Dimat vs. People

Although fencing is a malum prohibitum requiring no proof of criminal intent, the prosecution must establish that the accused knew or should have known the item was derived from theft or robbery, which may be inferred from the accused's failure to secure proper documentation for the item.

Jose Mantequilla's 1997 Nissan Safari was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria's parking area and reported to the Traffic Management Group (TMG). In December 2000, Mel Dimat sold a 1997 Nissan Safari to Sonia Delgado for ₱850,000.00. When TMG officers spotted the vehicle on March 7, 2001 and inspected it, they discovered its engine and chassis numbers matched Mantequilla's stolen vehicle, not the numbers listed in the deeds of sale.

• The Carnapping: Jose Mantequilla owned a 1997 Nissan Safari with plate number JHM-818, engine number TD42-119136, and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111, which was mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria and subsequently reported to the TMG.
• The Sale: In December 2000, Samson Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought a 1997 Nissan Safari from Mel Dimat for ₱850,000.00. The deed of sale indicated plate number WAH-569, engine number TD42-126134, and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553.
• The Recovery: On March 7, 2001, TMG officers spotted the vehicle bearing a suspicious plate number. Inspection revealed the true engine and chassis numbers matched those of Mantequilla's stolen vehicle. The vehicle was impounded and confirmed to be the one carnapped from Mantequilla.
• The Accused's Version: Dimat claimed he bought the vehicle in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino as collateral for a loan. He asserted that Tolentino showed him old registration documents and promised new ones but failed to deliver. Dimat also claimed the vehicle he sold to Delgado was not the stolen one, relying on the differing engine and chassis numbers in the deeds of sale.

• Mistaken Identity of Vehicle: Petitioner argued that the vehicle he sold to Delgado was not the same vehicle carnapped from Mantequilla, pointing to the differing engine and chassis numbers in the deeds of sale as proof.
• Good Faith and Lack of Criminal Intent: Petitioner maintained that he acquired the vehicle in good faith and for value, and that Tolentino's failure to deliver the registration documents should not prejudice him.

• Knowledge of Illicit Origin: Respondent countered that petitioner knew or should have known the vehicle was derived from an illicit source, given the absence of proper documentation and the circumstances surrounding the transaction.

• Knowledge in Fencing: Whether the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

• Knowledge in Fencing: The CA ruling was affirmed. The defense of differing engine and chassis numbers was rejected because the physical vehicle bore the numbers of the stolen car, proving the deeds of sale did not reflect the true numbers. While fencing is a malum prohibitum requiring no proof of criminal intent, the prosecution must still prove the accused knew or should have known the item derived from crime. Petitioner's admission that the seller failed to produce registration documents confirmed he knew the vehicle came from an illicit source; Tolentino could not have shown valid old documents because the vehicle had been carnapped.

• Elements of Fencing — The crime of fencing requires the following elements: (1) a robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing was derived from that crime; and (4) the accused intends by the deal to gain for himself or for another. All elements were proven in this case.
• Malum Prohibitum in Fencing — Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. However, the prosecution must still establish that the accused knew or should have known that the item was derived from theft or robbery, and that the accused intended to obtain some gain from the transaction.

• "Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts."
• "That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source."

• Tan v. People, 372 Phil. 93 (1999) — Followed. Cited as the controlling precedent enumerating the four elements of the crime of fencing.
• Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 183891 (2010) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that violation of P.D. 1612 is a malum prohibitum requiring no proof of criminal intent.

• Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) — The statute under which the accused was charged and convicted. Applied to establish that dealing in articles derived from robbery or theft, with knowledge of their illicit origin and intent to gain, constitutes fencing, irrespective of criminal intent.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Diosdado M. Peralta, Jose Portugal Perez, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe