Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson

A marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void ab initio when the marriage contract itself states that no license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on the basis of a false claim that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, and the party claiming validity fails to present the marriage license or any proof of its issuance. The absence of a marriage license may be proven not only by a certification from the local civil registrar but also by the categorical statements on the marriage contract itself, coupled with the failure of the claiming party to produce contrary evidence.

Luis G. Anson and Severina de Asis-Anson lived together and claimed to have been married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966, officiated by the Mayor of San Juan. Severina had two daughters: Maria Luisa, born December 30, 1965, and Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado, from a previous relationship. During their cohabitation, Luis and Severina acquired several real properties in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by various Transfer Certificates of Title. In November 1980, after their cohabitation ended, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement dividing their properties between them, followed by a second implementing agreement in April 1981. Luis thereafter left for the United States, contracted another marriage, and never reconciled with Severina, who died on September 21, 2002. The Civil Code governs the marriage, having been celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.

Luis G. Anson and Severina de Asis lived together and claimed to have been married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966, officiated by the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan, two days before their daughter Maria Luisa's first birthday. Severina had an older daughter, Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado, from a previous relationship. During their cohabitation, they acquired several real properties in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069, 5109, 8478-R, 44637, and 8003. No marriage settlement existed between them. The TCTs covering the properties were under Severina's name only, describing her as single without reference to any husband.

After their cohabitation ended in 1980, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement in November 1980, dividing their properties between them, with a second implementing agreement in April 1981. Both agreements described Luis and Severina as single and acknowledged their common-law relationship. Luis received the properties apportioned to him and thereafter left for the United States, where he married one Teresita Anson and had a son. Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina. From 1981 until Severina's death on September 21, 2002, Luis never saw or reconciled with Severina, never presented himself as her husband, and not even Maria Luisa knew of the alleged marriage.

On January 23, 2002, while Severina was still alive, she executed three Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069, and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title. After Severina's death, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir and securing new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637, and 8003. The Spouses Maya also obtained a Certificate of No Record of Marriage between Luis and Severina from the National Statistics Office.

On September 5, 2003, Luis filed a complaint against the Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya, seeking annulment of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement, claiming the properties were conjugal and that he was divested of his lawful share. The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya countered that Luis and Severina were common-law spouses whose relationship was terminated by the Partition Agreement, that the properties disposed of were Severina's exclusive properties, and that the marriage contract showed no marriage license was exhibited. Luis presented a certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina, which stated that no marriage license was exhibited, the marriage being of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code. On cross-examination, Luis admitted he did not apply for a marriage license. The Spouses Salgado were deemed to have waived presentation of evidence after failing to attend scheduled hearings.

• Nullity of Marriage for Lack of Marriage License: The Spouses Salgado argued that the marriage between Luis and Severina was null and void for want of a marriage license, as borne out by the marriage contract presented by Luis, which stated that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer, and as further confirmed by Luis's own admission on cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage license.
• Validity of Severina's Dispositions: Because the marriage was void, the properties disposed of through the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were owned by Severina as her own, separate, and exclusive properties, which she had the right to dispose of without Luis's conformity.
• Validity of the Partition Agreement: Luis admitted the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the Partition Agreement, and it remained uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated therein, estopping him from denying the same.

• Propriety of the Petition: Luis opposed the filing of the petition on the ground that it raised a question of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Burden of Proof on Marriage License: Luis countered that the Spouses Salgado did not present any evidence to support their theory, and that if the existence of a marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show its lack by clear and convincing evidence, including a certification from the local civil registrar.
• Presumption of Validity of Marriage: Luis relied on the presumption of validity of marriage and the presumption of regularity of the marriage contract as a public document.

• Propriety of the Petition: Whether the petition for review on certiorari raises a question of law cognizable by the Supreme Court.
• Validity of the Marriage: Whether the marriage between Luis and Severina was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license, given that the marriage contract stated no license was exhibited under a claim of exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
• Burden of Proof: Whether the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of a marriage license rested on Luis or on the Spouses Salgado.
• Validity of the Partition Agreement: Whether the Partition Agreement executed by Luis and Severina was valid without judicial approval.

• Propriety of the Petition: Yes. The petition raises a question of law — whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract stating that no license was exhibited on account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.
• Validity of the Marriage: Yes, the marriage was void ab initio. The marriage contract on its face showed that no marriage license was exhibited under a false invocation of Article 77 of the Civil Code, and Luis failed to present the marriage license or any proof of its issuance.
• Burden of Proof: The burden rested on Luis. Because the marriage contract itself contained an unequivocal declaration that no marriage license was exhibited, the presumption of validity of marriage could not overcome this prima facie evidence, and Luis was required to prove that a license was indeed secured.
• Validity of the Partition Agreement: Yes. Under co-ownership rules applicable to void marriages, partition may be made by agreement between the parties without judicial approval, and Luis had already received his share.

• Propriety of the Petition: While the Court's jurisdiction in Rule 45 petitions is generally limited to questions of law, exceptions are recognized, including when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. The core issue — whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract stating that no license was exhibited on account of the marriage being of an exceptional character — is a question of law. The CA's failure to consider the glaring statements in the marriage contract fell within the recognized exceptions.

• Validity of the Marriage: The marriage was celebrated on December 28, 1966, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, so the Civil Code governed. Under Article 53 of the Civil Code, a marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and under Article 80(3), marriages solemnized without a license are void ab initio, save for marriages of exceptional character. The marriage contract stated that no license was exhibited, citing Article 77 of the Civil Code, which pertains to religious ratification of a prior civil marriage. For this exemption to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) the parties must already be married to each other in accordance with law, and (2) the ratifying ceremony must be purely religious in nature. The December 28, 1966 ceremony was the only marriage ceremony, it was civil and officiated by the mayor, and there was no prior marriage to ratify. The twin requisites of Article 77 were not satisfied. Luis's own testimony confirmed that the ceremony was civil and that he did not apply for a marriage license. The RTC and CA erred in relying on Geronimo vs. CA, which involved a mere omission of the license number on the contract, not an affirmative statement that no license was exhibited under a false claim of exceptional character. The absence of the marriage license was apparent on the marriage contract itself, and no proof to the contrary was presented.

• Burden of Proof: As a public document, the marriage contract is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The entries stating that no marriage license was exhibited and that the marriage was of an exceptional character under Article 77 constituted prima facie proof of the absence of a license. Because the claimed exception was false, the burden shifted to Luis to prove that a marriage license was indeed secured. Luis relied solely on the presumption of validity of marriage, which cannot prevail over prima facie evidence on the face of the marriage contract. He neither presented the original or a copy of the marriage license nor called any witness to testify to its existence. His own testimony was equivocal and uncertain. While a certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove non-issuance, it is not the only proof; the categorical statement on the marriage contract, coupled with the false claim of exceptional character, sufficed.

• Validity of the Partition Agreement: Because the marriage was void ab initio, the property relations of Luis and Severina during cohabitation were governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, which applies to parties legally capacitated to marry but whose marriage is void for other reasons such as absence of a marriage license. Under this regime, property acquired during the union is presumed to have been obtained through joint efforts and is owned in equal shares. Article 496 of the Civil Code provides that partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings; the law does not impose judicial approval for an agreed partition to be valid. Luis admitted the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the Partition Agreement and had already received his share. No circumstance rendering the contract invalid or voidable was shown.

• Presumption of Validity of Marriage vs. Prima Facie Evidence on the Marriage Contract — The presumption of validity of marriage cannot prevail over prima facie evidence on the face of the marriage contract showing the absence of a formal requisite. When the marriage contract itself states that no marriage license was exhibited under a false claim of exceptional character, the burden shifts to the party claiming validity to prove that a license was secured.

• Absence of Marriage License as Ground for Void Marriage — Under Article 80(3) of the Civil Code, a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void ab initio, save for marriages of exceptional character. The absence of a marriage license may be established not only by a certification from the local civil registrar but also by the categorical statements on the marriage contract itself, coupled with the failure of the claiming party to present contrary evidence.

• Article 77 of the Civil Code (Religious Ratification) — For the exemption from the marriage license requirement under Article 77 to apply, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage), and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature. A civil ceremony with no prior marriage to ratify does not qualify.

• Property Relations in Void Marriages (Article 144, Civil Code; Article 147, Family Code) — In a void marriage where the parties are capacitated to marry, property acquired during cohabitation is governed by co-ownership. Partition of co-owned property may be made by agreement between the parties without need of judicial approval, pursuant to Article 496 of the Civil Code.

• Entries in Official Records as Prima Facie Evidence — Under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. A marriage contract, being a public document, is not only prima facie proof of the fact of marriage but also of the facts stated therein, including the absence of a marriage license.

• "Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the nullity of the marriage, tying the facial deficiency of the marriage contract to the legal consequence of voidness.

• "to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties." — This quotation, cited from Alcantara vs. Alcantara, articulates the canonical formulation of how the absence of a marriage license must be proven, a principle frequently invoked in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested." — This passage underscores the State's interest in the marriage license requirement, grounding the doctrinal insistence on strict compliance with formal requisites.

• "The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement." — This passage resolves the issue on the validity of extrajudicial partition between co-owners, applying Article 496 of the Civil Code to the property relations of parties in a void marriage.

• Geronimo vs. CA, G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 494 — Distinguished. In Geronimo, the absence of the marriage license number on the contract was a mere omission, and the husband was able to produce a copy from the National Archives showing the license number. The case was held inapplicable because here, the marriage contract affirmatively stated that no license was exhibited under a false claim of exceptional character.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553 (2008) — Followed. In Dayot, the Court declared a marriage void where the parties executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation in lieu of a marriage license. The principle that a false statement used to circumvent the license requirement cannot substitute for the license was applied to the false invocation of Article 77 in the present case.

• Valdes vs. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289 (1996) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that in a void marriage, the property relations of the parties during cohabitation are governed by Article 147 of the Family Code (or Article 144 of the Civil Code), establishing co-ownership of properties acquired during the union.

• Niñal vs. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000) — Cited for the proposition that the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage determines its validity, and for the principle that parties should not be afforded any excuse to avoid compliance with marriage license requirements.

• Alcantara vs. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192 (2007) — Cited for the formulation that the absence of a marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract or supported by a certification from the local civil registrar.

• Nicdao Cariño vs. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001) — Cited for the proposition that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to unions of parties legally capacitated to marry but whose marriage is void for other reasons, such as absence of a marriage license.

• Article 53, Civil Code — Lists the requisites of marriage, including a marriage license except in marriages of exceptional character. Applied to determine that a marriage license was required for the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage.

• Article 80(3), Civil Code — Declares void ab initio marriages solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character. Applied as the direct legal basis for declaring the marriage void.

• Article 77, Civil Code — Provides for religious ratification of a civil marriage, exempting the parties from the marriage license requirement for the subsequent religious ceremony. Applied and found inapplicable because the December 28, 1966 ceremony was civil, not religious, and there was no prior civil marriage to ratify.

• Article 144, Civil Code — Governs property relations of a man and woman living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, providing for co-ownership of property acquired through work or industry. Applied to determine the property regime between Luis and Severina.

• Article 147, Family Code — The successor provision to Article 144 of the Civil Code, governing property relations in void marriages where parties are capacitated to marry. Applied in conjunction with Article 144 to establish co-ownership of properties acquired during cohabitation.

• Article 496, Civil Code — Provides that partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Applied to uphold the validity of the Partition Agreement without need of judicial approval.

• Article 1079, Civil Code — Defines partition as the separation, division, and assignment of a thing held in common. Applied to characterize the Partition Agreement as a valid act of partition between co-owners.

• Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Applied to give evidentiary weight to the entries in the marriage contract, including the statement that no marriage license was exhibited.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Jose Portugal Perez, and Francis H. Jardeleza concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.