Dimatulac vs. Villon

When the State and the offended parties are deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and the prosecution, the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. The Secretary of Justice retains the power of control and supervision over provincial prosecutors to reverse their resolutions even after an information has been filed in court, and the trial court should defer arraignment when an appeal to the DOJ is pending and there are unmistakable indicia of a probable miscarriage of justice.

Petitioners Peter Paul and Veronica Dimatulac are the children of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, who was shot dead at his residence on 3 November 1995. Private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut, and Martin Yabut (collectively the YABUTs) were accused of the killing, together with several others. The dispute centered on whether the crime was murder or homicide, and on the procedural propriety of the reinvestigation, filing of the information, and arraignment conducted while an appeal to the Secretary of Justice was pending. The case also involved the scope of the Secretary of Justice's power of control and supervision over provincial prosecutors under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 3783, Act 4007, and DOJ Department Order No. 223, series of 1993.

On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Two days later, SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station filed a complaint for Murder before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol against Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, and several others. After conducting a preliminary examination through searching questions and answers, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the MCTC found probable cause and issued warrants of arrest with no bail recommended. Only four of the accused were arrested; only Francisco Yambao submitted a counter-affidavit. On 1 December 1995, Judge David issued a Resolution finding reasonable ground to believe that murder had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof, noting that circumstantial evidence strongly showed the presence of conspiracy. He directed the Clerk of Court to forward the entire records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga.

According to the sworn statement of petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac, Mayor Yabut, accompanied by bodyguards, went to the Dimatulac residence to talk about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Paul's uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio welcomed the group and prepared coffee. Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio to come down and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul heard a gunshot. While he did not see who fired, he was certain it was one of Mayor Yabut's companions. In a supplemental statement, Peter Paul added that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed. Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano corroborated that three men had approached him at the police station asking directions to Mayor Lacap's house and inquiring whether Virgilio was on duty; the group then left on a military truck headed for San Nicolas. Later that day, a telephone call reported that Virgilio had been shot.

Thereafter, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation, either motu proprio or upon motion of the YABUTs, who had not been arrested and were at large. All accused who had not submitted counter-affidavits before the MCTC, except the John Does, submitted counter-affidavits to Alfonso-Flores. In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs and the assailant Danny were in conspiracy but that the offense was only homicide, not murder. She reasoned that while the attack was sudden and unexpected, the means of execution were not deliberately or consciously adopted, because Mayor Yabut's command to shoot came so suddenly that the assailant had no opportunity to choose the means or method of attack. She recommended bail of ₱20,000 for each accused and dismissal of the case against the other accused.

On 23 February 1996, before the information was filed, petitioners appealed Alfonso-Flores's Resolution to the Secretary of Justice, arguing that treachery and other qualifying circumstances were present and that the dismissal of the complaint against Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao was erroneous. Petitioners asserted that the meeting between the accused and the victim was not accidental, that Mayor Yabut had instructed the assailant Danny to stay close to the victim with the remark "Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na," and that Danny had positioned himself near the stairs in ambush. Despite notice of the appeal, the Information for Homicide was filed on 28 February 1996 with RTC Branch 55 in Macabebe, and Judge Roura approved the YABUTs' cash bonds and recalled their warrants the same day. Petitioners moved to defer proceedings, but Judge Roura denied the motion on 26 March 1996 and set arraignment for 12 April 1996. Petitioners then filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals and moved to inhibit Judge Roura, who voluntarily inhibited himself on 29 April 1996. The case was transferred to Branch 54, presided by Judge Sesinando Villon, who received the records on 30 April 1996 and set arraignment for 20 May 1996. On that date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty to homicide, despite the pendency of the appeal before the DOJ and the petition before the Court of Appeals.

On 7 June 1996, Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners, finding treachery present and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information from homicide to murder and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused. The YABUTs moved for reconsideration, and on 1 July 1996, the Secretary set aside his own order, holding that the appeal had been rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of the YABUTs and their pleas of not guilty, though he reiterated that Mallari should be included in the information for homicide. Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment on 1 August 1996 and denied reconsideration on 15 October 1996. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for prohibition on 16 October 1996 as moot. Petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Supreme Court on 28 December 1996.

• Grave Abuse by the Provincial Prosecutor: Petitioners argued that Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to a motion for reinvestigation by the YABUTs who had not yet been brought into the custody of the law, and in filing the information for homicide despite knowledge of the pending appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
• Excess of Jurisdiction by the Trial Judge: Petitioners maintained that respondent Judge Villon acted in excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment and in denying their motions to set aside arraignment and for reconsideration, despite his knowledge of the pendency of the appeal before the DOJ and the submission of vital evidence proving that murder, not homicide, was committed. Petitioners relied on Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals in arguing that the trial court should have deferred the proceedings.
• Grave Abuse by the Secretary of Justice: Petitioners contended that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering his order of 7 June 1996 finding that the crime committed was murder and directing the amendment of the information, solely on the basis that the accused had already been arraigned.
• Treachery Present: Petitioners insisted that the killing was attended by treachery, since private respondents tricked the victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he was descending the stairs, with the assailant having been pre-positioned near the stairs on Mayor Yabut's instructions.
• Orchestrated Effort to Evade Murder Prosecution: Petitioners claimed there was an orchestrated effort on the part of private respondents to manipulate the rules on administrative appeals to evade prosecution for the non-bailable offense of murder, citing eight circumstances including the downgrading of the charge, the YABUTs' four-month hiding, the filing of the information despite notice of the appeal, the disallowance of the private prosecutor, and the precipitate arraignment.
• Right to Speedy Trial Not Impaired: Petitioners argued that deferring the arraignment would not violate the accused's right to a speedy trial, as only three months had elapsed since the filing of the information, and that the YABUTs were estopped from invoking that right having gone into hiding after the killing.
• DOJ Appeal Rule Applies Only to Accused-Appellants: Petitioners submitted that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals once the accused had been arraigned applies only to instances where the appellants are the accused, since by submitting to arraignment they voluntarily abandon their appeal.

• No Legal Justification to Set Aside Arraignment: Private respondents contended that no sufficient legal justification existed to set aside their arraignment, which had already been reset twice to accommodate petitioners' pending appeal, and that as of the date of arraignment the DOJ had not yet resolved the appeal and had not requested that arraignment be held in abeyance despite the appeal having been filed 86 days earlier.
• No Restraining Order Issued: Private respondents argued that since no restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals, it was proper for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment, to which neither the public nor the private prosecutors objected.
• Secretary's Decision Not Subject to Judicial Review: Private respondents theorized that the decision of the Secretary of Justice, involving the exercise of discretionary powers, is not subject to judicial review, and that under the principle of separation of powers, petitioners' recourse should have been to the President. They further submitted that mandamus does not lie to compel the Secretary to amend the information, as the determination of what offense was committed is a prerogative of the DOJ.
• DOJ Order No. 223 — Appeal by Complainants Improper: Private respondents argued that under DOJ Department Order No. 223, appeal by complainants is allowed only if the complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there is a finding of probable cause, in which case only the accused can appeal; hence, petitioners' appeal was improper.
• Failure to Appeal Withdrawal of Private Prosecutor's Authority: Private respondents stressed that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the public prosecutor of the private prosecutor's authority to handle the case.

• Grave Abuse by the Provincial Prosecutor: Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in (1) giving due course to the motion for reinvestigation by private respondents against whom warrants of arrest were issued but who had not yet been brought into the custody of the law, and (2) filing the information for homicide despite knowledge of the appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
• Excess of Jurisdiction by the Trial Judge: Whether public respondent Judge Villon acted in excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment and in denying petitioners' motions to set aside arraignment and reconsideration thereof, despite his knowledge of the pendency of the appeal and the submission of vital evidence to prove that murder, not homicide, was committed.
• Grave Abuse by the Secretary of Justice: Whether public respondent Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering his order finding that the crime committed was murder and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information from homicide to murder.

• Grave Abuse by the Provincial Prosecutor: Yes. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion by conducting a reinvestigation of accused who were at large, allowing them to submit counter-affidavits without demanding their surrender, downgrading the charge to homicide, and filing the information despite a pending appeal to the DOJ.
• Excess of Jurisdiction by the Trial Judge: Yes. Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs despite unmistakable indicia of a probable miscarriage of justice, including the pending DOJ appeal, the pending Court of Appeals petition, and documentary evidence supporting a murder charge.
• Grave Abuse by the Secretary of Justice: Yes. The Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio reconsidering his 7 June 1996 resolution solely on the basis that the accused had been arraigned, thereby relinquishing his power of control and supervision over the provincial prosecutors and surrendering to their inappropriate conduct and the undue haste of the trial judges.

• Grave Abuse by the Provincial Prosecutor: The MCTC had issued warrants of arrest for the YABUTs with no bail recommended, yet they were never arrested and never surrendered; they were never brought into the custody of the law. Under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the provincial prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, but this difference of opinion must be based on review of the record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Since the YABUTs and all other accused, except Francisco Yambao, had waived the filing of their counter-affidavits before the MCTC, Alfonso-Flores had no basis to sustain a downgraded charge. She further allowed the YABUTs to submit counter-affidavits without demanding their surrender despite standing warrants, recommended a bond of only ₱20,000 despite their status as fugitives, and filed the information for homicide on 28 February 1996 despite full awareness of the pending appeal to the DOJ. The information, though dated 29 January 1996, was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996, indicating no urgency in filing. No undue prejudice would have resulted from waiting for the DOJ's resolution, since the YABUTs were still at large and posted bail only after the information was filed. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor also failed to inform the trial court of the pending appeal and refused to agree to defer arraignment, amounting to defiance of the DOJ's power of control and supervision. Public Prosecutor Datu's disallowance of the private prosecutor from participating was likewise improper, since the offended parties had not waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately, and thus had the right to intervene under Section 16 of Rule 110.

• Excess of Jurisdiction by the Trial Judge: Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring resolution on the hold-departure motion until after arraignment — precisely when immediate action was needed since the accused were out on bail — and in denying the motion to defer proceedings on the ground that the private prosecution had not shown the appeal was given due course, when he was fully aware of the appeal filed as early as 23 February 1996. Judge Villon, who received the records on 30 April 1996, acted with deliberate dispatch in setting arraignment for 20 May 1996 without perusing the record with due diligence. Had he done so, he would have noticed the motion to defer proceedings, the order giving petitioners ten days to file a petition with the Court of Appeals, the filing of such petition, the Court of Appeals resolution directing comment and deferring action on the TRO (indicating prima facie merit), the motion to inhibit Judge Roura for prejudgment, Judge Roura's subsequent inhibition, the documentary evidence submitted on 30 April 1996 supporting a murder charge, and most importantly, the pending appeal with the DOJ. While Judge Villon was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution, as he had complete control over the case, his judicial instinct should have led him to examine the submitted documents and determine whether murder was the proper charge, or to direct the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Under the totality of circumstances, prudence dictated that he wait for the DOJ resolution. His acquiescence to the public prosecutor's findings and precipitate arraignment constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, nullifying the denial of the motion to defer, the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the arraignment, and the pleas of not guilty.

• Grave Abuse by the Secretary of Justice: It was grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution — which found murder was committed and directed the amendment of the information — solely on the basis that the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In doing so, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the provincial prosecutors and meekly surrendered to their inappropriate conduct and the undue haste of the trial judges. The sins of omission or commission of the prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the DOJ's own finding that murder was committed, in unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the offended parties. The DOJ should have exercised its power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the errors, including joining cause with petitioners to set aside the arraignment, directing the public prosecutors to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them, and inquiring into the regularity of the arraignment. Because the arraignment was void for deprivation of due process to the State and the offended parties, double jeopardy could not attach, and the Secretary's hasty motu proprio reconsideration was attended with grave abuse of discretion.

• Void Arraignment for Deprivation of State's Due Process — When the State and the offended parties are deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. The Court applied this doctrine to nullify the arraignment of the YABUTs, finding that the cumulative grave abuse of discretion by the prosecutors and the trial judges denied the State and the offended parties their day in court.

• Power of Control and Supervision of the Secretary of Justice over Prosecutors — Under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code (Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV, in relation to Sections 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III), R.A. No. 3783 (Section 3), and Act 4007 (Section 37), the Secretary of Justice exercises supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. "Supervision" means overseeing or the power of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties; "control" means the power to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate has done and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice, who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify their rulings. This power finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court held that the Secretary should have exercised this power more courageously rather than reconsidering his own correct resolution.

• Right of Offended Parties to Appeal to the DOJ — The last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that if upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information or to dismiss the complaint. The "proper party" referred to may be either the offended party or the accused. Section 1 of DOJ Department Order No. 223, while speaking of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, should not be literally applied to bar appeals by offended parties only in cases of dismissal; where the prosecutor downgrades the charge from murder to homicide, this effectively "dismisses" the complaint for murder. To rule otherwise would forever bar redress of a valid grievance and render the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 meaningless.

• Crespo vs. Mogul Does Not Foreclose DOJ Power of Review — Nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.

• "It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above discussed." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on why double jeopardy cannot attach: the void arraignment, resulting from grave abuse of discretion that deprived the State and offended parties of due process, cannot serve as a basis for the constitutional bar.

• "Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings." — This quotation, drawn from Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, articulates the canonical formulation of the Secretary of Justice's power of control and supervision over prosecutors, which the Court relied upon to hold that the Secretary should not have relinquished that power by reconsidering his own correct resolution.

• "All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious attitude as these were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately held." — This passage defines the standard expected of a trial judge who takes over a case with pending administrative appeals and unresolved procedural questions: the presence of unmistakable indicia of probable miscarriage of justice requires a cautious attitude, not precipitate action.

• "Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other." — This formulation encapsulates the Court's broader doctrinal point that due process in criminal cases is not the exclusive preserve of the accused; the State and the offended parties are equally entitled to its protection.

• Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987) — Followed and clarified. The Court held that nothing in Crespo forecloses the Secretary of Justice's power to review resolutions of subordinate prosecutors even after an information has been filed in court; the Secretary is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review once a complaint or information is filed.

• Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307 (1996) — Distinguished by private respondents and the OSG but relied upon by petitioners. The Court found reliance on Roberts proper in principle, as there the accused had not been arraigned and the judge had ordered indefinite postponement pending resolution of appeals; the Court further noted that Roberts confirmed that Crespo could not have foreclosed the Secretary's power of review without repealing the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112.

• Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 39 (1994) — Followed. The Court cited Marcelo for the proposition that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of subordinates despite an information having been filed, and that prudence dictated the trial court should have awaited the resolution of the pending DOJ appeal.

• Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 (1997) — Followed. Cited for the canonical statement that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice, who exercises power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors and may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify their rulings.

• Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court cannot permit a sham trial and travesty of justice to stand unrectified, and that courts would have no reason to exist if allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice.

• Balgos vs. Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA 287 (1989) — Cited by private respondents in support of their argument that petitioners should have sought an order from the Secretary of Justice directing the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the information.

• Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Provides that if upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information. The Court held that the "proper party" may be either the offended party or the accused, and that this provision is not nullified by Crespo vs. Mogul.

• Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Governs the procedure when the provincial prosecutor disagrees with the findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation. The Court noted that the prosecutor's review must be based on the record and evidence transmitted by the judge, and that where the accused had waived the filing of counter-affidavits, the prosecutor had no basis to sustain a downgraded charge.

• Section 16, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Grants the offended party the right to intervene in the criminal case where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is not waived, reserved, or previously instituted. The Court invoked this provision to condemn Public Prosecutor Datu's disallowance of the private prosecutor from participating in the case.

• Section 20, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Cited by the private prosecution in support of the need for a hold-departure order against the accused who were out on bail.

• Section 3(d), Rule 71, Rules of Court — Defines indirect contempt. Petitioners contended that the trial court's proceeding with the arraignment despite knowledge of the pending petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals constituted indirect contempt.

• DOJ Department Order No. 223 (30 June 1993) — The 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations. Section 1 allows appeals from resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint; Section 4 provides that no appeal may be taken from a resolution finding probable cause except upon a showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, that no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned, and that an appeal shall not hold the filing of the information in court. The Court held that Section 4's reference to an appellant who "had already been arraigned" indisputably refers to appeals by respondents or accused, not by offended parties, and that Section 1 should not be literally applied to bar appeals by offended parties where the prosecutor effectively dismisses the complaint for the higher offense.

• Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV, 1987 Revised Administrative Code (E.O. No. 292) — Confers upon the Secretary of Justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices.

• Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV, 1987 Revised Administrative Code — Defines "supervision and control" as including authority to act directly, direct the performance of duty, restrain the commission of acts, and review, approve, reverse, or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials.

• Section 3, R.A. No. 3783 — Provides that State Prosecutors shall perform such other duties as may be assigned by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.

• Section 37, Act 4007 — Provides that whenever a specific power is entrusted to a chief of bureau, the same is also conferred upon the proper Department Head, who may act directly or review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concurred.