Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Jr.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, deeming an elective official ipso facto resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy for another office, remains operative under the 1987 Constitution, because the act of filing constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI, and the constitutional enumeration of grounds for shortening a congressman's tenure is not exclusive; the Speaker and Secretary of the House perform a ministerial duty in excluding the member's name from the Roll.

Petitioner Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections and took his oath of office on 9 January 1987. The respondents are the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Secretary-General of the House, who serve as the administrative heads responsible for maintaining the Roll of Members. The dispute centers on Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), which provides that any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one held in a permanent capacity—except for President and Vice-President—shall be considered ipso facto resigned from office upon filing a certificate of candidacy. The provision's precursors include Commonwealth Act No. 666, Republic Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code, though only B.P. Blg. 881 extended the rule to members of the legislature.

Petitioner Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges of a sitting congressman. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the election for which was scheduled for 17 February 1990.

Upon being informed by the Commission on Elections of this development, respondents Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. and Secretary Camilo L. Sabio of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). The Speaker announced this action during the session of 9 February 1990, explaining that by the very act of filing his certificate of candidacy, petitioner was deemed ipso facto resigned and his name would no longer be carried in the Roll. Following the exclusion, petitioner was barred from all proceedings of the House, was not paid emoluments due his office, had his staff dismissed and disbanded, and had his office suites occupied by other persons.

Petitioner lost in the autonomous region elections. Thereafter, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 addressed to the Speaker, he expressed his intention to resume performing his duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. The record does not indicate what action was taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat, prompting the filing of this petition on 31 January 1991.

• Constitutionality of Section 67: Petitioner maintained that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the 1987 Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to present members of Congress. He argued that the term of office of members of the House and the grounds by which incumbency may be shortened are provided for in the Constitution itself, and Section 67 provides for a ground not found in the Constitution.
• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: Petitioner asserted that under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67 is repugnant to the constitutional provisions on tenure, as the Constitutional Commission deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67 and only reaffirmed the grounds found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
• Invalidity of Administrative Act: Petitioner contended that respondents' "administrative act" of striking out his name was ineffective in terminating his term as congressman and could not be justified as an interpretation of the constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation, as only the courts may interpret laws.
• Filing COC ≠ Holding Another Office: Petitioner claimed he could not be said to have forfeited his seat under Section 13, Article VI, because forfeiture is decreed only when a congressman holds another office or employment, and filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

• Operativity of Section 67: Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contended that Section 67 remains operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated therein falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
• Non-Exclusive Enumeration: Respondents argued that the grounds mentioned in the Constitution for shortening the tenure of Members of Congress are not exclusive, pointing to other modes such as resignation, death, and conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.
• Estoppel by Filing: Respondents asserted that petitioner's filing of a certificate of candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise, as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws.
• Ministerial Act: Respondents maintained that their questioned "administrative act" was a mere ministerial act that did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers, as the legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy were already spelled out in Section 67 itself.

• Operativity of Section 67: Whether Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is operative under the present Constitution.
• Authority to Exclude from the Roll: Whether the respondent Speaker and/or the respondent Secretary could, by "administrative act," exclude the petitioner from the Rolls of the House of Representatives, thereby preventing him from exercising his functions as congressman and depriving him of his rights and privileges as such.

• Operativity of Section 67: Yes. Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains operative under the 1987 Constitution, as the act of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI, and is consistent with the constitutional principle of public office as a public trust.
• Authority to Exclude from the Roll: Yes. The Speaker and Secretary-General performed a ministerial duty in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll, as the legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy were already spelled out in Section 67, requiring no statutory interpretation.

• Operativity of Section 67: The Court found that the same constitutional basis for Section 67—public office as a public trust—remains written in the 1987 Constitution, with Section 1 of Article XI being more emphatic than its 1973 counterpart. Rather than cutting short the term of elective officials, the provision ensures that officials serve out their entire term by discouraging them from running for another office, with the consequence that failure in the new candidacy means they cannot return to their former position. The Court distinguished "term" from "tenure": the term prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the tenure—the period during which an officer actually holds office—may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the officer's power. Under Section 67, an elective official who files a certificate of candidacy for another office is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The Court rejected the application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius with full rigor in construing a constitution, holding that the maxim is only a rule of construction, not a constitutional command. The constitutional enumeration of grounds for shortening a congressman's tenure in Article VI is not exclusive, as Section 2 of Article XI expressly provides that all other public officers may be removed from office "as provided by law," recognizing legislative authority to prescribe additional grounds. The concept of "voluntary renunciation" under Section 7, Article VI was found broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, as confirmed by the Constitutional Commission deliberations where Commissioner Davide explained that voluntary renunciation is "more general, more embracing" than abandonment or resignation. The filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation, as articulated in the Batasang Pambansa deliberations by Assemblymen Rono and Tolentino. The Court cited Monroy vs. Court of Appeals for the proposition that forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon filing of the certificate of candidacy, and Castro vs. Gatuslao for the rule that only the moment and act of filing are considered, with the vacating expressly made as of the moment of filing.

• Authority to Exclude from the Roll: The Court held that no statutory interpretation was indulged in by the respondents, because the legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy were already spelled out in Section 67 itself. The Speaker, as administrative head of the House, and the Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. Upon being informed by the COMELEC that petitioner had filed a certificate of candidacy, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67. Administrative officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of a statute that has not been judicially declared unconstitutional, as this would seriously hinder the transaction of public business. Officers of the government are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

• Public Office is a Public Trust — The principle, embodied in Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The Court applied this principle to uphold Section 67, reasoning that the provision ensures elective officials honor the mandate received from their constituents and do not trifle with it by running for another office while retaining the option to return if they lose.
• Distinction Between Term and Tenure of Office — The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the tenure—the period during which an officer actually holds the office—may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the officer's power. Tenure may be shorter than the term or may not exist at all, but this does not change the duration of the term. The Court applied this distinction to reject petitioner's argument that Section 67 unconstitutionally shortens the term of a congressman, holding that the provision affects tenure, not term.
• Presumption of Constitutionality of Legislative Enactments — A constitutional measure is presumed to be created by the enactment of legislation. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. The Court relied on this presumption to uphold Section 67 against petitioner's constitutional challenge.
• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius as a Rule of Construction — The maxim is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute; only those things expressed in positive affirmative terms plainly implying the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of the legislature. The maxim is a rule of construction, not a constitutional command, and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest. The Court used this doctrine to reject petitioner's argument that the constitutional enumeration of grounds for shortening tenure is exclusive.
• Voluntary Renunciation of Office — The concept of voluntary renunciation under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67 of B.P. Blg. 881, being more general and embracing than abandonment or resignation. The filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation, producing automatic and permanent forfeiture of the elective position being held.
• Ministerial Duty of Administrative Officers — Administrative officers cannot refuse to perform their statutory duties on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty, where the statute has not been judicially declared unconstitutional. Allowing such refusal would seriously hinder the transaction of public business. Officers of the government are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

• "Rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position." — This passage articulates the Court's rationale for upholding Section 67, reframing the provision not as a shortening of term but as a mechanism to ensure fidelity to the mandate.
• "The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer." — This defines the critical distinction between term and tenure that underpins the Court's analysis.
• "The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of legislature." — This states the doctrinal limitation on the application of the maxim in constitutional construction, central to rejecting petitioner's exclusivity argument.
• "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official." — This quotation from Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, adopted by the Court, establishes the automatic and permanent character of the forfeiture under the deemed-resignation rule.

• Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 620 (1967) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office; only the moment and act of filing are considered.
• Castro vs. Gatuslao, 94 Phil. 196 — Followed for the rule that the wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into account, and the law does not make forfeiture dependent on future contingencies.
• Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12 — Cited in support of the distinction between term and tenure of office.
• People vs. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90; Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30; Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6 — Cited collectively for the presumption of constitutionality of legislative enactments.
• Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil 818 — Cited for the principle that administrative officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of a statute not judicially declared unconstitutional.
• State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, Neb. 514, 64 NW 1104 — Cited for the proposition that the expression in the constitution of circumstances that shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others, nor preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds.

• Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — The central provision at issue, providing that any elective official running for any office other than the one held in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy. The Court held this provision operative under the 1987 Constitution.
• Section 7, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Provides that members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years, and that voluntary renunciation of office is a ground for shortening tenure. The Court held that the concept of voluntary renunciation therein is broad enough to encompass the deemed-resignation rule in Section 67.
• Section 13, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Provides for forfeiture of seat by holding any other office or employment in the government. The Court distinguished this ground from the forfeiture under Section 67, which is a mode of voluntary renunciation, not a holding of another office.
• Section 16(3), Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Provides for expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior. Cited by petitioner as one of the exclusive constitutional grounds for shortening tenure; the Court held the enumeration was not exclusive.
• Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Provides for disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest. Cited by petitioner as an exclusive ground; rejected by the Court.
• Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Declares that public office is a public trust and that public officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The Court relied on this provision as the constitutional basis for Section 67, finding it more emphatic than its 1973 counterpart.
• Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — Provides that all public officers other than those removable by impeachment may be removed from office as provided by law. The Court relied on this provision to establish that the constitutional enumeration of grounds for shortening tenure is not exclusive and that the legislature may prescribe additional grounds.
• Section 2, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and local officials first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. Cited by petitioner to establish the constitutional term of office.

Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concurred. Fernan, C.J., took no part.

• Gutierrez, Jr., J. — Justice Gutierrez dissented, arguing that Congress cannot by statute or administrative act add to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers, as the causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are exclusive and intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and independent discharge of their functions. He contended that the earlier statutory precursors of Section 67 all referred to non-constitutional officers (provincial, city, and municipal officials), and the legislature had never previously included its own members in the deemed-resignation rule, recognizing that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute but had to be in the Constitution. He rejected the equation of filing a certificate of candidacy with "voluntary renunciation," noting that for fifty years of constitutional history, running for another position was not considered voluntary renunciation of a congressional seat, and that "voluntary" refers to a state of mind that should not be treated lightly. He further invoked the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation, emphasizing that the case involved not merely the petitioner's right to sit in the House but the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress. He voted to grant the petition. Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concurred in the dissent.