Dilweg vs. Phillips

A nonresident alien need not establish residence or be physically present in the Philippines in order to institute and maintain a personal action against a resident or citizen for rights of action arising within Philippine territorial jurisdiction. Article 33 of the Civil Code, which authorizes a civil action for damages for defamation, makes no distinction as to whether the injured party is a Filipino citizen, a resident, or an alien.

Lavern R. Dilweg was a nonresident American, residing in Washington, D.C., who had never been present in or resided in the Philippines. Defendants Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros, and Isaac S. Eceta were residents within Philippine territorial jurisdiction. The causes of action arose from alleged libelous and defamatory statements uttered and published by the defendants in the Philippines. The civil action for damages was anchored on Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party, proceeding independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring only preponderance of evidence.

On February 7, 1958, Lavern R. Dilweg, a nonresident American then in Washington, D.C., filed through counsel a complaint consisting of six causes of action against Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros, and Isaac S. Eceta, seeking civil damages arising from alleged libelous and defamatory statements uttered and published by the defendants in the Philippines. The complaint contained no allegation that Dilweg had ever been in the Philippines or had resided therein at any time.

On February 24, 1958, Phillips and Dineros filed a motion to dismiss, which Dilweg opposed on March 7, 1958. The trial court denied the motion on May 13, 1958. Thereafter, Phillips and Dineros filed a joint answer on May 17, 1958, asserting six causes of action as counterclaims for damages against Dilweg. Dilweg answered the counterclaims on May 24, 1958. On June 11, 1958, Eceta, represented by separate counsel, filed an answer adopting in toto the answer and counterclaims of his co-defendants, which Dilweg answered on June 26, 1958. The trial court scheduled the hearing for December 10 and 11, 1958.

In the course of the trial on the merits, on March 8, 1961, Phillips and Dineros presented a written motion for reconsideration of the May 13, 1958 order that had denied their motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff's person because he was a nonresident who had never been present in the Philippines. Dilweg opposed the motion on April 7, 1961. On May 11, 1961, the trial court granted the motion, set aside its prior order, and dismissed the case. The trial court reasoned that in personal actions, jurisdiction over both subject matter and the persons of the parties is essential, and that because the plaintiff was neither a resident nor physically present within the territorial jurisdiction, the court could not acquire jurisdiction over his person and thus could not render a valid judgment against him — particularly should the defendants' counterclaims require enforcement. Dilweg moved for reconsideration on June 28, 1961; the defendants opposed on July 10, 1961; and Dilweg replied on July 22, 1961. On November 7, 1961, the trial court denied the motion, prompting the present appeal.

• Jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiff: Plaintiff maintained that Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a personal action instituted by a nonresident alien where the cause of action arose within Philippine territory and the defendants are found therein, and that neither residence nor physical presence is a prerequisite for the plaintiff to sue.
• Article 33 applicability: Plaintiff invoked Article 33 of the Civil Code, arguing that the provision authorizes a civil action for damages for defamation without making any distinction as to the citizenship or residence of the injured party.
• Counterclaims do not bar the action: Plaintiff contended that the existence of counterclaims against a nonresident plaintiff does not alter the court's jurisdiction, as the Rules of Court provide remedies against nonresident defendants.

• Lack of jurisdiction over plaintiff's person: Defendants contended that in a personal action, the court can acquire jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff only if he resides within the court's territorial jurisdiction, and that since Dilweg had never been and was not present in the Philippines, the court could not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
• Unenforceability of counterclaims: Defendants argued that if counterclaims were filed against the nonresident plaintiff, they could not be enforced because the court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person, and that any judgment rendered would be unenforceable outside Philippine jurisdiction since the plaintiff had no property in the Philippines.
• Reliance on American doctrines: Defendants invoked American doctrines on jurisdiction, arguing that in personal actions, jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the person whose rights are to be affected is essential, and that a court can acquire no jurisdiction where neither the person nor any property can be found within the state.

• Jurisdiction over nonresident alien plaintiff: Whether Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdiction over a personal action instituted by a nonresident alien who is not within the territorial jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

• Jurisdiction over nonresident alien plaintiff: No, the court cannot rightfully refuse jurisdiction. Neither residence nor physical presence in the Philippines is indispensable for a nonresident alien to maintain a personal action against a resident, where the cause of action arose within Philippine territorial jurisdiction and the defendants are found therein. Article 33 of the Civil Code imposes no citizenship or residence restriction on the injured party's right to sue for defamation.

• Jurisdiction over nonresident alien plaintiff: The trial court erred in holding that jurisdiction over the plaintiff's person requires his residence or physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction. A personal action sounding in tort is transitory in nature and follows the person of the defendant; Philippine courts are open to a nonresident plaintiff for redress of personal injury suffered by reason of the defendant's acts committed within Philippine territory. This position is supported by practically unanimous American authority, which the Court found persuasive given that Philippine rules on jurisdiction were patterned upon American laws and statutes. No general Philippine law restricts the right of nonresident aliens to sue in Philippine courts. Article 33 of the Civil Code, the specific provision availed of by the plaintiff, authorizes a civil action for damages for defamation by the "injured party" without distinguishing between Filipino citizens, residents, or aliens. The American decisions cited by the trial court were inapplicable because in those cases the defendants invoked lack of jurisdiction over their own persons, not over the plaintiff's. The existence of counterclaims against the nonresident plaintiff does not alter the result, as the Rules of Court provide remedies against nonresident defendants. The Court had recently upheld the right of non-residents to maintain personal actions against residents in Philippine courts in Sharruf vs. Bubla.

• Transitory nature of personal actions sounding in tort — A personal action sounding in tort is transitory in its nature and follows the person of the defendant; courts of the forum are open to the plaintiff for redress of personal injury suffered by reason of the defendant's acts committed within the territorial jurisdiction. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that a nonresident alien may sue Philippine residents for defamation committed in the Philippines.
• Right of nonresident aliens to sue — Neither residence nor physical presence in the forum state is indispensable for a nonresident alien to institute or maintain a personal action against a resident or citizen of that state for rights of action arising within, or for violations of laws committed within, the territorial jurisdiction of that state. The Court found no Philippine law restricting this right and applied the doctrine to reverse the trial court's dismissal.
• Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff — Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the filing of the complaint; it is jurisdiction over the defendant that requires voluntary appearance or coercive legal process. The trial court erroneously conflated the requirements for acquiring jurisdiction over defendants with those applicable to plaintiffs.

• "It is thus evident that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the court below, it is not indispensable for a foreigner to establish residence, nor need he be physically present in a state of which he is not a resident or citizen in order that he may initiate or maintain a personal action against a resident or citizen of that other state for rights of action arising in, or for violations of laws committed within, the territorial jurisdiction of that other state." — This passage states the ratio decidendi, articulating the core rule that residence or physical presence is not a prerequisite for a nonresident alien to sue in Philippine courts.

• "The above-quoted provision of law does not make any distinction as to whether the 'injured party', who may maintain an action for damages based on defamation, is a Filipino citizen or a resident or an alien." — This passage explains why Article 33 of the Civil Code applies to nonresident aliens, emphasizing the absence of any citizenship or residence restriction in the statutory text.

• "As a personal action, sounding in tort, it was transitory in its nature, following the person of the defendant. Our courts were open to the plaintiff for redress of any personal injury suffered by reason of defendant' acts" — Quoted from the New York Court of Appeals decision in Crashley vs. Press Pub. Co., this passage articulates the transitory-action doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court as the basis for allowing the nonresident plaintiff's suit.

• Sharruf vs. Bubla, G.R. No. L-17029, September 30, 1964 — Controlling recent precedent cited by the Court for the proposition that non-residents may maintain personal actions against residents in Philippine courts.
• Crashley vs. Press Pub. Co., 71 N.E. 258 — Persuasive American authority cited for the doctrine that a personal action sounding in tort is transitory and follows the person of the defendant, and that courts are open to nonresident plaintiffs for redress of personal injury.
• King Mau Wu vs. Sycip, 50 O.G. 5366 (1954) — Cited by the trial court for the proposition that a non-resident may sue a resident in Philippine courts for collection of money arising from a contract executed outside the country; the Supreme Court noted this as consistent with its ruling.
• Western Equipment and Supply Co. vs. Reyes, 51 Phil. 116 — Cited by the trial court for the rule that a foreign corporation unlicensed in the Philippines may sue to restrain residents from using its tradename, as an action in rem; distinguished from the present case which is a personal action.
• El Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 — Cited by the trial court for the requirement that a court must have jurisdiction over both subject matter and the persons of the parties; the Supreme Court did not dispute this principle but corrected its misapplication to the plaintiff.
• Perkins vs. Dizon, 69 Phil. 189 — Cited by the trial court alongside El Banco Español Filipino for the same jurisdictional principle; jurisdiction over the person is acquired by voluntary appearance or coercive legal process.
• Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523 — Cited by the trial court for the general rule that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by the filing of the complaint.

• Article 33, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party, proceeding independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring only preponderance of evidence. The Court held that this provision makes no distinction as to citizenship or residence of the injured party, thereby allowing a nonresident alien to maintain a defamation action.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concurred.