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Dinsay vs. Cioco

Respondent Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco was suspended from the practice of law for one year for his participation in the surreptitious substitution of Page Four of a notarized Certificate of Sheriff's Sale, which reduced the foreclosure bid price from ₱3,263,182.67 to ₱730,000.00, effectively defrauding the mortgagor. He had previously been dismissed from his position as Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff for the same act in an earlier administrative case, and interposed res adjudicata to bar the disbarment complaint. The Court rejected the defense, holding that res adjudicata does not apply to the exercise of the Court's administrative powers over members of the bar, and that misconduct as a government official may independently justify disciplinary action as a lawyer when it affects fitness for the profession or shows moral delinquency.

Primary Holding

A lawyer who has been administratively disciplined or dismissed from government service for misconduct may still be disciplined as a member of the bar for the same conduct when that misconduct affects his qualification as a lawyer or demonstrates moral delinquency; the doctrine of res adjudicata does not apply to the Court's exercise of its administrative powers over the legal profession.

Background

Respondent Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco served as Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Bacolod City. Petitioner Romulo G. Dinsay initiated administrative proceedings against him. The case arises from an extrajudicial foreclosure sale conducted by Deputy Sheriff Renato M. Belleza on March 8, 1984, in which Traders Royal Bank acquired mortgaged properties of Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO). Respondent executed the Certificate of Sheriff's Sale, which was notarized on the same day by Judge Vivencio T. Ibrado, Sr. This was not the first time respondent faced administrative sanctions for the same incident: in a prior per curiam resolution promulgated December 12, 1986 (the first Dinsay case), the Court had already dismissed respondent and Deputy Sheriff Belleza for grave misconduct.

History

  1. Supreme Court, December 12, 1986 — In the first Dinsay case, respondent and Deputy Sheriff Belleza were dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service, arising from the substitution of Page Four of the Certificate of Sheriff's Sale.

  2. Office of the Bar Confidant — Investigated the disbarment complaint and recommended suspension from the practice of law for one year.

  3. Supreme Court, Third Division, November 27, 1996 — Adopted the OBC recommendation and suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year.

Facts

Sometime in 1980, Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged certain properties to Traders Royal Bank as security for the payment of a loan. PLAMACO defaulted, prompting the Bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale held on March 8, 1984, conducted by Deputy Sheriff Renato M. Belleza, the mortgaged properties were sold to the Bank as sole bidder. Thereafter, a Certificate of Sheriff's Sale was executed by respondent Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco, then Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Bacolod City, and notarized on the same day by Judge Vivencio T. Ibrado, Sr.

In April 1984, records disclosed that Page Four of the Certificate had been surreptitiously substituted. The new page lowered the bid price from the original amount of ₱3,263,182.67 to only ₱730,000.00. The substitution would have left PLAMACO open to a deficiency judgment, whereas the original bid by the Bank would have totally extinguished PLAMACO's obligation. In effect, PLAMACO was defrauded of the difference between the original bid and the substituted amount.

Consequent to the anomaly, respondent and Deputy Sheriff Belleza were administratively charged. In the first Dinsay case, a per curiam resolution promulgated on December 12, 1986 decreed their dismissal for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service. In the instant complaint, respondent is sought to be disbarred on the basis of the same incident that triggered his earlier dismissal. Respondent interposed res adjudicata, maintaining that he could no longer be charged with disbarment as the matter had already been adjudicated in the first Dinsay case. The Office of the Bar Confidant investigated the complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Basis for Disbarment: Petitioner sought respondent's disbarment on the basis of the same incident — the surreptitious substitution of Page Four of the Certificate of Sheriff's Sale — that had already led to respondent's dismissal from government service in the first Dinsay case.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Res Adjudicata: Respondent maintained that he could no longer be charged with disbarment, the matter having been deemed adjudicated in the first Dinsay case.
  • Ministerial Function: Respondent averred that it was purely ministerial on his part to sign the new Page Four of the Certificate, seeking refuge behind this characterization of his role.

Issues

  • Res Adjudicata: Whether the doctrine of res adjudicata bars a disbarment proceeding predicated on the same misconduct for which the respondent was already administratively dismissed from government service.
  • Discipline as Lawyer vs. Government Official: Whether a lawyer may be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct committed in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
  • Appropriate Penalty: Whether the recommended suspension of one year from the practice of law is proper.

Ruling

  • Res Adjudicata: No. The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Court's administrative powers over members of the legal profession.
  • Discipline as Lawyer vs. Government Official: Yes. While a lawyer holding government office may not generally be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of official duties, the exception applies when the misconduct affects his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency.
  • Appropriate Penalty: Yes. Suspension from the practice of law for one year was proper, the respondent's participation in altering a notarized public document reflecting moral delinquency and unfitness for the profession.

Ruling Rationale

  • Res Adjudicata: The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of the Court's administrative powers. In the first Dinsay case, respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory authority. In the instant case, respondent is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over members of the legal profession. Although respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy, both proceedings being administrative in nature. The two proceedings rest on distinct bases of authority — supervisory power over court personnel versus plenary power over the bar — and thus res adjudicata cannot bar the second.

  • Discipline as Lawyer vs. Government Official: As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, when that misconduct is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. The Court agreed with the Office of the Bar Confidant that respondent's participation in changing the bid price in the Certificate of Sheriff's Sale affects his fitness as a member of the bar. As a lawyer, respondent knew that it is patently illegal to change the content of a notarized document — already a public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court — after its notarization. His defense that signing the new Page Four was purely ministerial was struck down in the first Dinsay case and was not adopted here. At any rate, respondent could not disclaim knowledge of the legal consequences of his illegal act.

  • Appropriate Penalty: The substitution would have left PLAMACO open to a deficiency judgment, whereas the original bid by the Bank would have totally extinguished PLAMACO's obligation, effectively defrauding PLAMACO of the difference between the original bid and the substituted amount. Given the gravity of the misconduct and its effect on respondent's fitness as a lawyer, the OBC's recommendation of suspension from the practice of law for one year was adopted as proper.

Doctrines

  • Res Adjudicata Does Not Apply to Administrative Disbarment Proceedings — The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Court's administrative powers, including disciplinary authority over members of the bar. A prior administrative proceeding against a court employee under the Court's supervisory authority does not bar a subsequent disbarment proceeding against the same person as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over the legal profession, even when predicated on the same misconduct.

  • Discipline of Lawyer-Government Officials for Official Misconduct — As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if that misconduct is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. The exception applies where the misconduct demonstrates moral turpitude or unfitness for the legal profession, even if the same act was already the basis for administrative sanction as a government employee.

Key Excerpts

  • "The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on why res adjudicata cannot bar a disbarment proceeding, establishing the distinction between judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings and the Court's administrative exercise of disciplinary authority over the bar.

  • "While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, it does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature." — This passage clarifies that successive administrative proceedings based on different bases of authority (supervisory over court personnel vs. plenary over the bar) do not constitute double jeopardy, a point frequently cited in subsequent legal ethics jurisprudence.

  • "As a lawyer, respondent knows that it is patently illegal to change the content of the said certificate after its notarization, it being already a public document." — This passage links the respondent's professional knowledge as a lawyer to the misconduct, establishing the basis for disciplining him as a member of the bar rather than merely as a government official.

Precedents Cited

  • Dinsay vs. Cioco, 146 SCRA 146 (1986) — The first Dinsay case, a per curiam resolution, in which respondent and Deputy Sheriff Belleza were dismissed from service for grave misconduct. The Court relied on its prior findings to reject respondent's ministerial-function defense and to establish that the same misconduct had already been adjudicated under the Court's supervisory authority, distinct from its plenary authority over the bar.
  • Gonzales-Austria vs. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 (1989) — Cited for the general rule that a lawyer holding government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of official duties, and for the exception when misconduct affects qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency.
  • In Re Lanuevo, 66 SCRA 245 (1975) — Cited through Gonzales-Austria vs. Abaya as supporting authority for the exception allowing discipline of a lawyer for official misconduct that demonstrates moral delinquency.
  • Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93 (1989) — Cited in support of the proposition that res adjudicata does not apply to the exercise of the Court's administrative powers.

Provisions

  • Rule 132, Section 19, Rules of Court — Defines public documents, including documents acknowledged before a notary public. The provision was applied to establish that the Certificate of Sheriff's Sale, having been notarized, was already a public document, making any alteration of its contents after notarization patently illegal and reflective of respondent's knowledge as a lawyer of the legal consequences of his act.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.