Dio vs. People

A defect in an information arising from failure to allege facts constituting an offense — including failure to establish venue in a libel case — is curable by amendment before arraignment, and the prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend before the information may be quashed. The proscription against amendments that operate to vest jurisdiction in the trial court applies only where the accused has already been arraigned under a defective information.

Private respondent Timothy Desmond is the Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, while petitioner Virginia Dio serves as Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors of the same corporation. The relationship between the parties as corporate officers of the same entity provides the context for the allegedly defamatory electronic messages that gave rise to the libel charges. The informations were filed under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes libel by means of writings or similar means, at a time when Republic Act No. 10175 (the Anti-Cybercrime Law) had not yet been enacted.

Virginia Dio served as Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, while Timothy Desmond was the corporation's Chair and Chief Executive Officer. On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel arising from electronic messages she allegedly sent. Two separate Informations, both dated February 26, 2003, were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 3, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109.

The Information in Criminal Case No. 9108 charged Dio with sending a defamatory electronic message on or about July 6, 2002 in Morong, Bataan to Desmond and to other persons, namely Atty. Winston Ginez, John Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson. The message accused Desmond of bleeding the company with an exorbitant monthly payroll of almost ₱1 million, bloating the price of animals brought to the Philippines from US$500,000 to US$750,000 each to acquire more shares than he was entitled to, and surviving at the pretext of being an environmental and animal protector. The Information in Criminal Case No. 9109 charged Dio with sending another defamatory electronic message on or about July 13, 2002 in Morong, Bataan to Atty. Winston Ginez, Fatima Paglicawan, Desmond, Hon. Felicito Payumo (SBMA Chairman), Terry Nichoson, John Corcoran, and Gail Laule. This message alleged that under Desmond's leadership the company had incurred losses of more than ₱100 million, that 50% of the assets reflected in the balance sheet were overvalued and non-existent, and that Desmond and his family had accumulated more than 70% of the paid-up capital through overvaluation and had bled the company for personal gain.

On April 22, 2003, Dio filed a Petition to suspend the criminal proceedings, which was denied in the RTC Order dated February 6, 2004. Dio moved for reconsideration and simultaneously moved to quash the Informations on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. The RTC denied both motions in its Order dated July 13, 2004, and subsequent motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. On October 11, 2005, Dio filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the Informations for failure to allege publication and lack of jurisdiction, which the RTC denied in its Order dated February 7, 2006. Dio moved for partial reconsideration, and the RTC ultimately granted this motion in its February 12, 2009 Order, quashing and dismissing the Informations on the ground that they failed to allege publication.

Desmond appealed to the Court of Appeals, which agreed that the Informations did not substantially constitute the offense charged because they did not allege that the emails had been accessed. However, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in quashing the Informations without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend them pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It reversed the RTC Order and remanded the case with directions to the Public Prosecutor to amend the Informations. Dio's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition.

• Venue as a Jurisdictional Defect: Dio maintained that venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases and that failure to allege where the libelous article was printed and first published, or where the offended party actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense, is a jurisdictional defect not curable by amendment, even before arraignment. She cited Agustin vs. Pamintuan and Leviste vs. Hon. Alameda in support.
• Lack of Prosecutor's Authority: Dio argued that the Informations were void because the prosecutor of Morong, Bataan had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, as the complaint filed before the prosecutor did not allege that the emails were printed and first published in Morong, Bataan, or that Desmond resided there at the time of the offense.
• Absence of Publication: Dio asserted that emailing does not constitute publication under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as there was no allegation that the emails were received, accessed, and read by third persons other than Desmond. She further argued that emails were not covered under Article 355 at the time the allegedly libelous messages were sent, and that there was no law punishing the act then.
• Privileged Communication and Good Faith: Dio argued that she sent the emails as private communications to corporate officers who were in a position to act on her grievances, and that the emails were sent in good faith, with justifiable ends, and in the performance of a legal duty.

• Amendability of Defective Information Before Arraignment: Whether an information's failure to establish venue is a defect that can be cured by amendment before arraignment.
• Prosecutor's Authority: Whether the alleged lack of authority of the prosecutor to file the Informations is a ground for quashing them.
• Publication Under Article 355: Whether emailing constitutes publication under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code such that the Informations fail to charge an offense.
• Good Faith as Ground for Quashal: Whether good faith and privileged communication are proper grounds for quashing the Informations.

• Amendability of Defective Information Before Arraignment: Yes. The defect was curable by amendment before arraignment, and the prosecution was entitled to the opportunity to amend under Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
• Prosecutor's Authority: No, the Informations could not be quashed on this ground. A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to quash an information, and the lack of authority must be evident on the face of the information to sustain quashal.
• Publication Under Article 355: This is a matter of defense to be resolved at trial, not a ground for quashing the informations.
• Good Faith as Ground for Quashal: No. Good faith is not among the enumerated grounds for quashing an information under Rule 117, Section 3, and it is not apparent on the face of the Informations.

• Amendability of Defective Information Before Arraignment: Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court mandates that when a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment, and the motion shall be granted only if the prosecution fails to make the amendment or the information still suffers from the same defect despite amendment. The Court found that Dio had not yet been arraigned, making Section 4 applicable. Petitioner's reliance on Agustin vs. Pamintuan was misplaced because in Agustin, the accused had already been arraigned under a defective information. The statement in Leviste vs. Hon. Alameda that an amendment operating to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is impermissible was obiter dictum, as it cited only Agustin, which did not involve amendment before arraignment. None of the cases petitioner cited involved the amendment of an information before arraignment, and thus none could control the facts of this case.

• Prosecutor's Authority: A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not among the grounds for quashing an information enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3. While lack of authority of the officer who filed the information is a proper ground, the defect must be evident on the face of the information. The Informations here alleged that the offense was committed in Morong, Bataan, and did not allege that the venue was elsewhere; thus, it was not apparent on the face of the Informations that the prosecutor lacked authority to file them. The proper remedy was to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend, and if the proper venue turned out not to be Morong, Bataan, the trial court could then dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the prosecutor.

• Publication Under Article 355: Petitioner argued that emails were not covered under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code at the time of the offense and that emailing does not constitute publication. The Court declined to resolve this on a motion to quash, holding that whether sending emails to the persons named in the Informations — who appear to be officials of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority — is sufficiently "public" as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-Cybercrime Law is a matter of defense that should be properly raised during trial. The Court noted that passionate and emphatic grievance channeled through proper public authorities partakes of a degree of protected freedom of expression, but the scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in abstractions and must be proven by evidence.

• Good Faith as Ground for Quashal: Good faith is not among the grounds for quashing an information under Rule 117, Section 3. It is not apparent on the face of the Informations, and what is not apparent cannot be the basis for quashing them. Under Danguilan-Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, for an alleged privilege to be a ground for quashing, it must be averred in the information itself and the privilege must be absolute, not merely qualified. Where these circumstances are not alleged in the information, quashal is not proper and they should be raised and proved as defenses. Even qualifiedly privileged communications remain actionable, with the burden on the prosecution to prove malice.

• Curability of Defects in Information Before Arraignment — Under Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, when a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court must give the prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment before granting the motion. The motion to quash shall be granted only if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or if the information still suffers from the same defect despite amendment. This rule has due process underpinnings: the State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power.

• Proscription Against Amendments to Vest Jurisdiction Limited to Post-Arraignment Cases — The doctrine that an amendment operating to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is impermissible applies only where the accused has already been arraigned under a defective information. Before arraignment, a defect pertaining to failure of an information to charge facts constituting an offense — including failure to establish venue — may be corrected by amendment.

• Defect in Complaint Before the Fiscal Not a Ground for Quashal — A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not among the enumerated grounds for quashing an information under Rule 117, Section 3. For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor's lack of authority, the lack of authority must be evident on the face of the information.

• Good Faith and Privileged Communication as Defenses, Not Grounds for Quashal — Good faith and privileged communication are matters of defense to be raised and proved during trial, not grounds for quashing an information. For privilege to serve as a ground for quashal, it must be averred in the information itself and the privilege must be absolute. Qualifiedly privileged communications remain actionable, with the burden on the prosecution to prove malice.

• "When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be cured by amendment, courts must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend the information." — This is the opening pronouncement of the decision, stating the core principle that animates the entire ruling.

• "Although the cases petitioner cited involved defective informations that failed to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the libel charges, none involved the amendment of an information before arraignment. Thus, these cannot be controlling over the facts of this case." — This passage distinguishes the precedents relied upon by the petitioner and establishes the critical temporal distinction between pre- and post-arraignment amendments.

• "Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public authorities, partakes of a degree of protected freedom of expression." — This statement articulates a constitutional dimension to the case, suggesting that expression directed at public officials warrants some measure of protection, while leaving the factual determination for trial.

• Agustin vs. Pamintuan, 505 Phil. 103 (2005) — Distinguished. The Court held that Agustin involved an accused who had already been arraigned under a defective information, unlike the present case where no arraignment had yet occurred. The ruling in Agustin that amendments to vest jurisdiction cannot be allowed was therefore inapplicable.

• Leviste vs. Hon. Alameda, 640 Phil. 620 (2010) — Distinguished as obiter dictum. The statement in Leviste that an amendment operating to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is impermissible even before arraignment was held to be obiter dictum because it cited only Agustin, which did not involve amendment before arraignment.

• People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 160619, September 9, 2015 — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the rule that when a motion to quash challenges the validity and sufficiency of an information and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion and order the prosecution to file an amended information.

• People vs. Andrade, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014 — Cited for the due process underpinning of the amendment rule, establishing that the State is entitled to its day in court.

• Sasot vs. People, 500 Phil. 527 (2005) — Followed for the rule that a defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to quash an information.

• Cudia vs. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 190 (1998) — Cited for the principle that lack of authority of the officer who filed the information is a proper ground for quashal, but that the infirmity cannot be cured by silence or acquiescence.

• Santos vs. People, 585 Phil. 337 (2008) — Followed for the rule that a motion to quash must be based on a defect evident on the face of the information.

• Danguilan-Vitug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103618, May 20, 1994 — Followed for the rule that good faith and privileged communication are matters of defense, not grounds for quashing an information.

• Rule 117, Section 4, Rules of Court — Governs amendment of a complaint or information when a motion to quash is based on a curable defect. Applied as the controlling provision: because Dio had not yet been arraigned, the prosecution was entitled to the opportunity to amend the Informations before they could be quashed.

• Rule 117, Section 3, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for quashing an information. Applied to determine that good faith and privileged communication are not among the enumerated grounds, and that a defect in the complaint before the fiscal is likewise not a ground for quashal.

• Article 355, Revised Penal Code — Punishes libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means. Cited by petitioner to argue that emails were not covered at the time of the offense; the Court held that whether emailing constitutes publication is a matter of defense for trial.

• Article XI, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Provides that public office is a public trust. Cited in connection with the observation that some leeway should be given to the public to express disgust toward public officials.

Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concurred.