Dimayuga-Laurena vs. Court of Appeals

A petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code fails where the petitioner does not prove a grave, incurable psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage, medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently explained under the Molina guidelines; alleged infidelity, violence, homosexuality, pressure to change religion, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation, not nullity. Properties belonging to a spouse’s parents, and businesses derived from them, do not form part of the conjugal partnership of gains, but a property acquired during the marriage remains conjugal where the spouse claiming it came from a parent-owned business fails to prove that allegation.

Petitioner Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena and respondent Jesse Lauro Laurena were spouses whose marriage and conjugal property are at issue under Article 36 of the Family Code and the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains. The statutory backdrop is Article 36’s requirement that psychological incapacity exist at the time of celebration, as elaborated in the Molina guidelines.

Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena and Jesse Lauro Laurena met in January 1983 and were married on 19 December 1983 at the Church of Saint Augustine in Intramuros, Manila. They have two children, Mark Jordan, born on 2 July 1985, and Michael Joseph, born on 11 November 1987. The property record shows that as early as 15 July 1978, respondent’s parents executed a General Power of Attorney in favor of respondent covering all their properties and businesses, and several Special Powers of Attorney were also executed by respondent’s parents in favor of respondent.

After the wedding, petitioner and respondent went to Baguio City for their honeymoon. They were accompanied by a 15-year-old boy, the son of one of respondent’s house helpers, whom respondent invited to sleep in their hotel suite. After the honeymoon, they settled in respondent’s house in Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque City. Petitioner became pregnant in March 1984 but suffered a miscarriage; according to petitioner, she almost bled to death while respondent continued watching a television show at the foot of their matrimonial bed. Petitioner alleged that respondent gave priority to the needs of his parents, would come home past midnight, and even tried to convert her to his religion. She also alleged that respondent was a womanizer and had feminine tendencies. Petitioner lived in Batangas for three years while she tended to their gasoline station while respondent remained in Parañaque City, and she discovered that respondent had been living a bachelor’s life while she was away. They frequently quarreled, and one time respondent hit her face.

On 14 April 1987, respondent’s parents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering two parcels of land in Tanauan, Batangas, with a total area of 966 square meters, for P40,000. The transfer was an accommodation so that petitioner, then working at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), could acquire a loan from BSP at a lower rate using the properties as collateral; the loan proceeds were used as additional capital for the Jeddah Caltex Station, and the loan was still being paid from the income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. The Lease Contract on the Jeddah Caltex Station was signed by respondent as attorney-in-fact of his mother Juanita Laurena. Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. As regards the duplex house and lot in Makati City, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Manuela C. Felix in favor of respondent. Respondent claimed that the duplex house was purchased from the income of the Jeddah Caltex Station, but he also testified that he received a series of promotions during their marriage “until we can afford to buy that duplex [on] Dayap.”

In September 1990, respondent abandoned their conjugal home and stopped supporting their children. Petitioner alleged that respondent’s psychological incapacity was manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his family’s needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity, and tendency to lead a bachelor’s life. On 19 October 1993, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against respondent. She alleged that respondent was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage and that the incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage although she discovered it only after the marriage. She further alleged that during their marriage they acquired the following properties as part of their conjugal partnership of gains: (a) the duplex house and lot at 4402 Dayap Street, Palanan, Makati City; (b) the house and lot on Palaspas Street, Tanauan, Batangas; (c) the dealership of Jeddah Caltex Service Station in Pres. Laurel Highway, Tanauan, Batangas; (d) personal vehicles consisting of a Mitsubishi Lancer, Safari pick-up, L-300 van, and L-200 pick-up; and (e) Jeddah Trucking. Petitioner prayed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of their children, and monthly support of P25,000.

Respondent denied petitioner’s allegations. He asserted that petitioner was emotionally immature, stubborn, unstable, unreasonable, and extremely jealous. He alleged that some of the properties claimed by petitioner were not part of their conjugal partnership of gains and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

The trial court found that the manifestations of respondent’s psychological incapacity alleged by petitioner were not so serious as to consider respondent psychologically incapacitated and that petitioner’s evidence only showed that she could not get along with respondent. The CA found that Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, was not able to talk to respondent and simply based her conclusions and impressions of respondent from her two-hour session with petitioner; that Dr. Lapuz’s testimony was vague and ambiguous on the matter of respondent’s personality disorder; and that petitioner was not able to prove that respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage or that it was incurable. The CA also found that petitioner’s bases in her complaint were respondent’s irresponsibility, insensitivity, and infidelity, while during trial she claimed that the root of her husband’s incapacity was his homosexuality, and that these allegations lacked factual and evidentiary bases. The Social Case Study Report submitted by Social Welfare Officer Marissa P. Obrero-Ballon found petitioner immature while respondent was responsible, and that the couple separated because of respondent’s infidelity. The CA further found that the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, the duplex house and lot on Dayap Street, the Jeddah Caltex Station, and Jeddah Trucking belonged to respondent’s parents, and that rentals from the properties and income from the businesses were deposited in the account of respondent’s parents.

• Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner argued that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing his infidelity, utter neglect of the family’s needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity, tendency to lead a bachelor’s life, homosexuality, abandonment, and physical violence, and claiming that the incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although discovered later.
• Conjugal Partnership of Gains: Petitioner argued that the properties excluded by the CA—the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, the duplex house and lot on Dayap Street in Makati, and the properties acquired through the operations of the Jeddah Caltex Station and Jeddah Trucking—formed part of the conjugal partnership of gains.

• Psychological Incapacity: Respondent denied petitioner’s allegations and asserted that petitioner was emotionally immature, stubborn, unstable, unreasonable, and extremely jealous; he prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
• Conjugal Partnership of Gains: Respondent argued that some of the properties claimed by petitioner were not part of their conjugal partnership of gains and appealed the trial court’s declaration that some of his parents’ properties were conjugal; he also argued that the dissolution of the conjugal partnership should be denied because the petition for nullity was denied.

• Psychological Incapacity: Whether respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
• Conjugal Partnership of Gains: Whether the properties excluded by the CA form part of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent.

• Psychological Incapacity: No. Petitioner failed to prove respondent’s psychological incapacity; the alleged infidelity, violence, homosexuality, pressure to change religion, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation, not nullity, and did not satisfy the Molina guidelines.
• Conjugal Partnership of Gains: Yes as to the Dayap duplex; No as to the others. The SC included the duplex house and lot on Dayap Street, Makati City in the conjugal partnership but sustained the exclusion of the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, the Jeddah Caltex Station, and Jeddah Trucking as properties of respondent’s parents.

• Psychological Incapacity: Article 36 of the Family Code requires psychological incapacity at the time of celebration, characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability. Santos vs. Court of Appeals defines it as no less than a mental incapacity causing a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants, confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders. The Molina guidelines require the burden of proof to be on the plaintiff, with doubt resolved in favor of the marriage; the root cause must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; the incapacity must exist at the time of celebration and be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; it must be grave enough to disable the party from assuming the essential marital obligations under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code; and the non-complied obligations must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the decision. Petitioner anchored her petition on respondent’s irresponsibility, infidelity, homosexuality, pressure to change religion, violence, and abandonment, but these are grounds for legal separation under Article 55, not for declaring the marriage void. Dr. Lapuz never talked to respondent and based her conclusions on a two-hour session with petitioner; her testimony was vague and ambiguous, and she failed to prove psychological incapacity, identify its root cause, or establish incurability. The Social Case Study Report found petitioner immature and respondent responsible, and that the couple separated because of respondent’s infidelity. Petitioner also failed to prove that the incapacity existed at the time of the marriage; the honeymoon incident with the 15-year-old boy was explained by respondent as a companion for pictures and videos due to monetary constraints, and he testified that he and petitioner had stayed in a hotel and had sexual relations before marriage. The totality of the evidence failed to show a grave, incurable incapacity existing at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
• Conjugal Partnership of Gains: The SC sustained the CA in part. Respondent’s parents executed a General Power of Attorney on 15 July 1978 in favor of respondent covering all their properties and businesses, and several Special Powers of Attorney were also executed. On 14 April 1987, respondent’s parents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering two parcels of land in Tanauan, Batangas, with a total area of 966 square meters, for P40,000; the transfer was merely an accommodation so that petitioner, then working at BSP, could acquire a loan at a lower rate using the properties as collateral. The loan proceeds were used as additional capital for the Jeddah Caltex Station, and the loan was still being paid from the income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. The Lease Contract on the Jeddah Caltex Station was signed by respondent as attorney-in-fact of his mother Juanita Laurena, leaving no doubt that it was the business of respondent’s parents. Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. As to the duplex house and lot in Makati City, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Manuela C. Felix in favor of respondent. Respondent claimed that the duplex house was purchased from the income of the Jeddah Caltex Station, but there was no sufficient proof to sustain this allegation; respondent himself testified that he received a series of promotions during their marriage “until we can afford to buy that duplex [on] Dayap.” Hence, the duplex house on Dayap Street, Makati City should be included in the conjugal partnership of gains.

• Psychological incapacity under Article 36 — A marriage is void if a party was psychologically incapacitated at the time of celebration to comply with the essential marital obligations, even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. It must be characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability; it must be a mental incapacity causing the party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants and confined to the most serious personality disorders. The SC applied it to deny nullity because petitioner’s evidence did not show a grave, incurable incapacity existing at the time of marriage.
• Molina guidelines — The SC in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina) laid down seven guidelines: (1) the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage; (2) the root cause must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) the incapacity must be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations; (5) the illness must be grave enough to disable the party from assuming the essential obligations of marriage, not a mere refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill will; (6) the essential marital obligations are those under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code, and the non-complied obligations must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the decision; and (7) interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great respect. The SC found petitioner failed to satisfy these guidelines.
• Expert examination not sine qua non but root cause must be identified — An actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity; the totality of evidence may suffice. However, the root cause must be medically or clinically identified, and an expert witness would strengthen the claim. The SC applied this because Dr. Lapuz never examined respondent and failed to identify the root cause or incurability.
• Properties of parents and conjugal partnership — Properties belonging to a spouse’s parents, and businesses derived from those properties, do not form part of the conjugal partnership of gains. A transfer made merely as an accommodation to obtain a loan does not convert the parents’ properties into conjugal property. The SC applied this to exclude the Tanauan ancestral house and lot, Jeddah Caltex Station, and Jeddah Trucking, but included the Dayap duplex because respondent failed to prove it was purchased from the parent-owned business.

• "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." — This is Article 36 as quoted in the decision; it supplies the statutory ground for nullity that petitioner invoked.
• "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." — The SC quotes Santos vs. Court of Appeals to define the threshold for psychological incapacity.
• "sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void." — The SC uses this to distinguish the facts petitioner alleged from the stricter ground of psychological incapacity.
• "the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage." — This is the SC’s conclusion on the first issue after applying the Molina guidelines.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) — Controlling precedent; first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability, and defined it as a mental incapacity causing a party to be truly incognitive of basic marital covenants.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina), G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198 — Controlling precedent; laid down the guidelines for interpreting and applying Article 36, which the SC applied to deny nullity.
• Marcos vs. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) — Followed; held that the totality of evidence may sustain a finding of psychological incapacity without actual medical examination, but the SC noted that an expert witness would have strengthened petitioner’s claim.
• Republic vs. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 177 — Cited; supports the point that an actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination is not a condition sine qua non, but the root cause must still be medically or clinically identified.
• Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, 30 June 2008 — Cited; supports the requisites of gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability and the requirement that the root cause be medically or clinically identified.

• Article 36, Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted by a party psychologically incapacitated at the time of celebration to comply with essential marital obligations is void even if the incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization; applied to deny nullity because petitioner failed to prove the requisites.
• Article 55, Family Code — Lists grounds for legal separation; the SC used it to classify sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, moral pressure to change religious affiliation, and abandonment as legal separation grounds, not nullity grounds.
• Articles 68-71, 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Define the essential marital obligations of husband and wife and parents and children; the Molina guidelines require the non-complied obligations to be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the decision; the SC found no psychological incapacity to comply with them.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The procedural rule under which the petition for review was filed; it governed the mode of appeal to the SC.