13: Respondent judge relied on the second paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13, Rules of Court, in granting the motion for leave to amend the information.

• Amendment After Plea: Whether an information for homicide can be amended to charge the crime of murder after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty.
• Second Paragraph Justification: Whether the amendment can be justified under the second paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13, Rules of Court.
• Dismissal and New Information: Whether the original homicide information can be dismissed after a plea of not guilty so that another information for murder can be filed.

• Amendment After Plea: No. A change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form but one of substance with serious consequences, and the first paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13 bars such amendment after plea.
• Second Paragraph Justification: No. The second paragraph speaks of dismissal and the filing of a new information, not amendment; it contemplates a substitute, not an amended information.
• Dismissal and New Information: No. Dismissing the homicide charge after a plea of not guilty to file a murder charge would place the accused in double jeopardy.

• Amendment After Plea: The first paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13 permits amendment in substance or form without leave before the defendant pleads. Thereafter, during trial, amendment is allowed only as to matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when it can be done without prejudice to the defendant's rights. Changing the charge from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is a substantive change with serious consequences. The amendment was therefore proscribed.
• Second Paragraph Justification: The second paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13 does not authorize an amendment. It provides that if it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed in double jeopardy. It contemplates the filing of a substitute information, not an amended information. Respondent's reliance on it was thus misplaced.
• Dismissal and New Information: Although no judgment had yet been rendered, petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to homicide. To dismiss the charge against him so as to file another charge for murder would place him in double jeopardy. The original information could not therefore be dismissed to permit the filing of a murder information.

• Amendment of Information After Plea — Under the first paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, an information may be amended in substance or form without leave of court before the defendant pleads. After plea and during trial, only matters of form may be amended, by leave and in the court's discretion, when no prejudice results to the defendant. A change from homicide to murder is a substantive amendment and cannot be made after a plea of not guilty.
• Substitute Information Under Rule 110, Section 13 — The second paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13 allows the court, if a mistake in charging the proper offense appears before judgment, to dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant is not placed in double jeopardy. It does not authorize an amendment; it contemplates a substitute information.
• Double Jeopardy Bar to Dismissal After Plea — Once the accused has pleaded not guilty to the original charge, dismissal of that charge to permit a new and more serious charge would place the accused in double jeopardy. This bars the substitute-information route in such circumstances.

• "The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant." — This is the first paragraph of Rule 110, Section 13, which the Court applied to bar substantive amendment after plea.
• "To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences." — This is the ratio decidendi on why the amendment was not allowed.
• "For the provision speaks not of amendment but of dismissal of the information In other words the provision contemplates the filing of a substitute, not an amended information." — The Court distinguishes amendment from substitute information under the second paragraph.
• "For the petitioner having pleaded not guilty to homicide, to dismiss the charge against him so as to file another charge for murder win place him thereby in double jeopardy." — The Court explains why the original information cannot be dismissed to file a murder charge.

• Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, 107 Phil. 843 — Cited in the separate concurring opinion of Justice Aquino. The respondent judge had relied on it, but the concurrence distinguished it: the plea in Dimalibot was made during the preliminary investigation to a complaint for homicide filed in the justice of the peace court, not the plea contemplated by Section 9, Rule 117; the plea in Dionaldo was made to an information filed in the Court of First Instance. It did not control the result.

• Rule 110, Section 13, Rules of Court — Quoted and applied. The first paragraph permits amendment in substance or form before plea and only as to form after plea; the second paragraph permits dismissal and filing of a new information for the proper offense if no double jeopardy. The Court held the first paragraph barred the substantive amendment from homicide to murder after plea, and the second paragraph did not authorize an amendment but only a substitute information.
• Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court — Cited in the concurring opinion to distinguish Dimalibot vs. Salcedo. The plea made during preliminary investigation to a complaint in the justice of the peace court is not the plea contemplated by this provision; the plea in this case was made to an information in the Court of First Instance.

• Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., and De Castro, JJ. — concurred.
• Aquino, J. — concurred in the result and wrote a separate opinion distinguishing Dimalibot vs. Salcedo, 107 Phil. 843, on the ground that the plea there was made during preliminary investigation to a complaint for homicide filed in the justice of the peace court, not to an information filed in the Court of First Instance.