Dimabayao vs. NLRC

An employee's act of leaving his work station to answer the call of nature does not constitute willful disobedience or gross and habitual neglect justifying dismissal under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as such act is beyond the employee's control and cannot be characterized as a wrongful and perverse attitude toward the employer's lawful orders.

Private respondent Island Biscuit, Inc. is engaged in the manufacture of biscuits, with private respondent Cheng Suy Eh as its General Manager. The company maintained a policy discouraging employees from going to the comfort room during working hours for sanitary or hygienic purposes because the company is engaged in the food business. The petitioner was employed on 5 April 1983 with the specific task of operating the roller, cutting biscuits, sorting out rejects, mashing flour, and feeding the flour mass into the thinning machine.

Danilo Dimabayao was employed by Island Biscuit, Inc. on 5 April 1983, tasked with operating the roller, cutting biscuits, sorting out rejects, mashing flour, and feeding the flour mass into the thinning machine. On 30 July 1992, while assigned to sort out rejects, petitioner obtained prior permission from his checker and went to the comfort room to answer the call of nature, after which he returned to his work place. Private respondent Cheng Suy Eh, however, was unhappy seeing petitioner away from his work station and demanded a written explanation for allegedly abandoning his work.

The following day, 31 July 1992, Marcela Lok, the company's Personnel Manager, handed petitioner a letter asking him to explain in writing why he left his work station on 17 and 30 July 1992. Petitioner verbally explained that he never left his station on 17 July, and on 30 July he only went to the comfort room briefly to answer the call of nature. Believing this denial was sufficient, he did not submit any written explanation. For his failure to submit a written explanation, petitioner was suspended for fifteen days, which he contested before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

On 20 October 1992, petitioner requested a fellow worker to replace him at his work station so he could go to the comfort room to relieve himself. Again, Cheng Suy Eh noticed petitioner's brief absence and berated him upon his return, requiring him to submit another written explanation for allegedly abandoning his work. Petitioner complied, but finding his explanation unsatisfactory, the company served him a notice of termination. Petitioner thereafter amended his complaint before the NLRC to include illegal dismissal among his causes of action.

The NLRC, in upholding the dismissal, cited petitioner's alleged prior infractions including a fist fight with a co-employee, negligence in mixing dough of one product, threatening and sending away co-workers, and refusing to comply with a checker's instructions. The NLRC noted that petitioner enjoyed two fifteen-minute coffee breaks and one hour meal time, and that he had been forewarned of termination if he committed the offense again. Witnesses testified during the hearing before the Arbitration Branch that petitioner was absent from his work station only for a few minutes and that on 20 October 1992 he took the initiative of asking a co-worker to take over his post before proceeding to the latrine.

• Illegality of Dismissal: Petitioner argued that his dismissal was illegal because his act of leaving his work station to answer the call of nature could not be characterized as abandonment, much less willful or intentional disobedience of company rules, since he was merely answering a call of nature over which he had no control.
• Procedural Due Process: Petitioner maintained that it would be doubly prejudicial to penalize him for the 17 and 30 July 1992 incidents because he was already suspended for fifteen days for those infractions, and that considering prior offenses as grounds for dismissal denied him procedural due process and deprived him of his right to be heard.
• Right to Reinstatement: Petitioner prayed for his reinstatement, arguing that the strained relationship doctrine did not apply because he was an ordinary employee whose relationship with management was on an impersonal level.

• Validity of Dismissal: Respondents argued that petitioner's termination was for a valid cause, as he violated several times the company rules prohibiting the leaving of one's post during working hours without proper authorization, making him a habitual violator of company regulations.
• Prior Infractions: Respondents cited petitioner's prior offenses, including a fist fight with a co-employee, negligence in mixing dough, threatening co-workers, and refusing to comply with instructions, as grounds supporting the dismissal.
• Forewarning: Respondents maintained that petitioner had been forewarned of termination if he committed the offense again, and that he virtually provoked them into terminating him by leaving his post on 20 October 1992.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the legality of petitioner's dismissal.
• Just Cause for Termination: Whether petitioner's act of leaving his work station to answer the call of nature constituted serious misconduct or willful disobedience, or gross and habitual neglect, justifying dismissal under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
• Strained Relationship: Whether the strained relationship doctrine barred petitioner's reinstatement.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the legality of petitioner's dismissal, as his act of leaving his work place to relieve himself could hardly be characterized as abandonment, much less willful or intentional disobedience of company rules.
• Just Cause for Termination: No. Petitioner's disobedience to his employer's orders was trivial and unimportant and did not merit a penalty as harsh as dismissal; there was no gross and habitual neglect of duties since he merely relieved himself, which could not have constituted abandonment of work or disrupted company operations.
• Strained Relationship: No. The strained relationship doctrine may be invoked only against employees whose positions demand trust and confidence, or whose differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement; petitioner was an ordinary employee whose relationship with management was clearly on an impersonal level.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court applied the requisites for willful disobedience as established in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. Court of Appeals and Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties he had been engaged to discharge. The Court found that petitioner's act of leaving his work place to relieve himself could hardly be characterized as abandonment, much less willful or intentional disobedience, since he was merely answering the call of nature over which he had no control. Restraining one's bowel movement can result in great discomfort and affect adversely the efficiency, and even the health, of the worker.

• Just Cause for Termination: The Court held that petitioner's disobedience was trivial and unimportant and did not merit a penalty as harsh as dismissal. There was no gross and habitual neglect of duties since he merely relieved himself, which could not have constituted abandonment of work. Neither could it have disrupted the operations of the company as to cause it irreparable damage. Witnesses testified that petitioner was absent from his work station only for a few minutes and that on 20 October 1992 he even took the initiative of asking his co-worker to take over his post before proceeding to the latrine. At most, a 7-day suspension without pay should have been sufficient penalty. The Court also noted that the offenses allegedly committed by petitioner way back in 1990 were mere afterthoughts conceived in the course of the trial to further justify his dismissal, as the termination letter was based merely on the 17 July, 30 July, and 20 October 1992 incidents. Penalizing him for the 17 and 30 July incidents was doubly prejudicial since he was already suspended for fifteen days for those infractions, which denied him procedural due process.

• Strained Relationship: The Court rejected the Labor Arbiter's postulate that there existed a strained relationship between the parties barring reinstatement. The strained relationship doctrine may be invoked only against employees whose positions demand trust and confidence, or whose differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. In this case, the relationship between petitioner, an ordinary employee, and management was clearly on an impersonal level. Petitioner did not occupy such a sensitive position as would require complete trust and confidence, and where personal ill will would foreclose his reinstatement.

• Willful Disobedience as Just Cause for Dismissal — Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal, envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The Court applied this test and found that petitioner's act of answering the call of nature was not willful disobedience because it was beyond his control and not characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude.

• Strained Relationship Doctrine — Strained relationship may be invoked only against employees whose positions demand trust and confidence, or whose differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. The Court held that this doctrine does not apply to an ordinary employee whose relationship with management is on an impersonal level, and who does not occupy a sensitive position requiring complete trust and confidence.

• Procedural Due Process in Dismissal — An employee cannot be penalized twice for the same infraction, and offenses not cited in the termination letter cannot be used as afterthoughts to justify dismissal. The Court held that considering prior offenses as grounds for dismissal was prejudicial to petitioner and denied him procedural due process, depriving him of his right to be heard, to refute, and to present evidence to controvert such accusations prior to his actual dismissal.

• "Petitioner's act of leaving his work place to relieve himself can hardly be characterized as abandonment, much less a willful or intentional disobedience of company rules since he was merely answering the call of nature over which he had no control. Restraining one's bowel movement can result in great discomfort and affect adversely the efficiency, and even the health, of the worker." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the act of answering the call of nature is not willful disobedience because it is beyond the employee's control.

• "Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for dismissal of an employee envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge." — This is the canonical formulation of the requisites for willful disobedience as a just cause for dismissal, frequently cited in subsequent labor law jurisprudence.

• "Strained relationship may be invoked only against employees whose positions demand trust and confidence, or whose differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement." — This defines the scope of the strained relationship doctrine, limiting its application to employees in sensitive positions.

• Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-38482, 11 June 1976, 71 SCRA 811 — Controlling precedent establishing the two requisites for willful disobedience as a just cause for dismissal; the Court relied on this case in finding that petitioner's conduct did not constitute willful disobedience.

• Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 92859, 1 February 1993, 189 SCRA 811 — Followed; reiterated the requisites for willful disobedience and was the basis for the Court's ruling that the NLRC could not be sustained in upholding the dismissal.

• Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116542, 30 July 1996, 260 SCRA 49 — Cited in support of the principle that a grave injustice would be committed against the employee if the penalty imposed was grossly disproportionate to the wrong committed.

• Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103215, 6 November 1992, 215 SCRA 501 — Cited for the proposition that strained relationship may be invoked only against employees whose positions demand trust and confidence, or whose differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement.

• Article 282(a) and (b), Labor Code — Provides that an employer may terminate an employment for serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work, and for gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. The Court found that petitioner's act of answering the call of nature did not fall under either category.

• Article 279, Labor Code — Provides for security of tenure: in cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title, and an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. The Court applied this provision in ordering petitioner's reinstatement with full backwages.

Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concurred.