Diaz vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The discharge of a public officer or employee for a grave offense such as dishonesty is not mitigated by the length of government service or the fact that it is a first offense. In administrative proceedings, substantial evidence — relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion — is sufficient to establish guilt. Public records, such as Supplies Ledger Cards, are prima facie evidence of the facts they contain and carry a presumption of regularity, which may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

The General Investigation Bureau A (GIB-A) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against several personnel of the Veterinary Inspection Board (VIB) of the City of Manila, including Jose L. Diaz as City Government Division Head III and Rodrigo R. Reyes as Mechanic III. The complaint charged violations of Section 3(e) and (i) of Republic Act No. 3019, Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Use of Public Funds or Property), and administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service under the URACCS. The core allegation was that Diaz and Reyes caused gasoline withdrawals for government vehicles that had been decommissioned or declared unserviceable, and that Diaz used government fuel for his personal vehicle.

• The Complained Transactions: On November 18, 1998, Diaz received from the Public Recreation Bureau one unit Jeep Yellow, CJ-81 Engine No. 406Y18. A Work Order dated December 29, 1998, authorized the replacement of engine no. 406Y18 with engine no. 13T-4990303; the former was decommissioned. An Inventory and Inspection Report of Unserviceable Property dated August 31, 1999, signed by Diaz, declared the Toyota Land Cruiser with plate no. SCB-995 “unserviceable.” On July 9, 2001, Diaz approved a letter authorizing the withdrawal of the Toyota Land Cruiser for disposal at the dumping area in Arroceros, Manila.

• The Gasoline Withdrawals: The VIB’s Gasoline Fuel Supplies Ledger Cards (SLC) revealed that from January 1999 to December 2001, 4,555 liters of gasoline were withdrawn for the vehicle with plate no. SCB-995, and from May 2001 to December 2003, 6,500 liters were withdrawn for the vehicle with engine no. 406Y18 — totaling 11,055 liters over five years. The SLC identified Diaz and Reyes as officials responsible for the withdrawals and showed Diaz withdrawing gasoline for a vehicle with plate no. PPR-691, which he acknowledged as his personal vehicle. Diaz was already receiving a transportation allowance during the same period.

• Diaz’s Defense: In his Counter-Affidavit, Diaz denied the charges. He claimed that the vehicle with plate no. SCB-995 continued to be used by the VIB from 1999 to December 2003 because its engine had been replaced in 1998, despite the unserviceability report. He asserted that the vehicle was finally removed only on August 18, 2004, after being sold at public auction. He denied knowledge of gasoline withdrawals for his personal vehicle, asserting that his signature did not appear on the SLC and no evidence proved he personally requested fuel.

• The Ombudsman’s Factual Findings: The Ombudsman gave weight to the SLC and found substantial evidence that Diaz and Reyes used government gasoline for personal purposes. The SLC established that Diaz personally withdrew 390 liters worth ₱6,653.40 for his personal vehicle. The Ombudsman rejected the claim that the vehicles with engine no. 406Y18 and plate no. SCB-995 were still in use, given the decommissioning in December 1998 and Diaz’s own authorization for disposal in July 2001.

• The CA’s Affirmance: The Court of Appeals upheld the Ombudsman’s findings, holding that the SLC, being public records, constituted prima facie evidence of their contents. It rejected petitioner’s hearsay and ill-motive objections. The CA found Diaz’s defense — that the vehicle continued to be used after being declared unserviceable — belied by his own letter authorizing its withdrawal for disposal. The documentary evidence Diaz submitted did not identify the subject vehicle as among those auctioned in 2004. The CA also found no denial of due process, as Diaz was able to explain his side through his Counter-Affidavit.

• Lack of Substantial Evidence: Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman’s findings, as sustained by the CA, were not supported by substantial evidence, assailing the probative value and trustworthiness of the SLC as hearsay and prepared with ill motives.

• SLC Unreliability: Petitioner maintained that the SLC were not prepared or signed by him and thus could not be used to prove personal gasoline withdrawals, especially for his personal vehicle with plate no. PPR-691.

• Plausible Justification for Gasoline Withdrawals: Petitioner asserted that his office continued to use the vehicle with plate no. SCB-995 for official purposes from 1999 up to December 2003, made possible by replacing the original engine with a new one purchased on December 1, 1998, and the vehicle was not actually removed from VIB premises until 2004 after public auction.

• Excessive Penalty: Even assuming guilt, petitioner contended that the supreme penalty of dismissal was too harsh considering his 22 years of government service and that this was his first offense; length of service should serve as a mitigating circumstance.

• Prima Facie Evidence of Public Records: Respondent countered that the SLC, as public records, constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and carry a presumption of regularity, which petitioner failed to overcome with sufficient contrary proof.

• Implausible Defense Contradicted by Own Acts: Respondent argued that petitioner’s claim of continued use of the unserviceable vehicle was negated by his own Inventory and Inspection Report declaring it unserviceable on August 31, 1999, and his July 9, 2001 letter authorizing its withdrawal for disposal.

• Gravity of Offense Not Mitigated: Respondent maintained that dishonesty is a grave offense under Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the URACCS, for which the prescribed penalty is dismissal; length of service or first-offense status cannot mitigate such a serious charge.

• Substantial Evidence: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of dishonesty was supported by substantial evidence.
• Probative Value of the SLC: Whether the Supplies Ledger Cards were admissible and sufficient to establish petitioner’s personal gasoline withdrawals, and whether petitioner overcame their prima facie character.
• Validity of the Defense: Whether petitioner’s explanation of continued official use of the decommissioned/unserviceable vehicle was plausible and adequately supported, thus negating dishonesty.
• Imposable Penalty: Whether the penalty of dismissal from service was excessive and should be mitigated by petitioner’s length of service and being a first-time offender.

• Substantial Evidence: The Ombudsman’s conclusion that petitioner committed dishonesty was supported by substantial evidence. The SLC showed gasoline withdrawals from 1999 to 2003 for engine no. 406Y18 (decommissioned as of 1998), vehicle with plate no. SCB-995 (declared unserviceable as of 1999 and authorized for disposal by petitioner himself in 2001), and petitioner’s personal vehicle with plate no. PPR-691, while he was already receiving transportation allowance. These circumstances ineluctably justify the finding of guilt. As a Petition for Review under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law, and none of the recognized exceptions applied, the factual findings of the Ombudsman, affirmed by the CA, were binding.

• Probative Value of the SLC: Objections to the SLC were rejected. They are public documents and, as such, constitute prima facie evidence of their contents. Their trustworthiness is grounded on the sense of official duty, the penalty for breach, the routine and disinterested origin of the statements, and the publicity of the record. Petitioner failed to present evidence of malice or irregularity in their preparation, and his disclaimer that he did not prepare or sign them did not divest them of probative value. Even while questioning the SLC, petitioner admitted his office used the vehicle with plate no. SCB-995 and engine no. 406Y18 during the relevant period, thereby lending credence to the documents.

• Validity of the Defense: Petitioner’s defense was implausible. His claim that the vehicle with plate no. SCB-995 continued to be used despite being declared unserviceable on August 31, 1999, was contradicted by the fact that if the engine had been replaced in December 1998, there would have been no reason to declare it unserviceable in August 1999. Petitioner’s belated repudiation of his signature on the Inventory and Inspection Report was not sustained because the signature resembled his other undisputed signatures, and he previously confirmed the report in his Counter-Affidavit. The documents he submitted concerning the 2004 public auction did not specifically show that the subject vehicle was among the items auctioned or withdrawn. What remained was a bare denial that could not overturn the Ombudsman’s affirmative findings.

• Imposable Penalty: The penalty of dismissal with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service was proper. Dishonesty is a grave offense under Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the URACCS, warranting dismissal on the first offense. Petitioner committed a series of violations over a number of years. A grave offense cannot be mitigated by the public employee’s length of service or the fact that he is a first-time offender. The purpose of discipline is not punishment but the improvement of public service and preservation of public faith and confidence in government. The accessory penalties are consistent with Section 58(a), Rule IV of the URACCS.

• Substantial Evidence in Administrative Cases — Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might opine otherwise. It is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe the respondent is guilty, even if evidence is not overwhelming. The factual findings of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally accorded great weight and respect, if not finality.

• Public Documents as Prima Facie Evidence — Public records are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Their trustworthiness rests on (1) the sense of official duty in preparing the statement, (2) the penalty attached to a breach of duty, (3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and (4) the publicity of record which facilitates exposure of errors. Absent contrary evidence, they are presumed to have been regularly prepared by accountable officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. The burden to overcome this prima facie character lies with the party challenging the document.

• Definition of Dishonesty — Dishonesty is the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.

• Non-Mitigation of Grave Offenses by Length of Service — A grave administrative offense such as dishonesty cannot be mitigated by the respondent’s length of government service or the fact that it is a first offense. The penalty of dismissal prescribed under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service for dishonesty is not subject to reduction on such grounds, given the gravity of the offense and its effect on public service.

• “Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.” — This definition from Balasbas v. Monayao was applied to characterize petitioner’s act of securing fuel for a vehicle declared unserviceable and for a personal vehicle while receiving transportation allowance as a disposition to defraud.

• “The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on (1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, (2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, (3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and (4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.” — Quoting Tecson v. Commission on Elections, the Court reaffirmed the high evidentiary value of public records like Supplies Ledger Cards.

• “Also, in Concerned Employees v. Nuestro, a court employee charged with and found guilty of dishonesty for falsification was meted the penalty of dismissal notwithstanding the length of her service in view of the gravity of the offense charged. To end, it must be stressed that dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been and should remain anathema in the civil service. They inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office. When an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government.” — This passage from Medina v. Commission on Audit encapsulates the rationale for rejecting length of service as a mitigating factor in dishonesty cases.

• Balasbas v. Monayao, 726 Phil. 664 (2014) — Cited for the definition of dishonesty as concealment or distortion of truth relevant to one’s office, implying a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud.
• Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil. 421 (2004) — Followed for the rule on the trustworthiness of public documents and the grounds that make entries therein prima facie evidence.
• Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna, 511 Phil. 420 (2005) — Relied upon for the principle that public documents are prima facie proof of their contents and the presumption of regularity of official acts.
• Medina v. Commission on Audit, 567 Phil. 649 (2008) — Followed for the doctrine that a grave offense like dishonesty is not mitigated by length of service, and that the object of disciplinary action is improvement of public service and preservation of public confidence.
• Office of the Ombudsman v. Atty. Bernardo, 705 Phil. 524 (2013) — Cited for the definition of substantial evidence and the enumerated exceptions to the rule limiting a Rule 45 petition to questions of law.

• Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (CSC Resolution No. 991936) — Classifies dishonesty as a grave offense, with the penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Applied as the basis for the penalty imposed on petitioner.
• Section 58(a), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Provides that the penalty of dismissal carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. Applied to affirm the accessory penalties.

Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (Acting Chairperson), and Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (Acting Chairperson) was on official leave.