Diokno vs. Cacdac

The Bureau of Labor Relations has original and exclusive jurisdiction over intra-union disputes, including controversies arising from the disqualification of candidates in union elections, and a union's COMELEC may not disqualify candidates by invoking a constitutional provision that governs expulsion of members without observing the due process and voting requirements prescribed therein.

The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization serving as the supervisory union of Meralco. Both petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES. The union's Constitution and By-Laws (CBL) governs the rights and obligations of members, including the procedures for the expulsion of members and the conduct of union elections through a Committee on Election (COMELEC). Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the CBL provides for the dismissal or expulsion of a member, after due process and investigation, by a two-thirds vote of the Executive Board, for acting in a manner harmful to the interest and welfare of the union and/or its members. The Labor Code, through Article 226, vests the Bureau of Labor Relations with original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts.

The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization and the supervisory union of Meralco. On April 1, 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created a Committee on Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of union elections scheduled for May 7, 2003, with petitioner Dante M. Tong as chairman and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and Romeo M. Macapulay as members. Several private respondents filed their certificates of candidacy. On April 12, 2003, the COMELEC rejected the candidacy of Jimmy S. Ong on the ground that he was not a member of FLAMES, while the candidacies of Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano were rejected because their departments were excluded from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement, rendering them allegedly disqualified from union membership as confidential employees.

On April 24, 2003, Ong, et al. filed a petition before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) seeking nullification of the COMELEC's order disallowing their candidacy, an accounting of union funds, and the designation of a BLR representative as COMELEC chairman in lieu of Tong. On May 2, 2003, petitioners filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private respondents Edgardo Daya, et al., alleging that they allowed non-union members to assist them in their campaign and committed acts of disloyalty inimical to FLAMES' interest, including collusion with officers of the Meralco Savings and Loan Association and the Meralco Mutual Aid and Benefits Association to exert undue influence on FLAMES members.

On May 6, 2003, the COMELEC issued a Decision declaring Daya, et al. officially disqualified from running or participating in the May 7, 2003 elections, excluding their names from the list of candidates, and declaring that any vote cast in their favor would not be counted. The COMELEC relied on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws, finding that Daya, et al. violated the provision by allowing non-members to aid their campaign, which was deemed inimical to the interest of FLAMES. The elections proceeded on May 7, 2003, and the COMELEC proclaimed a slate of winners that included several herein petitioners.

On May 8, 2003, Daya, et al., together with Ong, et al., filed a petition before the DOLE-NCR Med-Arbitration Unit seeking to nullify the order of disqualification, nullify the election proceedings and counting of votes, declare a failure of election, and order a new election under DOLE supervision. On May 14, 2003, another group led by private respondent Gaudencio Jimenez, Jr. filed a separate petition to nullify the May 7, 2003 election on the ground that it was not free, orderly, and peaceful. The two petitions were consolidated with the earlier petition of Ong, et al. The Med-Arbiter found that the COMELEC had directed Daya, et al. to file their Answer to the disqualification petition only on May 5, 2003; they filed it on May 6, 2003, the same day the COMELEC issued its disqualification decision. The election was held the following day. Daya, et al.'s efforts to seek reconsideration of their disqualification were rebuffed by the COMELEC, which also refused to receive their written protest.

The Med-Arbiter reversed the COMELEC's disqualification of Daya, et al., finding that the COMELEC accepted petitioners' allegations without substantiating evidence and erred in relying on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6), which pertains to expulsion of members rather than disqualification of candidates. The Med-Arbiter also found a denial of due process. The BLR Director affirmed this ruling in toto, as did the Court of Appeals, which held that the COMELEC, by utilizing the expulsion provision without the requisite two-thirds vote of the Executive Board, violated the union's CBL and arrogated unto itself a power it did not possess.

• Jurisdiction of the BLR: Petitioners contended that Article 226 of the Labor Code, which grants the BLR power to resolve inter-union and intra-union disputes, is dead law, having been amended by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6715, which allegedly transferred the conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration functions of the BLR to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Petitioners argued that private respondents Daya, et al. prematurely sought the BLR's jurisdiction because they failed to exhaust administrative remedies within the union, specifically the 30% membership support requirement for filing a petition before the Med-Arbiter.
• Validity of the Disqualification: Petitioners maintained that the COMELEC had the sole and exclusive power to pass upon the qualifications of any candidate, and therefore possessed the correlative power to disqualify any candidate in accordance with its guidelines. They challenged the finding that the COMELEC's reliance on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the CBL was premature.
• Conduct of the Elections: Petitioners asserted that the May 7, 2003 election was conducted in a clean, honest, and orderly manner, and that private respondents, some of whom are not bona fide members of FLAMES, were validly disqualified. They also alleged that non-members of the union were allowed by Daya, et al. to participate in the election campaign.
• Factual Determination: Petitioners implored the Supreme Court to make factual determinations regarding the conduct of the May 7, 2003 elections, contending that the case falls under exceptions to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

• Jurisdiction of the BLR: Respondents Daya, et al. maintained that the petition they filed before the DOLE-NCR Med-Arbiter questioning the disqualification order of the COMELEC and seeking nullification of the May 7, 2003 election involves an intra-union dispute within the jurisdiction of the BLR.
• Misapplication of the CBL: Respondents argued that the COMELEC, in disqualifying them, mistakenly relied on a provision in the FLAMES' CBL that addresses the expulsion of members from the union, and no expulsion proceedings were held against them.
• Disenfranchisement: Respondents underscored the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was disenfranchisement among the general membership of FLAMES due to the wrongful disqualification, which restricted the members' choices of candidates. They reiterated that had the COMELEC tabulated the votes cast in their favor, there would have been at least a basis for determining whether they lost the elections.

• Jurisdiction of the BLR: Whether the BLR has jurisdiction over the intra-union dispute arising from the COMELEC's disqualification of private respondents Daya, et al. in the FLAMES union elections, notwithstanding petitioners' contention that Article 226 of the Labor Code was amended by Republic Act No. 6715.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether private respondents Daya, et al. were excused from exhausting administrative remedies within the union before resorting to the BLR, and whether their petition before the Med-Arbiter was required to be supported by 30% of the union membership.
• Validity of the Disqualification: Whether the COMELEC validly disqualified private respondents Daya, et al. by relying on Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES CBL, which governs the expulsion of members.
• Validity of the Elections: Whether the May 7, 2003 FLAMES elections should be annulled on the basis of the wrongful disqualification of candidates and the resulting disenfranchisement of union members.
• Factual Review: Whether the Supreme Court should make factual findings on the conduct of the May 7, 2003 elections as an exception to the rule that it is not a trier of facts.

• Jurisdiction of the BLR: Yes. The BLR has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all intra-union conflicts pursuant to Article 226 of the Labor Code, and the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 6715 did not divest the BLR of this jurisdiction.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No, exhaustion was not required. The exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applied because the COMELEC refused to act on the disqualified candidates' motion for reconsideration and refused to receive their written protest, constituting a denial of due process. The 30% membership support requirement did not apply because the dispute did not involve the entire membership of the union.
• Validity of the Disqualification: No. The COMELEC committed a blatant misapplication of Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES CBL, which exclusively governs the dismissal and/or expulsion of members and requires due process, investigation, and a two-thirds vote of the Executive Board — none of which were observed.
• Validity of the Elections: Yes, the elections were properly annulled. The wrongful disqualification of candidates constituted disenfranchisement of the union membership by clipping the options afforded to member-voters, providing sufficient basis for annulling the May 7, 2003 elections.
• Factual Review: No. In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Supreme Court's review is confined to questions of law, and petitioners failed to show why any exception to the rule should apply, especially where the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter, BLR Director, and Court of Appeals were uniform and supported by bases in fact and law.

• Jurisdiction of the BLR: Article 226 of the Labor Code expressly grants the BLR and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. The amendment introduced by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6715 amended only the second paragraph of Article 226, changing "working days" to "calendar days" — it did not alter the BLR's jurisdictional grant. The controversy at bar is an intra-union dispute, defined under Section (z), Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code as any conflict between and among union members, including disputes arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union. The disqualification of Daya, et al. by the FLAMES COMELEC is a grievance over the CBL involving members of the union, squarely within the BLR's cognizance. The fact that non-members were alleged to have aided Daya, et al. does not alter the character of the controversy, as those non-members are not parties to the case.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: While the general rule requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention, established exceptions include instances where resort to the remedy would be futile, illusory, or vain, and where there is a violation of due process. The COMELEC directed Daya, et al. to file their Answer on May 5, 2003; they filed it on May 6, 2003, the same day the COMELEC issued its disqualification decision. The election was held the following day. Their efforts to seek reconsideration were rebuffed, and the COMELEC refused to receive their written protest. These circumstances established a denial of due process, rendering exhaustion of remedies within the union illusory and vain. As to the 30% membership support requirement, Section 1 of Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of Book V mandates this only where the issue involves the entire membership of the union — not the case here, where the issue was limited to the disqualification of particular union members from participating in the elections.

• Validity of the Disqualification: Article IV, Section 4(a)(6) of the FLAMES CBL exclusively governs the dismissal and/or expulsion of members from the union, requiring due process and investigation and a two-thirds vote of the Executive Board. The provision does not contemplate the disqualification of a candidate from union elections. Even assuming arguendo that the provision could apply to disqualification, the COMELEC still failed to observe the procedural requirements: no investigation by the Executive Board was conducted, and no two-thirds vote was obtained. In all respects, Daya, et al. were denied due process. Upholding the COMELEC's action would countenance a clear denial of due process, contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines.

• Validity of the Elections: The wrongful exclusion of Daya, et al. from the May 7, 2003 elections clipped the options afforded to union member-voters, constituting disenfranchisement. Because the mandate of the union cannot be said to have been rightfully determined when candidates are wrongfully excluded, the factual irregularities in the FLAMES elections provide proper bases for annulment. The uniform conclusion of the Med-Arbiter, BLR Director, and Court of Appeals — that Daya, et al. were wrongfully disqualified and the election should be annulled — was supported by sufficient bases in fact and law.

• Factual Review: In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the scope of judicial review is confined to errors of law; questions of fact are not entertained. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered below. While exceptions exist, petitioners failed to demonstrate why any exception should apply, particularly where the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter were affirmed by the BLR Director and then by the Court of Appeals.

• Jurisdiction of the BLR over Intra-Union Disputes — The Bureau of Labor Relations has original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts pursuant to Article 226 of the Labor Code. An intra-union dispute is defined as any conflict between and among union members, including all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union. The amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 6715 modified only the period within which the BLR must act (from working days to calendar days) and did not divest the BLR of its jurisdiction. The Court relied on Bautista vs. Court of Appeals in confirming that the BLR's jurisdiction over intra-union conflicts is clear and requires no further interpretation.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Its Exceptions — Before a party may seek judicial intervention, all available administrative remedies must be exhausted. However, exceptions include: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the proceeding is private land; (10) in quo warranto proceedings; and (11) where the facts show a violation of due process. In this case, the COMELEC's refusal to act on the disqualified candidates' motion for reconsideration and its refusal to receive their written protest constituted a denial of due process, bringing the case within exception (11) and rendering exhaustion within the union illusory and vain.

• Due Process in Union Disciplinary Proceedings — Where a union's constitution and by-laws prescribes specific procedural requirements for the expulsion of members — such as due process, investigation, and a two-thirds vote of the Executive Board — those requirements must be observed. A union's COMELEC may not arrogate unto itself the power to expel or disqualify members under a provision that vests that power exclusively in the Executive Board. Whether the case involves dismissal or expulsion from the union or disqualification from elections, the proper procedure established in the CBL must be followed.

• Disenfranchisement as Ground for Annulment of Union Elections — The wrongful disqualification of candidates from union elections constitutes disenfranchisement of the member-voters, as their options are clipped and the mandate of the union cannot be said to have been rightfully determined. Such disenfranchisement provides a proper basis for the annulment of union elections.

• "The law is very clear. It requires no further interpretation. The Petition which was initiated by private respondents Daya, et al., before the BLR was properly within its cognizance, it being an intra-union dispute." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the BLR's jurisdiction, affirming that disputes over candidate disqualification in union elections are intra-union conflicts within the BLR's original and exclusive authority under Article 226 of the Labor Code.

• "Without the requisite two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board dismissing and/or expelling private respondents for acts contemplated thereunder, the COMELEC was clearly violating the union's constitution and bylaws (sic) by utilizing the aforequoted provision in its said May 6, 2003 decision and, in the process, arrogating unto itself a power it did not possess." — This passage, quoted by the Court from the Court of Appeals' decision, articulates the core reasoning for nullifying the COMELEC's disqualification order: the COMELEC misapplied an expulsion provision without observing its procedural requirements and usurped a power reserved to the Executive Board.

• "If we uphold the COMELEC, we are countenancing a clear case of denial of due process which is anathema to the Constitution of the Philippines which safeguards the right to due process." — This passage underscores the constitutional dimension of the ruling, linking the COMELEC's procedural shortcut to a fundamental denial of due process protected by the Philippine Constitution.

• Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123375, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 406 — Controlling precedent followed by the Court for the proposition that the BLR has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all inter-union and intra-union conflicts under Article 226 of the Labor Code, and that this jurisdictional grant is clear and requires no further interpretation.
• Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. vs. Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers, G.R. No. 142666, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 45 — Cited for the doctrine that a party must avail of all administrative processes before seeking judicial intervention, and that premature invocation of judicial power is fatal to one's cause of action.
• Morcal vs. Laviña, G.R. No. 166753, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 508 — Cited for the enumeration of exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• Verceles vs. Bureau of Labor Relations-Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region, G.R. No. 153322, February 15, 2005, 451 SCRA 338 — Cited for the exception to exhaustion of administrative remedies where there is a violation of due process.
• Gerlach vs. Reuters Limited, Phils., G.R. No. 148542, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 535 — Cited for the rule that in a petition for review on certiorari, the Supreme Court's review is confined to questions of law and does not extend to reevaluation of the sufficiency of evidence.
• Umpoc vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 220 — Cited for the principle that re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

• Article 226, Labor Code of the Philippines — Grants the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. Applied to confirm the BLR's jurisdiction over the dispute arising from the FLAMES COMELEC's disqualification of candidates.
• Section 14, Republic Act No. 6715 — Amended the second paragraph of Article 226 of the Labor Code, changing "working days" to "calendar days." Applied to reject petitioners' argument that the BLR had been divested of jurisdiction, as the amendment did not alter the BLR's original and exclusive authority over intra-union disputes.
• Section (z), Rule I, Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code — Defines "Intra-Union Dispute" as any conflict between and among union members, including disputes arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union. Applied to classify the controversy as an intra-union dispute within the BLR's jurisdiction.
• Section 1, Rule XIV, Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code — Requires 30% membership support for petitions involving the entire membership of the union. Applied to reject petitioners' argument that Daya, et al.'s petition before the Med-Arbiter failed for lack of the 30% requirement, as the dispute was limited to the disqualification of particular members.
• Article IV, Section 4(a)(6), FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws — Provides for the dismissal and/or expulsion of a member from the union, after due process and investigation, by a two-thirds vote of the Executive Board, for acting in a manner harmful to the interest and welfare of the union and/or its members. Applied to nullify the COMELEC's disqualification of Daya, et al., as the provision governs expulsion — not candidate disqualification — and the COMELEC failed to observe the prescribed procedural requirements.
• Article IX, Section 1(c), FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws — Provides that the COMELEC shall rule on election protests or questions submitted in writing within 24 hours from the time the last ballot is officially opened, with three days to decide. Cited by the Med-Arbiter to show that the COMELEC refused to receive the written protest of Daya, et al., in violation of the union's own CBL.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Associate Justice, Chairperson, Third Division), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (Associate Justice), and Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (Associate Justice) concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were rendered.