Dichoso, Jr. vs. Marcos

A compulsory easement of right of way requires real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity; mere convenience for the dominant estate does not suffice as the legal basis for establishing the easement. When there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if that outlet is inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.

Petitioners Crispin Dichoso, Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie Dichoso Pe Benito are the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31219. Respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos is the owner of the adjacent Lot No. 1. The legal framework governing compulsory easements of right of way is found in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, which require that the dominant estate be surrounded by other immovables and have no adequate outlet to a public highway, among other requisites.

Petitioners Crispin Dichoso, Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie Dichoso Pe Benito are the owners of Lot No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31219. Respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos is the owner of the adjacent Lot No. 1. Petitioners claimed that they had no access to a public road to and from their property and had used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand.

On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent, praying for a right of way over an area of 54 square meters more or less of Lot No. 1, with payment of ₱54,000.00 as indemnity, annotation of the right on respondent's title, and ₱30,000.00 as damages for attorney's fees and costs of suit. Petitioners acknowledged that they had been granted another passageway by the spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce, the owners of another adjacent lot designated as Lot No. 21559-B, but they still instituted the complaint.

Instead of filing an Answer, respondent moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of cause of action and noncompliance with the requisite certificate of non-forum shopping. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties agreed to an ocular inspection of the subject properties, after which the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective position papers. In a resolution dated May 12, 2004, the RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss and required him to answer the complaint.

In his Answer, respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as a passageway, stating that petitioners' claim of right of way was only due to expediency and not necessity. He maintained that there was an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce, and thus there was no need to establish another easement over his property. In an Order dated July 6, 2005, the RTC declared that respondent's answer failed to tender an issue, opted to render judgment on the pleadings, and deemed the case submitted for decision.

On July 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, granting a right of way over an area of 54 square meters over Lot No. 1, ordering petitioners to pay respondent ₱54,000.00 as proper indemnity, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laoag City to annotate the right of way on respondent's title. The RTC found that petitioners adequately established the requisites for an easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code and declared petitioners in good faith for expressing willingness to pay proper indemnity.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners' complaint. The appellate court concluded that since a right of way had already been granted by the other servient estate, Lot No. 21559-B owned by the Spouses Arce, there was no need to establish an easement over respondent's property. The CA explained that while the alternative route through the Spouses Arce's property is longer and circuitous, the access road is adequate, and the convenience of the dominant estate is never the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way.

• Entitlement to Shortest Route: Petitioners argued that they are entitled to a grant of legal easement of right of way from their landlocked property through respondent's property, which is the shortest route in going to and from their property to the public street and where they used to pass.
• Unjustified Refusal: Petitioners argued that respondent cannot refuse to grant a right of way on the desired passageway which he closed, since the alternative passageway through the Spouses Arce's property is more circuitous and burdensome and was belatedly offered to them.
• Inadequacy of Alternative Route: Petitioners argued that they cannot be compelled to avail of a legal easement of right of way through the property of the Spouses Arce because that property has been foreclosed by the bank, and the latter is not a party to the case.

• Lack of Necessity: Respondent argued that petitioners' claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not necessity, and that there is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by the Spouses Arce, making another easement over his property unnecessary.
• Denial of Prior Use: Respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as a passageway.

• Entitlement to Easement: Whether petitioners can be entitled to a grant of legal easement of right of way from their landlocked property through respondent's property, which is the shortest route to the public street and where they used to pass.
• Refusal to Grant Right of Way: Whether respondent can refuse to grant a right of way on the desired passageway which he closed, given that there is another passageway which is more circuitous and burdensome and was belatedly offered to petitioners.
• Compulsion to Use Alternative Route: Whether petitioners can be compelled to avail of a legal easement of right of way through the property of the Spouses Arce, which was belatedly offered but has been foreclosed by the bank, with the latter not being a party to the case.

• Entitlement to Easement: No. Petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the requisites of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, particularly the requirement that the dominant estate has no adequate outlet to a public highway.
• Refusal to Grant Right of Way: Yes. Respondent can refuse to grant a right of way because petitioners already have an existing adequate outlet through the Spouses Arce's property; mere convenience for the dominant estate is not the gauge for granting a compulsory right of way.
• Compulsion to Use Alternative Route: Yes. Petitioners can be compelled to use the existing right of way through the Spouses Arce's property, as the true standard for the grant of a legal right of way is "adequacy," and when an existing adequate outlet exists, the opening of another servitude is unjustified.

• Entitlement to Easement: The Court noted that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing errors of law, with findings of fact of the CA being conclusive upon the Court. However, the present case falls under the 7th exception to this rule because the RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court then applied Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, which require the following requisites for an easement of right of way: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there is payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The Court held that petitioners failed to satisfy these requirements, particularly the first requisite, because they had already been granted a right of way through the adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce, and other lot owners use that outlet in going to and from the public highway. The Court emphasized that an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate, and it is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before the claim may be granted.
• Refusal to Grant Right of Way: The Court found petitioners' concept of "adequate outlet" to be a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. The Court quoted with approval the CA's observation that petitioners had been granted a right of way through the adjacent estate of the Spouses Arce before the complaint was even filed, that this right of way is being used by other estates similarly situated as petitioners, and that the fact that the Spouses Arce are not insisting on a right of way through respondent's property bolsters the conviction that they have adequate outlet to the highway which they are making available to petitioners.
• Compulsion to Use Alternative Route: The Court held that the convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. The Court cited Cristobal vs. CA, where the easement was disallowed because an outlet already existed; Floro vs. Llenado, where the Court refused to impose a right of way although the alternative route was admittedly inconvenient because the petitioner had to traverse several ricelands and rice paddies; and Ramos vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., where the Court refused to grant the easement even if the petitioner had to pass through lots belonging to other owners that were grassy, cogonal, and greatly inconvenient due to flood and mud.

• Doctrine of Real Necessity in Compulsory Easements — In order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioners already had an adequate outlet through the Spouses Arce's property, making the imposition of another easement over respondent's property unjustified.
• Adequacy as the True Standard — The true standard for the grant of a legal right of way is "adequacy," not convenience. When there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even when the said outlet is inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. The Court applied this standard in affirming the CA's dismissal of petitioners' complaint.
• Burden of Proof on the Dominant Estate Owner — An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before the claim for easement of right of way may be granted. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that petitioners failed to satisfy the requisites of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.

• "The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is 'adequacy.' Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that adequacy, not convenience, is the controlling standard for granting a compulsory right of way.
• "We find petitioners' concept of what is 'adequate outlet' a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement." — This passage defines the doctrine of real necessity and rejects convenience as a basis for imposing a compulsory easement.
• "It must be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the obligations imposed on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted." — This passage establishes the burden of proof on the dominant estate owner and characterizes an easement as an abnormal restriction on the servient estate.

• Cristobal vs. CA, 353 Phil. 318 (1998) — Followed. The Court disallowed the easement prayed for because an outlet already existed, a path walk connected to a private road leading to a public street, which was determined to be sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate.
• Floro vs. Llenado, 314 Phil. 715 (1995) — Followed. The Court refused to impose a right of way over petitioner's property although the private respondent's alternative route was admittedly inconvenient because the respondent had to traverse several ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different persons, and the passage was impassable during the rainy season.
• Ramos vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., 238 Phil. 689 (1987) — Followed. The Court refused to grant the easement prayed for even if the petitioner had to pass through lots belonging to other owners, which were grassy, cogonal, and greatly inconvenient due to flood and mud, because such grant would run counter to the prevailing jurisprudence that mere convenience for the dominant estate does not suffice.
• Costabella Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333 — Cited in support of the proposition that the convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way.
• Quintanilla vs. Abangan, G.R. No. 160613, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 494 — Cited for the enumeration of the requisites for an easement of right of way.
• David-Chan vs. CA, 335 Phil. 1140 (1997) — Cited for the proposition that petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right of way.

• Article 649, Civil Code — Governs the conferment of a legal easement of right of way. The Court applied this provision in determining whether petitioners were entitled to demand a right of way through respondent's neighboring estate, requiring that the dominant estate be surrounded by other immovables and without adequate outlet to a public highway, and that proper indemnity be paid.
• Article 650, Civil Code — Requires that the easement of right of way be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The Court applied this provision in evaluating whether the claimed right of way satisfied the statutory requirements.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Court noted that its jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the CA under this rule is limited to reviewing errors of law, with findings of fact of the CA being conclusive upon the Court, subject to recognized exceptions.

• Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
• Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad
• Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza