Dimayacyac vs. Court of Appeals

An order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on grounds of extinction of criminal liability or previous jeopardy; and a dismissal upon the accused's own motion constitutes express consent, defeating a double jeopardy claim. Additionally, the right to speedy disposition of cases is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, and the accused's failure to assert the right may constitute waiver.

The case arises from a criminal prosecution for falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner, a lawyer, was charged along with others for using spurious documents in a land registration case. The first information was quashed on the ground of duplicity of offenses, and the prosecution later filed separate informations. The legal backdrop includes Rule 117 of the Rules of Court on motions to quash and the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases.

Petitioner Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac, along with Lourdes Angeles, Estrella Mapa, and Atty. Ponciano R. Gupit, was charged with falsification of public documents under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that they conspired to falsify a certification dated March 10, 1986 purportedly signed by Fernando Dizon, a report dated May 5, 1986 purportedly signed by Jose Mariano, and a Sales Certificate and Deed of Assignment allegedly issued by the Bureau of Land in favor of Lourdes Angeles, and used these spurious documents in a petition for reconstitution of titles over lots in the Piedad Estate, resulting in the issuance of transfer certificates of titles in the name of Estrella Mapa that encroached on properties belonging to private respondents Romeo Gomez, Sixto Agbada, Irene Agbada-Cruz, and Mercedes Aristorenas.

Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two grounds: that the officer who filed it had no legal authority, and that more than one offense was charged. He was arraigned while the motion was pending. On August 23, 1991, the RTC Branch 80 granted the motion to quash on the second ground, holding that the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is discretionary on the court. More than two years later, on October 19, 1993, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed two informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-49988 and Q-93-49989, arising from the same acts of falsification. Petitioner moved to quash these on the ground of double jeopardy, citing Section 3(h) of Rule 117. The RTC Branch 227 denied the motion as to Q-93-49988, holding that it involved a different document from that in the quashed information, and stayed resolution on Q-93-49989.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which denied it, ruling that since the first information was quashed on his motion for duplicity, he was not placed in double jeopardy by the subsequent filing. The CA also noted that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution except when based on grounds of extinction of liability or previous jeopardy. Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assigning errors relating to double jeopardy and the finality of the dismissal order. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its comment, argued that petitioner waived double jeopardy by filing the motion to quash, but also advanced that the case should be dismissed for inordinate delay in preliminary investigation, violating his right to speedy disposition. Private respondents countered that the quashal on duplicity does not bar refiling, and that petitioner never raised the speedy disposition issue.

• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in disregarding the doctrine of double jeopardy, as he had already been arraigned when the first information was quashed, and the dismissal order had become final and executory.
• Finality of Dismissal: Petitioner contended that the CA erred in not considering that the order of dismissal in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 had become final and executory, and that the conclusion that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution has no legal basis.
• Adoption of OSG's Speedy Disposition Argument: Petitioner, through a Manifestation dated August 3, 1999, adopted the OSG's argument that the two-year delay in refiling the informations violated his right to speedy disposition of cases.

• Waiver of Double Jeopardy (OSG): The OSG contended that petitioner, by filing the motion to quash and refusing to withdraw it after arraignment, is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy, as his motion constituted express consent to the dismissal.
• Speedy Disposition (OSG): The OSG advanced that the criminal case may be dismissed for inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation, which is a violation of the accused's constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases.
• Quashal Not a Bar (Private Respondent Cruz): Private respondent Irene Agbada-Cruz argued that the quashal of an information is not a bar to another prosecution except when based on extinction of liability or previous jeopardy, citing Section 6 in relation to Section 3, Rule 117.
• No Jeopardy at Instance of Accused (Gomez and Aristorenas): Private respondents Romeo Gomez and Mercedes Aristorenas contended that jeopardy does not attach where dismissal was at the instance of the accused, and that petitioner never raised the speedy disposition issue, thus his silence should be interpreted as a waiver.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the prosecution of petitioner under the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988 constitutes double jeopardy, considering that when the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was previously quashed, he had already been arraigned.
• Speedy Disposition: Whether petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated by the two-year delay in filing the subsequent informations.

• Double Jeopardy: No. The dismissal of the first information was upon petitioner's own motion, constituting express consent, so one of the requisites for double jeopardy is absent.
• Speedy Disposition: No. Petitioner never asserted his right to speedy disposition, and the two-year delay was not shown to be vexatious, capricious, or oppressive.

• Double Jeopardy: The Court cited People vs. Tac-An, which enumerated three requisites for double jeopardy: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense. Legal jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, a valid plea, and dismissal without the accused's express consent. The Court found that the duplicitous information was valid because the defect could be waived, citing People vs. Bugayong and People vs. Manalili. However, the last requisite for double jeopardy was not present because the termination of the first case was upon petitioner's own motion to quash, which constituted express consent. Citing Sta. Rita vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that dismissal at the accused's instance defeats a double jeopardy claim.
• Speedy Disposition: The Court applied the factors from Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan: length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice. The two-year delay was not unreasonable because the prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain it, and petitioner never asserted the right. The Court distinguished Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan and Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where there were vexatious circumstances such as political motivation or deprivation of retirement benefits. Citing Dela Peña vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that failure to assert the right constitutes waiver.

• Double Jeopardy Requisites — For double jeopardy to attach, three requisites must exist: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy was validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy is for the same offense. Legal jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, a valid plea, and dismissal without the accused's express consent. In this case, the dismissal was upon petitioner's own motion, so the express consent element was missing.
• Validity of Duplicitous Information — A duplicitous information is valid because the defect may be waived; an accused who fails to object prior to arraignment may be convicted of as many offenses as charged and proved. Here, the first information was quashed on petitioner's motion, but the defect was waivable.
• Express Consent to Dismissal — A dismissal of a criminal case at the instance of the accused, such as a motion to quash, constitutes express consent, barring a double jeopardy claim. The Court applied this in finding no double jeopardy.
• Speedy Disposition of Cases — The right to speedy disposition is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. Factors to consider: length of delay, reasons for delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice. Failure to assert the right may constitute waiver.

• "Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first." — This states the canonical test for double jeopardy, which the Court applied to the facts.
• "Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused." — This defines when jeopardy attaches, and the absence of element (e) was decisive in this case.
• "The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried." — This is the standard for speedy disposition, which the Court used to reject the OSG's argument.

• People vs. Tac-An, 398 SCRA 373 (2003) — Controlling precedent for the elements of double jeopardy.
• People vs. Bugayong, 299 SCRA 528 (1998) — Cited for the rule that a duplicitous information is valid and the defect may be waived.
• People vs. Manalili, 294 SCRA 220 (1998) — Followed for the same proposition that a duplicitous information is valid.
• Sta. Rita vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 484 (1995) — Followed for the rule that dismissal at the accused's instance constitutes express consent.
• Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988) — Distinguished; no political motivation or vexatious delay present here.
• Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301 (1997) — Distinguished; no deprivation of benefits or unreasonable delay.
• Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945 (2002) — Followed for the factors in determining speedy disposition violation.
• Dela Peña vs. Sandiganbayan, 360 SCRA 478 (2001) — Followed for the rule that failure to assert the right constitutes waiver.

• Section 3(e) and (h), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Grounds for motion to quash; (e) duplicity of offenses, (h) previous jeopardy. The first information was quashed under (e), and petitioner invoked (h) in the second motion.
• Section 6, Rule 117, Rules of Court — An order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution unless based on grounds (f) extinction of liability or (h) previous jeopardy. The Court applied this to hold that quashal on duplicity does not bar refiling.
• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Right to speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The Court applied this in assessing the two-year delay.

Puno (on official leave), Quisumbing (Acting Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concurred.